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While most accounts of Western attitudes towards history in the nineteenth 
century suggest that Victorians had a faith in its origin, teleology and meaning, twentieth-
century assessments of history more often suggest the opposite.  Both poststructural 
theory and postmodern historiography in the wake of Hayden White’s Metahistory
present a relativist view of the possibility of either objectivity or material referentiality in 
historical discourse, particularly through the medium of narrative.  From this perspective, 
historical narrative is defined as a discursive creation that obscures the material relations 
of its production and as an instrument of ideology and oppression.  
“Fact, Fiction, and Fabrication” investigates what political and ethical 
repercussions this attitude towards and theorization of history has and how much 
contemporary fiction typically labeled “postmodern” both initially reflects and ultimately 
denies this model.  This study argues that the assessment of contemporary postmodern 
fiction as reflecting poststructural models of endless textuality denies an important 
element of the novels studied: their commitment to the possibility of accessing material 
reality and the importance of such access both for the construction of an ethics and for 
political agency.   By looking closely at contemporary novels that explicitly theorize 
history and historiography, it becomes clear that they instead insist on a sense of the 
“real” at least in part because of these political concerns. These novels, which I label 
“postmodernist historical fiction,” insist that although an inviolable origin, teleology, and 
even consistent referentiality cannot be obtained in historical reference, there can be a 
provisional referentiality and access to the real without a return to the classical history of 
foundationalism, immanence and teleology that contributes to hegemony.  These texts are 
also tied together by their deployment of nonnarrative methods that counter the 
deformation of the real that takes place within narrative discourse according to White, 
among others.   The primary texts considered are Art Spiegelman’s Maus, Milan 
Kundera’s The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, Virginia Woolf’s Between the Acts, 
Graham Swift’s Waterland, and Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children.
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Introduction
Memory as Forgetting: The Problem of the Postmodern in Kundera’s The Book of 
Laughter and Forgetting and Spiegelman’s Maus
In one of poststructuralism’s most-quoted statements, Jacques Derrida declares in 
his Of Grammatology that “there is no outside-the-text” (158). While Derrida is 
principally interested in revealing the internal contradictions of foundational philosophy 
based upon binary divisions, his above declaration also suggests the impossibility of 
finding “truth,” not merely in its transcendental philosophical sense, but also in the 
possibility of a material and historical referent.  This assertion of the textuality of 
existence and the difficulty/impossibility of accessing a reality outside of representation 
and signification were not initially applied specifically to “history” as a concept by 
Derrida, but its implications for history in the postmodern world still resonate,
particularly, as we shall see, in the case of traumatic events and historical incidents that 
serve as sites of communal and individual identification for oppressed peoples. Likewise, 
one of the most prominent philosophers of the postmodern, Jean-François Lyotard asserts 
that postmodernism (and modernism itself)1  takes place in the realization that 
Enlightenment rationalism and scientific positivism are not tied to objective truth and 
reality, but rather are merely “language games,” like narrative itself, that create “the 
effects of reality,” that, in a postmodern age, become “the fantasies of realism” (Lyotard 
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74). In this context, “realistic” fiction, “objective” history, and positivist science become 
not only misled in their attempts to configure the world as an eminently understandable 
and coherent system, they also become ideologically charged deceptive practices that 
posit an immanent and essentialized world where none exists.2
This postmodern/poststructural emphasis on the “real” as inextricable from the 
constructed and the textual has also found its way into both historiography and historical 
fiction  with potentially troubling social and political repercussions. This is particularly 
the case because of the ways in which the historical real is a site of political contestation.  
In the West, for instance, the ontological verifiability of the Holocaust is central to the 
identity formation of Jews and others.  Relativist postmodern historiography that would 
theoretically insist that accounts of the Holocaust are closer to fiction than to “fact” (in 
their discursive and linguistic construction), undercut the communal insistence of Jews 
that the Holocaust be maintained as the “real” in communal history and memory as a 
bastion against future repetitions of the traumatic event.3   Similarly, a novel like Salman 
Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children provides a sense of the “real” history of the Amritsar 
Massacre as opposed to the “official” history perpetuated by the British colonizers.   It is 
this politically necessary real that would seem to be threatened by a radical 
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poststructuralism that denies the referentiality of any discourse, whether hegemonic or 
oppositional. 
Linda Hutcheon has attempted to arrest this problem somewhat by redefining the 
postmodern as a discourse that is both historical in the traditional sense and 
deconstructive, both presenting the past as if such representation is easily accessible and 
transparent and exposing the linguistic, discursive, and ideological barriers to transparent 
representation.  In Hutcheon’s sense, postmodernism is simultaneously complicit with 
traditional historical accounts and their withering deconstructive critique, allowing the 
possibility that some degree of referentiality may be maintained. Despite Hutcheon’s 
important intervention, however, many critics still read contemporary fiction within the 
context of the theoretical shift towards a poststructuralism that questions, even denies, the 
possibility of linguistic referentiality and sees the allusion to a material “reality” as at best 
specious theory and at worst collaboration in totalitarian dominance.  This positioning of 
postmodern fiction within a broader poststructural movement is, at times, valid but, as I 
will argue throughout this study, it ignores a substantial and politically important branch 
of postmodern fiction that insists on access to some version of the “real,” despite a 
continued skepticism towards universalizing discourses.  I propose to label this important 
body of work “postmodernist historical fiction,” throughout this study.4
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Over the course of this work, I argue for a (re)evaluation of postmodernist 
historical fiction as a genre that insists on the presence of a past material reality beyond 
discourse and on the possibility of accessing that past.  This, however, is not merely a 
hypothetical call for revising our views on a species of fiction, but also has ramifications 
for social and political praxis.  I draw attention to this genre precisely because it insists 
on the political and ethical necessity of maintaining a sense of that historical real which 
resists the complete engulfment in text or discourse that poststructuralism suggests.  It is 
my goal in this study to analyze this dimension of postmodernist historical fiction in 
order to reveal alternative ways to define and theorize the historical real and redeem this 
important vein of fiction from its common association with an ultimately apolitical 
relativism.  By identifying how various examples of postmodernist historical fiction 
redefine both the real and historical referentiality itself without abandoning it, I believe 
we can escape the most troubling repercussions of deconstructive readings of history 
without sacrificing the theoretical insights of poststructuralism and postmodern theory.
That is, postmodernist historical fiction has much to teach us about the nature of reality 
itself and particularly its representation.  
Important to this discussion is the role of narrative form, both the reliance upon it 
in traditional historiography and the critique of it brought to bear by postmodern 
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historiographers like Hayden White.   By considering how particular models of 
narrativity contribute to the sense of historical narrative as “false,” it becomes possible to 
reacquire the accurate, verifiable or "real" through models of anti-narrativity, 
representations of the past that reject or resist traditional narrative form, exhibited by the 
postmodernist historical fiction discussed in the chapters that follow.  I will focus on only 
a few texts, Virginia Woolf’s Between the Acts, Graham Swift’s Waterland, and Salman 
Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children foremost among them, but will also refer to other texts 
that may fit under the umbrella I will define more expansively later in this introduction. 
First, however, it is important to more clearly delineate the ethical and political 
problems generated by the deconstruction of traditional historical representation 
accomplished by (post)modernist historiographic discourse. To do so, I first examine the 
vanishing divisions between history and memory and the moral and ethical distinctions 
between them.  I undertake this project in this introduction by looking at two works of 
postmodernist fiction5  that deal explicitly with the politics of memory and what Lyotard 
has labeled as the “withdrawal of the real” (79). Both Milan Kundera’s  The Book of 
Laughter and Forgetting and Art Spiegelman’s  Maus explore the contested relationships 
of memory, history, and collective memory and the problems raised by these categories 
in our postmodern world.  The two novels propose and illustrate the traditionally central 
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importance of both individual and collective memory in advancing the political interests 
of oppressed peoples and particularly in protecting a communality and shared 
identification from the effacing powers of “official” or institutional history. However, 
both authors also point to how individual and collective memory are themselves 
inextricable from textuality and can both be modes of political oppression. In doing so,
both authors foreground the difficulty for socially and politically oppressed peoples to 
participate in their own coherent and stable identity formation and representation through 
memory in an age identified as postmodern. 
Through the investigation of two texts preoccupied both with memory and with a 
postmodern aesthetic, we can see how they reveal postmodernism as not only productive 
in its destabilization of power, but also problematic in its difficulties in offering concrete 
and stable counter discourses that do not themselves participate in oppression. Milan 
Kundera’s The Book of Laughter and Forgetting and Art Spiegelman’s Maus stage this 
problem of the postmodern6 in the theater of memory by foregrounding memory’s 
necessity in resisting power, while admitting its own tenuous ties to the real and its 
implication in the abuse of power.  The process by which they dissolve the standard 
binary separation of history and memory complicates and foregrounds the problematic of 
historical representation by disallowing the primacy and originary authority of memory.  
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These texts do, however, also provide interesting and productive models for historical 
representation that are more evidently realized in the novels examined in the remaining 
chapters of this study.  I leave the discussion of their inclusion in my proposed category 
of postmodernist historical fiction for my conclusion, as what is initially important for my 
argument is the examination of the problems they highlight.
Memory and Its Politics in Kundera and Spiegelman
Kundera’s The Book of Laughter and Forgetting opens with two scenes that 
foreground the importance of individual and collective memory as important political 
tools to fight oppression. The first scene, set in 1948, depicts the frightening ability of the 
totalitarian Soviet-led regime in Prague to deface, erase and rewrite history to suit its own 
ideological ends. To illustrate this ability to alter history, Kundera relates the true story of 
Gottwald and Clementis, both Communist leaders.  Gottwald gives a speech outdoors 
with Clementis by his side. Because it is cold and snowing, Clementis takes off his hat 
and places it on Gottwald’s head. As Kundera describes, the moment became famous and 
was reproduced copiously. “On that balcony the history of Communist Bohemia began” 
(3). Four years later, like Trotsky in Russia, Clementis was charged with treason and was 
eventually hanged. “The propaganda section immediately made him vanish from history 
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and, of course, from all photographs...Nothing remains of Clementis but the fur hat on 
Gottwald’s head” (3-4). Kundera here underlines the possibility of, and inherent danger 
in, the effacing of historical “fact.”  Where Clementis once stood as a symbol of the 
brotherhood and good-feeling of Communism in its optimistic youth, now he is erased, 
no longer useful for a totalitarian regime. 
The novel continues to point out how history is controlled and dictated by those in 
power, and the devastating effects that historical manipulation can have. Gustav Husak 
was the seventh president of Czechoslovakia, put into power by the Russians in 1969, and 
is named by the Kundera-narrator as the “President of Forgetting” (217). Husak earned 
the name by driving 145 Czech historians from research institutes and universities (218). 
In response to this, a displaced historian asserts, “You begin to liquidate a people...by 
taking away its memory. You destroy its books, its culture, its history...Then the people 
slowly begins to forget what it is and what it was. The world at large forgets it faster” 
(218). When the Kundera-narrator suggests however that “Nothing remains of 
Clementis,” he is clearly being ironic and disingenuous. Clementis exists, at the very 
least, in Kundera’s memory, a fact emphasized in the second scene of the novel.7
In the second scene, set in 1971 during the reign of Husak, Mirek, a resident of 
Prague, attempts to prevent the erasure of history through the vehicle of his own memory. 
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Mirek says, “The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against 
forgetting.” In doing so, he attempts “to justify what his friends call carelessness,” for 
what facilitates memory on one hand is the evidence for accusations of subversiveness on 
the other (4). Mirek’s friends are concerned that his collections of diary, correspondence, 
and minutes of meetings will be discovered and used as evidence against him. 
Nevertheless, Mirek is intent on preserving and controlling his memories in the hopes of 
resisting power.
The notion of memory as an inherent bastion in the battle against political and 
social oppression is illustrated by, but is by no means limited to, Kundera’s Book. Similar 
discourses have been foregrounded in virtually all popular discussions of what is known 
as the Holocaust or the shoah,8  the extermination of millions of Jews by the Nazis during 
the second World War.9    Within this discourse, the very act of memory becomes a 
primary constituent of a Jewish identity and is meant to ensure that a similar act of 
oppression never occurs again. In this context, Jewish writer Cynthia Ozick has 
emphasized “‘the necessity of memory in a time when memory begins to melt into 
history and history is discarded’” (qtd. in Brogan 163).10   Indeed the memory of the 
Holocaust has been seen by some to replace the other communal memories of Judaism. In 
observing a community seder in Texas, Phillip Lopate saw that “[...]the Shoah was at the 
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heart of their faith; it was what touched them most deeply about being Jewish. The 
religion itself— the prayers, the commentaries, the rituals, the centuries of accumulated 
wisdom and tradition— had shriveled to a sort of marginally necessary preamble for this 
negative miracle” (qtd. in Gilman, The Jew’s Body  34).11  Likewise, as Peter Novick 
observes, “what American Jews do have in common is the knowledge that but for their 
parents’ or [...] grandparents’ or great-grandparents’ immigration, they would have 
shared the fate of European Jewry” (Holocaust 7).  In this reading, the communal 
memory has become virtually the only thing that allows for the retention of a broad 
Jewish community.
It is the widespread allegiance to the memory of the Holocaust that has spawned 
so many narratives of survival of the death camps, including the formally unorthodox 
Maus, Art Spiegelman’s comic book depiction of his father’s (Vladek’s) experience in 
Auschwitz. The desire to remember and to construct a Jewish identity from that memory 
must have played a role in Spiegelman’s desire to record and represent Vladek’s story. It 
is also this belief in the centrality of memory that leads Artie (Spiegelman’s 
autobiographical representation in Maus) to reproach Vladek for destroying the diaries of 
Anja, Vladek’s wife:
VLADEK. After Anja died I had to make an order with 
everything...These papers had too many memories. So I burned them...
[...]
11
ARTIE. Did you ever read any of them? ...Can you remember what she 
wrote?
VLADEK.  No. I looked in. But I don’t remember...Only I know that she 
said, “I wish my son, when he grows up, he will be interested by this.”
ARTIE. GOD DAMN YOU! YOU— YOU MURDERER! HOW THE 
HELL COULD YOU DO SUCH A THING!!
VLADEK.  Ach. (Maus 159)
Like Kundera’s depiction of the propaganda machine that obliterates Clementis,  and in 
doing so strikes a blow for “power” against man, Vladek has contributed (in Artie’s eyes) 
to the forces of “forgetting” against the forces of memory. Artie’s hope for a coherent 
remembered past from which to construct his own identity is denied by his father’s 
destruction of the diary.
The political importance of memory, foregrounded in these passages, is not 
merely hypothetical. The prevalence of self-titled “revisionist historians,” labeled instead 
“Holocaust deniers” by their adversaries, who deny the existence of the Holocaust, the 
existence of gas chambers, and the plan of the “final solution” itself, represent, for many, 
the attempt to erase and efface history in an attempt to perpetuate anti-Semitism. Kenneth 
Stern, of the American Jewish Committee, refers to the memory of the Holocaust as a 
protective force against prevalent anti-Semitism. “If the Holocaust is denied, relativized, 
recedes from memory with the passing of generations [...] a braking force against the 
two-thousand-year world tradition of anti-Semitism will be diminished” (24). Like 
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Kundera’s Mirek, Stern invokes the power of memory as a bulwark against power and 
hatred. Personal memory and witnessing are, in this case, used as one type of historical 
evidence, but they are also used as a counterbalance to the manipulable documentary 
evidence of traditional written history.  The number of people who take any stock in 
holocaust denial is very small , and, indeed, they are described as “fruitcakes,” 
“screwballs,” and “nuts” in the space of three pages by the eminent historian Peter 
Novick in his The Holocaust in American Life (270-72).  Nevertheless, the threat of the 
erasure of the past is taken seriously not because of the widespread political influence of 
these “screwballs,” but because of the large importance attributed to the memory of the 
event itself, particularly in the Jewish community.
It is this centrality of memory that likewise leads French historian Pierre Vidal-
Naquet to title his book denouncing the denial of the Holocaust Assassins of Memory. 
Vidal-Naquet responds specifically to the accusations of one of the primary French 
deniers of the Holocaust’s existence, Robert Faurisson, whose 1978 article, “The Problem 
of the Gas Chambers or the Rumor of Auschwitz” (Vidal-Naquet xi) was one of the 
initial attempts to deny the Holocaust’s existence.12  One interesting aspect of these 
pseudo-historical accounts is their refusal to allow personal memory as a means of 
evidence. David Cole, a Holocaust revisionist who appeared on a talk show in 1992 to 
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discuss the subject, denied the potential verifiability of eyewitness memory: “I hear 
eyewitnesses and then I hear other forensic and factual evidence. What am I supposed to 
do?” (qtd. in K. Stern 132). Jean-François Lyotard ironically identifies the deniers’ 
position on the impossibility of reliable memory-evidence: “His argument is: to identify a 
site as a gas chamber, I shall accept as a valid witness only a victim of such a gas 
chamber; now according to my adversary, such victims can only be dead; otherwise the 
gas chambers would not be what it is claimed to be; thus there are no gas chambers” (qtd. 
in Vidal-Naquet 144 n17). Faurisson’s attack on memory and its power leads Vidal-
Naquet to his title, and gives Mirek and Artie ample reason, it seems, to fight relentlessly 
to retain their own personal memory against the potential effacement of history.13
From these examples, we might be inclined to see both Kundera and Spiegelman 
operating within, rather than against, a positivist, liberal humanist aesthetic and ideology. 
Mirek and Artie’s protests against the erasure, or manipulation, of historical fact seem to 
be about an epistemological problem rather than an ontological one. The implication by 
Mirek is that reality and truth do exist, and can be accessed relatively easily, but that 
totalitarian forces are working to efface them. Likewise, Artie’s protests seem to indicate 
that, given all of the documentary evidence, his mother’s identity can be recaptured. The 
binary of memory vs. forgetting positions the institutional (historical) forces on the side 
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of forgetting vs. the personal forces on the side of memory. Nevertheless, if 
postmodernism is about anything it is about the blurring of binaries and the dissolution of 
boundaries. While postmodernism may declare that the past is “evacuated of history and 
[this evacuation is] a signal of the artifice of any such account, any history” (Crapanzano 
137), it does not declare memory as the immanent and essential replacement for history. 
Rather, like history, memory, autobiography, and memoir have been unmoored from their 
tenuous claims to “touching the world.”14
Through their mutual commitment to a postmodern aesthetic, Kundera and 
Spiegelman place their political defense of memory into question, both by problematizing 
memory’s own ties to referentiality and by exposing memory’s role in the administration 
of power. As both Kundera and Spiegelman clearly show, history, memory, and identity 
are, at least partially, matters of social construction, texts not truths. The question of 
whether or not Mirek’s or Vladek’s memories can found themselves politically outside of 
Derrida’s metaphorical text and in a material reality is a question of real political 
significance. In addition, (post)modernity’s consistent questioning of the capacity of 
memory to exist independently of forgetting or of the representation of memory that 
inevitably reconfigures it destabilizes the possibility of memory being deployed as a 
political and social bulwark against power.15
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History, Memory, and Collective Memory
The differences between history, individual memory and collective memory are 
complex and at times difficult to distinguish. Nevertheless, with the essential importance 
of memory in resisting power specified above, it becomes necessary to construct some 
working definitions. For theorists of history like Michel de Certeau, Michel Foucault, and 
Maurice Halbwachs, the practice of history in the West, or, more accurately, the creation 
of history by Western historical discourse, is traditionally one which attempts to create a 
unity and an order out of the past. As de Certeau asserts, “[History] customarily began 
with limited evidence [...] and it took as its task the sponging of all diversity off of them, 
unifying everything into coherent comprehension” (The Writing of History 78). Robert 
Berkhofer, a historian, describes the idea of a comprehensive and unified history as “The 
Great Story,” the ultimate, perhaps unreachable, dream of the historical community.  
However, de Certeau goes on to explain that such a history is that which in turn gives the 
dominant society of the present a way to define themselves against that past, revealing 
how a dream of objective and complete comprehension is at least partially a means of 
domination and manipulation for the purposes of hegemony. “[I]ntelligibility is 
established through a relation to the other; it moves (or ‘progresses’) by changing what it 
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makes of its ‘other’— the Indian, the past, the people, the mad, the child, the Third 
World” (Writing  3; my emphasis).   Likewise, Foucault’s philosophical affiliation with 
the “others” of the world makes him similarly critical and at times antagonistic to the 
traditional (or “classical”) “history” that de Certeau describes.
As Foucault asserts in a rare moment of direct confrontation: “The traditional 
devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history and for retracing the past as a 
patient and continuous development must be systematically dismantled” (“Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History” 88). Foucault argues that such a “comprehensive view” erases the 
past rather than preserves it, and acts as a means of domination in the present, as this 
history serves the purposes of contemporary hegemony.  Like de Certeau and Foucault, 
Maurice Halbwachs concurs that the “model” history has always been one of 
retrospective unification, the narrativizing and reconciling of diverse elements into a 
comprehensive and comprehensible “story” (see Halbwachs 101-105). As de Certeau and 
Foucault also suggest, Halbwachs argues that history always asserts its referentiality, 
insisting on the existence of certain events while actually shaping them into an 
intelligible story that separates the present from the past.
Certainly, we might see an extreme and twisted form of this version of history in 
the treatment of Clementis in Communist Bohemia. When Clementis and his hat are 
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viewed as part of Czech history (i.e., when this foundational moment is part of the Czech 
past that is meant to help define its present), the moment is allowed to survive in the 
narrative of the nation. However, when the present Czechoslovakia has no use for this 
past or when it does not fit into the unified story it presents to itself, Clementis is 
obliterated from official history. While this erasure is clear and obvious to anyone who 
remembers the history in which Clementis is included, theorists like de Certeau and 
Foucault assert that any classical or traditional unifying history that attempts to define the 
present by separating it from the “other” of the past, commits similar violence.16
Rather, Foucault suggests that “history becomes ‘effective’ to the degree that it 
introduces discontinuity into our very being [...]. ‘Effective’ history deprives the self of 
the reassuring stability of life and nature, and it will not permit itself to be transported by 
a voiceless obstinacy toward a millennial ending” (“Nietzsche” 88). Here Foucault 
juxtaposes history as it has traditionally been practiced and suggests a new history (or 
genealogy) that dismantles, rather than unifies.  This genealogy might, for instance, allow 
Clementis to remain in the picture even after he is no longer part of the ideology of the 
ruling class.  That, indeed, an anthology like Peter Burke’s The New History: Its Past and 
Its Future, is dedicated to the institutional development of the “new history” that 
Foucault describes is a testament to the power of these ideas.  In fact, the “new history” 
18
has made such progress in the past thirty years that there has been significant backlash 
against it, spawning a “revival of narrative” and a hopeful return to the idea of the Great 
Story.17
Of course, rather than the “new” history that Foucault proposes, many theorists 
have suggested memory as the opposite to and reparative for history. Maurice 
Halbwachs, most well-known for his work on “collective memory,” sees memory as that 
which retains and holds continuities and consistencies within communities rather than the 
dramatic changes and ruptures between the present and the past that history chronicles. 
History, I have said, is not interested in these intervals when nothing 
apparently happens, when life is content with repetition in a somewhat 
different but essentially unaltered form without rupture or upheaval. But 
the group, living first and foremost for its own sake, aims to perpetuate the 
feelings and images forming the substance of its thought. (85-6)
If this is the case, the critiques of history by de Certeau, Foucault and others seem to 
apply less to collective memory that does not seek to define the present by homogenizing 
the “other” of the past, but rather is content to protect and preserve shared traditions, 
feelings and images. As Halbwachs discusses, all individuals are part of several 
communities or “collectives” and each individual’s memories are constructed in 
relationship to those communities with no memory being purely individual or outside of a 
group context.18
19
This basic distinction between memory, collective memory, and history has 
caused some commentators to stress the distinctions between them and to bemoan the 
loss of memory with the advent of modernity. 
Memory and history, far from being synonymous, appear now to be in 
fundamental opposition. Memory is life, borne by living societies founded 
in its name. It remains in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of 
remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, 
vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to being long 
dormant and periodically revived. History, on the other hand, is the 
reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer. 
Memory is a perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal 
present; history is a representation of the past. (Nora 8)
This dichotomy is similar to the one initially suggested by both Maus and The 
Book of Laughter and Forgetting as detailed above. Memory, in these texts, seems to be a 
tie to a community and an identity that is in danger of eradication by the forces of history. 
Artie and Mirek at first seem to seek to retain the “continuous present” of their memory 
in resistance to the defacing and erasing power of a retrospective renarrativization by a 
dominant power (as in the totalitarian Czech regime) or the obliteration from within (as in 
the case of Vladek’s destruction of the diaries).  While Nora does not deny the inherent 
deformations, manipulations, and appropriations that memory is subject to, he notes that 
these are different from history because they are “unconscious” and thus not open to 
intentional hegemonic political abuse.  As we shall see, however, this distinction that 
Nora insists upon is fragile at best.
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The definition of “history” as provided by de Certeau and Foucault is, of course, 
not part of the traditional definition of history, but rather part of the poststructural attack 
on that definition. It is worthwhile to point out, however, that de Certeau and Foucault 
take part in the attempt to distance history from the “real” by revealing and stressing its 
inextricable ties to discourse.  As de Certeau points out, in French (and in English) the 
word for past events and their retelling are the same (“history”) highlighting the 
impossibility of direct access to a historical real that is unmediated by discourse (Writing
21).19    Like Derrida, they argue, in this case, that history cannot be “outside the text,” 
and that rather than merely presenting the world, it “re-presents” it, substituting or 
supplementing discourse for the real. As Roland Barthes puts it “Historical discourse 
does not follow the real; rather, it only signifies it, endlessly reiterating that it happened, 
but without having this assertion be anything other than the obvious underside of all 
historical narrative” (Barthes, “Historical Discourse” 153-54; emphasis in original).
This move in historiography reflecting the postmodern “withdrawal of the real” 
has become fairly widespread and is reflected in much contemporary discourse. As Janet 
Abu-Lughod puts it, “accounts of social events are ‘constructions’ rather than 
descriptions isomorphic with some ‘objective reality’” (112). Or in Vincent Crapanzano’s 
words, 
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Today, in an age that has been declared postmodern [...] the ruin has been 
replaced by the quotation, the trace, really a pseudo-trace, a detritus, a re-
ferent, a carrying back to/from a past, that is so completely 
decontextualized, so open to recontextualization, that it [...] becomes at 
once an emblem of a past evacuated of history and a signal of the artifice 
of any such account, any history. (137)
In other words, to varying degrees, Crapanzano and Abu-Lughod acknowledge 
and assume that no historical account can be said to present what actually occurred. 
Rather, history, like fiction, is the representation of events in a narrative form, that uses 
narrative’s techniques to create an artificial text.  In many ways, as Hayden White has 
pointed out, the presentation of history in narrative form allows for the interpretation of 
history as a story, a plot with inherent meaning, where the conglomeration of historical 
events and detritus does not necessarily have meaning on its own. “In this world, reality 
wears the mask of a meaning, the completeness and fullness of which we can only 
imagine, never experience [...] historical stories [...] give to reality the odor of the ideal. 
This is why the plot of a historical narrative is always an embarrassment and has to be 
presented as ‘found’ in the events rather than put there by narrative techniques” (“The 
Value of Narrativity” 20; emphasis in original).  White here takes the less extreme 
postmodern position that reality does, in fact, exist, but that the shaping of and 
presentation of that reality through language, and particularly through narrative, 
fictionalizes it, shapes it into a story that cannot have unmediated access to reality.  White 
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is one of the primary figures in what is often termed “postmodern historiography,” 
asserting in his Metahistory how history and historical narration is manipulated and 
shaped by various modes of “emplotment,” the shaping of found historical events into 
various predetermined narrative forms that govern future interpretation and the cognitive 
understanding of traditional historical narrative.  I shall return to White, narrativism and 
its particular relevance to my own claims about postmodernist historical fiction later in 
this introduction.  
For now, however, it is sufficient to note that the influence of White, Kellner, 
Ankersmit, et. al. is not precisely in the revelation of history as construction, but in the 
continuous sensitivity to this revelation and the argument that historical discourse should 
somehow reflect this sensitivity.  If history, in a postmodern age, is less identifiably tied 
to the real, and more insistently a deformation of it, because of its tendency towards 
emplotment, contextualization, and retrospective narrativization, attempts like Mirek’s 
and Artie’s to oppose memory to history constitute an effort to arrest the “withdrawal of 
the real” by adverting to the continuous present that Pierre Nora and others find as 
constitutive of memory rather than history. This attempt, however, falters when faced 
with the many theorizations of memory itself as disconnected from the real.  
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Personal memory is, of course, most clearly represented by the genres of 
autobiography and memoir. As Paul John Eakin observes, “The presence of fiction in 
autobiography...tends to make us uneasy, for we instinctively feel that autobiography 
is...precisely not-fiction” (Fictions 9). Nevertheless, postmodern culture and 
poststructuralist theory have, of course, denied the possibility of a true representation of 
the self through language and the accurate recovery of a true self through memory. In 
addition, whereas some assume that autobiography is the objective representation of the 
self and presentation of past events, Paul de Man suggests:
We assume that life produces the autobiography as an act produces its 
consequences, but can we not suggest, with equal justice, that the 
autobiographical project may itself produce and determine the life and that 
whatever the writer does is in fact governed by the technical demands of 
self-portraiture and thus determined in all its aspects by the resources of 
his medium. (“Autobiography as De-Facement” 920; emphasis in original)
This typically poststructural reversal of signifier and signified suggests the creativity and 
performativity of the self in writing. Rather than representing an essential “self,” this 
view assumes that there is only the representation(s) and that memory and the self are 
created out of linguistic performance.
It is this view of memory that seems to subvert the political efficacy of both 
Mirek’s and Artie’s attempt to fight power through memory. Both Kundera and 
Spiegelman seem, at first, to be devoted to recapturing or defending a truth for 
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progressive political purposes, to prevent its effacement by totalitarian or anti-Semitic 
forces. In response to this conception, one might see the ideas of postmodernism (the 
“withdrawal of the real”) as a danger to their political aims, a relativism akin to that of 
the Holocaust deniers. Indeed, poststructuralism was frequently accused of providing the 
appropriate atmosphere for Holocaust denial to flourish on college campuses.  If, as one 
strand of criticism offers, “postmodernism is disqualified from political involvement 
because of its narcissistic and ironic appropriation of existing images and stories,”
(Hutcheon Politics 3) as well as its insistence on the incomprehensibility or impossibility 
of identifying a referent, it would seem to be irrelevant to the political and socially 
directed work that Kundera and Spiegelman are doing. Nevertheless, both authors make 
use of metafictional, techniques in their attempts to achieve their political and aesthetic 
goals. 
Certainly, from the perspective of a theorist like Fredric Jameson, postmodernism 
is a reflection of the decadence and narcissism of capitalist culture, not a means for active 
political discourse. However, for other theorists and practitioners of postmodernist 
fiction, the disappearance of the referent, the provisionality of truth and the denial of any 
totalizing master narratives provide liberatory opportunities. In this context, the master 
narratives of patriarchy, whiteness, centrality, heterosexuality and western discourse, are 
25
seen as merely fictional histories that are, particularly in light of Foucauldian social 
theory, implements of power. The power to deconstruct these narratives and provide 
alternative narratives or counterhistories is essential to the politically radical branch of 
postmodernist thought. The ability to create the self, to re-present history, and to “play” 
in the newly unleashed signifiers is a political opportunity to topple, destroy, and 
provisionally replace the master narratives already in place.  The withdrawal of the 
referent, however, equally leads the skeptic to inquire “Replace them with what?”  
Kundera and Postmodern Memory
Where Mirek in “Lost Letters,” the first section of The Book, desperately hoards 
items of memory in an attempt to resist power, he also attempts to destroy other items 
that he does not wish to include or accept as part of his identity. Mirek sets out on an 
attempt to destroy love letters he once sent to Zdena, a former lover, by reclaiming the 
letters from her. He does not wish them to be part of his memory, his memory collection, 
or his identity. Rather he wishes to create an identity  for himself out of his selected past.
His connection to his life was that of a sculptor to his statue or a novelist 
to his novel. It is an inviolable right of a novelist to rework his novel. If 
the opening does not please him, he can rewrite it or delete it. But Zdena’s 
existence denied Mirek that author’s prerogative. Zdena insisted on 
remaining on the opening pages of the novel and did not let herself be 
crossed out. (15)
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Kundera’s reputation as a master ironist is built on such moments as these; Mirek 
struggles against institutional power on one hand, while he attempts to construct his own 
identity through an act of power on the other. Kundera makes this analogy painfully 
clear:
He wanted to efface her from the photograph of his life not because he had 
not loved her but because he had. He had erased her, her and his love for 
her, he had scratched out her image until he had made it disappear as the 
party propaganda section had made Clementis disappear from the balcony 
where Gottwald had given his historic speech. Mirek rewrote history just 
like the Communist Party, like all political parties, like all peoples, like 
mankind. They shout that they want to shape a better future, but it’s not 
true. The future is only an indifferent void no one cares about, but the past
is filled with life, and its countenance is irritating, repellent, wounding, to 
the point that we want to destroy or repaint it. We want to be masters of 
the future only for the power to change the past. We fight for access to the 
labs where we can retouch photos and rewrite biographies and history.  
(30-31)
Kundera’s analogizing of “real” life to the novel, and of Mirek to the novelist at first 
seems to be a convenient metaphor, condemning Mirek for confusing fiction and reality. 
However, as we shall see, in The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, Kundera resolutely 
blurs the line between fiction and reality, and leaves us wondering what other choice 
Mirek has in constructing his identity. While Mirek initially seems admirable in his 
efforts to preserve memory, the novel here indicates that memory, or at the very least, the 
inevitable narrativization of memory, is itself an instrument of power and potentially 
oppression.20  It appears that the constitution of personal identity through memory-
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construction is as potentially dangerous as its political mirror. In this case, Kundera 
foregrounds the similarities between institutional history and individual memory rather 
than their differences. Both are open to narrative construction, with Mirek’s memory 
revision reflecting on the micro-level the totalitarian efforts to efface history that occur in 
the macrocosm of the political arena. Identity and history are both, then, like the novel, 
artistic and performative creations which do not represent truth.  This passage 
additionally seems to suggest that the rewriting of one’s own memory is not a liberating 
counternarrative to destabilize hegemonic official accounts, but is rather a universal 
impulse that is politically dangerous, an unavoidable abuse of power.21 Mirek’s 
impulse to make a novel of his life is part of a tendency towards emplotment that is 
consistently highlighted and questioned by postmodern discourse. It is, in fact, the 
narrativity of history, that, for many, removes history from any possibility of 
referentiality. History, like fiction, partakes of the conventions of narrative, “selection, 
organization, diegesis, anecdote, temporal pacing, and emplotment” (Hutcheon Poetics 
111). It is the re-presentation of events in a narrative form, using narrative techniques.
While history is accused of narrativization and unification by Foucault, de 
Certeau, and others, for some the attraction of memory is its resistance to such 
emplotment. For critics like Mae G. Henderson, the importance of memory is precisely in 
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its capacity to lie outside narrative. In a work like Henderson’s study of Toni Morrison’s 
Beloved, memories are configured as “residual images” or “rememories [Morrison’s 
term]” (Henderson 66) that lie outside the cultural narrative and “haunt” the possibility of 
coherent meaning. This is especially so in cases of extreme trauma (as in the depiction of 
slavery in Beloved or in the case of the shoah) wherein events in the past have been 
psychoanalytically repressed and are therefore not possessed, owned, or assimilated by 
the subject. “‘Rememory’ [...] is something which possesses (or haunts) one, rather than 
something which one possesses” (Henderson 67) or reintegrates through Hegelian 
recollection.  Possession of the cultural narrative, the administration of cultural history, 
is, for Henderson, the domain of the white man, while being possessed, or haunted by 
repressed memories is the initial role of the black woman. Again, as in Nora’s conception 
of memory, memory is seen as a superior mode of accessing the past because it is not 
subject to intention, and as such, the conscious efforts of hegemonic or repressive 
interests.
The notion of the return of the repressed and the self-conscious use of ghosts and 
hauntings explored by Henderson has been one way of creating a binary between the 
emplotted history and the repressed memory.  As Kathleen Brogan has discusses, the 
appropriation of the metaphor of haunting and ghosts has been central in depicting 
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repressed cultural and ethnic narratives. However, even in Henderson’s understanding of 
haunting, Sethe cannot gain freedom merely by fragmenting and denying the 
“overemplotment” of the patriarchal inscription of her life, she must also create “an 
alternate plot structure” (74), a “counternarrative that reconstitutes her humanity” (79), 
by reincorporating the repressed event (her traumatic murder of her daughter, Beloved). 
In this way, emplotment is not merely the realm of the official historian, it is also 
essential in constructing resistant subjectivity. 
It is the denial of the binary separation of the narrative, institutional, historical 
emplotment which represses and the individual, inassimilable memory that haunts and 
resists the initial narrative that Kundera seems careful to avoid here. As we have seen, 
Kundera reveals the tendency to emplot historical events even in the recesses of personal 
memory. If, as Kundera suggests, it is not only political parties, but all people who fight 
for a past they wish to “destroy or repaint,” our understanding of reality can never be 
true, but can only be the result of a struggle for power and the access to emplotment. 
Clementis’ hat may be present as a ghost or a haunting of the official narrative, but it can 
also be incorporated into that narrative through retrospective emplotment.22  In addition, 
Kundera dissolves the binary that separates history (external documents, emplotment, 
manipulable evidence) from memory (internal-mental, immanent, personal, witnessing, 
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resistance to emplotment) by proposing the presence of memory-objects (photographs, 
journals) as part of personal memory.  In this way, the distinction between history and 
memory again becomes untenable.
While postmodern and poststructural theorization has been quick to deny the 
potential for full referentiality in language, Roland Barthes, a poststructuralist thinker, 
has been “remarkably gullible” (Rugg 11) in respect to the image, and particularly the 
photograph. Although Barthes acknowledges photography’s constructedness in its 
reliance on pose and perspective, he still believes in the “magic” of the photograph, in its 
status as an “emanation [...] of past reality” (Camera Lucida 88; emphasis in original). 
Barthes argues that photography’s “force is [...] superior to everything the human mind 
can or can have conceived to assure us of reality” (Camera 87). The seemingly 
transparent ability of the photograph to refer to reality seems to be a way to arrest the 
postmodern “withdrawal of the real” and to use memory as a bulwark against the 
narrative plot of history.  “[P]hotographs [...] represent the physical [...] principle of 
reintegration in autobiography and photography: subject and object, self and other, body 
and voice” (Rugg 21).23
Kundera, however, effectively denaturalizes the photograph as a representation of 
transparent reality and as a means of reintegrating self/other binaries. First, as we have 
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seen, photographs are seen to be, in the postmodern age, nearly as manipulable as 
language and text. Clementis can be erased from a photograph just as the Jews can be 
erased from the written history of Europe or African-Americans and women can be 
erased from the textual history of the United States. Vicki Goldberg has detailed how the 
computer and the Scitex machine have made the photograph as much a creative form as a 
representational one (cited in Shawcross 117-8). The easy accessibility of computer 
scanning and computerized photographic manipulation only contributes to this sense of 
the photograph as merely one more system of signification that does not have direct 
access to a referent. Likewise, rather than being merely a way to mimetically recover and 
reconstruct memories, photographs have been seen to construct and create them. 
“Inevitably, the line between memory and photograph blurs, with photographic-era 
children uncertain as to whether their memories of childhood are memories of events they 
witnessed or photographs they have seen” (Rugg 23). When combined with the 
destabilization of the referentiality of the photograph, we can then see memory itself, or 
at least its Hegelian recollection, as a creative process, not merely within the subject, but 
also without, through the manipulation of memory-objects. Rather than providing for the 
integration of a unitary subject, we find, in The Book,  subjectivity built on memory as a 
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prosthetic process, with external and manipulable items like photographs and journals 
being indispensable in the construction of the self.
While Gottwald and Hasak operate on a macro-level, manipulating memory-
objects like the Gottwald/Clementis photograph to reinscribe the nation’s history, Mirek 
does the same work on a personal level with the desire to destroy his letters to Zdena. 
With The Book’s denial of the immanence of memory and the referentiality of both text 
and image, it is no longer possible to merely see memory as something that is repressed, 
resistant to the emplotment of official history.  Rather, memory itself is a construction 
that takes part in the implementation of power relations. The binary separation of history 
and memory that we have seen Pierre Nora and others create is here substantially 
questioned, leaving the political efficacy of memory in resisting power similarly in 
question. Mirek’s attempts to preserve the powers of memory against those of historical 
forgetting are seen to be largely textual constructions that themselves have difficulty in 
accessing the real.
Throughout Kundera’s novel, the characters, including Kundera himself, search 
for and use memory, as Mirek does, as a means of identity construction. In another 
section of The Book, “Mama,” Mama remembers and envisions herself as a young girl 
reciting a patriotic poem in 1918, celebrating the end of the Austrian Empire and the 
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establishment of the Czechoslovak republic, but forgetting the last stanza of the poem.  
Although the audience did not realize that the poem was not over and responded with 
great applause, Mama, in her shame, rushed to the bathroom in despair. 
As her son, Karel, points out, however, Mama’s memory is faulty, a trick. Mama 
had already graduated by the time the great war concluded and her poem, in reality, was 
merely part of a Christmas pageant. Again, Kundera clearly establishes the story of the 
poem as a constituent of Mama’s identity. Her romantic patriotism is embodied in this 
recollection; she clings to the memory  despite her internal admission of its falsehood. In 
an effort to “write” her identity, when asked to recite the patriotic poem, she recites the 
Christmas poem while never acknowledging the discrepancy between her story and her 
recitation. Mama seems to prefer her own version of the event to the truth, or the official 
version of the truth, and builds her identity, her patriotism, on her version. 
Karel, similarly, constructs his erotic identity on a childhood memory of 
witnessing his mother’s friend Nora naked in a spa. This image, preserved in Karel’s 
memory, is resurrected by Mama’s assertion that his friend Eva looks like Nora. This 
assertion, combined with Karel’s memory of the original event, makes Eva irresistibly 
attractive to Karel. For Karel, both Eva and Karel’s wife, Marketa become objectified and 
emptied of their identity. Karel turns them into objects, rather than people.  While making 
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love with them, “he felt like a great chess player who has conquered opponents 
simultaneously on two chessboards [...] he couldn’t help laughing and shouting: ‘I’m 
Bobby Fischer! I’m Bobby Fischer!’” (67). This hysterical identity-formation comes as a 
direct result of Karel’s access to his childhood memories. Rather than providing him with 
a barrier against power and ideology, it becomes an implement of gendered 
objectification. In The Book, memory is not merely the repressed resistance to historical 
“objective” narrative, it is also the personal construction of identity at the expense of 
others. Mama’s nationalism and Karel’s objectification of women rise directly from their 
emplotment, or narrative construction, of their memories.
Later, in “Lost Letters II,” Tamina attempts to create and define her own identity 
through the recovery of notebooks of love letters to and remembrances of her husband. 
Currently living in an unnamed town in the west of Europe and an escapee of the 
totalitarian regime in Prague, Tamina struggles to remember her husband, who died 
during the escape. Tamina, like Mirek, desperately wishes to recover the notebooks left in 
Prague, but to preserve them, rather than destroy them. For Tamina, the memory of her 
husband is the primary constituent of her identity. Rather than fighting to rewrite the 
novel of her life, she is fighting not to forget it, or so the narrator seems to suggest. As we 
have seen, however, the binary separation of these two acts seems impossible. Tamina 
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attempts to remember her husband by drawing pictures of him from an old passport photo 
and eventually imagines superimposing his features on every man she sees. “But all these 
efforts only showed that her husband’s image was irrevocably slipping away” (117). As 
the possibility of retaining, recovering, and recuperating her memory and her notebooks 
recedes, so Tamina’s identity disappears. She eventually retreats from the world 
altogether, to the oneiric island of children. Rather than creating an identity out of the 
narrative of her memory, Tamina’s memory slips away, and her identity along with it.  
While the narrative construction of identity built on memory seems to be an act of 
domination, the inability to do so seems to lead then to a complete loss of identity, 
placing humanity in a difficult, if not untenable, position, in our relationship with the past 
and our memories of it.
In addition to the overall theme that nearly all people/characters in the novel 
write, construct or narrate their own lives into a provisional but constructed coherence or 
lose their identity altogether, Kundera, additionally, draws metafictional and explicit 
attention to their fictionally constructed status as well. Kundera declares, “It is a novel 
about Tamina, and whenever Tamina goes offstage, it is a novel for Tamina. She is its 
principal character and its principal audience, and all the other stories are variations on 
her own story and meet with her life as in a mirror” (227). This statement within the 
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novel, in typical postmodern fashion, attempts to break the barrier between fiction and 
reality. Tamina is both a clearly fictional construction and a “real” audience for the rest of 
the novel. She is both author and reader of her own life.
This metafictional dissolution and inversion of the distinction between fiction and 
reality is further complicated by Kundera’s resolute refusal of genre distinctions. As 
Kundera notes in an interview, The Book contains multiple and diffuse generic 
categories: anecdote, autobiographical narrative, critical essay on a feminist book, a fable 
on angels and devils, historical narrative, the dream narrative of Tamina’s death, 
musicological reflections, historicopolitical commentary, etc (Art of the Novel 76). 
Kundera’s blending, particularly, of history and autobiography with fiction and dream, 
works to show the impossibility of rigid genre distinctions, as well as the inherent 
fictionalizing of reality, and the inherent reality of fiction.
 In doing so, Kundera does not exempt himself from his group of characters 
seeking and fictionally constructing identity through memory. In two autobiographical 
narratives, taking up parts of both sections entitled “Angels,” Kundera relates some of his 
own past, his erasure from history in Communist Prague,24 his tenure as a horoscopist for 
a Communist publication and lead Communist official, and his relationship to his dying 
father whose memory was not erased, but which became incommunicable when he lost 
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the power of language.  Kundera’s father, victimized by aphasia, was reduced to the 
enunciation of two words, “That’s strange.”  While Kundera does not explicitly show or 
comment, as he often does, on how these memories constitute his own identity, his 
selection of them for inclusion in a novel about memory’s power, its seduction, and its 
role in constituting identity, clearly asks us to read him via these anecdotes. Kundera 
replaces a narrative in which he was “a man erased from history” (The Book 84), with his 
own account of his life. Like Mama, who chooses the memory of the poem, Karel who 
chooses the memory of Nora, Tamina who “recollects” the memory of Pavel, Mirek who 
wishes to erase Zdena from his palette of memories, and Artie Spiegelman who 
constructs himself through his father’s memories, Kundera chooses to show us his 
marginalization and effacement as a person and as a writer, as well as his relationship 
with his father, and his affection for modern classical music. Kundera’s identity, for the 
reader if not for him, is clearly constructed from these selected memories.
In addition, Kundera’s comments that all the stories of the novel are variations or 
reflections of Tamina’s story reduces and proclaims his own story (presumably placed in 
what would traditionally be called real history or autobiographical memory) to be merely 
a variation on hers. Her foregrounded fictionality does not subordinate her 
historicopolitical importance. Rather, she is the center around which the 
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autobiographical, historical, and political narratives revolve. In addition, Kundera’s 
assertion that novelistic characters are, on one hand, “experimental [autobiographical] 
selves” for the author  (Art 31), and, on the other hand, simultaneously nothing more than 
a conglomeration of words25 which define their character, further complicates and 
subverts the reality/fiction boundary. If Tamina is simultaneously a fictional character, a 
reader, an experimental self for Kundera and a conglomeration of words,  the separation 
of autobiography and fiction, reality and language, truth and narrative become impossible 
to maintain. Where Barbara Foley identifies the difference between truth narratives and
fictional narratives in their cognitive reception by the reader, in which the reader decodes 
texts identified in these categories in different ways, Kundera works hard to subvert these 
cognitive differences, by mixing genres, by fictionalizing himself, and by giving the 
fictionally constructed and narrated characters privilege over historical narrative.26
Where personal memory, at the opening of the Book, seems to be a way of safeguarding, 
verifying, or even resisting false history, by the end it seems clearly to be a performative 
construction, an act of repressive power (in the cases of Mirek, Mama, Karel, and 
Tamina), and, in many ways, has no concrete connection to the “reality” it purports to 
represent as a reparative to the effacement of history. In this way the self-reflexive, 
relativist use of metafictional technique and postmodernist assumptions makes it 
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impossible to maintain the binary that Mirek (and at times the Kundera-narrator) 
proposes at the outset. Memory, like history, is a construction, prone to fictionalization, 
that may provide a counternarrative to the official institutional history, but also may 
contribute to the loss of meaning and effacement of referentiality that Mirek seems bent 
on preventing in “Lost Letters.”  If memory cannot, in and of itself, arrest the slippage of 
historical reference, the question remains whether it is possible, or advisable, to do so.
Spiegelman and Postmodern Memory
If the effectiveness of Mirek’s attempt to fight power through memory is undercut 
by the relativizing of memory itself through Kundera’s postmodern aesthetic, it is 
important to note the central role that personal and communal memory have played in the 
politically radical arm of postmodern thought. Because history is always written by the 
victors, the discourse of official history has become a central object of postmodern 
denaturalization. In this view, personal memory is often taken to be the reparative for 
institutional history. If institutional history is the perpetrator and perpetuator of a “master 
narrative” that marginalizes and confines large portions of a society, the localized and 
relative truth of personal and collective memory is often seen to be a means of 
reconstituting identity and fighting repressive power. Some cultural studies theorists 
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often choose to stop their analyses with the denaturalization of prevalent modes of 
essentializing thought through discursive analyses, while others champion the 
reclamation of lost voices and the reconstitution of counternarratives. While these 
projects are indispensable in any attempt to destabilize the discourses of bourgeois 
liberalism that still administer hegemonic power (patriarchy, whiteness, 
heteronormativity),  it is also important to consider how postmodernism, if taken to its 
logical conclusion, can present a radical relativism that may lead to political paralysis, as 
in the destabilization of Mirek’s attempts to fight hegemonic power. Where the localized, 
relativistic truths of personal memory may be championed as counterdiscursive in one 
context, their relativism and mutability may elsewhere be seen as oppressive. 
Jonathan Boyarin has observed how the postmodern attempt to delegitimate 
“universal history” has, at times, led to the reification of memory and the understanding 
of history and memory as “fundamentally different modes of relating to the past, with the 
Jews as a favorite case of a ‘people of memory’ in opposition to history” (93). While 
personal memory is known to be prone to error, forgetfulness, and to be partially 
constituted of creative imagination, it nevertheless maintains for some, particularly in the 
case of a traumatic event like the Holocaust, some authority over the proliferation of 
textuality and electronic media so prevalent in the postmodern age.27
41
It is nevertheless a given that in the postmodern age that there are no modes of 
representation and identity formation that have inherent authority, and that the 
valorization of memory, as Boyarin suggests, may be a reification that has political 
ramifications. This foregrounds the difficulty for socially and politically oppressed 
peoples to participate in their own coherent and stable identity formation and 
representation through memory in an age identified as postmodern. As we have seen, it is 
often the case that oppressed groups work to re-present, reincorporate, and renarrate 
traumatic events that would seem to lie outside the symbolic register (i.e. seem to be 
beyond signification or impossible to narrate).28 The Holocaust, or the genocidal 
elimination of the Jews during the second World War, undoubtedly qualifies as a 
traumatic event that would seem to lie outside the possibility of narration and the 
plenitude of meaning.29   Art Spiegelman has, indeed, referred to the shoah as “the central 
trauma of the Twentieth Century [sic]” (qtd. in LaCapra, History and Memory 140). 
While the traumatic event often leads to the repression of memories of the event,30 as we 
have seen it also leads to the attempt to control, narrate, and give meaning to the event 
through recollection and narration.31 This may help to explain the collective Jewish 
impulse to “witness” through memory the events of the Holocaust. This impulse is 
illustrated by the Yale Fortunoff Collection of approximately 3,700 survival testimonies 
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and the Survivors of the Shoah Foundation which plans to record the testimonies of 
approximately 50,000 survivors (LaCapra, History and Memory 11).
As Dominick LaCapra discusses, these testimonies of personal memory serve as a 
source for official history without exhausting their potential for more imaginative identity 
construction. This also illustrates some anxiety about the possibility that the Holocaust 
may be forgotten once its primary witnesses disappear. As Michael Staub observes:
[…] they reflect a general anxiety over the impending death of all 
concentration camp survivors and their living memories. When they are 
gone, we will have mountains of written texts, videotapes, films, 
recordings and other evidence. But the actual voices will be lost forever. 
How, then, to approximate the authority of the oral in a world increasingly 
suspicious of and unconvinced by written evidence? (35)
Staub here expresses a postmodern skepticism as to the mimetic possibilities of 
textual signification, but posits the oral and the remembered as a possible reparative to 
the official history of textuality. The difficulty of maintaining this binary is clear in the 
thousands of memories committed to paper, audiotapes, and videotapes in an attempt to 
approximate a supposed immanence and referentiality that the oral represents for some.32
The adoption of a prosthetic memory, indicates the difficulty, if not impossibility, of 
“touching the world,” in representing the experience of the shoah. As the presence of 
personal memories become past textual history, the line between these two hypothetically 
opposed terms dissolves. While collective memory and its traditions theoretically survive 
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in the continuous present as long as the community survives, the almost obsessive 
collection of survival testimonies and the commitment of them to textual representations 
indicates a communal anxiety about the possibility of maintaining such a collective 
identity without the tools of history to “fix” and eternalize the past.
As Sander Gilman has shown, in the nineteenth century Jewish identity had been 
constructed from without by scientific discourses that constructed “Jew” as a race rather 
than as a religion. Eastern Jews were seen as “Oriental,” while Western Jews were often 
classified as “black,” and both groups were seen as, irredeemably, a mongrel race, a 
hybrid and contaminating mixture. Likewise, Jews were identified by their flat feet, their 
big noses, their proclivity for sexually transmitted diseases, and above all, for men, by 
their circumcised penises. As Gilman explores, the traumatized male member marked the 
Jew as not only racialized, but also feminized and pathologized. In this sense, the figure 
of the Jew becomes an ideal site for the postmodern discursive denaturalization of the 
social text of nineteenth and early twentieth century discourse that posed scientific 
positivism as a master narrative. Gilman himself repeatedly has done the work of 
exposing the racializing, feminizing, and pathologizing discourses precisely as social 
text, rather than as scientific truth, showing how the white, European, Christian, 
patriarchal dominant was able to construct an identity for Jews accepted by a large 
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percentage of Europeans in the years preceding World War II and, to a lesser extent, 
after.
In the wake of this denaturalization of imposed Jewish identity, collective 
memory has become increasingly important in reconstructing a Jewish community. If it 
has become common to de-essentialize notions of “formal-race,” in order to subvert 
oppression, a reliance on “historical race” has become necessary.33  While biological 
pseudoscientific notions of racial difference (couched in positivist or scientific discourse) 
have been exposed as social construction, the material effects of those discourses have 
helped create a community with common experiences, bound together not only by shared 
experiences and traditions, but also by shared persecution. While ascription from without 
is still a troubling fact of racist, imperialist and sexist cultures, the postmodern age has 
also increasingly allowed for people to, in Toni Morrison’s words, “choose their 
identities. Now people choose to be Black. They used to be born Black. That’s not true 
anymore” (qtd. in Brogan 12; emphasis in original).34   Replacing the pseudo-scientific 
conflation of racial and religious identifications, Jews and other oppressed groups have 
often turned to shared collective memory to reinscribe their own subjectivity.
Again, however, we must observe that such reinscription is neither ideologically 
neutral nor unmediated in its access to and construction of a shared past. As Marc Ellis 
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has observed, the reincorporation of a traumatic memory to build a primary identity is not 
necessarily liberatory nor advisable in constructing a personal or religious identity. 
Rather, Ellis observes how it was only in the wake of Israel’s 1967 war that “Jews 
articulated for the first time both the extent of Jewish suffering during the Holocaust and 
the significance of Jewish empowerment in Israel” (qtd. in Rothberg 680). This in turn, 
claims Ellis, began to give Jewish consciousness a primary identity of  “innocence and 
redemption,” building Jewish identity out of the role of “innocent victims” and building 
the identity of Israel to be one of “messianic redemption” (Rothberg 680).35 The 
deployment of the Holocaust as a political and discursive means of validating Israeli 
aggression is also noted by Israeli philosopher Yehuda Elkana, a survivor of the death 
camps.  In his “A Plea for Forgetting,” Elkana  argues that the Holocaust lesson that “the 
whole world is against us”  and that “we are the eternal victim” was “the tragic and 
paradoxical victory of Hitler” (qtd. in Novick, Holocaust 164).  Indeed, Elkana asserts 
that “this lesson [...] had contributed to Israeli brutalities in the West Bank and to the 
unwillingness to make peace with the Palestinians” (Novick, Holocaust 164).  Ultimately, 
Elkana argues that the Jewish injunction to remember is misleading and, indeed, 
damaging, “It may be that it is important for the world at large to remember [... ].  For our 
part, we must forget!” (qtd. in Novick, Holocaust 164; emphasis in original).  This 
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argument is not based on a wish for the bliss of ignorance, but rather on the observation 
of the deformative and ideological inevitabilities involved in reconstructing memory.
As in the case of Kundera’s novel, both Elkana and Ellis see many Jewish people 
choosing the traumatic memory to define themselves, activating  a “legitimating 
apparatus for Jewish chauvinism and for the Jewish state, since, within its terms, we 
cannot acknowledge Jews themselves victimizers, either as individuals or as a collective” 
(Rothberg 680-1). Like Kundera, Ellis and Elkana see the construction of identity through 
memory (or its recollection) as a potential abuse of power to oppress others. Memory is 
not merely used to create a collective consciousness or to fight off the erasure of history 
by Holocaust revisionists, but also to legitimate Zionist aggression, particularly, in the 
arena of Israeli/Palestine relations (see also Rothberg 680-83). Memory is not an innocent 
remembering, nor is it merely in its historical inaccuracy that it can be liberatory or 
dangerous, it is also a means of constructing identity that can constitute an abuse of 
power.  The current and continuing struggles in the Middle East underscore the very real 
ramifications of emphasizing and reconstructing collective memory.
It is in this context that Art Spiegelman embarks on his own representation of 
Vladek’s survival testimony.  Like Kundera, he partakes of a postmodern aesthetic that 
places the truth value of memory, history, and identity into question, never claiming for 
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himself the historical accuracy of truth-telling that might allow for the co-option of his 
work into essentialist constructions of history or Jewish identity. At the same time, he is 
committed to representing history in all of its specificity and factuality in an effort, 
among other things, to prevent revisionist effacement.
Like Kundera, Spiegelman  uses multiple generic conventions in order to separate 
his work from a univocal survivor’s testimony or a historical document. Spiegelman’s 
book is biography, autobiography, comic book, animal fable, oral history, and graphic 
novel all at once. As commentators on Maus never fail to observe, Spiegelman does not 
represent his father or anyone else in the world of Maus as people, but rather as 
anthropomorphic animals. Although the books are labeled as “Holocaust/ 
Autobiography,” the supposedly real representations of people are drawn in comic-book 
form and as animals. The Jews are mice, the Nazis are cats, Americans are friendly dogs, 
French are frogs, Poles are pigs, and Gypsies are, of course, moths. Spiegelman, in this 
way, both literalizes and denaturalizes the stereotypical Nazi assessment of Jews as 
vermin and disease carriers in order to portray the anthropomorphic mice as real people.36
It is also true that Spiegelman does not attempt to humanize many other groups, 
particularly the Nazis, who remain predatory throughout. In displaying all the groups as 
comic-book animals, however, Spiegelman is sure to distance his Holocaust narrative 
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from any claim to actual truth.  Indeed, when Maus was listed on the “Fiction” side of the 
New York Times bestseller list, Spiegelman complained, ironically admitting the generic 
problematic that Maus creates:
If your list were divided into literature and nonliterature, I could gracefully 
accept the compliment as intended, but to the extent that “fiction” 
indicates that the work isn’t factual, I feel a bit queasy [...]
The borderland between fiction and nonfiction has been fertile 
territory for some of the most potent contemporary writing [...]. I shudder 
to think how David Duke— if he could read— would respond to seeing a 
carefully researched work based closely on my father’s memories of life in 
Hitler’s Europe and in the death camps classified as fiction.
I know that by delineating people with animal heads I’ve raised 
problems of taxonomy for you. Could you consider adding a special 
“nonfiction/mice” category to your list? (qtd. in LaCapra, History and 
Memory 145)37
The fact that the Times agreed with Spiegelman and moved his book from the 
fiction to the nonfiction list (see Doherty 69) hardly changes the dynamics at play here.  
In his letter, Spiegelman displays both an allegiance to history as factual, as a political 
necessity to refute the David Dukes of the world, and an acknowledgment that his book is 
not and cannot be completely non-fiction.  He has created a hybrid category38 that both 
relies on identity, history and memory and also visually exposes them as essentialist 
notions. Spiegelman’s allegiance to historical accuracy is evident in his careful 
reconstruction of people, places and events. In an interview, he acknowledges this 
attempt, “Now, my father’s not necessarily a reliable witness and I never presumed that 
he was. So, as far as I could corroborate anything he said, I did— which meant, on 
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occasion, talking to friends and to relatives and also doing as much reading as I could” 
(Brown 93). Artie even asks another survivor, Pavel, for clarification on details after his 
father’s death (Maus II 47), and includes representations of sketches by Vladek to clarify 
his oral testimony (Maus 110; also see Maus II 60, 70). Nevertheless, accompanying 
Spiegelman’s efforts at historical reconstruction are self-reflexive acknowledgments of 
the futility of this attempt. In another interview, he observes, “essentially, the number of 
layers between an event and somebody trying to apprehend that event through time and 
intermediaries is like working with flickering shadows. It’s all you can hope for” (Brown 
98).  In this, his view reflects those of the numerous Holocaust commentators we have 
seen above.
Indeed, Spiegelman’s text both embodies and refutes positivist scientific 
definitions of the Jew.  Maus combines two of the most threatening and overdetermined 
aspects of the Jewish stereotype, the Mauscheln and the Mischling. Although Spiegelman 
clearly uses the German word for mice in his title, he also clearly draws upon Mauscheln, 
“the speaking of German with a Yiddish accent, intonation, or vocabulary...” (Gilman, 
The Jew’s Body 88). Clearly Vladek’s speech represents a version of Mauscheln, taken 
by anti-Semites as a sign of difference and duplicity, a hidden language (Gilman, The 
Jew’s Body 88; also see 10-37), but turned here into a way of provisionally recovering a 
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positive Jewish identity.39  In addition, the once derogatory concept of Mischling, the 
discursive construction of Jews as a hybrid, impure, and mongrel race (Gilman, Kafka: 
The Jewish Patient  14-15), is positively transformed into Spiegelman’s hybrid, 
literary/popular, image/text, fiction/history creation. In this way Spiegelman is able to 
partake in the postmodern denaturalization of master narratives, revealing how the body 
and the voice are discursively constructed in service of Nazism and broader anti-
Semitism.  
Further, Maus is not merely the story of Vladek’s survival, and includes, 
particularly in Maus II, a third narrative of how Artie survives the telling.  Indeed, Artie’s 
attempts to keep Vladek focused on his story and to check his facts transforms the story 
from Vladek’s “autobiography” into a collaborative project that adds representational 
problems (see Iadonisi).  In elaborating these narrative frames, Spiegelman provides 
himself with additional opportunities to question the truth-value of memory and the 
results of constructing identity out of memory, even as he relates Vladek’s story in comic 
form.  At the opening of Maus II.  Artie discusses how he will draw his wife.  Françoise, 
with her, emphasizing the fictionality of his production.
ARTIE: What kind of animal should I make you?
FRANÇOISE: Huh? A mouse of course!
ARTIE: But you’re French!
FRANÇOISE: Well...How about a Bunny Rabbit?
ARTIE: Nah. Too sweet and gentle.
FRANÇOISE: Hmmph.
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ARTIE: I mean the French in general. Let’s not forget about the centuries 
of anti-Semitism. I mean, how about the Dreyfus affair? The Nazi 
collaborators!  The—
FRANÇOISE: Okay! But if you’re a mouse, I ought to be a mouse too. I 
converted didn’t I? (Maus II 11; see figure 1)
This passage foregrounds the difficulty or impossibility of assigning essentialist 
racial features to an individual, but it also shows Spiegelman’s power. The historiography 
of Maus is always presented through Spiegelman’s 
representations, representations which carry the 
tremendous power of allegorical iconography in 
addition to his own choice (from his father’s 
choices) of what facts to represent and how to 
represent them. In the scene quoted above, Artie 
experiments with several sketches of Françoise, 
literarily illustrating the power of imagistic 
representation. Both the character Artie and the 
author, Art Spiegelman, control the ways in 
which we perceive Françoise and the other 
historical figures in Maus,  much as anti-Semitic discourse controlled perceptions of Jews 
in the years preceding the Shoah. Spiegelman’s self-reflexive portrayal of this 
Figure 1: From Maus II: A 
Survivor’s Tale/And Here My 
Troubles Began by Art 
Spiegelman, copyright © 1986, 
1989, 1990, 1991 by Art 
Spiegelman.  Used by permission 
of Pantheon Books, a division of 
Random House, Inc.
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problematic helps provisionalize the memories he shows us. Particularly in Maus II, Artie 
begins to show an intense realization of the problems inherent in historical production:
ARTIE: Sigh. I feel so inadequate trying to reconstruct a reality that was 
worse than my darkest dreams. And trying to do it as a comic strip! I 
guess I bit off more than I can chew. Maybe I ought to forget the 
whole thing. There’s so much I’ll never understand or visualize. I 
mean reality is too complex for comics...So much has to be left out or 
distorted.
FRANÇOISE: Just keep it honest honey.
ARTIE: See what I mean...In real life you’d never have let me talk this 
long without interrupting. (Maus II 16)
The metafictional self-reflexiveness of this passage is extraordinary. Like 
Kundera, Spiegelman here foregrounds the literary production of his supposedly 
representational/ mimetic work. Not only does Artie admit the inherent pitfalls in 
narrativizing history, he also subverts the binary of reality/fiction by having the fictional 
Artie comment on his own status as literary production. “In real life,” he says, 
highlighting the fact that, of course, this representation of life is not life, while at the 
same time narrating the impossibility of representing life accurately. These metafictional 
references to the constructedness of the text of Maus increase in Maus II, with the writing 
continually drawing attention to itself as writing. Another example occurs when Artie 
goes to see his “shrink” Pavel. “His place is overrun with stray dogs and cats [...].  Can I 
mention this or does it completely louse up my metaphor” (43). Here, Spiegelman 
acknowledges the possibility of the metaphor getting beyond his control and freely 
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admits its limits. His translation of memory results in unavoidable inaccuracy and 
highlights the metaphor-laden fictionality of his representations.
Even the first volume of Maus contains 
self-reflexive attempts to illustrate the 
constructed nature of Spiegelman’s historical 
project, most apparently in the comic within a 
comic of the autobiographical “Prisoner on the 
Hell Planet,”  a short “obscure underground
comic book” (99) that he had written in 1972. 
The comic presents the suicide of Spiegelman’s 
mother, along with his own self-involved 
interpretation of events in which he blames his 
mother for his own emotional death. This 
comic-book depiction of stylized human figures illustrates the subjective constructedness 
of Spiegelman’s younger work, while reflecting on the depiction of the animals in Maus. 
The sudden depiction of stylized human figures in a narrative about anthropomorphic 
mice highlights the fact that there is a human writing/drawing the mouse Artie, who, in 
turn, wrote the “Prisoner on the Hell Planet,” which, at the same time, was written by the 
Figure 2: From Maus I: A 
Survivor’s Tale/My Father Bleeds 
History by Art Spiegelman, 
copyright © 1973, 1980, 1981, 
1982, 1984, 1984, 1985, 1986 by 
Art Spiegelman.  Used by 
permission of Pantheon Books, a 
division of Random House, Inc.
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real human Spiegelman. This blurring of the distinction between reality and fiction helps 
to prevent the reader from ignoring the historiographic construction of Maus, despite its 
seemingly univocal presentation of Vladek’s experiences.
In addition, both “Prisoner on the Hell Planet” and Maus II contain realistic 
photographs of the characters involved, emphasizing once more the fictional 
constructedness of the rest of the text (Maus 100; see figure 2).40 Although here the 
photograph seems to be meant to provide a “reality effect,” the stylized, sketched hand 
that holds the photograph in the comic, helps to contribute to the sense that it is more of a 
“fantasy of realism” than a clear touching of the world. If a constructed, drawn human 
hand is holding the picture, which is in turn part of a comic held by an anthropomorphic 
mouse in a comic which is held by a presumably human reader, the layers of reality and 
construction become truly vertiginous. The photograph itself does not provide us with 
any guarantee of referentiality, especially given the family’s apparent happiness in the 
photo. This happiness is belied by the mother’s suicide and the son’s recent release from 
a mental hospital in the mise en scene. The posed and constructed nature of the 
photograph is itself revealed as a fiction.  The photograph of Vladek which appears later 
in the book is similarly posed, showing him in a concentration-camp uniform despite the 
fact that it was taken in a souvenir shop after the war had concluded (Maus II 134; see 
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also Hirsch 23-25). Elsewhere in the book, photographs themselves are shown as drawn 
mouse figures, as the real is replaced by the constructed (Maus II  115).  In this way, as 
Marianne Hirsch observes, “Spiegelman lays bare the levels of mediation that underlie all
visual representational forms,” (11) rather than privileging one over another.
In this way, history and memory are questioned, even as they are presented. 
Where memory might initially be seen as a stable and clear way to fight social and 
political oppression, it soon becomes destabilized and questionable in Spiegelman’s 
postmodern self-reflexivity. As we have seen above, essentialist racial identity is 
questioned in the body of the text in similar ways, but is further destabilized by the 
narrative itself. Throughout Vladek’s narrative, there are times when the Jews put on pig 
masks in order to disguise themselves as Poles and escape Nazi persecution. As Vladek 
reminds us, this is easier for those without stereotypical distinguishing racial markers, as 
some mice are depicted with tails, while others are not.41  This use of animal masks makes 
an initial foray into the de-essentializing of racial identity. Nevertheless, it is initially 
consistent with the metaphors of the narrative and does not exceed their boundaries.
Later, in Maus II, Spiegelman begins to more self-reflexively exhibit postmodern 
notions of the dynamic performativity and constructedness of identity. Chapter Two 
(“Auschwitz (Time Flies)”) finds Artie depicted as a man with a mouse mask. Television 
56
interviewers and his therapist are depicted, similarly, as men with animal masks in this 
framing section, where Artie is interviewed about the first volume of Maus for television 
and pays a visit to his therapist. Humans then seem to choose their identity and their race, 
in the way we have seen Toni Morrison suggest, by wearing masks, while simultaneously 
asking Artie what masks he assigns them. One reporter in a mouse mask asks, “If your 
book was about Israeli Jews what kind of animal would you draw?” (Maus II 42).  It is 
hard here to agree with Marianne Hirsch’s suggestion that Spiegelman “come[s] close to 
duplicating the Nazi’s racist refusal of the possibility of assimilation or cultural 
integration when he represents different nationalities as different animal species” (13).  
Particularly in Maus II, it is clear that these different “species” or “races” are masks 
human’s wear, choices they make, not inviolable elements of nature.  In Nazi Germany’s 
case, of course, the choices were made from without, not from within, but this can hardly 
be considered natural or essential from the perspective Spiegelman offers in Maus.
Indeed, this attention to the performative construction of identity takes place in 
what is undoubtedly the book’s most self-aware moment. Spiegelman depicts Artie 
worrying about the mass-market co-option of his Holocaust narrative. Artie sits at his 
drawing table, in front of television interviewers, discussing his own commercial success 
while sitting atop a pile of mouse corpses. Clearly, Artie is concerned about what Fredric 
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Jameson might call the commodification of his art. The sense that he may be faking 
authenticity without realizing it, or that there can be no separation of the money-making 
commodity and its artistic and social significance, finds Spiegelman pointing resolutely 
to the constructedness of his artistic creation and the constructedness of his own identity, 
wearing the mouse mask for commercial gain. That this commercial gain is built on the 
deaths of millions of dead mice, or Jews, is horrifically and vividly depicted. The 
simultaneously humorous but threatening depiction of the American advertiser offering a 
licensing deal for Artie vests (“Maus. You’ve read the book now buy the vest!” (42)) 
depicts the postmodern tendency for binaries to become nonexistent.  Not only are 
signifier/signified and reality/fiction barriers destroyed, but the differences between 
commercial product and high art are self-reflexively dissolved as well. Similarly, 
Spiegelman is more careful to depict the technological construction of his text in Maus II, 
illustrating not only Vladek telling his story into Artie’s tape recorder, but also Artie 
listening to the tapes (47) and sitting at his drawing table in an attempt to translate oral 
narrative and recording into a comic-book narrative.
Finally, as Arlene Wilner points out, even Vladek’s oral narrative is specifically 
configured not only as history, but also as “story,” subject to the perils of emplotment 
that, critics have suggested, separate history from a purely referential role. Here we can 
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see that Staub’s invocation to “approximate the authority of the oral” is, at least 
somewhat, misguided. The very transformation of life into narrative, even without the 
comic-book format and second-hand testimony of Artie, is a construction that asserts 
meaning where none, necessarily, exists. When Vladek closes his narration by saying, 
“We [Vladek and Anja] were both very happy, and lived happy, happy, ever after,” 
(Maus II 136), the reader can only read this as a fairy tale construction of actual events, a 
violent unification of diverse elements. From reading Artie’s frames, specifically “The 
Prisoner on the Hell Planet,” the reader knows that Anja commits suicide and that 
Vladek’s later life is far from a fairy tale. His inclination to close his narrative at the end 
of his Holocaust experiences illustrates the danger of narrativizing reality, despite the 
seeming unavoidability of doing so. Like Kundera’s Mirek, Vladek is seen to want to 
control his memory through narrative recollection.  Just as Mirek attempts to erase 
Zdena’s life, Vladek attempts to erase the trials of Anja, and, simultaneously, completely 
erases his second wife, Mala, from his life’s narrative. It is only through Artie, whose 
narration is equally questionable, that we learn of Mala at all. 
By refusing to allow Vladek a univocal presentation of events, Spiegelman is 
careful not to allow traumatic memory to define Vladek, and the Jewish people in 
general, as victims who remain innocent. Vladek, through Artie’s eyes, is seen to be a 
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racist and a miser, someone neither Artie nor Françoise can stand. What is more, the text 
refuses to allow the Holocaust as an excuse for domineering and occasionally hate-filled 
behavior.
ARTIE: I used to think the war made him that way.
MALA: Fah! I went through the camps...All our friends went through the 
camps. Nobody is like him!
ARTIE: Mm... It’s something that worries me about the book I’m doing 
about him...In some ways he’s just like the racist caricature of the 
miserly old Jew. (Maus 131-2)
Here Spiegelman shows a refusal to allow Vladek only the role of victim, while at the 
same time indicating anxiety over the possible narratives available to him. Vladek may be 
a miser, but Spiegelman does not want to participate in anti-Semitic discourses that 
would define Vladek as a caricature of the miserly Jew. Instead, all he can do is draw 
attention to the problem.42
Vladek’s racism is especially telling in showing the dangers of constructing 
narratives out of memory. When Vladek balks at the prospect of picking up a black 
hitchhiker and inscribes him with familiar stereotypes, it is clear that Vladek’s memory 
does not provide him with a sense of communality for those similarly oppressed, but 
rather gives him a sense of entitlement. 
FRANÇOISE: That’s outrageous! How can you, of all people, be such a 
racist! You talk about blacks the way Nazis talked about the Jews!
VLADEK: Ach!  I thought really you are more smart than this, 
Françoise...It’s not even to compare, the Shvartzers and the Jews! 
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(Maus II 99)
Here, the denaturalization of essentialized racial identities for Jews is not extended to the 
“shvartzers,” as Vladek calls them. Instead, the reconstruction of Jewish identity, built 
partially on the shoah, reconstructs the Jew as white, as the black man’s “other.”  While 
Jews themselves were often configured as black, equivalent to those of African descent, 
in nineteenth century racialist discourse,43 this discursive transformation of Jews from 
black to white, allows for the transformation of the Arab in Palestine into an “other”, 
rather than a sibling in racial oppression.44  As Edward Said has pointed out in multiple 
contexts, Zionism may be a positive site of communal identity formation for the Jew, but 
it remains a site of racist inscription for the Arab inhabitants of Israel. The Arabs are seen 
as “outlandish, strange, hostile” (“Zionism” 216), much as Vladek sees the black 
hitchhiker. Although Spiegelman may not be referencing this analogy directly in this 
scene, as Michael Rothberg suggests (682), he is undoubtedly highlighting the discursive 
production of racial identity and how identity can be constructed at the expense of others. 
That memory is seen throughout Maus as a primary identifier for Jews highlights its role 
in constructing new narratives that threaten to inscribe “others.”  In this sense Jonathan 
Boyarin’s advice to avoid the construction of identity based on place, specifically Zionist 
Israel, and replace it with identification based on memory is subtly delegitimated. It is, at 
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least partially, the reconstruction of a narrative based on memory, that allows the 
(over)identification with the state of Israel.
As Kundera comments on the irony of Mirek exerting his memory’s power onto 
Zdena, Spiegelman, through his metafictional and postmodernist techniques, continually 
draws attention to the constructedness of Vladek’s narrative and its potential use as an 
instrument of power. Vladek’s erasure of Anja’s suffering in the post-Holocaust years 
and his one-sided portrayal of Anja counterbalance the narrative of the resourceful 
survivor of the primary narrative. At the same time, Spiegelman refuses to represent 
himself in a completely positive light, showing Artie’s lack of appreciation for his 
marriage and his complicity with the commercialization of the shoah. In addition to these 
problematics, as we have observed, Spiegelman continually foregrounds his story as 
“text,” and not as “truth,” showing, like Kundera, that memory, history and identity are 
all largely constructions that are always part of ideological/political discourse and 
oppression, whether this is conscious or not.
Kundera, Spiegelman, and the Problem of Ideology
Thus far, I have focused on the degree to which the effort to oppose history and memory 
in an effort to valorize the referentiality of the latter is exposed as untenable within these 
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two texts, and within a rigorous account of postmodern discourse.  In this, my approach 
might be labeled as a kind of vulgar deconstruction that undercuts a commonly held 
binary, revealing how both history and memory are subject to construction and 
narrativization, leaving us further away from a representation of the “real” than when we 
began.  In this process, I have also endeavored to emphasize the problems inherent in this 
approach, the political and ethical stakes involved in the abandonment or deconstruction 
of any kind of historical referentiality.  That is, while the denaturalization of particular 
accounts of the historical past can be liberating and radical reassessments that give 
additional freedom to the oppressed, the simultaneous denaturalization of alternative 
histories and memories leaves such freedoms on shaky ontological ground.  An 
uneasiness with the results of this approach is illustrated both in these texts and within the 
broader debate on these issues. Over the course of the remainder of this study, I 
will look more closely at how several examples of postmodernist historical fiction 
endeavor to overcome this problem and retain a hold on the referent of the historical past.  
In doing so, I suggest an expansion of approaches to the past, abandoning both the 
naively material and the extremity of some types of postmodern relativism.  At the same 
time, however, it is important to acknowledge the complexity of the issue and to not 
dismiss a postmodernist or poststructural approach as an irrelevant or insular theoretical 
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relativism.  Rather, this approach teaches us both not to accept notions of transparent 
referentiality and also not to behave as if historical representation is simple and 
transparent, even when we know it is not.  While the former is fairly uncommon in 
contemporary historiography, the latter continues to be the dominant attitude towards 
historical representation, as discussed above.  Kundera and Spiegelman teach us to take 
the problems of historical representation seriously, while warning against simplistic 
theoretical ways out, like the naive adoption of personal and collective memory as the 
reparative to history.  What they less effectively offer, however, is a functional and 
theoretically tenable alternative approach to representations of the past. While sitting 
on his psychiatrist’s couch in Maus II, Artie Spiegelman quotes Samuel Beckett, “Samuel 
Beckett once said: ‘Every word is like an unnecessary stain on silence and nothingness.’”  
He follows this by stating, “On the other hand, he said it” (Maus II 45). Here Spiegelman 
offers the double-bind that the possibility of political action encounters in the postmodern 
world, particularly through memory-work and historical representation. Textual 
proliferation both foregrounds relativistic historiography and indicates the futility of 
attempting social change. “...look at how many books have already been written about the 
Holocaust. What’s the point? People haven’t changed...Maybe they need a newer, bigger 
Holocaust,” says Artie (Maus II 45). Mirek’s notion that personal memory can be a social 
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and political bulwark against political oppression is denied by Artie’s statements, and yet, 
like Beckett, he makes them. 
In addition, as both Kundera and Spiegelman show in their hybridized texts of 
fact and fiction, of memory and creation, memory cannot be seen as a security blanket 
against the master narrative of history, because memory itself dynamically creates 
history, and is an implement of power or ideology. While Mirek, Mama, Karel and 
Tamina cling to pasts that are at least partially of their own creation, Kundera, in a later 
essay, acknowledges the impossibility of maintaining the memory/forgetting binary, “We 
do not know [reality] as it is in the present, in the moment when it’s happening, when it 
is. The present moment is unlike the memory of it. Remembering is not the negative of 
forgetting. Remembering is a form of forgetting” (Testaments Betrayed 128).  Here 
Kundera denies the notion of the continuous present suggested by Nora as a feature of 
memory itself.  Rather, Kundera suggests that memory, like history, is irrevocably and 
irremediably separate from the presence that is associated with the “present” or the 
“real.”
As Kundera points out, and as the characters of The Book and Maus illustrate, 
memory is not inviolable, it is a series of selections and erasures that defines it as much 
by what it is not as by what it is. These selections and erasures earmark memory, like 
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identity and history, as a construction. Although it is true that historical events have 
political, social, and bodily repercussions, it is also true that the reconstruction of those 
events also have sociopolitical consequence. There is no essential memory that lies 
outside the constructedness of discourse, at least according to the postmodern aesthetic 
that the work of both Kundera and Spiegelman suggest. In “The Border,” the final section 
of The Book, Kundera comments on the problem that this simultaneously postmodern and 
political viewpoint presents. “It takes so little, so infinitely little, for someone to find 
himself on the other side of the border, where everything— love, convictions, faith, 
history— no longer has meaning” (281).
On one side of the border, as Kundera configures it, is the radically postmodern,45
a world where there can be no meaning, referent, or political commitment whatsoever. 
The other side, however, is equally problematic. The assigning of meaning, love, faith, 
history, and even personal memory, inevitably leads to a perpetuation of ideology, or in 
Kunderan terms, an idyll. As many Kundera critics have noted, the figure of the closed 
circle, the “circle dance,” or the “idyll” shown throughout The Book, indicates Kundera’s 
distaste for univocal meaning, the single belief of the circle dance.  For Kundera, those 
who put their faith in communism were victims of ideological essentialism, as are the 
girls in “The Angels” who assign a single, ironically semiotic and deconstructive, 
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meaning to Ionesco’s Rhinoceros. They dance in a solipsistic circle, trusting in the 
security of their ideology and meaning. Kundera acknowledges the appeal of essentialist 
ideological discourse (“I too once danced in a ring” (The Book 91)), but refuses it, just as 
he refuses a postmodern loss of meaning that is not politically engaged. Like Spiegelman, 
Kundera follows Beckett in saying something, despite the acknowledgment that whatever 
narrative is constructed will have tenuous ties to “reality” and will have ideological 
repercussions. This is perhaps most clear when Kundera identifies the idea of “justice for 
all” as an idyll, an impossible dream.
I emphasize: idyll and for all, because all human beings have always 
aspired to an idyll, to that garden where nightingales sing, to that realm of 
harmony where the world does not rise up as a stranger against man and 
man against other men, but rather where the world and all men are shaped 
from one and the same matter. There, everyone is a note in a sublime Bach 
fugue, and anyone who refuses to be one is a mere useless and
meaningless dot that need only be caught and crushed between thumb and 
finger like a flea. (The Book 11; emphasis in original)
In typical postmodern fashion, Kundera denies any totalizing narrative, even a 
master narrative that is premised on equality (like that of liberal humanism), because, like 
liberal humanism, the closed circle of the idyll will not only exclude, but will also 
“crush” those it does not encompass. The postmodern double-bind is also evident, 
however. If a world where man does not rise against other men is merely a master 
narrative then violence and oppression themselves remain inevitable.
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Both Kundera and Spiegelman acknowledge and emphasize the possible 
ideological complicity of their hybridized historical fictions. They do so not to offer their 
own myths or “idylls” to live by, it seems, but rather to posit “the world as ambiguity, 
[...] not a single absolute truth but a welter of contradictory truths [...] to have as one’s 
only certainty the wisdom of uncertainty”(Art of the Novel 6). Kundera, in particular, does 
not allow this “wisdom of uncertainty” to lead to political paralysis, but instead seems to 
offer uncertainty itself as something of a political goal. In the above quotation and 
elsewhere, Kundera seems to conclude that it is certainty itself, not the particular 
ideological formations of totalitarian Communism or fascism, that lead to oppression, and 
that the foregrounding of epistemological uncertainty, postmodernism’s bailiwick, de-
stabilizes, without eliminating, the possibility of the co-opting of knowledge, memory, 
history, and identity for and by power. 
It is this construction of instability and uncertainty as an ethics in itself that has 
permeated recent efforts to establish poststructuralism and postmodern fiction as ethical, 
despite its usual resistance to concrete political positioning. As Simon Critchley explores 
in The Ethics of Deconstruction, Derridean poststructuralism is ethical in its insistence on 
seeing the “Other” (that which is outside) as “other” (incomprehensible, irreducibly 
different) rather than as a means of constructing meaning.  Andrew Gibson likewise sees 
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the ethic of postmodern fiction in its insistence on maintaining alterity rather than 
attempting to explain or make sense of its subject matter. For Gibson the ethics of 
postmodern fiction lie in its ability to “indicate[] the finitude of ontological discourse, its 
lack of purchase on the real” (63).
As Charles Molesworth observes, however, Kundera’s commitment to the 
wisdom of uncertainty itself constitutes something of an idyll, a unifying belief, and that 
is the belief in the novel itself. As Kundera asserts,  “The world of one single Truth and 
the relative, ambiguous world of the novel are molded of entirely different substances. 
Totalitarian Truth excludes relativity, doubt, questioning; it can never accommodate what 
I would call the spirit of the novel” (Art of the Novel 14; emphasis in original).  Here, the 
spirit of the novel is opposed to the spirit of the world outside of it, with the former 
valorizing uncertainty while the latter promotes its opposite.
For Kundera, it is not necessarily what is contained in a novel’s narrative that 
contains liberatory opportunities, but rather it is the multivocal heterogeneity of 
perspective that the novel’s form encompasses that creates a relativism that leads to 
wisdom.  In this, Kundera resembles the Bakhtin of The Dialogic Imagination.  
Throughout his novels and his books of essays, The Art of the Novel and Testaments 
Betrayed, Kundera continually offers the novel as that which offers the wisdom of 
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uncertainty, that which poses questions rather than answers them. In doing so, he tries to, 
more or less successfully, occupy the border between univocal meaning and meaningless 
chaos, while paradoxically promoting his own ideology of politically committed 
uncertainty.
Spiegelman is less confident about the power of his text to have any political or 
social utility. Spiegelman, as we have seen, foregrounds not only the ideological 
atrocities of fascism, but also the ideological dangers of reconstructed Jewish memory. In 
doing so, he does not seem to offer uncertainty itself as a solution, but, in Maus at times, 
withdraws from representation altogether. Where The Book ends on “The Border” 
offering an uncertain balancing between meaning and meaninglessness, the Maus books 
end with a statement of the inadequacy of representation. In the final panels, Vladek lies 
in bed and tells Artie, “I’m tired from talking, Richieu, and it’s enough stories for now...” 
(Maus II 136). Richieu is the name of Artie’s brother, killed during the Holocaust, whose 
story was never completed.  At the same time, Spiegelman, via Vladek, seems to 
proclaim the inadequacy of all stories, not only to explain the Holocaust, but to represent 
them as well.   Where Kundera offers an alternative to history in the novel itself (and the 
history of the European novel) and its potential for multivocal, dialogic discourse, 
Spiegelman, at the close of Maus, seems less willing to offer an alternative at all. While 
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providing a voice for Vladek, Spiegelman is never sure what political and social purpose 
this postmodern construction of self-reflexive narration can serve. Joshua Brown offers 
that “Spiegelman has created a history that is compelling in its portrayal of the Holocaust 
and in its consistent analysis of the hazards and holes in the reconstruction of history” 
(108). In the end, however, Spiegelman seems unsure of the possibility of avoiding the 
“hazards and holes,” even if these ideological pitfalls are consistently analyzed. The Book 
finds a measure of narrative comfort in its position on “The Border” between meaning 
and meaninglessness. Maus never offers us that comfort.
The pairing of these two texts, then, illustrates two prevailing contemporary 
readings of postmodernity in general and postmodernist fiction in particular. While critics 
like Gibson and Critchley find a certain ethics in the “withdrawal from the real” (similar 
to Kundera’s “wisdom of uncertainty”) found in works that stress the difficulty in 
attempting to find a real outside the text, others are concerned that the abandonment of 
ontology or a stress on the “finitude of ontological discourse” places postmodernist works 
outside of social and historical praxis. In Writing History, Writing Trauma,  Dominick 
LaCapra questions the poststructural historiography of critics like Hayden White and 
Frank Ankersmit precisely because of their incapacity to acknowledge the real historical 
events (like the Holocaust) that are so central to communal identity formation or radical 
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politics precisely as real, or theoretically independent of retrospective textual 
construction.  
While Kundera’s and Spiegelman’s novels refuse to allow an uncritical 
acceptance of memory as the real and presence as opposed to the constructedness of the 
past through historical discourse, they also underline through Mirek’s and Artie’s 
marshaling of memory against power, the dangers of a complete relativizing of the real or 
a removal of the real into the realm of the sublime or the impossible to attain. Both 
authors’ works stress the importance of maintaining a sense of the true and the factual 
while acknowledging and foregrounding how history and memory both become deeply 
textual stories without direct access to truth.  In doing so, they stress the significant 
importance of the debate over history and memory in the postmodern age. While it is 
possible to construct a hypothetical ethics in radical alterity and the sublimity of 
uncertainty, when true events or historical facticity are essential in constructing a 
community identification or a radical politics, such uncertainty seems unsatisfactory. If 
the “wisdom of uncertainty” is then untenable within social praxis and representation is 
itself falsifying and prone to abuse of power as we have seen illustrated in both Kundera 
and Spiegelman, these texts suggest the need for a new way to configure the real as an 
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accessible way to found identity and fight power without proffering it as an inviolable 
idyll that excludes and abuses. 
Postmodernist Historical Fiction and Finding the Real
While Maus and The Book denaturalize the differences often proffered between 
memory and history, they also pinpoint the need for a method of accessing the past, of 
“finding the real” that cannot be summarily dismissed as purely discursive construction.  
If memory and history are, in fact, more alike than different, does this then mean that 
both are merely constructions of the individual or communal mind and that their sole 
function is in the administration of power?  Both Mirek’s and Artie’s reliance on and 
adherence to a past that would be constitutive of resistance and radical politics suggests 
that this is not the case, although how, precisely, the past and its material/ontological 
existence can be accessed for the purposes of political radicalism or for the development 
of an ethics, whether local or universal, is not clear from a study of these novels and the 
criticism they have engendered.46   It would, of course, be the height of egotism to assert a 
foolproof and watertight methodological approach towards such complicated and vexed 
issues.  We must not content ourselves, however, with simply viewing texts like Maus
and The Book as quintessential examples of  postmodernist relativism, because they, like 
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the other books I will explore in this study, are centrally concerned with exploring, 
suggesting, and asserting means of representation that successfully access the historical 
past, even as they undercut and provisionalize traditional methods of doing so. 
Indeed, while it is often assumed that a materialist orientation towards history is 
necessarily a retrograde and reactionary position, I suggest that the opposite can be, and 
often is, the case.47   Certainly a naively traditional approach to history that views its 
standard presentation as transparently mimetic does not allow for the exposure of 
rhetoric, propaganda, and ideology often just beneath its surface.  It is, however, equally 
problematic to categorically deny the possibility that an accurate presentation of the past 
is possible, for this suggests that any claims about it are equally valid or not valid at all.  
Norman Geras voices this objection eloquently in the New Left Review,
If there is no truth, there is no injustice...if truth is wholly relativized or 
internalized to particular discourses or language games [...] there is no 
injustice [...].  The victims and protestors of any putative injustice are 
deprived of their last and often best weapon, that of telling what really 
happened.  They can only tell their story, which is something else.  
Morally and politically, therefore, anything goes. (qtd. in Jenkins 23)
While Mirek and Artie’s attempts to recover the past are in reaction to specific threats, 
they also call to mind Geras’s concerns.  Both have seen or heard of injustice on a 
monumental scale and the need to present “what really happened” in opposition to such 
injustice is a powerful one.  
74
Unfortunately, much postmodernist fiction (and art in general) is either celebrated 
or eviscerated for its relativizing function, that is, for its tendency to reject the possibility 
of telling “what really happened” and instead to insist only on the possibility of “telling 
[one’s] story,” emphasizing the constructed nature of art, rather than its capacity for 
reproducing the past.  As Geras suggests, such a position eliminates the possibility of any 
type of impartial justice.  I suggest that such an assessment of much postmodernist 
fiction, particularly for what I am calling “postmodernist historical fiction,” is 
misleading.  By looking at three texts as primary exemplars, Virginia Woolf’s Between 
the Acts, Graham Swift’s Waterland, and Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children, we can 
see how postmodernist historical fiction insists upon, rather than denies, the possibility of 
historical referentiality and provides us with possible modes of representation that more 
precisely access the real.  All three of these texts have been both praised and criticized for 
their imbrication in the postmodern gestalt and their denaturalization, demystification, 
and deconstruction of traditional historical representation.  While all of these texts, like 
Maus and The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, do problematize traditional modes of 
historical representation, they do so not to eliminate the possibility of representation that 
accesses the past, but to suggest that traditional narrative models are contributors to 
deviations and deformations of the past, rather than effective means to access the real.  
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These historical novels insist on the possibility of access to the “real” of the past 
precisely because such access is a political and ethical necessity.  Woolf’s Between the 
Acts insists on the possibility of accessing a past that is not only different from the great 
narratives of great men but also more accurate.  For Woolf, this provides a foundation for 
feminist intervention not based purely on an equal epistemological status for women’s 
stories, but rather on a reliance on a truer version of the past.  Likewise, Swift’s 
Waterland argues for alternative ways of conceiving of the “real,” precisely so that the 
experience of the working classes, not easily transformed into traditional narrative 
history, becomes available.  Like Woolf, Swift insists on the historical accessibility of the 
working classes so that their treatment in the present cannot be similarly erased.  Finally, 
Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children insists on a way of looking at the past that allows for an 
abundance of stories and an insistence upon access to the real, particularly within a 
postcolonial context in which the subaltern experience is often suppressed or forgotten 
within colonialist histories.  Rushdie too insists upon access to the materiality of the 
subaltern past not purely as an alternative story but as a truth that colonialism and 
postcolonialism threatens to efface.  Not only do the political and ethical concerns of the 
three novels overlap, they also insist upon historical access as a prerequisite to their 
variably radical politics.   At the same time, however, they formally foreground the 
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complexity and difficulty of historical reference whereas much traditional historical 
representation does not.  This leads to unorthodox modes of presentation designed both to 
suggest the difficulty of accessing the past and the possibility and necessity of doing so.
As discussed above, the most commonly identified ideological appropriation of 
history and memory takes place within the process of narrative emplotment, that is, the 
transformation of events into stories that serve a particular purpose.  It is no surprise then 
that common to all of the texts discussed in depth in this study is their resistance to 
narrative as the primary mode of historical representation.  All offer modes of 
nonnarratability or anti-narrativity as the primary means of accessing historical reality, 
suggesting that while narrativizing may be natural to the human condition, it is not, 
perhaps, the best or most accurate way to indicate the presence of the past.  This aversion 
to narrative, or at least to its capacity for historical reference, reflects the career-long 
concerns of Hayden White and other historical theorists variously labeled narrativist, 
postmodernist, or constructivist historiographers.  White proves to be a useful 
paradigmatic example in this case both for his central place within the discourse and 
debate over historical reference in the past thirty years, and for the degree to which his 
persistent probing of the limits of representation and narrative are both predicted, 
reflected, and finally diverged from by the works of postmodernist historical fiction this 
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study encompasses.  For this reason, it is useful to look closely at White and how 
narrative takes a central place in the quest for historical objectivity.
The relationship between narrativity and material reference in historical discourse 
is not immediately obvious and merits some explanation.  The very notion that historical 
representation might be largely deviant from the past itself is now commonsensical but 
was, for quite some time, undertheorized. Peter Novick’s book That Noble Dream
chronicles the efforts of the American historical profession to achieve the “dream” of 
objectivity in historical reportage, as well as the countervailing tendency to deny 
objectivity and insist on some version of relativism.  Here, it is important to note the 
fundamental difference between “objectivity” and “impartiality,” the former referring to 
the capacity of historians to correctly and accurately reproduce or present the “object” 
that is the past itself, while the latter indicating the idea of ideological neutrality.  While 
the latter has nearly always been a stated goal of the historical profession despite the 
large and long deviations from that goal, the goal of objectivity has been less consistently 
delineated or defined.  Instead, it has often been assumed. Still, relativism within 
American historiography is not a recent development, but goes back to the time following 
World War I, particularly in the nineteen-thirties, wherein philosophical and theoretical 
objections to the possibility of objectivity were substantial.48   The backlash that followed, 
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reasserting objectivity, was followed by a stronger surge of relativism, which resulted, 
according to Novick, in an “Objectivity in Crisis” for which White has become the 
central symbol and spokesperson.49
  While narrativism in historiography precedes White,50 his approach, as 
mentioned above, is most suggestive for the insights to be gained from postmodernist 
historical fiction.  His most important works, the introduction to Metahistory and the 
influential essays reprinted in Tropics of Discourse, The Content of the Form, and 
Figural Realism, approach the formal presentation of history, particularly language and 
narrative, seriously and analyze its effects on objectivity rigorously, in particular noting 
how narrative, traditionally conceived, obscures the possibility of historical objectivity.  
This, too, is the case with all of the novels included in this study, although the 
conclusions they derive from their critique of narrative differ from those of White, 
arguing for a possible objectivity in forms other than narrative where White argues for 
these forms without making claims for their objectivity.
Preceding White by some forty years,  Charles Beard’s nineteen-thirties definition 
of relativism both expresses the commonality of early and late-century historical 
relativism and pinpoints some key differences.  When Beard writes that “every 
historian’s work— that is, his selection of facts, his emphasis, his omissions, his 
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organization and his methods of presentation—bears a relation to his own personality and 
the age of circumstances in which he lives.  This is relativism” (qtd. in Novick Noble 
Dream 26),, he sounds very much like White, who later focuses on selections, omissions 
and erasures within any historian’s work.  Beard, however, is less concerned with the 
“methods of presentation,” which occupy only one place in a several item list of 
inevitably relativistic modes of historicism.  White, and many like him, focus more 
substantially on the methods of presentation, particularly narrative, but language itself as 
well.  As a result, whereas the earlier movement focused on recent theories in the 
sciences and social sciences, the most common point of comparison for White and his 
contemporaries, is between history and literature.  As Arthur Danto noted fairly early 
within the movement.  “The difference between history and science is not that history 
does and science does not employ organizing schemes which go beyond what is given.  
Both do.  The difference has to do with the kind of organizing schemes employed by 
each.  History tells stories” (qtd. in Mink 45).  Here, the crucial specification of history as 
storytelling is given center stage and the possibility of historical reference within fiction 
is suggested if only by a perverse inversion of properties.
Before more clearly defining the critique of narrative undertaken by White, and 
reflected in various forms of postmodernist historical fiction, it is important to define 
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precisely what narrativism means by narrative, as well as how the term will be used 
throughout this study.  Although the entire field of narrative theory is, at least partially, 
devoted to defining narrative and its attendant parts, there is some level of agreement on 
the bare-bones definition of narrative.  For my purposes, Lawrence Stone’s definition 
proves particularly useful.  In his own efforts to theorize historical discourse, Stone 
writes, “Narrative is taken to mean the organization of material into a chronologically 
sequential order and the focusing of the content into a single coherent story, albeit with 
subplots” (qtd. in Berkhofer 27).  In this definition of narrative, although the linear 
presentation (sjuzet or discourse) of material may not be strictly necessary or even rigidly 
possible, the precession of events (what has been called the story itself or fabula) should 
be presented to the reader as a chronological series of events that is invested with 
meaning, often based on its conclusion.51   It also focuses on narrative as a structuring and 
organizing principle which excludes or omits all events or information that does not fit 
into its “coherent story.”  It is this focus on organization and coherence that, as we shall 
see, lends itself to relativist critique.  Also central to many definitions of narrative and its 
common bedfellow, plot is the notion of causality.  Here, despite Danto’s claim that 
history is composed of “stories,” the distinction E. M. Forster makes between story and 
plot is important.  Forster claims that story merely delineates a “narrative of events 
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arranged in their time-sequence (e.g. “The king died and then the queen died,” while 
“plot is also a narrative of events, the emphasis falling on causality” (“The king died, and 
then the queen died of grief”) (Forster 86; see also Richardson, Narrative Dynamics 58).  
In the context of the debate over objectivity in historical narrative, Forster’s argument 
that story serves merely to answer the question “and then?” while plot serves to answer 
the question “why?” is an important one, because plot, in this construction, serves to 
explain how events occur, to bring them into comprehensibility and order.  White’s 
critique of narrative as a mode of historical representation is closely tied to its 
explanatory function.  If, then, a story could be constructed that did not have Forster’s 
“plot” per se, one might escape the relativist critique based on its explanatory function.  
Later developments in narrative theory, however, serve to dissolve the distinction 
Forster makes between story and plot in a manner that solidifies narrative’s explanatory 
function and leaves it, therefore, further open to relativist critique.  Likewise, any 
distinction between plot and narrative itself becomes difficult to maintain within later 
incarnations of narrative theory.  Seymour Chatman, in a critique of Forster, asserts that 
any linear presentation of events leads the reader to assume causality, even where it is not 
apparent, indicating the explanatory capacity of any story or narrative and that plot is 
therefore inherent to linear presentation.  Peter Brooks’s later definition of plot as the 
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“dynamic shaping force of the narrative discourse,” (13) indicates the inseparability of 
plot and story or either from a strict definition of narrative, which in turn asserts the 
thoroughgoing presence and influence of the explanatory capacity of plot and narrative.  
Brooks takes his cue from Paul Ricoeur who notes that plot “makes events into a story 
[…and] places us at the crossing point of temporality and narrativity” (qtd. in Brooks 14).  
Viewing plot as a dynamic force rather than a static component of a story makes 
causation, even where not explicitly obvious, inherent to narrative.  That is, plot and 
narrative become virtually inseparable, and both assume and deploy causation as their 
explanatory mode.
It is precisely the capacity of plot to “make events into stories” that triggers 
White’s influential species of historical relativism.  Since White considers the idea that 
reality presents itself as narrative to be, a “wish,” a “desire,” or a “fantasy,” (in short 
anything but the actual case), the transformation of events into stories has nothing to do 
with an attainment of historical accuracy.  Indeed, White expresses a preference of sorts 
for pre-narrative modes of historical presentation like annals and chronicles precisely 
because they do not provide the illusion of structure which did not, and could not have, 
existed in events themselves.  
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Annals merely present a list of events in chronological order, the chronicle “starts 
out to tell a story but breaks off in media res, in the chronicler’s own present” eliminating 
the possibility of a conclusion, which often functions to provide the “explanation” or 
summing up of the meaning of all that has come before.  So, whereas narrative presents 
reality as if it displays the form of a story, annals, according to White, “represent 
historical reality as if real events did not display the form of story, the chronicle 
represents it as if  real events appeared to human consciousness in the form of unfinished 
stories” (“Value ” 5).  Most importantly, White asserts that while conventional 
historiography assumes the identity between history and narrative (that is, no real history 
exists without a narrative component), White asserts that such a relationship is 
completely “conventional” and that, in fact, the rhetorical positioning of “the real,” the 
“true” as equivalent to the “narratable” is merely a matter of discursive construction.  
The postmodernist historical fiction examined in this study similarly critiques the 
capacity of narrative to obscure access to the past as it existed, but, although it is often 
read as if it promotes a thoroughgoing relativism, it instead provides this critique in order 
to suggest alternative forms as more effective ways of accessing the real.  White offers 
that our notion of historical reality is itself constructed from the form in which it is almost 
universally offered, and that our conception of what reality is would no doubt be 
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completely different if we operated within a society in which, for instance, annals, 
chronicles, or some form heretofore unexplored were the preferred mode of presentation.  
In this, he suggests that, in essence, the media is the message, that any conception of 
reality can only be a product of its discursive construction.  By contrast, the works of 
postmodernist historical fiction examined here insist on the capacity of representation to 
access the real, even as they perform a critique of narrative and language every bit as 
complex as White’s.  
If we return to the mechanics of White’s critique of narrative, it is clear that while 
he acknowledges that the sequential nature of annals, per Chatman, do produce a de-facto 
kind of narrative, it also leaves gaps in its narrative that it makes no attempt to fill, the 
continuous listing of years for which there are no corresponding events.  In this, White 
pinpoints narrative’s function, to pull together disparate events and to give the impression 
that they are all related and form a whole: 
the presence of these blank years in the annalist’s account permits us to 
perceive, by way of contrast, the extent to which narrative strains to 
produce the effect of having filled in all the gaps, to put an image of 
continuity, coherency, and meaning in place of the fantasies of emptiness, 
need, and frustrated desire that inhabit our nightmares about the 
destructive power of time.  (“Value” 11)
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In this, White’s view of narrative’s function reflects that of history suggested by Fritz 
Grillparzer, the Viennese dramatist, reproduced by Nietzsche, again stressing the 
seemingly inevitable connection between history and its common form of presentation.
What is history but the way in which the spirit of man apprehends events 
impenetrable to him: unites things when God alone knows whether they 
belong together; substitutes something comprehensible for what is 
incomprehensible; imposes his concept of purpose from without upon a 
whole which, if it possesses a purpose, does so only inherently; and 
assumes the operation of chance where a thousand little causes have been 
at work. (Nietzsche 91; see also Lane 456)
Like Grillparzer and Nietzsche, White sees narrative history as strategy of 
comfort in a world that offers none, a theme that recurs often in Swift’s Waterland.  
White argues that while both annals and narratives select certain events to include while 
omitting many others, narrative gives the impression of a unified whole with no 
exclusions or erasures, in which the past makes sense and all events are connected.  
White is careful, finally, to note that annals too give the impression that all events are 
connected, if by nothing else, than by the implication of divine providence, but the 
chronicle, and finally, the narrative do an even better job of suggesting  that events 
happen for particular reasons, all connected, and therefore operate as if according to some 
law.  Here White draws from Hegel, who argues, previous to de Certeau, that “History” 
refers both to the objective (the past itself) and the subjective (its narration), but Hegel 
sees the “union of the two meanings [...] as of a higher order than mere outward accident” 
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(qtd. in White, “Value of Narrativity” 11).  That is, Hegel sees the dual meanings of the 
term as an indication of their natural or essential union, and that it is the state itself, or the 
Law, that produces history, both in action and in its narration.  For White, by contrast, the 
union of the two meanings in a single term (“history”) is purely rhetorical and indicates 
how narration, particularly in its implication of unity and order, is imbricated within and 
part of the production of “law, legality, legitimacy, or, more generally, authority” 
(“Value” 13; emphasis in original).  Narrative’s capacity to make what may be random or 
ideologically complicit choices of events for presentation seem natural, whole, or 
inviolate  is, to White, a means of naturalizing the social order, of legitimating the law.  
“narrativity, certainly in factual storytelling and probably in fictional storytelling as well, 
is intimately related to, if not a function of, the impulse to moralize reality, that is to 
identify it with the social system that is the source of any morality that we can imagine” 
(14).  
The notion presented here, that the narrative form is a means of legitimating 
conventional morality, may be a questionable one, as undoubtedly events could be 
selected and narrativized to suggest amorality as a meaning and goal of life if one wished 
to do so.  The broader point, however, is more compelling.  The unifying tendency of 
narrative, its tendency to exclude and select while simultaneously providing the 
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impression of natural and transparent meaning, obfuscates the barriers to accessing the 
reality of the past and, in so doing, may provide an even stronger barrier than we might 
suspect.  That is, by obscuring the large degree of selection, exclusion and erasure that 
any account of the historical past must partake of, it discourages the pursuit of knowledge 
of those events and personages which have been excluded.  Likewise, if  such events are 
to be recovered and presented within a narrative form, they must be made to fit a broader 
“meaning” or explanation to which they otherwise might be inimical.  
White’s assertion that we only identify something as “real” if it is “remembered” 
and “capable of finding a place in a chronologically ordered sequence” (“Value” 19), 
drives his point home; the notion of “reality” is itself a discursive construction.  In our 
society, suggests White, something is only “historical” if it has been remembered (itself a 
questionable assessment of reality, given the manipulability of memory) and if it can be 
fit comfortably into a narrative, which is itself an explanation of the past that implies 
coherence.  Reality, then, according to White, is seen as unified and coherent precisely 
because this is what our lives (and history) are not and because this is what we most 
fervently desire.  It is a small step to suggest that narrative falsifies events even if they 
“truly” happened, although White never quite makes this assertion.52  Again, these ideas 
are similarly explored in the works of postmodernist historical fiction I examine within 
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this study, although with a difference.  These texts work to seek those parts of the past 
not encompassed by the tyrannies of sequence, memory, and coherence, in order to more 
accurately present the past without laying a claim to total Truth or inviolate meaning that 
would reproduce the unifying function of narrative.   
 Overall, what White emphasizes here is the capacity narration and plot have to 
transform actual events into stories, full of causality, progress and meaning where none is 
inherently present.  His focus on tropology in the introduction to Metahistory also reflects 
the poststructural emphasis on the incapacity of language to refer to material objects or 
their past which came to dominate a large portion of relativist historiography.  As White 
sagely notes, “The fall into legend is the price science pays to myth for the use of 
language” (qtd. in Vann “Turning Linguistic” 62; see White “The Abiding Relevance”), 
suggesting that language itself precludes the supposed aims of history, a point of view 
presented somewhat more elliptically by the big names of French poststructuralism, 
particularly Jacques Derrida. Within historiographic discourse there has been a wide-
ranging debate about both narrativism and the linguistic turn.53 It is also important to note 
that some of this debate has been both pre-figured and reproduced in such discourses as 
feminist theory and postcolonial theory (in both cases, the work of Gayatri Spivak is 
relevant), both of which are intimately concerned with issues of materiality versus 
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discursive construction.  Some of these debates are noted and explored in the chapters 
that follow wherein both feminist and postcolonial concerns are foregrounded in relation 
to the novels under discussion.  The importance of a critique of narrative and an 
insistence on the access to the material past to feminism are evident particularly in 
Between the Acts, but also in Waterland, while their similar importance in relation to 
colonial and subaltern histories are suggested in all three texts, but most pervasively in 
Midnight’s Children.   
While various proponents and opponents of historical narrativism specifically, 
and relativism in general, are given fuller voice in some of the chapters that follow, most 
important to my own claims is the degree to which the narrativists have won the battle, 
but lost a significant element in the war, at least within the field of historiography.  In 
terms of the philosophy of history, White’s Metahistory may be the most influential book 
of the twentieth century, even if the influence is largely, according to Peter Novick, 
outside of the historical profession itself.  Indeed, the spread of the “linguistic turn” in 
general and postmodern historiographic theory in particular has led Nancy Partner to ask 
if “the impact of non-referential language theory, deconstruction and the exposure of 
hegemonic interests embedded in what used to pass for natural description left the ancient 
discipline [of history] shattered beyond recuperation” (21).  
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Partner’s response to her own rhetorical question is, typically, in the negative.  
She observes that “the ‘linguistic turn’ was a revolving door and that everyone went 
around and around and got out exactly where they got in” (22).  That is, while anyone 
who gives serious thought to the matter seems to acknowledge that linguistic, social, and 
narrative construction prevent unmediated access to the past, historians whose business is 
the reporting of the past rather than the theorizing of that reporting “carry on in all 
essential ways as though nothing had changed since Ranke, or Gibbon for that matter: as 
though invisible guardian angels of epistemology would always spread protecting wings 
over facts, past reality” (Partner 22).  Historians, then, tend to acknowledge the 
theoretical limits of their profession, yet continue to present history in a discourse that 
implies unmediated access to the past.  Indeed, Hans Kellner argues that even the most 
theoretically-minded historians are prone to sliding into a “realist” posture, arguing that 
“the ghost of naive realism haunts all of us, however much we deny it” (“Introduction,” 
10).  That is, while many historians (like Partner) argue that the “postmodern” skepticism 
towards language’s ability to represent the past is not postmodern at all, but has been 
typical of the profession since at least Ancient Greece, it is equally true that the discourse 
of historicism frequently ignores this skepticism. 
91
While there have been spirited defenses of both the possibility of historical 
objectivity and narrative’s capacity to transmit such objectivity, what is of central interest 
to me here is the way that postmodernist historical fiction expresses just such a 
skepticism towards narrative’s capacity to represent the past.  However, the common 
critical approach to such skepticism has been an assessment of such texts as denying the 
possibility of historical reference instead of a focus on their critique of narrative itself as 
a barrier to reference.  White’s critical fortunes, in this regard, mirror that of the novels I 
will discuss.  White is often excoriated for denying the possibility of historical objectivity 
when, in fact, this is not his primary goal.  Instead, his work functions primarily as a 
critique of a particular form of representation, that of narrative, and as an advocacy for 
different forms.  It is, indeed, often White’s central point not only that discourse deforms 
referentiality, but that history should reflect the knowledge of this deformation, not 
ignore it.  It is not surprising then that White’s greatest reception has been among literary 
scholars who see such awareness not within “history” proper, but in historical fiction like 
that of Kundera, Spiegelman, and the other writers examined in this study.  
The clearest expression of White’s argument for different forms occurs in the 
early “The Burden of History,” which reflects some of the concerns aired by Nietzsche 
and Foucault about the problems with contemporary historical representation.  White, 
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likewise, calls for a radical change in historical presentation to break free of the tropology 
of historical discourse and “to participate positively in the liberation of the present from 
the burden of history” (41; emphasis in original).  By this, White means that the myth of 
the possibility of objective presentation of historical facts has confined the writing of 
historical narrative to a “realistic” framework that identifies “the sole possible form of 
historical narration” as that used in “the English novel as it had developed by the late 
nineteenth century” (“Burden” 44; emphasis in original), or that of “realistic” narrative.  
In this, White critiques the failure of historians to employ the narrative methods, or 
“techniques of literary representation,” of the great modernists “Joyce, Yeats and Ibsen” 
(“Burden” 43), and encourages the use of “surrealistic, expressionistic, or existentialist 
historiography” (43) and the “plunder of psychoanalysis, cybernetics, game theory, and 
the rest” (47).  The novels I discuss in this study, like many of the great novels of the 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, are characterized stylistically by their rejection 
of linear, “realistic” narrative and its embrace of recursive, circular, self-reflexive and 
heavily subjective narration, or indeed the refusal of narrative itself.   White calls for 
these experimental innovations54  in historiography as a means of acknowledging the 
futility of recapturing the past in a means that is “literally truthful” and instead claims 
that “they can be judged solely in terms of the richness of the metaphors which govern its 
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sequence of articulation” (“Burden” 46).    White’s critique of the realistic, traditional 
narrative form leads him, in this essay at least, to promote history as art, to be judged not 
by its capacity for objectivity but by its linguistic richness.  
Postmodernist historical fiction makes a similar advocacy for different linguistic 
forms and particularly non-narrative approaches, but insists forcefully that a different 
form may allow us access to the real itself, rather than merely creating a different 
discursive formation of reality.  It does so by suggesting that where narrative obscures or 
falsifies reality while laying claim to it, models of non-narratability and anti-narrativity 
give us such access without claiming unity and coherence, thus avoiding the type of 
obfuscation inherent to the narrative form.  Each text I discuss gives a different model of 
non-narratability or anti-narrativity, but all deny narrative as a feasible model for 
representing the past accurately.
As I have endeavored to define narrative, it is also necessary to define terms such 
as non-narratability and anti-narrativity more rigorously.  Simplistically, of course, a 
definition of non-narrative or anti-narrative would be based upon a point-for-point 
rejection of standard definitions of narrative, like that of Stone.  In particular, this means 
the rejection of sequential organization and all that this implies, particularly the 
uninterrupted movement from past to present, the frequently asserted fundamental 
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separation of past from present, and any notion of progress or teleology.  Likewise, non-
narrative or anti-narrative, like the chronicle, refuses the comfort and explanation of 
conclusions, closures, or teleology.  Also, what I am calling non-narrative or anti-
narrative refuses the principles of selection, elision, and erasure that allows the 
homogenization of the disparate elements of the past into a single, unified, story.  While 
postmodernist historical fiction cannot include every event or personage in a particular 
segment of the past, they work hard to prevent alternative events to traditional histories 
and/or events that are not easily integrated in a singular narrative.  Most importantly, 
postmodernist historical fiction uses nonnarrative devices to express and access the real, 
not merely to explore the “richness of metaphors.”
Throughout this study, I use several terms to delineate separate elements or 
specific characteristics of nonnarrative.  Foremost among these are the “nonnarratable” 
and the “anti-narrative.”  For nonnarratability, I draw principally from narrative theorists 
like D. A. Miller (Narrative and Its Discontents) and Peter Brooks (Reading for the Plot) 
who assert that in order for a narrative to commence or be sustained, an event or situation 
must occur that brings instability or disequilibrium to a relatively stable situation.  As 
such, it requires life and/or mind altering circumstances that inalterably separate the 
moment narrative begins from its nonnarratable past.  One strategy used in postmodernist 
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historical fiction to access the real of the past is to focus on the nonnarratable, the period 
devoid of life-altering “events,” or, at the very least, between two or more such events, 
providing a period of little change as it is traditionally defined, presenting more 
continuity between past and present than discontinuity and therefore suggesting the 
possibility of accessing the past through the repeated and recursive present.  Nora’s claim 
for the “continuous present” that memory provides has a parallel here, although memory 
itself is rarely viewed in postmodernist historical fiction as the medium through which 
the real of the continuous present can be accessed.
I use the term anti-narrative, by contrast, to refer to events so strange, 
incomprehensible, or inexplicable that they are impossible to comfortably fit into the 
unity, coherence, and comfort of narrative unity.  While narrative is sustained and carried 
forward by life or world changing events that stimulate its existence and then must be 
resolved or explained through its processes and conclusions, some of these events cannot 
be explained by narrative and cannot fit comfortably into whatever meaning the 
conclusion seems to provide.  The existence of such events is common to the works 
examined here, particularly in Woolf’s idea of “Moments of Being” expressed in her A 
“Sketch of the Past,” but also evident in a novel like Between the Acts, as well as in 
Graham Swift’s delineation of the concept of the “Here and Now” in Waterland.  This is 
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one version of the idea of the “historical sublime” discussed by Ann Rigney in her book 
Imperfect Histories and by Hans Kellner in a recent article in PMLA (“However 
Imperceptibly”).  Kellner refers to the inexplicability of certain actions and their causes 
and notes the responsibility of the historian to express that inexplicability in both form 
and content.55   Kellner refers negatively to the “beautification by explanation” inherent to 
narrative, but does not suggest, as postmodernist historical fiction does, that the 
avoidance of such beautification may lead us closer to the truth.  Like White, he 
advocates a form of anti-narrativity inspired by the historical sublime without giving it 
any epistemological privilege.  Works like Between the Acts and Waterland do give it 
that privilege and present a compelling logic and ethics for doing so that is important to 
consider. 
Rushdie’s version of anti-narrativity is somewhat different.  His focus on the 
“errata” that are generated by his narrative but are not explicitly part of it indicates a 
skepticism towards the capacity of narrative to access and/or reproduce the past in its 
fullness and the subsequent need for the inclusion of events, personages, or ideas outside 
of a unifying narrative construct.  Although such events, for him, are not necessarily 
sublime in the same way as “Moments of Being” or the “Here and Now,” they do provide 
a way of avoiding the “beautification” inherent to narrative.  The dialectic nature of the 
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nonnarratable and anti-narrative are most clear in Swift’s Waterland which explicitly 
deals with the theorization of history, but both of the other novels considered at length 
partake of both of these versions of nonnarrative.
Finally, I use terms like narratability and hypernarratability to express the 
antagonists to ideas of nonnarrativity and anti-narrativity.  An event is narratable if it 
stimulates narrative desire and creates the disequilibrium necessary to generate a 
narrative.  Likewise, it is narratable if it fits easily into a unified sequential procession the 
provides formal unity and coherence.  It is hypernarratable, in this context, if its 
narratability seems parodically extreme, stimulating a wealth of stories and providing the 
fulfillment of unity and coherence almost too easily in the manner of a cheap romance or 
compulsively rigorous detective novel.  Swift and Rushdie, in particular, make use of 
such events to provide a stark contrast to their nonnarratable and anti-narrative strains.  
While this overview of the terms, debates and conditions of narrativism has 
focused largely on historiography and the historical profession, the remainder of the 
dissertation does expand the scope somewhat.  In particular, I position the works of 
postmodernist historical fiction against such poststructural theorists as Derrida and Paul 
de Man, and within the debates over materialism and discursive construction common to 
feminist and postcolonial  history.  Primarily, I examine how works of postmodernist 
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historical fiction have been commonly placed into the relativist camp when they do not 
comfortably into such a category.  The defining of these texts as “postmodernist” and 
therefore relativist has blunted their social, political, and ethical concerns, something 
which I address in the chapters that follow.  Such claims have been made before, 
particularly by critics like Satya Mohanty who argues for the creation of a category of 
postpositivist realism illustrated primarily through Toni Morrison’s Beloved and by 
Michel Rolf-Trouillot who traces the importance of silences in accessing the past. My 
own innovation is principally in the marriage of narrative theory and high theory and the 
effort to align efforts at historical reference to the refusal of narrativity.  
All of the works discussed in this study follow this path, although in very 
different ways.  In this, they refuse the two common options offered by Kundera and 
Spiegelman, the embracing of the “wisdom of uncertainty” and the retreat from 
representation.  Kundera and Spiegelman’s work illustrates the susceptibility of memory 
to emplotment and its questionable status as a reparative to history.  Instead, 
postmodernist historical fiction offers nonnarrative modes of representation as a means to 
access the past.  In this, they refuse White’s espousal of the “fictions of factual 
representation” and replace it with a version of the facts available through fictional 
representation.  While I do not claim that these fiction writers have untied the Gordian 
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knot of historical reference, these works of fiction do have much to teach us about the 
social, political, and ethical importance of maintaining the possibility of accessing the 
materiality of the past, and about the formal capacity for doing so.
Notes
1 Lyotard takes the idiosyncratic position that the postmodern actually precedes 
the modern. He observes that the (post)modern takes place in the realization that neither 
narrative nor scientific discourse can present an objective truth. The modern displays a 
nostalgia, or a longing, for the previous era’s belief in a totalizing system by which to 
understand the world. The postmodern accepts, even embraces, the relativist new era. 
Although Lyotard’s definition is far from the only assessment of the postmodern, the 
characteristic of a retreat from an “essential” and coherent belief system is standardly 
associated with postmodernism with either positive or negative connotations (or both) 
depending on the critic.
2  It is in this sense that I see poststructuralist deconstruction as a practice related 
to postmodernism as a site of theoretical exchange. Both emphasize the impossibility of 
accessing a foundational or essential truth. Deconstruction does so by revealing the 
contradictions and “supplementary” logic of the central texts of western metaphysics (and 
literature) while postmodern theory in the mode of Lyotard, Baudrillard and Jameson 
posit the current age as that of lost metanarratives (Lyotard) and the dissolution of the 
difference between the simulation (the textual representation) and the real (Baudrillard). 
Of course, these (largely Marxist and post-Marxist) theorists take different positions on 
the desirability of this historical development, with Jürgen Habermas (fairly consistently) 
advocating a return to the values and philosophical approach of the Enlightenment, and 
Jameson (at times) displaying a nostalgia for a less fragmented and historically amnesiac 
time. Lyotard, of course, sees the dissolution of master narratives as a positive and 
necessary development, while Baudrillard (in his later work) seems to apocalyptically 
accept and embrace the development of signification without referent. Common to all of 
them, however, is the sense that, as Linda Hutcheon points out, “...the master narratives 
of bourgeois liberalism are under attack” (Poetics 6).
3 Although historians almost universally condemn the claim that the Holocaust did 
not occur, there has been a movement to focus on the construction of the term 
“Holocaust” as a signifier in post World War II politics. The focus on the discursivity of 
the term and the political ends to which it is used does not, however, to my mind, obviate 
the importance of insisting on the material reality of the event itself, under whatever 
name. 
4  I argue for this semi-neologism not because Hutcheon’s term for similar work 
(“historiographic metafiction”) is linguistically unwieldy (my terms are no more friendly 
to the tongue) but because she identifies the object under study as “metafiction,” 
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foregrounding the self-referential elements of the discourse more centrally than its 
historiographic element (which is relegated to the merely adjectival).  Instead, I think it is 
important to locate the work within a long tradition of “historical fiction” that has an 
allegiance to fidelity to the past (while still taking artistic license).  I also wish to allow 
for the possibility that not all historiographic metafiction attempts to insist upon the 
possibility of accessing the material past (not having studied all of its incarnations, as 
Hutcheon seems to have done), while what I am calling postmodernist historical fiction 
does make such an attempt.  Indeed, it is its defining element.
5 I use this term (“postmodernist fiction,” borrowed from Brian McHale) as a way 
of suggesting some shared preoccupations with postmodern theorists like Lyotard, 
Baudrillard, etc. al., but not necessarily a shared discursive field. The writers I discuss are 
not explicitly theorizing the postmodern world, although they do share an interest in the 
difficulty of accessing truth, reality, and the past as a site of investigation. In their 
attempts to move outside the theorization of lost signification and into the realm of 
representing history, they call to attention the sociopolitical repercussions of the theories 
I have discussed, as the theorists themselves also do in different ways.
6 Defined here loosely as the preoccupation with the destabilization of the 
confidence in referentiality and a historical referent. 
7  Although it is unfashionable to name the narrator as the author, it is also 
difficult in the case of The Book and Maus not to do so. Their autobiographical 
components make it difficult to, as we shall see, confirm these books as novels with 
purely fictional narrators. The distinction between fiction and reality is instead 
consistently challenged. If, as this article and much postmodern theory argue, reality as 
we perceive it is a narrative construction of sorts, the distinction becomes even less 
tenable.
8  There is much debate over the correct terminology to be used in referring to this 
event, especially within the Jewish community, where the term has come to be a bit of a 
political football.  As Peter Novick recounts: “In recent years, it has been said that the 
word [Holocaust] is hatefully inappropriate because its original meaning was a religious 
sacrifice consumed by fire; it thus represents a pernicious Christianization of Jewish 
suffering.  On these grounds...the Hebrew word for catastrophe, ‘shoah’ is said to be 
superior—a purely Jewish and purely secular term....” However, as Novick points out, 
“Since long before the Second World War, ‘holocaust’ in everyday usage, was almost 
always used to describe widespread destruction, particularly by fire, with no [...] 
theological freight [...].  And ‘shoah’ in the Hebrew Bible was repeatedly used to 
describe punishments visited by God on the Jews—hardly a more palatable connotation” 
(Holocaust 133).  Finally, the word “holocaust” was traditionally the English translation 
of the Hebrew “shoah,” making the debate seem somewhat irresolvable and unnecessary 
(even if the translation is not completely accurate, as translations rarely are).  My 
tendency is to use the English term throughout this study (as my Hebrew school days are 
long behind me and almost completely forgotten), although I do so with the knowledge 
that there is significant debate around this issue.  I choose to follow Novick’s lead in 
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marking the debate as one of lesser importance among the many surrounding the 
Holocaust.
9  The genocide also included the killing of millions of others of various religions 
and ethnicities. Despite this fact, however, the Holocaust has become intensely identified 
with the Jewish experience.
10 See the next section of this chapter for a more thorough discussion of the 
differences between history, memory, and collective memory.
11  In this context, Gilman takes Lopate’s comments to be an example of Jewish 
“self-hatred.” That is, where Lopate critiques an overemphasis on the Holocaust, Gilman 
insists on its positive centrality. Both, however, acknowledge the centrality that the 
memory of the Holocaust has had in practice in contemporary Jewish religious and 
communal identification.  Novick also observes the importance of the Holocaust within 
folk religion (i.e. among generally irreligious American Jews), and identifies several 
political and social reasons for it, not the least of which are the fading theological 
commitment in much of contemporary American Jewry and the controversy over Israeli 
politics.   Novick quotes a Rabbi who observes that there is nothing surprising in the 
(increasing) focus on the Holocaust among Jews because ‘God and Israel are too 
controversial’ (Holocaust 169).  Novick’s deconstruction of the “essential” primacy of 
the Holocaust in Jewish life in favor of a discursive analysis of the origins of this primacy 
is important and necessary, but does not reduce the importance of maintaining a firm grip 
on the Holocaust as an event that occurred and has impact on the present precisely 
because it occurred and not as a cautionary “story.”  Novick does question the 
Holocaust’s contemporary utility because of its status as an extreme event, but never 
questions its historical facticity.
12 Faurisson’s work actually follows the initial efforts of the American “star” of 
Holocaust denial, Arthur Butz, whose book The Hoax of the Twentieth Century: The 
Case Against the Presumed Extermination of European Jewry helped inspire the Institute 
for Historical Review, which was devoted to uncovering the Holocaust as hoax.  This 
touched off a brief firestorm of controversy including the publication of Holocaust Denial 
advertisements in many college newspapers in the early 1990’s and the publication of 
several books that denied the deniers.  For a brief account of these events, see Novick 
Holocaust 270-72.
13  Again, the actual threat here is rather small, as the percentage of the population 
who are Holocaust deniers is statistically miniscule.  The mere idea that such a memory 
can be denied or obscured is, however, a frightening one for many Jews (and others as 
well).
14  This phrase is borrowed from Paul John Eakin’s investigation of the art of self-
representation, Touching the World.
15  See Richard Terdiman’s fascinating Modernity and Memory Crisis for an 
account of how the lost faith in the representational capacity of memory is a 
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distinguishing feature of the twentieth century. Terdiman also provides a useful analysis 
of the parallels between the slippage of linguistic signification (in semiotic discourse) and 
the slippage of mnemonic signification. Memory, in the past century, is always seen to be 
inextricable from forgetting as direct access to past experience is consistently denied.
16  In other words, while Kundera exposes and discusses the obvious ways in 
which the obliteration of Clementis is a distortion of the historical record, Foucault and 
de Certeau assert that the erasure and silencing of facts, events, and occurrences are an 
unavoidable and constitutive part of unifying traditional or “classical” history. The 
Clementis example is merely a more obvious representative of the consistent narrative 
violence of which all history partakes. It is in this way that the two fundamental 
requirements for classical history contradict one another. It is impossible for a unifying 
narrative to exist and also be completely “referential.  Rather the real and its unifying 
narration are incompatible, according to Foucault and de Certeau.
17
 See Burke, particularly the introduction and the final chapter for an account of 
this backlash.
18  This rather extreme assertion has been contested, of course, but it does provide 
a useful touchstone to the concept of “collective memory” which is largely Halbwachs’s. 
19  This, likewise, ties to Baudrillard’s sense of the postmodern world in which 
signifier and signified, simulation and the real, are indistinguishable from one another. 
Here the representation (history) seems identical or at least indistinguishable from what 
was once considered the historical real (history).
20  We might call this narrativization inevitable in the sense that, as Derrida offers, 
there is nothing “outside the text.”  Again, the difficulty of separating the “real” from the 
“representation” is the key problem here, as any telling or representation of his memories 
turns “reality” into discourse.
21  Here it might be helpful to advert to Hegel’s distinctions between “memory” 
and “recollection.”  If memory (or the intuition) is the images and feelings that exist in 
our past and in “the dark depths of our inner being” (§454 Zusatz), recollection is that 
process by which these memories become “our actual possession” (§454 Zusatz), become 
integrated into the ego and become part of the self. Here Mirek attempts to incorporate 
Zdena into his ego by erasing those parts of her that do not correspond to his image of 
himself. In this Hegelian conception, we might see Zdena as part of his memories, but not 
of his “recollection.”  However, it seems that Kundera tries to break down the difference 
between these two Hegelian concepts, as the self becomes more of a performative 
construction than a synthetic creation, and “recollection” becomes less a means of 
identity formation and more of a narrative performance that excludes and erases, 
eliminating memories and truth in its quest for synthetic wholeness.
22  It may be useful to understand the psychoanalytic “return of the repressed” as 
itself a cultural narrative that “makes sense” of trauma. The portrayal of ethnic and 
cultural “haunting” is already, in one sense, an emplotment (a narrativizing or 
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textualizing) even before the exorcism that Sethe achieves with Beloved. Beloved, in 
Henderson’s terms, is already part of the narrative of the Uncanny (“unheimlich”) and the 
“return of the repressed.”  All of this, of course, refers principally to Freud’s 
psychoanalytic theory and practice of which memory is possibly the key and vital 
element. Freud founds neurotic subjectivity in particular, and subjectivity in general 
substantially on traumatic (sexual) memories that have hitherto been “repressed.” “We 
give the name of traumas to those impressions, experienced early and later forgotten, to 
which we attach such great importance in the aetiology of neuroses” (Freud Moses and 
Monotheism 72). The psychoanalytic process, then, is meant to move the subject from 
“repeating” (re-enacting the trauma in a different form), to remembering (recalling the 
trauma rather than repressing it), to “working through” the trauma. Although the exact 
way to “work through” the trauma is at times unclear, at least part of the process is the 
narration of and reintegration of the repressed event into the ego, or the subject’s 
narrative of their own life (the “talking cure”). The therapeutic narration of the repressed 
event seems to me to be reflected by the “working through” that Sethe does in Beloved, 
reviving the repressed event of the murder of Beloved and re-integrating it into a new 
story to conquer her neuroses. In The Book of Laughter and Forgetting however, it seems 
the urge to re-narrate and unify the ego (or the self) is an oppressive force of erasure and 
suppression rather than a productive “working through.”  While this (unavoidably 
reductive) account of Freudian psychoanalysis seems to suggest that the recovery of the 
truth and its narration are essential to a healthy subjectivity, the Kunderan model suggests 
(along with poststructural historical accounts of history and memory discussed above) 
that the recovery of the “truth” and its narration are irreconcilable and that the attempt to 
unify the ego, particularly through narration (as seen here with Mirek) is an oppressive 
and exclusionary procedure. Of course, the status of “truth” is already radically brought 
into question in Freud, particularly through the concept of “screen memories,” 
foundational, and at times traumatic, memories that may in fact be false memories 
substituted for the “true” repressed memories in the unconscious. How to identify “screen 
memories” from “true” memories is never completely clear and lends itself to a 
(post)modern “withdrawal of the real.”  This Freudian relativism has additionally become 
a central site of contestation because of Freud’s willingness to deny the essential “truth” 
of his patients’ memories of sexual molestation. Richard Terdiman chronicles Freud’s 
initial adherence to the “facticity” of the unconscious and his later increasing inability to 
separate truth and “phantasy” (240-343).
23
 Although Barthes does see the photography as an “emanation of past reality,” 
he also sees it as a barrier to memory, rather than a facilitator of it.  Photographs serve as 
a “counter-memory” that replace memory itself rather than contribute to it and inhibit the 
mourning process rather than contribute to it (Camera Lucida 89-91).  
24  “The only amusing thing about it all was my existence, the existence of a man 
erased from history, from literary histories, and from the telephone book, of a dead man 
now returned to life in an amazing reincarnation to preach the great truth of astrology to 
hundreds of thousands of young people in a socialist country” (The Book 84).
25  In an interview reprinted in Kundera’s theoretical Art of the Novel, Kundera 
suggests that his characters are constructed from an “existential code” made of a 
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conglomeration of words, “For Tereza [in The Unbearable Lightness of Being]: body, 
soul, vertigo, weakness, idyll, Paradise. For Tomas: lightness, weight” (29).
26  Increasingly, postmodern theory has attempted to deconstruct divisions between 
fiction and history, non-referential and referential narrative, as the quotation from Paul de 
Man (above) indicates. De Man, in the passage quoted, takes the most extreme 
postmodern position that, in fact, the real does not exist until it is represented in writing. 
Partially through de Man’s influence, however, it has become increasingly difficult, if not 
impossible, to claim the transparent referentiality of autobiographical narrative. In a 
recent effort to arrest the slippage between history and fiction, Dorrit Cohn has pointed 
out the generic and narratological conventions that separate the fictional from the 
historical, but she acknowledges that the conventions of autobiography and 
autobiographical novels are often indistinguishable, as in the paradigmatic case of 
Proust’s A La Recherche du Temps Perdu. Likewise she is reluctant to consider closely 
the genre of what Linda Hutcheon calls historiographic metafiction (and I call 
postmodernist historical fiction here); self-reflexive, postmodern, but simultaneously 
historical narratives like that of Kundera and Spiegelman.
27  This is particularly the case in early twentieth century discourse about 
“involuntary,” spontaneous, or unconscious memories (as opposed to those willfully 
brought to consciousness by the subject). The idea that spontaneous memories may be 
more reliable (more connected to the “real”) than voluntary or conscious memories is, of 
course, a commonplace in Proust but makes surprising reappearances in other contexts as 
well. “The valorization of powerful, unconscious, involuntary, or spontaneous memories 
over conscious or voluntary memory by both Bergson and Proust may well constitute a 
strong current in the cultural unconscious of Joyce’s Ulysses” (Rickard 61). Likewise, the 
Freudian “return” of the repressed is a corresponding type of unconscious memory. Freud 
is not confident in the referentiality of such returning repressed memories (“Screen 
Memories”) and the radically postmodern view would discourage the distinction between 
the textual representation of conscious memory and the supposed reality of spontaneous 
memory. The first, at least in its re-iteration, may be as discursive as the latter, although 
the distinction between them highlights how difficult and complicated a problem memory 
is. Some events may, of course, be merely “forgotten” (perhaps because they are 
unimportant), others are “repressed” (because they are so important). The result to the 
“conscious” mind seems remarkably similar.
28  The Symbolic is Lacan’s term, and is useful here in distinguishing between the 
“Real” (that which is beyond explanation or signification) and that which is “inside the 
text” (to again adopt Derrida’s formulation). For Lacan, the “Real” is that which defies 
explanation, causality, and signification and corresponds to Freud’s “unconscious” while 
adapting it to the linguistic realm (for Lacan, the unconscious is structured like a 
language). The “Symbolic” realm, then, is discursive, subject to emplotment, and 
invested with meaning. The “Real” is the sublime, beyond explanation but (as its name
suggests) perhaps the most completely referential despite its elusiveness.  More on the 
application of Lacanian theory to historical representation follows in Chapters One and 
Two.
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29  The notion of the impossibility, or at least inadvisability, of referencing the 
Holocaust goes back at least as far as Theodor Adorno’s claim that it is barbaric to write 
lyric poetry after the Holocaust (see Adorno, “After Auschwitz” 362) but has expanded 
far beyond that narrow and particular art form.  Several books of essays have been 
devoted to this idea and it is widely circulated within Holocaust studies (which continues 
to churn out countless accounts of the Holocaust despite its claimed fundamental 
unrepresentability).  Two paradigmatic examples are the collections, Lang, Writing and 
the Holocaust and Friedlander, Probing the Limits of Representation.  A general attitude 
towards representing the Holocaust is expressed by Raul Hilberg who writes, “You all 
remember Adorno’s dictum that it is barbaric to write poetry after Auschwitz.  I am no 
poet, but the thought occurred to me that if that statement is true, then is it not equally 
barbaric to write footnotes after Auschwitz?” (25).  Indeed, Hilberg and others insist that 
such an attempt is not only barbaric, but doomed to failure because of the impossibility of 
representing the traumatic nature of the event.  Arthur Cohen notes that “there is 
something in the nature of thought that is alien to the enormity of the death camps,” while 
Emil Fackenheim notes that the more the psychologist, historian, or 'psychohistorian’ 
attempts to explain the Holocaust the more he is forced to admit its “inexplicability” 
(both qtd. in Seeskin 110).  Of course, the typical postmodernist claim that representation 
itself is constitutively destined for failure makes the Holocaust just one among many 
events that cannot be represented, and the fact that this is so evidently true in the case of 
the Holocaust makes it perhaps the most real event and most comprehensible (in its 
incomprehensibility).  Friedlander, indeed, calls for an “aesthetics that marks its own 
limitations, its inability to provide eternal answers and stable meaning” (Young 666) as 
the preferred type of history for the Holocaust, although he also asks for a simultaneously 
coherent and explanatory approach to put alongside the former.  I shall return to the 
difficulties of these ideas both within this introduction and throughout the study.
30 This is once again within a Freudian framework, where personal trauma leads to 
the repression of memories of that event. Here, I apply the idea loosely to a community 
that has a traumatic event that occurs to all in the community (at least metaphorically 
speaking) and is, therefore, prone to collective repression.  This has become a common 
prism through which to view the Holocaust, particularly because of the paucity of 
Holocaust discourse and study in the twenty years or so following the event and the 
discourse’s substantial “return” after that period.  In Writing History, Writing Trauma, 
Dominick LaCapra describes the Holocaust and its writing in precisely these terms.  Peter 
Novick, on the other hand, argues substantially against such an interpretation and prefers 
to see the fluctuations in Holocaust consciousness (particularly in the United States) as 
dictated by more immediate social and political concerns.  
31 Again, here, the Hegelian definition of “recollection” is useful. See note 21.
32  Derrida’s famous deconstruction (in Dissemination) of writing as “pharmakon,” 
both poison and cure, is applicable here. Although it is often writing that is trusted and 
valorized in much contemporary discourse, the spoken seems to hold a reservoir of 
immanence for many in terms of “remembering” the Holocaust.
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33  Here I am employing Neil Gotanda’s terms, originally adopted in a legal 
context, but useful in separating racial identifications inscribed from without and those 
constructed from within a racialized group. “Formal-race” refers to the external, 
supposedly neutral, formal characteristics ascribed to certain racial groups by societal 
discourse, while “historical race” refers to the combination of societal inscription and 
communal identification that has “created” the race as currently constituted (Gotanda 
257). Gotanda’s use of several different terms to replace the singular term of “race,” 
helps problematize the essentialist and monolithic understanding of race still prevalent in 
contemporary society.
34  Actually in a more radically postmodern view of identity, they were never born 
“Black”, except in the sense that identity can only be formulated in discourse and a 
discourse that denied the positivist “one drop of blood” rule common to the United States 
did not popularly exist.
35  This idea of historical events fitting into a previously established dramatic 
“plot,” here one of innocence and redemption is akin to the poststructural historiography 
of Hayden White who notes how historical discourse partakes of “emplotment” (as 
discussed above) which mediates, obscures, or obliterates historical access to the real (or 
to “meaning”) through discursive mediation.
36  The primary reason for Spiegelman’s deployment of the comic-book form is 
undoubtedly (and self-admittedly) because this was the form in which he had always 
worked.  It is, however, also an extremely appropriate one in the sense that Jews were 
often portrayed as mice, rats, and vermin in cartoon form in Nazi Julius Streich’s weekly 
Der Sturmer.  The other commonly cited source for Spiegelman’s choice of mice for 
Jewish representation is the equally anti- Semitic Der ewige Jude (1940) by Fritz Hippler 
in which Hippler cross-cuts between ghetto rabbis and sewer rats (Doherty 74-75).  In 
Maus, by contrast, Joshua Brown argues that “...the Jews are not mice, the Poles are not
pigs, the Germans are not cats. The anthropomorphic presentation of the characters 
should make that eminently clear” (105; emphasis in original). Brown may overstate the 
case somewhat, but it is clear that Spiegelman’s appropriation of Nazi iconography is 
meant ironically not literally. We must also note that Spiegelman partakes of 
stereotypical depictions of the gentile characters as well, with French frogs, and Gypsy 
“moths.” While this appears to be an effort to expose and concretize discursive 
constructions of racial identity, it only makes this an obvious and political issue in the 
case of the Jews.  
37
 Although I initially found this passage in LaCapra’s study, it appears quite 
frequently in studies of Maus (although not always at such length).  The complete quote 
also appears in James Young’s “The Holocaust as Vicarious Past” and originally in 
Spiegelman’s letter, New York Times Book Review 29 Dec. 1991: 4.
38 Dominick Lacapra’s study of Maus in History and Memory After Auschwitz
analyzes its hybridity in depth (143-155).
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39  For a fascinating analysis of the deployment of linguistic difference in Maus, 
see Rosen “The Language of Survival.”  Rosen points to the degree to which Vladek’s 
voice and language, “uniquely broken, incompetent, unmastered” (260) is the closest the 
book gets to “authoritative” (260).
40  My reading here is diametrically opposed to several other critics’ accounts of 
Maus.  Steven Tabachnick, for one, sees the photographs as lending authenticity, rather 
than pointing to construction.  “These genuine photographs say that this story, like the 
Holocaust itself, actually happened; that this is autobiography, not fiction,” while 
simultaneously declaring that it lends an air of nostalgia (160).  Nostalgia, of course, 
consists of a coloring of the past that could hardly be said to be strictly “accurate,” and 
the point here is not, I believe, a separation of autobiography and fiction but an 
observation of what they share.  This is not to say that Spiegelman does not aim for an 
accurate presentation of the past (he does), but that he simultaneously argues for the 
impossibility of actually achieving such a representation.  For much more on photographs 
and their contribution to memory (and post-memory) in Maus, see Hirsch “Family 
Pictures: Maus, Mourning, and Post-Memory.”
41  “But Anja-her appearance-you could see more easy she was Jewish. I was 
afraid for her” (Maus 136).
42 Again, Hayden White’s suggestion that there are only so many “stories” that 
events can be plotted into seems relevant here. In denying Vladek the narrative of 
“messianic redemption,” Artie finds himself faced with the narrative of Jewish 
miserliness, which is of course intimately connected with the narrative of anti-Semitism 
that contributed to the Holocaust in the first place. The desire to avoid emplotment does 
not seem like an easily attainable goal here.
43  For an account of this discourse, see Gilman The Jew’s Body, 99-101, 234-43. 
e. g. “For Jews bear the salient stigma of the black skin of the syphilitic...”; “The Jews are 
black, according to nineteenth-century racial science, because they are not a pure race, 
because they are a race which has come from Africa” (99).
44  If, for de Certeau, classical history is characterized by its tendency to construct 
“others” of the past, we can see how collective memory is equally prone to constructing 
“others,” only here in the more politically volatile present.
45 This is the side of the border we might associate with Baudrillard who writes, 
“All Western faith and good faith became engaged in [a] wager on representation: that a 
sign could refer to the depth of meaning, that a sign could be exchanged for meaning and 
that something could guarantee this exchange— God of course. But what if God himself 
can be simulated, that is to say can be reduced to the signs that constitute faith? Then the 
whole system becomes weightless, it is no longer itself anything but a gigantic 
simulacrum— not unreal, but a simulacrum, that is to say never exchanged for the real, 
but exchanged for itself, in an uninterrupted circuit without reference or circumference” 
(5-6).
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46 My focus here on the possibility of accessing the past for the purposes of 
political radicalism presumes that the version of history most often presented in place of 
an accurate one is one that serves reactionary and conservative interests.  While I do not 
think this is too far too stretch credulity, the very notion that an at least partially truthful 
account of the past can be known assumes that access to it may be (and probably has 
been) used for alternate and various purposes.
47  The common suggestion is that those who have faith in the capacity of 
historical representation to accurately present the past are naively accepting of modes of 
representation that are far from being transparently mimetic but are instead serving the 
needs of hegemony.  This naive acceptance of traditional form is that which is savagely 
attacked by Foucault and before him, Nietzsche, both of whom call for a dismantling of 
the traditional practice of history precisely because of its congeniality to hegemony.  This 
argument assumes a naive trust in traditional accounts of history presented traditionally.  
My claim is that a skepticism towards these traditional accounts without the abandonment 
of the possibility of any referentiality has the potential for a greater radicalism, an attack 
on power based on historical accuracy, and therefore some degree of truth.
48  Much of the origins of the first wave of American historical relativism go back 
to readings (and particularly misreadings) of scientific theories such as Einstein’s Theory 
of Relativity, Bohr’s principle of “complementarity” and Heisenberg’s Uncertainty 
Principle, along with the philosophy of pragmatism (William James, John Dewey, C. S. 
Peirce, et. al) (Novick Noble Dream 133-167) combined with the close linking of history 
with science and social science.  The champions of this early relativism, Charles Beard 
and Carl Becker, are rarely referred to today despite their prominence at the time.  The 
reaction against relativism was largely constructed from a perceived schism between 
American and Allied empirical and ideologically neutral science and the state-sponsored 
and controlled Nazi and Socialist sciences that were purportedly so ideologically biased 
as to lose their claim to accuracy.  The later resurgence of challenges to objectivity were 
less influenced by these movements in the sciences but were linked rather more closely to 
the widespread “linguistic turn” in the humanities which attempted to position science 
within language itself and within discourse theory in general.  Lyotard’s effort to mark 
the moment of postmodernism as the moment of realization that science cannot function 
as a metanarrative and that it too, surprisingly enough, is a “language game,” is 
emblematic of this shift.  Americans were not, of course, the first or only group of 
historians to question the possibility of objectivity.  The French were equally, if not more, 
concerned with analyzing such problems.  The debate on this side of the Atlantic is a 
reasonable reflection of debates elsewhere for my purposes, however, and a complete 
recap of all positions on the debate worldwide would be outside of my purview here.  
Suffice it to say that objectivity has proved to be a difficult and hotly debated topic since 
the practice of history began to be theorized as a whole.  My concerns are more focused 
on the narrativist positions advocated by Hayden White and his fellow travelers over the 
past quarter century and their common association with postmodern fiction, which I 
largely deny.
49  This is my effort to boil down over a hundred years of institutional history and 
is therefore reductive to say the very least.  Nevertheless, the broader point remains 
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applicable.  The battle over the possibility of objectivity in historical discourse is a 
lengthy one, although the central place of narrative theory within that discourse is 
considerably less lengthy. Certainly, Sir Philip Sidney was concerned with the distinction 
between fiction and history as far back as the 16th century (612), but the idea that 
narrative itself has some bearing on the possibility of material referentiality is 
significantly more recent.
50  Although White is most frequently identified as the father of narrativist 
relativism, Louis Mink notes some early important discussions of historical narrativism 
that predate White’s breakthrough in Metahistory.  These include Morton White’s The 
Foundations of Historical Knowledge, A. R. Louch’s “History as Narrative,” Maurice 
Mandelbaum’s “ A Note on History as Narrative,” and W. B. Gallie’s Philosophy and the 
Historical Understanding (see Mink 45, n3).  In addition to these discussions of 
narrativism, relativism within the past quarter century has takes several different forms, 
complete coverage of which exceeds the goals of this introduction and this study.  Again, 
Novick’s That Noble Dream is a useful reference for the institutional history involved, 
particularly the long final section on “Objectivity in Crisis.”  While Novick notes the 
diffuse nature of the recent philosophical opposition to historical objectivity, he also 
acknowledges the central position White has taken within the debate, both as a figure of 
admiration (by the likes of Mink and Ankersmit) and of distaste by those who “required a 
symbolic embodiment of extreme ‘nihilist relativism’”  (598-99).  
51 I will discuss the capacity for conclusions to dictate meaning more substantially 
in Chapters One and Two, in reference to Between the Acts and Waterland.
52  White’s own amendments, changes, and deviations from this basic account of 
his ideas (derived principally from his “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of 
Reality”) are many and the further contributions of followers and opponents are legion 
and would be impossible to recount here fully, nor is it necessary to do so.  It is 
worthwhile to mention, however, that his earlier, and more frequently cited, introduction 
to Metahistory, entitled “The Poetics of History” emphasizes more thoroughly how 
narrative has the capacity to dictate morality and worldview by molding the events that 
are its raw material into particular story structures or “modes of emplotment.”  His 
borrowing of these basic structures from Northrop Frye’s work of literary criticism, 
Anatomy of Criticism, only furthers the sense that White sees history and fiction as much 
more closely aligned than history and science.  The modes of emplotment he identifies, 
Romance, Tragedy, Comedy, and Satire, each serve to “explain” the events of the past in 
different ways, imposing a different ideology particularly when combined with modes of 
argument that establish the nature of causality within any particular historical discourse.   
White’s further linking of particular types of tropes, or figures of speech, to the modes of 
argument he identifies inextricably links notions of causality and explanation to notions 
of semiotic slippage, imprecise meaning, and the impossibility of full explanation.  When 
pride of place is given to “irony” as the final tropological model, the one based on 
“aporia” or doubt, “in which the author signals in advance a real or feigned disbelief in 
the truth of his own statements...” (Metahistory 37), it is clear that historical referentiality 
is identified as a discursive formation rather than an actual possibility. 
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53  Support for White’s general viewpoint is provided by the likes of Hans Kellner, 
Frank Ankersmit, Louis Mink, Dominick LaCapra and French historiography linked to 
French poststructuralism like that of Michel de Certeau.  Certeau’s simple statement that 
“in pretending to recount the real, [history] manufactures it” (“History: Science and 
Fiction” 43) sums up White’s suggestion that reality is a discursive formation, and 
likewise his account of “the bewitching voices of the narration [that] transform, reorient, 
and regulate the space of social relations” (“History” 43) more economically restates 
White’s claim that narrative serves a regulatory function.  This seeming obliteration of 
reference to the material past is denounced from both right and left by such traditional 
historians as Gertrude Himmelfarb (who refers to the move towards a postmodernist 
history as a “flight from fact”) and Geoffrey Elton (who demands a “return to essentials”) 
as well as radical historians like Bryan Palmer who see postmodernist historiography as a 
threat to a Marxism that relies on cultural materialism and the “real” plight of “real” 
workers.  Christopher Lorenz has also proven to be a consistent and persistent voice 
against narrativism, while Dominick LaCapra, often identified with the narrativists, holds 
some important reservations.   There are, of course, volumes written within and about this 
debate, the intricacies and scope of which I cannot begin to cover here.  For excellent 
overviews of the topic, as well as a selection of important essays, see Fay, Pomper, and 
Vann History and Theory: Contemporary Readings, Ankersmit and Kellner A New 
Philosophy of History, Jenkins, The Postmodern History Reader, Burke, New 
Perspectives on Historical Writing, and Canary and Kozicki, The Writing of History.  A 
fairly substantial and well-organized bibliography is usefully supplied in the Jenkins text.
54  It would be quite a stretch to call these techniques “experimental” in fiction at 
this late stage, (at least) a century after these techniques began to be employed with 
increasing regularity, but again White speaks principally of historical narration where 
such techniques have been infrequently employed.
55  Again, there is much similarity here between the case made for the historical 
sublime and that made by Gayatri Spivak in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” and elsewhere.  
Spivak, too, argues for the essential inaccessibility of many voices of the past and warns 
against the appropriation and representation of them because of the dangers of ideological 
misuse.  Like Kellner, Spivak suggests listening to the “silences” of the past and 
expressing their inexpressibility through a rejection of traditional form and the easy 
accessibility of realistic narrative.  Her allegiance to Derrida’s version of
poststructuralism and the inescapable aporias of epistemology is well known.
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Chapter One
The Pageantry of the Past and the Reflection of the Present: History, Reality, and 
Feminism in Virginia Woolf’s Between the Acts.
Virginia Woolf’s final novel, Between the Acts (1941), occupies an intriguing 
place in the historical novels of the twentieth century.  Written by one of the now most 
canonical modernists, it has, along with The Waves, been identified more recently as a 
forerunner of postmodernism, or at least more postmodern attitudes towards history.  
Indeed, the entire novel is saturated with speculation upon and theorization of the nature 
of history.  Weiner Deiman notes that the novel has “an almost obsessive preoccupation 
with history on virtually every page” (56).1   However, as in most of Woolf’s work,  
locating one position that the novel takes on the conceptualization of history would be
extremely difficult, as Woolf is a master of ambiguity, playing each character and their 
perspectives off of one another.  Certainly Lucy Swithin’s evolutionary and millennia-
spanning vision of prehistoric London contrasts with the satirical overview of English 
literary history seen in Miss La Trobe’s pageant.  Likewise, the contemporary threat of 
Nazism is a dominant influence on someone like Giles Oliver, while other characters 
seem if not oblivious to this threat then somewhat less obsessed by it.  One thing that is
clear,  however, from the multiplicity of viewpoints the novel provides on the nature of 
history and historical narrative, is that Woolf does not invite her readers to take historical 
112
narrative as read, accepting uncritically what traditionally organized and presented 
historical narratives provide without a closer interrogation.  Indeed, more difficult 
questions may be whether or not Woolf provides us with any sense of how history should 
be represented, whether past reality can indeed be accessed at all, or if the multiplicity of 
viewpoints and contingent representations suggest that no true representation of reality is 
possible, or even desirable.
Over the course of this chapter I show how this novel, along with the 
contemporary essay Three Guineas,2 foresees the problematic of historical representation 
I have outlined in the introduction.  Between the Acts, like Spiegelman’s Maus and 
Kundera’s The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, insistently muddies the distinctions 
between fact and fiction, art and history, memory, history, and narrative, in order to 
question, problematize, and largely deconstruct what had been established within public 
discourse as the most proper and accurate mode of historical representation.  In doing so, 
however,  it does not, as some have suggested, abandon the possibility of accurate 
historical representation, nor does it champion “undecidability” as an ethics in itself.  
Rather, Between the Acts insists on a material referentiality as the basis for a radical 
ethics while offering us a new kind of historical representation.  Long before Hayden 
White’s critique of narrative’s capacity to reproduce the past and its tendency to obscure 
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its own limits, Woolf’s novel refuses narrative as a ideal mode of historical 
representation.  It rather insists on models of both non-narratability and anti-narrativity,  
using the “present” moment as its primary building-block and focusing on moments 
“between the acts” as opposed to the climactic actions that generate narrative.  Each of 
these strategies contributes to Woolf’s feminist vision of a world, and an aesthetic no 
longer dictated by patriarchal forms and a possibility for a third “plot,” one neither of 
love nor hate. but one of  “peace.”
The Picture and the Portrait
The novel takes place in one day in 1939, the day of the annual village pageant on 
the grounds of Pointz Hall, the residence of the Olivers.  The pageant is to be a historical 
one presenting,  “Scenes from English History” (61), but well before the reader knows 
the subject of the pageant, the theme of history itself is introduced.  Lucy Swithin, the 
sister of the Hall’s patriarch, Bartholomew Oliver, is reading an Outline of History 
(modeled after either H. G. Wells’s or G. M. Trevelyan’s comprehensive history of 
England),3 which describes the antediluvian prehistoric London, when England was not 
yet separated from the continent, when Piccadilly was filled with rhododendrons, and 
when it was populated by “monsters” like “the iguanodon, the mammoth, and the 
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mastodon; from whom presumably, she thought, [...] we descend” (10).  Mrs. Swithin’s 
long view of history, of which human history itself is only a small segment, is 
complemented by more traditional accounts of national history in the pageant and even 
family history.
Family history is emphasized in the two portraits at the top of the stairs in the 
Hall. “Two pictures hung opposite the window.  In real life they had never met, the long 
lady and the man holding his horse by the rein.  The lady was a picture, bought by Oliver 
because he liked the picture; the man was an ancestor.  He had a name.  He held the rein 
in his hand” (29).  Here the lady is shown to be “merely” a picture, while the ancestor 
bears the weight of “reality,” of history itself.  This juxtaposition of the two portraits 
initially seems to offer the reader what has, at times, been considered a typically 
modernist distinction between “art” as an independent and autonomous project and 
reality as something distinguished from art and outside of it.  The lady, in this sense, is a 
floating signifier with no referent, while the ancestor’s portrait signifies something 
beyond itself:  the external world, or reality.
In this context, it is useful to advert to one of the central touchstones for the 
definition of modernism itself, T. S. Eliot’s well-known essay, “Ulysses, Order, and 
Myth.”  Here, in referring to the mythological parallels deployed in James Joyce’s 
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masterpiece, Eliot writes, “It is simply a way of controlling, of ordering, of giving a 
shape and a significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is 
contemporary history” (Eliot 681).  Eliot praises Joyce for providing a bastion of art that 
serves to protect us from the chaos and futility of what he calls “contemporary history,” 
or what we might provisionally call reality itself.  Eliot’s assertion, when read alongside 
Frankfurt-school influenced analyses of the importance and impact of “autonomous art” 
provides one common definition of modernism.  Theodor Adorno, in an essay called 
“Commitment” among other places, calls for an art that critiques the corruption of the 
world by refusing to participate in it.  While overtly political art is easily fetishized and 
co-opted by the capitalist system, Adorno argues that alien, difficult, horrific, and 
sublime works like those of Beckett and Kafka succeed where politically committed art 
fails, by not participating in the discourse of politics that has created oppression in the 
first place.  “Kafka and Beckett arouse the fear which existentialism merely talks about.  
By dismantling appearance, they explode from within the art which committed 
proclamation subjugates from without, and hence only in appearance.  The inescapability 
of their work compels the change of attitude which committed works merely demand” 
(315).  Adorno’s favoring of autonomous works of art echoes Eliot’s appreciation for 
those works which lie outside of, or function as protection from, the corrupt world in 
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which they are produced.  Despite Adorno and Eliot’s own tremendous social and 
political differences, together they provide us with the now somewhat conventional 
assessment of what modernism is, that which produces complete and autonomous works 
of art that lie outside of the “world” itself and which both critique that world and shelter 
us from it.4   This juxtaposition of art and world is evident in the two paintings at the top 
of the stairs in Pointz Hall.  
No sooner, however, than this separation of art and life is introduced in the novel, 
than it is exploded, questioned and problematized.  Although the ancestor has all the 
weight of reality and history initially attached to him, the reader soon learns that this 
portrait excludes, omits, and deletes elements of reality in an effort to contain and 
configure the past.  While Buster the horse is included in the portrait, Colin, the “famous 
hound” whom the ancestor wished to include in the picture and is buried at his feet in the 
same grave is omitted because the “Reverend Whatshisname” would not allow his 
inclusion at the sitting.  Immediately, this exclusion of the dog puts the empirical, 
mimetic claim of the historical portrait into question, as it excludes as much as it 
includes, while calling to mind Woolf’s Flush, the biography of Elizabeth Barrett 
Browning told from the perspective of her dog.  Later, however, it also becomes clear 
that Colin has not been lost to history at all, but has been amply recorded.  Bartholomew 
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Oliver asserts, “There was my ancestor.  He had a dog.  The dog was famous.  The dog 
has a place in history.  He left it on record that he wished his dog to be buried with him,” 
while his sister reads this historical data into the picture itself, “‘I always feel,’ Lucy 
broke the silence, ‘he’s saying: “Paint my dog”’” (38).
In this rather lighthearted discussion of the family history of Colin is an important 
commentary on the nature of historical representation that is then carried out throughout 
the novel and particularly in Miss La Trobe’s pageant.  The exclusion of Colin indicates 
the propensity, and indeed inevitability, of historical representation to exclude, omit, 
erase, and select important elements of history, reflecting the contemporary rise of 
relativist historiography and predicting its later revival.5   Likewise, however, because the 
ancestor chose to record Colin’s existence elsewhere, his absence from the portrait 
becomes the central fact of the ancestor’s historical existence, leading Lucy to identify 
the ancestor purely by his desire to be buried with his dog and to be painted with him.  In 
fact, while the dog’s name is remembered and emphasized in these passages, the ancestor 
himself recedes, is left unnamed, and his identity itself is left overdetermined by the 
absence of his dog.  In this microcosm, we see how the transmission of history distorts 
and omits essential elements of the historical record while providing us with only partial 
stories.  In one historical representation the important element of the dog is excluded, 
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while in the others left behind his significance is, if anything, overemphasized, obscuring 
the identity and history of his master.
In his discussion of the novel, Allen McLaurin juxtaposes the two paintings to 
focus on Woolf’s aestheticism and formalism, allying her with the definition of 
modernism sketched out above. He asserts that Woolf approves of the independent art 
work of the “picture” because of its “pure form” while disapproving of the contamination 
of the portrait of the ancestor by social and worldly concerns.  McLaurin allies Woolf’s 
aestheticism here with the formalism of fellow Bloomsbury-ite Roger Fry who insisted 
that “the essential aesthetic quality [of the work of art] has to do with pure form” and that 
“the value of the aesthetic emotion” is “infinitely removed from [...] ethical values and 
likewise from the concerns of history and politics” (54).  More recently, David 
McWhirter largely refutes these claims by briefly focusing on the two paintings as part of 
his argument that Between the Acts may perhaps be the “first postmodern historical 
novel” (805-8) in its exposé of history itself as textually, discursively and ideologically 
produced.  In his refutation of the modernist interpretation of the two pictures as 
fundamentally opposed, McWhirter notes that the portrait of the ancestor is, like the 
picture of the lady, posed, composed and constructed as a work of art for aesthetic value 
and is constructed primarily from ideological discourse rather than from a mimetic 
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fidelity to the historical real.  In this, McWhirter notes how our sense of the real and our 
historical representations have much in common with works of art in the sense that they 
are staged, constructed and manipulated for particular purposes, not merely a mirror held 
up to reality.
McWhirter does note, however, that there are still substantial differences between 
the portrait of the ancestor and the picture of the lady.  The lady in the picture, for 
example, has more in common with Colin, the missing dog, than she does with the 
ancestor himself.  As McWhirter points out:
the lady is anonymous, without name, identity, or voice, she makes no 
demands and produces no talk.  Imaged as a vase, ‘alabaster, smooth, cold, 
holding the still distilled essence of emptiness, silence,’ the lady’s formal 
perfection—the objectification of her beauty in the male artist’s 
‘picture’—is inseparable from her gendered powerlessness, her absence 
from history and its discourses. (806) 
So, while the “historical” portrait of the ancestor is brought closer to an art work in that it 
is revealed to be posed, mediated and constructed, the supposedly pure form of the lady’s 
picture is likewise revealed not as outside the struggles, oppressions and power relations 
of historical existence, but rather as a reflection of and production of those power 
relations.   When paired with the portrait, we can see in the picture how men’s stories and 
patriarchal pursuits (in this case, hunting) are considered worthy of historical 
consideration, while women are seen as mere objects of the male gaze, worthwhile only 
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to the degree to which they give aesthetic pleasure.6  Here the division between  formal 
purity and historical context is dissolved even where it seems most forcefully asserted.
While the initial thrust of the modernist movement has often been critically seen 
as championing a pure form that abandons the real world pursuit of the ethical, political, 
and historical in pursuit of a more perfect aestheticism, as the specter of Nazism loomed, 
a new generation of artists and critics, mostly on the left, insisted that such an approach to 
art no longer met the needs of the world in which it was produced.  Instead, a demand for 
artists to “take sides” politically and ethically in the instance of the Spanish Civil War 
and the subsequent conflagration of World War II was intense.  Woolf certainly felt the 
pressure of these demands despite her continuing distaste for overtly polemical fiction (an 
aversion that did not apply to her essays).7 It is true that in response to these demands, 
Woolf at times seems to suggest that art and politics as such should be separated.  When, 
however, Woolf writes in a letter to her nephew Julian that “all politics be damned” (qtd. 
in H. Lee 671), we cannot take this to be a statement of a detached modernist 
aestheticism that insists, once and for all, on the separation of art from life, politics and 
ethics.  Indeed, as we have already seen through the example of the portraits, such a rigid 
binary division is shown to be impossible within her work.
121
While Eliot positions Ulysses as that which is protected from the chaos and 
disorder of history by the unity and form of art, in Between the Acts, Woolf presents the 
telling of history itself as an artistic creation.  Moreso than the family history of the 
portraits, La Trobe’s pageant dominates the novel, foregrounding how one artist “creates” 
history, recording, selecting, erasing, and editing vast expanses of English history in 
order to construct a unified artwork.  In this, the novel presages poststructural and 
postmodern theorization of the discursive and textual construction of reality in general 
and of history in particular.   Between the Acts clearly suggests how history itself is not a 
mimetic reflection of an inviolable real, but is rather a creation of retrospective and 
concurrent signification, a point of view less congenial to conventional definitions of 
modernism and more in line with the critical delineation of postmodernism itself. As 
Linda Hutcheon offers, “What this means is that the familiar humanist separation of art 
and life (or human imagination and order versus chaos and disorder) no longer holds” 
(Hutcheon, Poetics 7).  Miss La Trobe’s historical pageant in Between the Acts clearly 
offers us this postmodern view in the sense that it presents history (or more properly, 
historical representation) as an artistic construction.  In addition, while it promises to 
initially present “Scenes from English history” (61), it later confuses and/or conflates 
English history with the history of English literature, at times presenting history proper 
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but more often presenting pastiches of various historical literary styles like the 
Renaissance drama and Restoration comedy.  Here Woolf’s novel, as in the comparison 
of the two paintings, pushes resolutely against  the boundary distinctions between art and 
life, between fact and fiction, allying her novel in the eyes of many critics, with a 
postmodernism that may be accused of historical relativism and therefore an ethical 
relativism, where ethics is derived from a reading of history.8
Although the overlapping of history and literature in the pageant partially 
deconstructs the “humanist” separation of art and life, the novel does this more 
aggressively in other ways, making the reader see the fragility of this separation.  The 
most clearly postmodern moment in this regard occurs after the pageant has ended and 
Miss La Trobe retires to the local pub to contemplate her next artistic creation.  “She no 
longer saw them, yet they upheld her, sitting arms akimbo with her glass before her.  
There was the high ground at midnight; there the rock and two scarcely perceptible 
figures.  Suddenly the tree was pelted with starlings.  She set down her glass.  She heard 
the first words” (147).
At first, this passage merely seems to be a description of artistic inspiration, 
where Miss La Trobe “hears” how her next pageant will begin.  Later, however, it takes 
on a more complex valence.   At the end of the novel,  Giles and Isa Oliver, two of the 
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characters who live at Pointz Hall and who help comprise the audience of the pageant, 
prepare to confront one another after a day in which Giles has engaged in adulterous 
flirtation with Mrs. Manresa, while Isa has made her anger at Giles clear.  
Left alone together for the first time that day, they were silent.  Alone, 
enmity was bared; also love.  Before they slept, they must fight; after they 
had fought; they would embrace.  From that embrace another life must be 
born.  But first they must fight, as the dog fights the vixen, in the heart of 
darkness, in the fields of night.
Isa let her sewing drop.  The great hooded chairs had become 
enormous.  And Giles too.  And Isa too against the window.  The window 
was all sky without colour.  The house had lost its shelter.  It was night 
before roads were made, or houses.  It was night that dwellers in caves had 
watched from some high place among the rocks. 
Then the curtain rose. They spoke. (152)
This closing passage does more than close the chapter on the contentious 
relationship between the Olivers for the day; it puts their very status as independent 
agents into question.  The reference to the “high place” reflects the “high ground” that 
Miss La Trobe envisions, while the “two figures” in La Trobe’s vision are certainly the 
Giles and Isa presented here.  When the final sentence encloses the Olivers on a stage, 
where the curtain rises, we are presented with the possibility that Giles and Isa are part of 
a play, rather than merely its observers, that they are artistic creations as opposed to 
“real” agents, once again seemingly undercutting the possibility of human agency on 
their part and therefore a refusal of their status as ethically autonomous subjects.  
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Although there are multiple ways in which Between the Acts breaks down the 
Eliotic modernist division between art and life, these final lines of the novel cement the 
deconstruction of this division as one of the novel’s central themes.  Just as the two 
paintings at Pointz Hall at first seem diametrically opposed with one representing art and 
the other reality, the actions that take place within the pageant initially seem to be art, 
while those focused on between  its acts seem to be representative of life itself.  
Nevertheless, this division is destroyed again, when a theatrical curtain rises on Giles and 
Isa, two of the members of the audience, not, we are led to believe until this moment, 
actors in the play.  This inversion of the framing story and the frame story suggest that 
this division cannot be a stable one and that no clear division between art and life can be 
maintained.9
The Woolfian Artist and the Relativist Historian
While Woolf and her modernist contemporaries were often criticized by 
succeeding generations for an aestheticism that inviolably separated  art from politics and 
the social sphere, the recent effort by contemporary critics, including McWhirter, Pamela 
Caughie, and Patricia Klindeinst Joplin, to claim Woolf for postmodernism is partially 
made in an effort to exempt Woolf from these charges.  A huge body of materialist 
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feminist criticism that re-reads Woolf’s fiction through the prism of her own feminist 
essays10 also effectively divorces Woolf from these accusations.  Certainly, in Between 
the Acts, as well as in works like Flush and Orlando, Woolf self-consciously breaks 
down the barriers between fiction and the more explicitly mimetic “realistic” modes of 
representation like history and biography, as opposed to erecting them.  In this, it would 
seem clear that art both participates in and constructs history itself and cannot be 
excluded from any debate over politics and/or social ethics.
Still, however, where modernism was once criticized for its attempts to divorce 
politics and ethics from art, the postmodern too has come under fire for a radical 
relativism that may disqualify itself from the construction of a coherent ethics or a 
participation in proactive politics.  While the radically constructivist accounts of 
historiography discussed in the introduction of this study, along with the debates over 
their ethical repercussions, post-date Woolf’s death by several decades,  Between the Acts 
explores the problems and concerns about ethics and historical representation in ways 
that predict and confront these debates, as well as shed light upon them.  Woolf’s own 
theorization of fiction is marked by similar concerns to those raised by Hayden White, 
while her novel deals with the elusive nature of reality and the ethical and political 
necessity of accessing it.  
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While Eliot praises Ulysses for its division of art from life, in “Modern Fiction” 
Woolf also praises Joyce’s novel, but for different reasons.  At first, Woolf seems in 
agreement with Eliot in her critique of materialists like Wells who discharge the work 
best left to “government officials” (Woolf, “Modern Fiction” 105), the work of politics 
and social intervention.  Woolf here seems to advocate an autonomous art separate from 
the concerns of politics and “real life.”  Yet, somewhat paradoxically, Woolf does not 
praise Joyce for his unity of form, but rather for his disregard of the demands of form in 
his pursuit of reality itself:  
he is concerned at all costs to reveal the flickerings of that innermost 
flame which flashes its messages through the brain, and in order to 
preserve it he disregards [...] whatever seems to him adventitious, whether 
it be probability, or coherence, or any other of those signposts which for 
generations have served to support the imagination of a reader [...]. If we 
want life itself, here surely we have it” (Woolf, “Modern Fiction” 107).  
In fact, in both “Phases of Fiction” and “The Narrow Bridge of Art,” Woolf 
identifies the central problem of artistic creation as the difficulty in maintaining unity, 
order and coherence while simultaneously representing the real world accurately and 
truthfully.  “It is the gift of style, arrangement, construction, to put us at a distance from 
the special life and to obliterate its features; while it is the gift of the novel to bring us 
into close touch with life.  The two powers fight if they are brought into combination” 
(“Phases” 101).    Here, Woolf notes that unity and order are not to be found in real life 
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and since it has traditionally been the novel’s duty to represent life in all of its 
complexity, the traditional provinces of art (unity and beauty) are in natural opposition to 
the novel form and, indeed, to reality itself.  The difficulty of trying to maintain order, 
unity and coherence in a real world antithetical to these concepts is illustrated in Mrs. 
Dalloway, wherein Clarissa desperately tries to maintain these qualities in the form of her 
party.  However, when Clarissa hears of Smith’s suicide, she internally notes,  “Oh! [...] 
in the middle of my party, here’s death” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 183).  The unity and 
order of the party is shattered by the intrusion of the slice of chaos and despair of 
Septimus’s world, the real world.
Between the Acts is likewise characterized by the tension between the unity of 
artistic achievement and the chaos or dispersal of reality.  Lucy Swithin is prone to “one-
making,” the attempt to draw everything in her surroundings into one central order and 
meaning, while Miss La Trobe attempts to do the same with her pageant.  The tension 
between the possibility of unity and the inevitable reality of dispersal are also echoed by 
the alternatively unifying and dissolving sounds of La Trobe’s gramophone.  When there 
is an unexpected gap in the unified whole of her artistic creation. La Trobe bemoans its 
loss in a similar fashion to Clarissa in Mrs. Dalloway,  “Illusion had failed. ‘This is 
death,’ she murmured, ‘death’” (99).  For La Trobe, the absence of artistic shaping, of 
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illusion itself, is tied to a vertiginous loss of meaning, a confrontation with the real that is 
analogized with death itself and which contrasts the unifying vision of her pageant.11
Similarly to Woolf’s analysis of the disjunction between reality and art, Hayden 
White and other relativist historians see the unity, coherence , and emplotment of 
historical narrative as incompatible with the chaos and uncertainty of reality.  From this 
perspective, Miss La Trobe in Between the Acts can quite easily be seen as both a 
historian in the mode White suggests, and the “artist” in Woolf’s theory of fiction.  In 
fact, for constructivist historiographers like White, there is little or no difference between 
an artistic creation and traditional historical discourse, as both take raw material and 
shape it into the form of a narrative or art through exclusions, erasures and selections, 
falsifying and fictionalizing that which has any purchase on empirical reality.  Miss La 
Trobe then creates both a work of art and a historical text in her pageant and like both the 
Woolfian artist and White’s historian she desperately attempts to create order and unity 
out of contradictory and chaotic raw material.  It is this attempt at ordering that leads the 
historian or the artist further and further away from representing reality, because it is 
ordering and construction that are presented for their beauty as opposed to their mimetic 
fidelity.  The question posed by the juxtaposition of the two paintings and by the final 
encounter between the Olivers is, however, whether or not the real can be accessed at all, 
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outside of the shaping of artist or historian and if this is not possible, is an ethics or 
justice based upon a reference to the truth of the past, in the sense offered by Norman 
Geras in the introduction, possible?  Although Woolf’s novel shows the complicated and 
pervasive influence of textual and discursive signification on historical representation, it 
is also clear that she insists on the possibility of access to a material reality that cannot be 
completely contained or mediated by discourse and which offers us the possibility for 
establishing an ethics based on materiality.
The Pageant, Patriarchy, and Deconstruction
Woolf’s insistence on access to the materiality of history is not a claim for naïve 
and transparent referentiality.  Rather, it is based on a rigorous and complex analysis of 
the discursivity of traditional historical representation and, particularly, a critique of its 
patriarchal, imperialist, and hegemonic iteration.  The analysis of the two pictures 
provides a microcosm of the novel as a whole in this regard, but is far from telling the 
whole story.  Woolf’s discursive analysis of patriarchy in Three Guineas provides an 
early example of such work and is a harbinger of much essential feminist critique that has 
followed.  Nevertheless, Woolf does not settle for a deconstruction and revelation of how 
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discourses deform and control historical representation, she also insists on the possibility 
of a more accurate presentation of the real and the necessity for finding it.   
Like Woolf herself, Miss La Trobe may be seen as a modernist in her attempts to 
impose unity and order on her work of art, but she can also be seen as postmodern in her 
efforts to expose history as mediated and constructed.  Like much later feminist criticism 
influenced by, and influencing, poststructural and postmodern theory, Between the Acts, 
in concert with its nonfiction partner Three Guineas, exposes how society, and history in 
particular, are not merely representations of past reality, but are also a discursive 
production of a patriarchal society which defines what is important enough to be 
considered “history.” Miss La Trobe’s pageant both re-presents and parodically 
deconstructs traditional patriarchal histories, exposing how what had been naturalized as 
the subject matter and formal presentation of historical narrative are actually discursive 
productions of patriarchal ideology, making historical discourse itself complicit in the 
oppression of women.  As Woolf points out in Three Guineas,  it is a masculinist 
paradigm that defines the great “acts” of great men, particularly in the field of battle, as 
the central subject matter for historical narrative.  In this case, it is impossible to prevent 
war when battlefield exploits are given the privilege of place as the central element to be 
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immortalized in historical narrative.  She argues, indeed, that the only way to eliminate 
war is to eliminate it in the mind, “we should not believe in war” (Three Guineas 97).
This critique of patriarchal discourse and its domination of historical narrative is 
seen clearly in Between the Acts, wherein traditional historical subject matter is either 
absent or parodically reproduced and deflated.  Where history, and traditional narrative 
itself, are dependent on climactic “acts,” usually of violence or conflict, Woolf’s novel 
suggests that it is more important to look “between the acts,” to find not only our past and 
present, but also reality itself.    While Miss La Trobe’s excision of 200 years of English 
history emphasizes the necessary selections and erasures that inhibit the ability of any 
history to accurately reproduce reality, Between the Acts also submits the possibility of 
finding the real not in traditional historical narrative but in an alternative absence of 
narration.12  One audience member, Colonel Mayhew, complains, for instance, of the 
notable omission of all military history. “‘Why leave out the British Army? What’s 
history without the Army, eh?’” (110).  La Trobe (and Woolf) point here to how history 
has been inextricably linked to acts of violence, domination, warfare, and bloodshed.  La 
Trobe’s omission of this element of historical discourse offers the possibility that there 
are other stories to be told, or, more precisely, that an absence of “stories” such as these is 
preferable.
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Likewise, when La Trobe does present a historical member of the dominant 
patriarchal culture, he is parodically undermined and critiqued.  In Three Guineas, Woolf 
explicitly draws a parallel between the underlying urge for violence, domination, and 
“other”-ing in patriarchy and in colonialism:  “abroad the monster has come more openly 
to the surface.  There is no mistaking him there.  He has widened his scope.  He is 
interfering now with your liberty; he is dictating how you shall live; he is making 
distinctions not merely between the sexes, but between the races” (102).  The pageant’s 
iconic Victorian policeman reveals the subtext of much British colonial discourse, by 
voicing his desire to dominate and enforce his will on others,  rather than voicing the 
more socially acceptable rationales for such domination.  “Over thought and religion; 
drink; dress; manners; marriage too, I wield my truncheon.  Prosperity and 
respectability always go, as we know, ‘and in ‘and.  The ruler of an empire must keep his 
eye on the cot; spy too in the kitchen; drawing- room; library; [...]. That’s the price of 
Empire; that’s the white man’s burden” (114; emphasis in original).  The policeman’s 
soliloquy serves to expose how imperialist and nationalist discourse covers up patriarchal 
society’s penchant for operating through violence, domination, and ideological control. 
In Three Guineas, Woolf calls for a new type of college that will not teach “the 
arts of dominating other people; not the arts of ruling, of killing, of acquiring land and 
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capital,” (34) just as she asserts that these are precisely the skills and ideals that are 
taught in contemporary education.  Likewise, earlier in the pageant, when the figure of 
“Reason” introduces the Enlightenment skit, she mentions that “In distant mines the 
savage sweats; and from the reluctant earth the painted pot is shaped.  At my behest, the 
armed warrior lays his shield aside; the heathen leaves the Altar steaming with unholy 
sacrifice [...]. No longer fears the unwary wanderer the poisoned snake” (88-89; 
emphasis in original).   Here again, the ideology that champions Reason also requires the 
exclusion of, and assignment of savagery to, “other” cultures, and the labeling of 
“heathen” and “unholy” to alternative religions.  While Bartholomew Oliver and the rest 
of the audience cheer the ascension of Reason (88), it is clear that La Trobe parodies this 
self-congratulatory presentation of history and highlights the fact that certain peoples and 
cultures are caricatured, contained and isolated in order for England to define itself 
historically.
What makes Woolf’s novel particularly insightful is the way that its portrays these 
patriarchal and imperialist discursive formations as existing both within traditionally 
textual media, like the pageant itself, and outside of them, dictating behavior in everyday 
life.  In this Woolf predicts many of the insights of poststructuralism.  Reading these 
insights back into Woolf’s novel also proves useful.  As Foucault suggests throughout 
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much of his discursive analyses, there is nowhere outside the network of discourses that 
constitute power.  Likewise, Derrida’s famous proclamation that there is no “outside the 
text” (Of Grammatology 158)13  does not indicate merely that the search for an 
extratextual referent is impossible, but rather that reality itself is composed of discourses, 
signs and contexts.   As Simon Critchley points out in The Ethics of Deconstruction, 
Derrida’s deconstruction does not, as some readings have suggested, “wish to turn the 
world into some vast library; nor does it wish to cut off reference to some ‘extra-textual 
realm’[...] the word “text” does not suspend reference ‘to history, to the world, to reality, 
to being and especially not to the other”(Critchley 39; Derrida Limited Inc. 37; emphasis 
in original).  Derrida’s term, archi-writing (archi-écriture) or the “general text” (le texte 
en général) (Of Grammatology 26), refers to the “text” of the world itself, the network of 
discourses and signification that comprise our experience of that world.
What I call ‘text’ implies all the structures called ‘real,’ ‘economic,’ 
‘historical,’ socio-institutional, in short: all possible referents.  Another 
way of recalling once again that ‘there is nothing outside the text’.  That 
does not mean that all referents are suspended, denied or enclosed in a 
book, as people have claimed, or have been naïve enough to believe and to 
have accused me of believing.  But it does mean that every referent and all 
reality has the structure of a différantial trace [...] and that one cannot refer 
to this ‘real’ except in an interpretative experience.  The latter neither 
yields meaning nor assumes it except in a movement of différantial 
referring.  That’s all.  (Derrida, Limited Inc. 148)
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Without exploring fully the idea of the différantial trace,  it is clear that Woolf’s 
Between the Acts suggests that, indeed, the everyday world is an “archi-writing” that can 
be read or, perhaps, “deconstructed” like a conventional text, the novel itself or the 
pageant within it.  La Trobe’s pageant illustrates how patriarchal and imperialist 
discourse controls what is presented as history, as well as dictating the behavior of agents 
within history itself.  The reader is signaled to not confine their reading of these 
discourses to the pageant itself, however, by the use of the framing devices mentioned 
above.  When the “curtain rises” on Isa and Giles, the reader understands that the Olivers 
are trapped within the same discourses, the same archi-writing, as those in the pageant.  
As Herbert Marder puts it, the sense that:
ordinary life is merely a charade—more elaborately staged than the village 
play, but not fundamentally different in kind—is woven into the collective 
consciousness throughout.  The idea that all our words and acts are forms 
of quotation, that social behavior masks tribal ritual is developed in 
several different contexts, ranging from Giles and Isa’s dissatisfaction 
with the parts that have been assigned them to Mrs. Swithin’s humorous 
claim that she could have played Cleopatra. (“Alienation Effects” 425)
Although Marder does not explicitly note that the “charade” played out in “life” 
is, like the pageant, one determined by patriarchal discourse, his sense that Giles and Isa, 
along with the other audience members, play out “roles” assigned to them, allows us to 
see how both pageants are enclosed within a “general text” of signification and discourse.  
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Isa and Giles act out the same roles as their forbearers, with Giles as the violent 
dominator and Isa as the oppressed homemaker.  Although they are not part of the 
pageant, they continue to act out the social scripts that ensure patriarchal and colonial 
domination.  In this way, social discourse both obscures and mediates the reality of the 
past and dictates behavior in the present. They are, indeed, the new pageant, which will 
repeat the same forms, dialogues, and social scripts as the previous one unless something 
is done to change them.  Likewise, as the Olivers are the audience of the pageant, the 
readers of Between the Acts  are the audience for the Olivers’ interactions, and like them 
we are not “outside of the text.” We too live in their world of patriarchal and imperialist 
signs and discourses; the curtain, too, is around us if only we can see it.14
This is, of course, largely Woolf’s point in Three Guineas, in which she refuses to 
take a stridently anti-Nazi or pro-British nationalist position as the war approaches 
because she sees the deep and pervasive parallels between Nazi discourse and ideology 
and those of the patriarchal nationalist structure in England itself.15   She warns against 
the viewing of Britain as outside the network of discourses that make Hitlerism what it is, 
but rather asks for her readers to see their own complicity in the creation of Nazi 
Germany.  Likewise, even though, Woolf calls for women to form a “Society of 
137
Outsiders,” to reject their complicity with patriarchal culture, she nevertheless sees their 
own participation in this culture.16
In Between the Acts, Woolf, through the medium of Mrs. Swithin, notes that the 
contemporary English are hardly different from their Victorian ancestors, as symbolized 
by the “truncheon” of the policeman, or their Nazi contemporaries in their valuation of 
social status, violence and domination.  As Woolf offers in Three Guineas, “it seems as if 
there were no progress in the human race, but only repetition” (120).  Towards this point 
in Between the Acts, Mrs. Swithin notes that the Victorians are just “you and me and 
William dressed differently” (122), emphasizing the continuity between the 1939 
audience of the pageant and their Victorian ancestors.17    Isa also notes the burden that 
the past lays upon those in the present, “How am I burdened with what they drew from 
the earth; memories; possessions.  This is the burden that the past laid on me, last little 
donkey in the long caravanserai crossing the desert. ‘Kneel down,’ said the past.  ‘Fill 
your pannier from our tree.  Rise up donkey.  Go your way ‘til your heels blister and your 
hoofs crack’” (109).   Here Isa points to the oppressive influence the past has on the 
present, and how, particularly, the oppressions of the past and particularly of women, are 
discursively carried on in the present, despite the evident external and legal changes in 
the treatment of women.  Isa notes that “That was the burden […] laid on me in the 
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cradle; [...] crooned by singing women; what we must remember; what we would forget’ 
(109).  As she observes, the imperative to “forget” the oppression and the discursive 
construction of women is strong, but the possibility of such forgetting is not as achievable 
as she would hope.  As she observes, “we must remember,” despite the simultaneous 
need for forgetting.  That is, our attempts to forget are futile, if not misguided, because 
the past is always present through the network of partriarchal discourses.  The echoes of 
the pageant that occur outside of it, in the world of Pointz Hall, solidify the sense that the 
past depicted in the pageant is inextricable from the present outside of it. 
The parallels between the pageant and the world outside it are too plentiful to 
comprehensively enumerate, but reviewing a few can help to elaborate how the novel 
configures the social text of patriarchy and imperialism.  The depiction of the patriarchal 
tendency to value violence and domination, particularly of colonized cultures, is seen 
clearly in the pageant, but it is also reflected in the general text of the world outside the 
pageant.  While Colonel Mayhew bemoans the exclusion of the army from the pageant, 
Bartholomew Oliver (Giles’s father) dreams of the days when his life had meaning, 
precisely when he was involved in the British colonial project and entrusted with the use 
of that most patriarchal and violent of symbols, the gun.  He dreams, “himself, a young 
man helmeted; and a cascade falling.  But no water; and the hills, like grey stuff pleated; 
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and in the sand a hoop of ribs; a bullock maggot-eaten in the sun; and in the shadow of 
the rock, savages; and in his hand a gun.  The dream hand clenched; the real hand lay on 
the chair arm” (17).  Although much of this reminiscence seems hardly positive (the 
images of “grey”, “maggot-eaten,” “shadows” and “savages”) what does remain in 
Bartholomew’s mind is his own youth and power, his dominance which has passed in his 
old age.  
When Isa then “interrupts” his reverie, he mentally accuses her of “destroying 
youth and India” (17) just as the possibility of a world shaped equally by female or 
feminist discourse would destroy the world Bartholomew lives in and the prerogatives he 
enjoys.  Although his youth and gun are physically gone, the discourses and ideology of 
patriarchy and imperialism remain of value to Bartholomew and his contemporaries.  
Similarly, as Christopher Ames observes, the children of the stodgy parents in the 
pageant’s Victorian skit merely reiterate their parents’ prejudices, rather than breaking 
free of them: “the satire lies precisely in the younger generation’s lack of rebellion.  
When the young couple flee together to become missionaries, they carry on the 
imperialist project associated with their parents’ generation” (“Modernist Canon 
Narratives” 397).  The seeming inescapability of patriarchal and imperialist discourse 
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may be a source of humor here, but it is also an ominous commentary on the world 
outside the pageant.
Like the young Victorians, Giles follows in his father’s footsteps, fulfilling the 
literal definition of patriarchy, and reflects also his forefathers who “no longer fear the 
poisoned snake,” during the first intermission of the pageant.  While Giles is both fearful 
and angry at the impending war in Europe he repeats and reflects the violence it 
symbolizes.  When coming across a snake in the grass, choking with a toad in its mouth 
and unable to swallow, Giles observes that “it was birth the wrong way round—a 
monstrous inversion.  So raising his foot, he stamped on them.  The mass crushed and 
slithered [...]. But it was action.  Action relieved him.  He strode to the barn, with blood 
on his shoes (72-3).  Like Europe itself, the snake and the toad are killing one another, 
but the only solution Giles can arrive at is “action,” violence and bloodshed.  Although, 
this relieves him, it solves nothing, only creating more death and leaving a stain on his 
shoes.    Still, however, it is clear to what a great degree the audience members of the 
pageant partake of a patriarchal ideology that valorizes violence as heroism.  Just as the 
pageant opens with a song about the “valiant Rhoderick,” “Armed and Valiant/Bold and 
blatant,” (59) so too is Giles seen as a “hero,”because of the blood on his shoes by the 
“wild child” Mrs. Manresa (78).
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While Mrs. Manresa is, at times, seen as a transgressive, radical, figure who does 
not abide by the formal rules for society, her repetition of the discourse of masculine 
heroism, proven by bloodshed and violence, indicates just how pervasive such ideology is 
and how discursively constructed social scripts are less easily eluded than codified rules.  
Even the homosexual William Dodge, who is viewed by Giles as a “toady; a lickspittle” 
(46) because of his failure to fulfill the societal role of “masculinity,”views Giles from 
this romantic angle, being attracted to his masculinity and “heroism,” repeating internally 
the phrases associated with Rhoderick in the pageant (80).  While Woolf, in Three 
Guineas, attempts to strip war of its romantic discursive baggage, she also acknowledges 
in Between the Acts the difficulty of doing so.  Even as she writes,  “if we knew the truth 
about war, the glory of war would be scotched and crushed where it lies curled up in the 
rotten cabbage leaves of our prostituted fact purveyors” (Three Guineas 97), she observes 
how deeply ingrained the belief in the glory and heroism of war is.
Just as men’s discursive and ideologically defined roles are outlined and defined 
in the pageant and reflected in the world outside of it, so too are women’s.  Even Isa, 
who, for the most part, sees through the facade of Giles as a heroic figure and castigates 
him internally for his adulterous transgressions and hypocrisy, cannot completely 
abandon the social tendency to celebrate what he symbolizes and turn him into a hero.  
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While Isa, both internally tells Giles, “‘I don’t admire you [...]. Silly little boy, with blood 
on his boots’” (81), she nevertheless retains a part of herself that insists on loving him 
because he is “ ‘The father of my children’[...] slipping into the cliché conveniently 
provided by fiction’” (14).  Here, Isa’s ability to identify how her love of both Giles and 
of patriarchy is textually and discursively produced does not prevent its existence.18   For 
her, love is part of the archi-writing that both creates and is created by the textuality of 
such fictional clichés.  Giles, then, is simultaneously just a “silly boy” with bloody boots 
and the “father,” with all of the iconic power and influence that term invokes.  As David 
McWhirter observes, despite Isa’s ability to identify the clichés that dictate her behavior, 
“she cannot escape the restrictive identity—wife, mother ‘Sir Richard’s daughter’—she 
has internalized” (795).  In fact, even her fantasies of freedom are tied to patriarchal 
discourse as she chooses a gentleman farmer (Mr. Haines) as her prospect for adulterous 
love (see McWhirter 795).
Although Mrs. Swithin, after observing part of the pageant, feels that she could 
have played Cleopatra, and despite Catherine Wiley’s claims that the pageant “bears a 
distinctly feminine face” (13), much, if not all, of the pageant, reiterates the conventional, 
stereotypical, roles of women, even as it critiques and mocks them.  While men are 
parodically presented as “heroic,” valiant, violent and dominant, women are associated 
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with the home and defined by their need to marry and reproduce. The valuation of 
domesticity and femininity in the Victorian era is reiterated by Budge when he returns 
after the Victorian skit to say, “For it’s ‘Ome ladies, ‘Ome gentlemen.  Be it never so 
humble, there’s no place like ‘Ome” (120; emphasis in original).  Despite the audience’s 
correct feeling that La Trobe and the pageant present this “Angel of the House” ideology 
in order to mock and critique it, much of the audience still cannot, or does not wish to, 
relinquish the ideology itself.  “‘Oh but it was beautiful,’ Mrs. Lynn Jones protested.  
Home she meant; the lamplit room; the ruby curtains; and Papa reading aloud” (121).
Similarly, the lust for money to be obtained through marriage that is depicted in 
the mock-Restoration comedy “Where There’s a Will, There’s a Way” is reflected in 
Mrs. Manresa’s marriage to the wealthy Jew, Ralph, who never appears in the novel.  In 
addition, the cross-dressing and gender-bending of the mock Renaissance comedy is 
wrestled into order and conventional heterosexual couplings at its conclusion, just as the 
lesbian Miss La Trobe and the gay William Dodge are mocked, criticized and 
marginalized by the larger community in the broader world of the novel.  The enforced 
heteronormativity, economically determined heterosexual relationships, and feminized 
domesticity that are both presented and mocked in the pageant are all reflected in the 
contemporary audience of the pageant, illustrating once again how the real world both 
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produces and reflects the textual and is discursively and ideologically determined.  It is 
for this reason that Isa sees her own life as “abortive,” (15) never realizing her potential, 
but instead following the roles others have written for her, as mother and wife, but not as 
an agent capable of making change.
Taking this view of the novel, and particularly of the pageant itself, it is clear how 
it reflects the critical act of Derridean deconstruction and, at least initially, repeats some
of its problems.  Because Derridean philosophy denies the possibility of an external 
vantage point to critique or analyze a particular text or, more importantly, a broader 
social context, all “deconstructive” readings are, by definition, within the text they 
critique and are, therefore, as Simon Critchley points out, a “double reading”:
what distinguishes deconstruction as a textual practice is double reading—
that is to say a reading that interlaces two motifs or layers of meaning, 
most often by first repeating what Derrida calls ‘the dominant 
interpretation’ [(Limited Inc. 143)] of a text in the guise of a commentary 
and second, within and through this repetition, leaving the order of 
commentary and opening a text up to the blind spots or ellipses within the 
dominant interpretation. (Critchley 23; emphasis in original)
Here, Critchley notes the way deconstructive readings, particularly by Derrida, 
first voice or repeat the dominant interpretation of the text before outlining how the text 
is inconsistent or blind to its own metaphysics and therefore “deconstructs” itself.  
Although Between the Acts does not strictly follow the supplementary logic of 
deconstruction, it does, in many ways, provide a “double reading” in the way Critchley 
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suggests.  While it does present the traditional account of patriarchal history, through the 
voice of Mr. Budge’s policeman, the “conversion of the heathens” by the young 
Victorians, the rise of the Enlightenment, etc., it also reveals and illustrates the 
contradictions within that history, the incompatibility of Enlightenment reason and 
colonial domination, the impossibility of correlating romantic love with heroic slaughter, 
etc.  In doing so, it exposes the contradictions of historical discourse and contemporary 
political practice, but like deconstruction, does not seem to offer an alternative, because 
all it has to work with is the text itself.  In doing so, its purpose seems to be to destabilize 
patriarchal discourse as deconstruction attempts to destabilize dominant interpretations. 
“the second moment of reading [...] is the destabilization of the stability of the dominant 
interpretation [...] opening its intended meaning [...] onto an alterity which goes against 
what the text wants to say or mean” (Critchley 26-7).  Certainly, from a feminist point of 
view, it is valuable to see how patriarchal discourse, and practice, is internally 
contradictory, and cannot logically fulfill its own purported ideology.  Still, this avoids 
the question of an alternative discourse or ideology, offering neither, as deconstruction 
offers not its own interpretation but an unraveling of a previous one.  
The description of deconstruction Critchley offers is remarkably similar, in fact, 
to Linda Hutcheon’s assessment of the form and function of “postmodern parody” which 
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she identifies as a “double process of installing and ironizing [...] signal[ling] how present 
representations come from past ones and what ideological consequences derive from both 
continuity and difference” (“Postmodern Parody” 225).  In this, Hutcheon suggests that 
parody in the postmodern era derives from the presentation or re-presentation of 
historical representations with irony in order to comment on the status and function those 
representations have in the contemporary world.  Certainly, Woolf’s pastiches of the 
Renaissance drama, the Restoration comedy, and the Victorian family picnic function in 
this way, repeating the basic form and message of these types of texts along with an 
ironic commentary on their relevance to contemporary society, particularly from a 
feminist viewpoint.  In this way, as Hutcheon suggests, Woolf’s novel foregrounds the 
“politics of representation,” particularly the history of such representations, and is thus “a 
value problematizing, de-naturalizing form of acknowledging the history (and through 
irony the politics) of representation” (225).  Here, Hutcheon denies the Fredric Jameson 
claim that postmodernism disqualifies itself from ethical and political relevance because 
of its repetition and appropriation of historical forms without context or depth (what 
Jameson calls “pastiche”).  Although Hutcheon sees this occurring in such postmodern 
media as the music video and the popular film, she asserts that historiographic 
metafiction or postmodern parody does not follow this trajectory, but rather repeats and 
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appropriates forms in order to comment on the power and influence of such forms and 
representations, and in doing so, deconstructing, denaturalizing, or de-essentializing 
representations once taken to be truths and revealing them merely as texts with 
ideological repercussions.  That is, it takes the “unacknowledged assumptions of the 
‘collective consciousness’”() and reveals them precisely as assumptions, discursively 
produced, rather than the truths they are assumed to be in the larger culture.  
In the context of feminism, Hutcheon argues “Postmodern parodic strategies are 
often used by feminist artists to point to the history and historical power of those 
[patriarchal] cultural representations, while ironically contextualizing [them] in such a 
way as to deconstruct them” (230).  Hutcheon’s argument for the political and ethical 
impact of postmodern parody of historical representations is, however, still ethically and 
politically limited in its tendency to stop at the point of denaturalization and critique, 
while refusing to offer a stronger alternative, or indeed to acknowledge that patriarchal 
history is not only politically damaging and exploitative, but also factually inaccurate, 
with a more accurate representation of the truth being possible.  
While patriarchal history is revealed to be a construction of ideological hegemony 
in postmodern parody, the problematic nature of all representations is foregrounded as 
well in this type of fiction.  Therefore, while we are taught to doubt the “truth” presented 
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to us by hegemonic power, we are also taught that truth in relationship to historical 
representation is impossible to access.  “The postmodern condition with respect to history 
might well be described as one of the acceptance of radical uncertainty” (Hutcheon, 
“Postmodern Parody” 227).  In describing one example, Hutcheon notes how Peter 
Ackroyd’s Chatterton reduces all access to the purported real to the level of pure 
representation, open to manipulation and, in fact, lies, abandoning the possibility of 
access to material referentiality.  It is this movement to displace the real completely into 
the purview of representation that is ultimately denied by Woolf’s novel.  While Between 
the Acts does function in the fashion of a postmodern parody, revealing the discursive 
nature of patriarchal history and providing a social critique of contemporary patriarchy, it 
also anticipates the problems with stopping with this function and moves more firmly 
toward an ethical stand based on a reference to the real.  This arresting of the most 
extreme implications of relativist historicism makes it a primary example of 
postmodernist historical fiction.
Irruptions of the Real
What makes the reading of Between the Acts presented thus far troubling, or at the 
very least problematic, is the way it seems to preclude an ethical dimension.  That is, 
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while the novel does provide a detailed and chilling diagnosis of the pervasiveness of 
patriarchal discourse and ideology, it does not seem to offer its readers a way to fight 
against the pervasiveness of patriarchy or its contemporary political parallel, fascism.  In 
fact, it seems to suggest that such a movement against patriarchal ideology is impossible.  
Because Woolf so adeptly presents how the world outside the text of the pageant reflects 
the patriarchal and imperialist ideology within it, and indeed that both of these texts 
reflect the primitive behavior of the hunters and gatherers in the prehistoric London that 
Lucy reads about in her Outline of History, there is the sense that there is nothing but 
repetition in history and that the principal reason for this repetition is the unavoidable 
internalization of the hegemony of patriarchy.19   That is, while the text of past patriarchy 
can be read, and even in some cases identified and deconstructed, it cannot be escaped.  
We are all within the archi-writing or general text of patriarchal history and like Isa, 
despite our objections to it and our efforts to ironize it, we cannot overturn it.  To put it 
another way, while the idea of the “text” comprehends reality as such, there is no real 
beyond it, or no outside-of-the-text from which to critique it and act against it.  Even the 
deconstructive double reading described above must be a double reading precisely 
because there can be no reading outside of the text itself as presented.  While the critique 
of patriarchy is embedded in its iteration, in this case, the repetition of the dominant 
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discourse is necessary to make this critique possible, making a truth outside of patriarchy 
seem impossible to access.
While this reading explains the portions of the novel I have thus far discussed, a 
further reading of Woolf’s novel shows that it acknowledges the pervasive discursive 
effects of patriarchy, while still insisting on a real outside of it from which a radical 
politics  can be constructed.  While Between the Acts denies the possibility of a cohesive 
and united artistic purity independent from reality, it also denies a radical relativism that 
denies any possibility of access to the real.  In doing so, it makes a claim for feminism 
based not only on the denaturalization of patriarchal discourse, but also based on a claim 
for a more accurate history that affirms the reality of women’s oppression and the 
possibility of a resistant politics with a purchase on material reality.  While, as Hutcheon 
suggests, there may be “radical uncertainty” in the double reading of Between the Acts
there is not an abandonment of the possibility of truthful representation.
Just as Hayden White sees traditional narrative history itself as coherent and 
unified, a fabrication constructed from narrative that excludes the real,20  Woolf’s novel 
notes the political repercussions of such arbitrary unity, indicating the ways that what 
once was acknowledged as mimetic history actually operates through the perspective of 
the patriarchal dominant and its storytelling forms.  Unlike White, however, Woolf offers 
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us the possibility that there is a reality beyond patriarchal discourse that allows us to see 
beyond and beneath narrative construction and gives us a basis for fighting oppression.  
This is evident when at several moments in the novel, there are irruptions of chaos and 
dispersal which interrupt and challenge the unity and coherence of the story of patriarchal 
history and the artistic pageant that both reflects and critiques it.
The first irruption occurs when Isa reads of the rape of a girl by barracks officers 
at Whitehall.21   The soldiers, clearly representative of patriarchal British society, tell the 
girl of a horse with a green tail, making Isa imagine a fairy-tale story of romantic knights 
and fantastic tales.  What follows, however, is a gang rape of the girl that is neither 
romantic nor fantastic.  Instead, “That was real; so real that on the mahogany door panels 
she saw the Arch in Whitehall; through the Arch the barrack room; in the barrack room 
the bed, and on the bed the girl was screaming and hitting him about the face” (19).  
Here, the reality of the girl’s rape allows Isa to have a vision of horrific encounter, which 
although mediated by the newspaper account, exceeds that account and seems to allow 
her direct access to this traumatic moment.  Like Giles Oliver, the soldiers within 
patriarchal discourse are likely symbols of heroism not in spite of, but because of their 
link to violence and conquest.  The “horse with a green tail” emphasizes the romantic 
images of such knights and quests, which inevitably involve the “rescue” of a “damsel in 
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distress,” or the winning of a woman by a man.  In this case, however, the actual event 
that occurs, or the fact of the rape, cannot be reconciled with a traditional patriarchal 
narrative like that of knights and damsels.  As Catherine Wiley comments, “When Isa 
reads and recalls the newspaper account of a girl’s rape by soldiers in Whitehall, she 
alerts Woolf’s readers to the side of war that is rarely historicized” (13).  To this it is 
important to add that the reason this side of war is not historicized is because of the 
difficulty in fitting such history into the patriarchal narratives that constituted the 
discipline of history itself, particularly at this time. In this disjunction between the 
singular event and the ideological narratives embedded in the collective historical 
consciousness is what Isa sees as real.  
This distinction between the real and the patriarchally narratable is forwarded 
immediately before Isa’s encounter with the newspaper story as well, as she stands in the 
library, looking at books by Keats, Shelley, Yeats, and Donne.  Despite her affection for 
these works of art, “none of them stopped her toothache” (18).  The toothache here 
constitutes reality, the painful truth that no art or text can completely obscure.  As 
Herbert Marder notes, “Fiction can invent a horse with a green tail, but behind that 
seductive image lurks a real rape” (“Alienation Effects” 431-32).  Jane Marcus further 
elaborates Woolf’s passage on remembrance and forgetting, by noting  “‘what we must 
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remember’ is the rape; ‘what we must forget’ is the male rewriting of women’s history” 
(“Liberty, Sorority, Misogyny” 76).  In the present context, Marcus here highlights the 
importance of remembering the real even though it is its narrativization and 
transformation into discourse that is more frequently provided in hegemonic 
representations.  If the rape is elided or transformed into a story, it is reality itself that is 
lost.
In this regard, the newspaper account of the rape and Isa’s reading of it are allied 
to the curious beginning of Three Guineas that lauds, somewhat disingenuously, the 
newspaper and the photograph.  Although, as the photograph of Clementis in The Book of 
Laughter and Forgetting amply illustrates, both the photograph and the newspaper are 
prone to heavy mediation, deformation and manipulation of the truth, Woolf presents 
them here as symbolic of the access to the real that she sees as possible.   She identifies 
the daily paper as “history in the raw” (7), while she offers the photograph as “pictures of 
actual facts [...] simply statements of fact addressed to the eye” (10).  While she notes the 
ways in which soldiers not yet at war tend to valorize it, she likewise points out that 
photographs of actual war present a very different, and factually more accurate, picture.  
First she presents the sunny view of war presented in a soldier’s biography, which is later 
supplemented by the biographer’s affirmation of the soldier’s “supreme” happiness:
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“I have had the happiest possible life, and we have always been working 
for war, and have now got into the biggest in the prime of life for a soldier 
[...] Thank God, we are off in an hour. Such a magnificent regiment!  Such 
men, such horses!  Within ten days I hope Francis and I will be riding side 
by side straight at the Germans.” (Three Guineas 7)
This celebration of warfare is contrasted not only with an opposing feminist 
viewpoint, but with the “facts” of war that photographs present.  “Besides these pictures 
of other people’s lives and minds—these biographies and histories—there are also 
pictures—pictures of actual facts; photographs” (10).  What these pictures of the Spanish 
Civil War show Woolf and her readers is not the glory and romance of war, but rather, 
like the rape Isa reads about, war’s ugly reality.
They are not pleasant photographs to look upon.  They are photographs of 
dead bodies for the most part.  This morning’s collection contains the 
photograph of what might be a man’s body, or a woman’s; it is so 
mutilated that it might, on the other hand, be the body of a pig.  But those 
certainly are dead children, and that undoubtedly is the section of a house.  
A bomb has torn open the side; there is still a bird-cage hanging in what 
was presumably the sitting room, but the rest of the house looks like 
nothing so much as a bunch of spilikins suspended in mid air. (11)
Although later in the essay Woolf voices extreme skepticism of the newspaper22
and, historically, the photograph too becomes open to manipulation,23  it is clear that 
Woolf here wishes to distinguish between the stories told about war and the facts of war; 
that is, the real as defined by the suffering, death, and tragedy depicted in these 
photographs.  It is these facts, this real, that becomes the basis for Woolf’s ethical stand 
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for pacifism in Three Guineas.  Certainly, Between the Acts indicates the pervasiveness 
of patriarchal ideology that makes any possibility of breaking through this general text 
extremely difficult, if not impossible.  Nevertheless, Isa’s encounter with the story of the 
“rape” functions in the novel as the photographs of the Spanish Civil War do in Three 
Guineas, as an access to the reality of oppression, particularly women’s oppression that 
cannot be reconciled with the stories of the glories of war and patriarchal history.  
Likewise, this glimpse of the real seems to be a moment where the search for truth and 
therefore justice can begin.  I will return to this moment and how the novel defines its 
encounter with the real.
Another irruption of the real occurs toward the end of the pageant, when Miss La 
Trobe attempts to release her hold on the unity and coherence of the pageant and to 
merely present the real of present time itself.  Like John Cage’s musical experiments, she 
presents nothing on the “stage” of the pageant itself and instead allows the audience to 
experience their present:  
She wanted to expose them, as it were, to douche them, with present-time 
reality.  But something was going wrong with the experiment. ‘Reality too 
strong,’ she muttered. ‘Curse ‘em!’ [...]. If only she’d a backcloth to hang 
between the trees—to shut out cows, swallows, present time!  But she had 
nothing.  She had forbidden music. [...]. This is death, death, death, she 
noted in the margin of her mind; when illusion fails.  (125)
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Reflecting the earlier passage in the novel and that in Mrs. Dalloway, death here 
is analogized with reality itself.  However, while several critics point out that this failure 
of Miss La Trobe to achieve formal unity functions as a critique of and a commentary on 
fascist and patriarchal politics, few mark sufficiently that the disruption of this formal 
unity is importantly achieved by reality itself.   Patricia Joplin asserts that Miss La Trobe 
here “bears a striking resemblance to a petty dictator in her will to re-impose unity on her 
fragile, dispersed, uncontrollable work of art” (88).  Joplin, however, reads the novel as 
one which “celebrates rather than mourns the impossibility of final meaning” (89), in 
effect configuring it as antifascist in its postmodern assertion of the impossibility of 
metanarratives and the slippery relationship between referent, signifier and signified.  In 
fact, Joplin, in a somewhat commonplace critical maneuver,  analogizes a faith in the 
connection between signifier, signified and referent with political authoritarianism: “In 
both theme and structure, Wool’s last work becomes a meditation on the proximity of 
artist to dictator—of author to authoritarian ruler—when language is used as if there were 
no gap between sound and meaning, sign and referent” (89).  That this gap exists, and is 
rather cavernous, is, of course, one of the central tenets of poststructural/postmodern 
theory.  Likewise, Julie Vandivere asserts that Woolf in Between the Acts, “does not 
reinscribe epistemology or teleology; nor does she profess truth.  Instead, she suggests on 
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a grammatical level that any reliance on posited reality will give way” (231).  Here, both 
Joplin and Vandivere suggest that Woolf’s postmodern novel not only refuses unification, 
traditional epistemology and teleology, but also that truth itself and factual accuracy are 
subverted in the novel.  
In a complementary viewpoint, Pamela Caughie offers Between the Acts as a text 
that treats “truth and reality as negotiable concepts” (54).  Although, as Caughie argues, 
Between the Acts does frustrate attempts to fulfill most of the audience’s wishes “to leave 
the theatre knowing exactly what was meant” (54), it is also true that the novel does not 
completely relativize notions of “truth and reality,” despite its irrefutable challenge to 
traditional epistemology, teleology and narrative form.  Rather, Between the Acts insists 
on our capacity to access the real despite its own attack on traditional means of 
presenting and representing the past. 
Although the reading of Between the Acts  as a postmodern celebration of the 
indeterminacy of meaning is useful and relevant to a world haunted by the specter of 
Hitler and threatened by a violently imposed unity, it also forwards the postmodern 
notion that Between the Acts  encourages the dissolution of the real and the notion that 
access to reality, both historical and present is impossible.  What is clear, however,  is 
that while the novel does juxtapose chaos and order, dispersal and unity, part of this 
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juxtaposition is the analogizing of the chaotic and the dispersed with the real itself.  Miss 
La Trobe allows for and encourages the intrusion of the real in the final act of the 
pageant, despite her anxiety when it becomes “too real,” while Isa gets a glimpse of 
reality itself when reading the newspaper article.  That there is a gap between “sound and 
meaning” is emphasized repeatedly in the novel, but there is also a countervailing 
tendency to insist on the possibility of factual accuracy and to insist that some truths are 
not negotiable, as in the cases of the photographs and the rape.  This countervailing 
tendency is the building block of Woolf’s feminist ethics in the novel and that ethic relies 
upon the rejection of narrative and the deployment of nonnarrative forms.
Narrativity as Reality and the Problem with Plot
The resistance of reality to artistic presentation is, as we have seen, central to 
several of Woolf’s essays.  Hayden White’s brand of historiographic relativism later 
pinpoints this resistance particularly to the deformations of narrative, but Woolf’s own 
antagonism to traditional narrative is also clear in “Modern Fiction.” In that foundational 
essay, Woolf mocks not only the “series of gig lamps” symbolic of sequential 
progression, but also the reliance on actions and events that stimulate narratability, 
denying them both any epistemological privilege in the representation of reality: “if a 
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writer were a free man and not a slave, if he could write what he chose, not what he must 
[…] there would be no plot. […] Life is not a series of gig lamps symmetrically 
arranged” (106).  Similarly, in terms of the historiographic debate, Christopher Lorenz 
summarizes, “The crucial narrativistic message in this context is that neither the mode of 
emplotment nor the viewpoint can be located in reality, but only in the linguistic universe 
of narrative.  It is the historian who imposes a linguistic, literary structure on the past —in 
the past nothing real corresponds to it” (“Can Histories Be True?”311).  Although Lorenz 
offers this view to critique it, it remains a fair, if reductive, account of a particular strain 
of historical narrativism.  Again, Woolf’s views on “realistic” fiction parallel this critique 
narrative history; that is, she argues, it cannot approach reality because of its dependence 
on unity and structure.  
While many countervailing arguments have been made defending narrative 
history’s claim to factual accuracy and explanatory truth within the historiographic 
debate, most of these objections are raised on philosophical and epistemological grounds 
arguing that narrative can have access to historical truth even if life itself is not structured 
as narrative.  Although these objections have some validity, a countervailing view is 
taken exemplarily by David Carr,24  particularly in his Time, Narrative, and History, and 
is key to the understanding of Woolf’s vision of history in Between the Acts.
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Carr’s objection is not that life can be mirrored in narrative despite their structural 
differences, but rather that life itself is structured as a narrative, particularly in the mental 
life of human beings.  That is, in our daily life, we construct narratives to explain, predict 
and construct our activities.  In claiming this, Carr refutes the narrativist assertion that 
“narrative is nothing but window dressing or packaging, something incidental in our 
knowledge of the past” (Time 9), and instead insists that “narrative structure pervades our 
very experience of time and social existence, independently of our contemplating the past 
as historians” (Time 9).  Carr argues that although it may be possible to theorize time 
outside of narrative, as Bergsonian durée pure or “now points,” it is cognitively 
experienced as events or actions that have beginning, middles, and ends (i.e. narratives) 
and that the focus of human experience is largely on the future, or the prospective end of 
the narrative currently being experienced (Time 39- 41).  While these mental narratives 
are always being configured and reconfigured as new experiences change expectations, 
life itself is envisioned as narrative(s).  
Like experienced time [...] practical time involves at bottom a sequence of 
distinguishable events or event-phases that we live through or act out one 
at a time, one after the other, such that we are always “located” at one 
such point at a time.  In both action and experience, however, this ever-
changing point is a vantage point from which the other phases of the 
sequence, future and past, are grasped. (40)
161
Carr devotes much time and effort to illustrating how the phenomenological experience 
of reality is narratable, exploring the ways in which simple “short term actions and 
experiences” (49) are experienced as narrative by the participants.  Although he stops 
short of claiming narration as an essential or natural human activity, he does, in 
accordance with Barbara Hardy, assert that it has become a “primary act of mind” that 
dominates action in the present, not merely in retrospective storytelling.25 Likewise, he 
continues, the “self” is experienced as a narrative whose beginning and middle change 
dynamically over time, and whose end is predicted, if never fully experienced, through 
the mental narration.  He finally extrapolates these principles to communities which 
construct narratives about themselves, particularly their origins and possible conclusions, 
and which in turn construct “histories” themselves.  It is not my purpose here to assert the 
philosophical veracity or falsehood of Carr’s assertions, but it is essential to see how 
these principles are reflected in Between the Acts and how Woolf’s novel functions both 
as an affirmation of Carr’s diagnosis and a challenge to some of the fundamental 
ramifications of his reading. First, while the narrativism of White, Ankersmit, Mink, et. 
al. is often referred to as postmodern historiography and is allied with the relativism of 
French poststructural theory, it is clear that in at least one fundamental way Carr’s 
phenomenological analysis of life experienced as narrative is closer to Derridean thinking 
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than the narrativists.  The narrativists see the fundamental problem of traditional narrative 
historiography in the crucial distinction between the reality of experienced existence 
(chaotic, disordered, random, inexplicable) and the order created by narrative (linear, 
progressive, causally connected, open to explanation).  Carr’s observation that life, 
although perhaps more random and inexplicable than we believe, is, in fact, experienced
as narrative.  In this way, reality is experienced much like a novel or a written history, in 
which each of us is the hero/ine of our own narrative, and our histories or fictions are, at 
least partially, reflections of how we experience the world, although how we experience 
the world may just as easily be heavily influenced by the narratives we read, watch or 
tell.
The supposedly relativistic Derridean assertion that “there is no outside-the-text” 
is then confirmed by the phenomenologically oriented Carr in the sense that Carr affirms 
that life is experienced as a text and vice-versa.  Certainly, Woolf’s novel offers us a 
similar assessment in Between the Acts, in which the characters outside the pageant 
reenact the narratives and roles of those within it, allowing their present behavior to be a 
copy of the narratives of the past, repeating the social scripts and plots of past narratives, 
particularly the patriarchal and imperialist plots which offer progress and coherence even 
at the expense of the lives of women, natives, and other marginalized peoples.  It is here 
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that Woolf’s novel and Carr’s philosophy diverge, in their comparative analysis of the 
desirability of experiencing life as narrative.
Carr objects to the narrativist view that life is random and chaotic and therefore 
unlike narrative history.  In this, Carr assesses the narrativists to be pessimistic.  He 
observes that narrativists see narrative and particularly narrative histories as having 
meaning and causality, while life itself is a meaningless sequence of events.  “The 
problem with theorists such as White and Mink is not that they postulate the possibility of 
such a meaningless sequence, but that they turn things upside down: they place it at the 
heart of human experience, giving us as sad and depressing [...] a picture of human reality 
as we can imagine” (89).  On the other hand, Carr sees his own views as more optimistic, 
as he asserts that life too can have the inherent meaning and coherence that retrospective 
history confers.  It is here that Between the Acts diverges from Carr’s assertion.  Although 
not specifically a tract of narrative theory, Woolf’s novel instead notes the sad and 
depressing results of experiencing life as narrative in pointing out how these experienced 
plots are patriarchal in construction and in effect and are inherently harmful to Others,
particularly women whose roles in patriarchal plots are sadly limited.
What the narrativists and Carr have in common is their assessment that narrative 
in general, and its primary constituent(s), plot and/or emplotment,26  lend coherence, 
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meaning, and relief to a world that is otherwise characterized by randomness, chaos, and 
a lack of inherent meaning.  In this both Carr and White and his fellow narrativists seem 
to agree with Eliot’s assessment of art’s purpose in “Ulysses, Order and Myth,” providing 
structure where none exists.  Woolf’s novel rather suggests that plot itself is constricting, 
stultifying and oppressive, reproducing the power relations of patriarchy.  As indicated by 
the novel’s title, Between the Acts is interested in contrasting moments of action with 
what happens between these moments, or a lack of action itself.  Since many definitions 
of narrative locate important actions as the prerequisite for narration itself, it becomes 
clear that Woolf’s novel explores the possibilities and problematics of plotting.  While 
the definition of narrative and plot has a long and varied history,27 a common thread in 
these definitions of traditional narrative is the assertion that there must be some action or 
event that makes something narratable or worth narrating.  That is, by most conventional 
definitions, something must happen to spark and sustain narrative interest, or, as many 
theorists put it, to stimulate readerly “desire” (see Chapter Two for a more complete 
exploration of these theorists).  Woolf’s critique of action itself is then part of her critique 
of narrative and vice versa.
A further definition of narrative, one favored by Carr, specifies the reliance of 
narrative on temporality and sequence.  That is, a narrative must consist of at least two 
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events, connected through a progression of time and that indeed “narrative structure 
pervades our very experience of time” (Time 9).  Peter Brooks concurs with this 
definition of plot, noting that “not only does the reading of narrative take time; the time it 
takes to get from beginning to end [...] is very much part of our sense of narrative, what is 
has accomplished, what it means” (20).  Likewise, the plot is that which unifies the 
events that occur over time, making them coherent, complete and related to one another.  
Plot, according to Brooks, among others, is that which pursues the secret that sparks 
readerly desire, and while Brooks notes that narrative itself can only be sustained as long 
as this secret is unexplained, its end goal is its explanation.  If a grand or cataclysmic 
action is enough to begin or spark a narrative, the plot is that which pursues, unfolds 
and/or explains the causes or ramifications of that action (see Brooks 18).  In this way, 
the plot ties together or unites action that might otherwise appear to be unrelated.  
In one of the earliest discussion of plot, Aristotle asserts this principle in a 
different way.  In summarizing Aristotle’s account, Brian Richardson writes, “[plot] 
needs to be complete and of a certain magnitude, and its beginning and end must not be 
arbitrary.  A plot should have an organic unity and be free from irrelevant incidents; the 
events that compose it should be connected in a probable or necessary progression, rather 
than simply conjoined in an episodic sequence” (Narrative Dynamics 56).  The corollary 
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of the “unified” and “complete” nature of narrative or plot is also offered here; that is, the 
removal of anything not necessary to the plot, or which is irrelevant.  In agreement with 
this assertion, Roland Barthes offers that “art knows no static,” that is, where life contains 
many insignificant and irrelevant actions and events, these are either excluded from a 
proper narrative or invested with meaning so as to include them (see Carr, Time 13 -14, 
58).  In fact, the act of emplotment is assessed by Paul Ricoeur to be a “configurational 
act” that “grasps together” various elements and creates a unified whole out of them by 
looking at the series of events from their end point “reading the end in the beginning and 
the beginning in the end, we also learn to read time itself backwards” (Ricoeur 1:105; 
also see Carr, Time 64 -5).  Carr asserts that this act of emplotment occurs not only in 
retrospective storytelling, but also dynamically in the process of living and in 
constructing our subjectivity.  In either case, we can see how actions or events occur in 
time, while the plotting or emplotment of these events may be considered the order 
imposed on either dynamically or retrospectively.  Narrative itself, in this context, may be 
conceived of as the telling, reading or experiencing of the plot.  That is, while narrative 
itself is experienced in time, those events and actions that might be part of a narrative but 
are not part of the narrative being told or experienced, that are extraneous to the current 
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plot, are either retrospectively or concurrently and dynamically eliminated, leaving only a 
unified structure.
Although these definitions of narrative and plot are merely structural and seem 
politically and ethically innocuous, Woolf’s novel serves both to destroy our sense of 
what we should ethically expect from a narrative and to advocate for a mode of 
nonnarrativity that does not lead us to the same ethical and political conclusions as that 
offered by traditional narrative.  While traditional narrative predicates itself upon action, 
Woolf’s novel questions the validity and value of action itself.  In fact, although Woolf’s 
novel does not often explicitly confront the notion of narrative, as such, its abstraction 
from specific actions to a more abstract concept of action correlates with the attempt to 
theorize narrative itself.  When Giles crushes the snake, his movements are explained:  
“But it was action.  Action relieved him.  He strode to the barn, with blood on his shoes.” 
Here, “action” as such, is correlated with the active masculine principle in which action 
for its own sake is translated into violence.  In this, the action configured by much 
narrative theory as merely  necessary to raise narrative interest is already and always 
violent.  For Woolf, although action sparks narrative desire, it is ironically action itself 
that we should not, indeed must not, desire.  
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Likewise, the “acts” referred to in the title have multiple significations, nearly all 
of them reflective of Woolf’s condemnation of patriarchy.  Certainly, the most literal and 
obvious of its meanings is the sense that the “real” story of the novel takes place not in
the pageant, but between its theatrical Acts.  As we have seen, the actions in the pageant 
are reflective of accepted patriarchal history and of the patriarchal discourse out of which 
it is constructed.  The notion of a place between these Acts may then refer to a women’s 
history and reality obscured by the Acts of the pageant and the actions of men.  Likewise, 
the “between the acts” of the title refers clearly to its setting between the two World 
Wars.  Although published in 1941, in the midst of the second of the two great conflicts, 
the novel is set in 1939, before England joins in the fight against Hitler, and is thus 
properly between these two great Acts of British history.  As Patricia Joplin notes, “Mid-
summer, 1939, the moment Woolf’s fiction represents, was the last interval of ‘normal’ 
life before Britain ceased to be a spectator and became an actor in the war” (92).  Here, 
Joplin’s choice of a theatrical metaphor reflects Woolf’s own use of action versus its 
lack. The correlation of the wars with acts or actions serves to contrast the violence of 
action with the nonviolence of passivity, and Woolf ‘s famous pacifism is not only here 
associated with peace but also with the passivity that is juxtaposed with the action of war 
and the hyper-masculinity of Giles who performs violence for its own sake and for the 
169
relief it gives him.  In tying this to an nonnarrative strain in Woolf’s novel, it is sufficient 
to note that where action is the prerequisite for narrative itself, Woolf’s title suggests the 
difficult necessity of avoiding the acts themselves and instead finding the spaces between 
them.  Although we have already observed how Giles’s actions seem part of an 
unavoidable and endlessly repeating plot, or archi-writing, that is difficult to escape, 
Woolf’s novel makes an attempt to imagine a world without plot and therefore, possibly, 
without patriarchy. 
Woolf’s aversion to and critique of  plot as a concept is not original to Between 
the Acts, of course, as both her theoretical and fictional writings examine the concept of 
plot in a multitude of ways throughout her career.  In “Modern Fiction,” Woolf was 
already objecting to the necessity of plot in fiction.  
So much of the enormous labour of proving the solidity, the likeness to 
life, of the story is not merely labour thrown away but labour misplaced to 
the extent of obscuring and blotting out the light of the conception.  The 
writer seems constrained, not by his own free will but by some powerful 
and unscrupulous tyrant who has him in thrall, to provide a plot, to 
provide comedy, tragedy, love interest, and an air of probability 
embalming the whole so impeccable that if all his figures were to come to 
life they would find themselves dressed down to the last button of their 
coats in the fashion of the hour. (105-106)
The oppressiveness of plot and its role in “embalming” fiction is not merely, however, as 
this essay suggests, due to its reliance on convention and its obscuring of ineffable “life.”  
Rather, as the foreboding notion of plot as a powerful and “unscrupulous tyrant” 
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suggests, plot itself is tied, in other works, to patriarchal hegemony and domination.  
Indeed, as Susan Stanford Friedman argues, the seemingly purely formalist innovations 
in “Modern Fiction” are transformed into a feminist social and political agenda in A 
Room of One’s Own: “Woolf’s advocacy in A Room of One’s Own of a feminine style 
and sequence conflates feminism and modernism in a radical way” (162).  In A Room of 
One’s Own, Woolf  not only critiques plot and narrative, but suggests that these forms, as 
they have been traditionally practiced, are fundamentally antithetical to women’s state of 
mind and artistic inclinations.  When she argues that women must “break the sentence” 
and “break the sequence” of traditional narrative, she is insisting on an explosion of the 
narrative form itself.  When she says in appreciation of the mythical Mary Carmichael, 
“First she broke the sentence; now she has broken the sequence” (Room of One’s Own 
2196), she is appreciating and advocating the subversion of narrative itself.  As Friedman 
observes, “Narrative is understood to be a mode that foregrounds a sequence of events 
that move dynamically in space and time” (164; emphasis in original).  The breaking of 
that sequence is not only a formal innovation, but a refusal of the “tyranny” of a 
patriarchal form that is a contributor to social and political tyranny as well.  
Between the Acts’ aversion to the ethics of traditional plot is evidenced in many 
ways, but is most explicitly expressed by Isa who, in observing the convoluted plot of the 
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pastiche of Renaissance drama, thinks to herself; “Did the plot matter?  She shifted and 
looked over her right shoulder.  The plot was only there to beget emotion.  There were 
only two emotions: love and hate.  There was no need to puzzle out the plot.  Perhaps 
Miss La Trobe meant that when she cut this knot in the centre?  Don’t bother about the 
plot, the plot’s nothing (67).  Where plot is normally seen as central to any assessment of 
a work of narrative or its meaning, Isa asserts that such attention to “what happens” and 
how it is tied together is irrelevant.  Isa here refers to the cacophony that occurs in the 
midst of the playlet, making it impossible to extricate the plot, “There was such a medley 
of things going on, what with the beldame’s deafness, the bawling of the youths, and the
confusion of the plot that she could make nothing of it” (67).  Here, in fact, the playlet 
fails to meet the requirements of an ideal plot offered by Aristotle in its inclusion of the 
static that does not have direct relevance for the meaning and/or resolution of the story.
It is then this deviation from plot as such that allows Isa to have insight into its 
lack of importance, instead placing emphasis on the emotions invoked.  Even here, 
however, Isa is constrained by the patriarchal discourses and plots she has witnessed in 
the pageant and in her own social milieu, identifying only two possible emotions, each 
stemming from traditional patriarchal plots, the marriage plot (love) and the plot of 
masculine competition (hate).  It is only after the scene comes to a conclusion and the 
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beldame dies that Isa identifies a third possible emotion, stemming, it seems, from a lack 
of plot itself: “She fell back lifeless.  The crowd drew away.  Peace, let her pass.  She to 
whom all’s one now, summer or winter.  Peace was the third emotion.  Love.  Hate.  
Peace.  Three emotions made the ply of human life” (68).  Although there may be 
additional emotions in “human life,” here it appears that Isa identifies an additional 
emotion not normally conceived to be an emotion at all but rather, perhaps, its absence, 
and one that is not associated with patriarchal action, but with the feminist pacifism 
advocated in Three Guineas.  In seeing beyond the traditional male plots of the pageant, 
Isa gets a glimpse of the peace for which the novel expresses hope, if not confidence.
The inclusion of the static that is not part of the plot proper in the Renaissance 
playlet is then repeated and redeployed in the novel as a whole.  As any cursory reading 
of the novel will indicate, Between the Acts is full of ambient noise, particularly snippets 
of conversation among the audience members,  natural sounds of animals and birds, and, 
at one crucial moment, the sound of airplanes flying by, drowning out the speech of 
Reverend Streatfield.  While it might be possible to extract elements of all of this noise 
and identify it as important to a particular strand of plot, much of it seems merely 
included to indicate the atmosphere of the day of the pageant and, indeed, can obscure the 
plot and its linear progression more than contribute to it.  Here, again, Woolf’s novel, in 
173
its form as well as its content, obscures the reader’s access to the plot, as such, and 
indicates its opposition to the rigid linear plotting that is associated with patriarchy 
throughout the novel.  A representative passage illustrates the inclusion of static:
Then when Mr. Streatfield said: One spirit animates the whole - the 
airplanes interrupted.  That’s the worst of playing out of doors. ... Unless 
of course she meant the very thing ... Dear me, the parking arrangements 
are not what you might call adequate ... I shouldn’t have expected either so 
many Hispano-Suizas ...That’s a Rolls...That’s a Bentley ... That’s the new 
type of Ford. ... To return to the meaning—Are machines the devil or do 
they introduce a discord ... Ding dong, ding...by means of which we reach 
the final ... Ding dong. ... Here’s the car with the monkey... Hop in ... And 
good-bye, Mrs. Parker ... Ring us up.  Next time we’re down don’t forget 
... Next time ... Next time... (139-40)
Although some of this passage might be said to integrate clearly with the novel’s 
themes, and others less clearly, the effect is of a random collage of static much of which 
(the parade of cars, the Hispano-Suizas, the monkey) exceed any unifying narrative 
trajectory that might be labeled plot.  While Aristotle argues that plot should be unified 
and all action should be important to the story, Woolf’s inclusion of such ambient noise is 
an implicit objection to Aristotelian notions of plot.28
The aversion to traditional narrative is also clear in several other important 
symbolic moments in the novel, particularly the comparison of the two paintings 
discussed at the opening of this chapter and the legend associated with the Pointz Hall 
lily pool.  Both of these episodes contrast circumstances that generate narratable stories 
with an alternative in closer contact with the real.  It is initially clear that the ancestor in 
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the portrait is a representative of history, while the painting of the lady is merely a 
picture, an example of disinterested and pure art.  Not coincidentally, the portrait of the 
male ancestor is a clear symbol of patriarchy, while the picture, at least partially, 
symbolizes its feminine opposite.  Finally, the portrait is linked with the process of 
narrative and narration, while the picture is associated with the lack of narration or 
nonnarratability.  The portrait is said to be a “talk producer” (30) and this essentially 
means that it is a narrative-producer, providing the impetus for the stories of Colin the 
hound and Buster the horse, as well as the ancestor’s crusade for their inclusion in the 
portrait.  The picture on the other hand is seen to produce the very opposite of narration, 
“In her yellow robe, leaning, with a pillar to support her, a silver arrow in her hand, and a 
feather in her hair, she led the eye up, down, from the curve to the straight, through 
glades of greenery and shades of silver, dun and rose into silence” (30).  Although the 
bulk of this description is devoted to the visual impact of the picture, it leads not to talk, 
but to silence, the absence of both talk and narration: “Empty, empty, empty; silent, 
silent, silent” (30).  These lines, immediately following those above, attempt to convey 
what a nonnarrative world might sound like and feel like.  
Another key ingredient, that of temporality, is also eliminated here, for not only is 
the picture and the room in which it hangs “silent” but the novel conveys it as outside of 
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time: “The room was a shell, singing of what was before time was; a vase stood in the 
heart of the house, alabaster, smooth, cold, holding the still, distilled essence of 
emptiness, silence” (30).  The contrast here of the portrait (historical, patriarchal, and 
narrative), with the picture (ahistorical, feminine, and nonnarrative) conveys how 
Woolf’s stand against war and patriarchy must be carried out not through stories that 
counter traditional patriarchal narratives in content but imitate them in form, but rather, 
more appropriately, through nonnarrative expressions that more closely approximate or 
access the real by refusing available plots in the archi-writing of patriarchy and, indeed, 
plot itself.  
While several critics have noted Woolf’s skepticism towards and objections to the 
idea of plot both in Between the Acts and in her other novels, often these objections to the 
unity of plot are configured as an alternative unity, associated with the pre-Oedipal unity 
of the lyric, and not associated with the materiality of the historical real.  Honor 
McKitrick Wallace’s clearly delineated definitions of narrative and lyric are helpful in 
this regard: “narrative is the formal expression of linear, teleological movement that is at 
the very least metaphorically linked, if not driven by, masculine desire, while lyric is the 
attempt to subvert narrative’s linearity by positing a timelessness linked to feminine 
desire” (177).   It is clear that this definition of lyric intersects with and illustrates the 
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instances of the picture and the lily pond in Between the Acts, particularly through their 
connection to timelessness and silence, as opposed to sequentiality and talk.  While the 
lyric approach to these passages obscure Woolf’s crucial claims to historical materiality, 
it does help indicate Woolf’s anti-narrative strain and its origins in feminism, or at the 
very least in feminine desire.29
This is not to say that women in the novel are exempted from the tendency to 
narrativize, nor to say that they too cannot be at the center of traditional narrative.  
Women like Isa and Mrs. Manresa take central roles in patriarchal narrative and women’s 
inclusion in the tendency to narrativize is further seen in the story of the lily pool.  The 
lily pool behind Pointz Hall is a site, like the portrait of the ancestor, which is “talk-
producing.”  The legend, perpetuated by the servants, is that in the “deep centre” of the 
pool a “lady” had drowned herself . Ten years after, the pool had been dredged and only a 
sheep’s thigh bone had been recovered.  Nevertheless, the servants insist on the death of 
the lady and the subsequent presence of a ghost at Pointz Hall.  Here again, the “stories” 
of the lady’s suicide, undoubtedly over a failed romance, is contrasted with the reality of 
the dead sheep and the absence of ghost stories.  Here we see how narration is 
constructed largely of the desire to uncover and explain “secrets,” particularly gothic 
secrets,  even if the secrets must be fabricated in order to uncover them.30
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In contrast, the initial description of the lily pool has several similarities to the 
description of the “picture” of the lady:
There had always been lilies there, self-sown from wind-dropped seed, 
floating red and white on the green plates of their leaves.  Water, for 
hundreds of years, had silted down into the hollow, and lay there four or 
five feet deep over a black cushion of mud.  Under the thick plate of green 
water, glazed in their self-centered world, fish swam—gold, splashed with 
white, streaked with black or silver.  Silently they manoeuvered in their 
water world, poised in the blue patch made by the sky or shot silently to 
the edge where the grass, trembling, made a fringe of nodding shadow.  
On the water-pavement, spiders printed their delicate feet.  A grain fell 
and spiralled down; a petal fell, filled and sank.  At that the fleet of boat-
shaped bodies paused; poised; equipped; mailed; then with a waver of 
undulation off they flashed.  (34-5)
Here, the effect is of a piece of artwork observed, with the beautiful colors once 
again silently integrating with one another, balancing and moving without explanation, 
eternally and naturally maintaining a unity without a linear progression or narration.  In 
this, Renée Watkins sees one of the central thematic notes of the novel; “Like Proust, 
[Woolf] is committed to the study[...] of the moment, to the observation of its many 
dimensions, as they interlock.  Unlike him, she looks outside society, to nature, in hopes 
of finding reliably real things [...].  The force of the paragraph [...] derives from its 
reverence for natural things” (364).  Watkins points to how Between the Acts does try to 
locate a “real” outside-the-text of a society that is dominated by patriarchy.  While art, 
via Eliot, may at first be an appropriate extra-textual location, Woolf’s treatment of the 
pageant indicates how art is more likely to repeat, reflect, and even generate, the plots of 
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lived history than to be exclusive from them.  Here, nature and its observation seems to 
offer an anti-narrational “reliably real thing,” but even the lily pool becomes a site for 
narration and explanation, as opposed to mystery and silence, through the story of the 
lady and her ghost, as well as in the treatment of the pool by Bartholomew Oliver, who 
explains the beauty of the fish by the “reasonable” and biological imperative for sex 
(143), silencing his sister’s objections.  The heteronormative plot of reproduction 
explains away the mystery of the pool in several ways, transforming the reliably real and 
extra-textual into one of the most common social plots.  While the picture and the lily 
pool do become Woolfian possibilities for anti-narration, characterized by their silence, 
beauty, and inexplicability, they can only have limited success in countering the 
patriarchal imperatives of narration.  Both are easily re-integrated and explained in some 
of the most common patriarchal social plots particularly in patriarchy’s tendency to 
define women as “silent,” inexplicable” and “beautiful.”31
Bergson’s Present and Woolf’s “Moments of Being”
Watkins’s reference to Proust allows us entry into another way that both Woolf’s 
novel and La Trobe’s pageant attempt to overcome the overwhelming imperatives of 
narrative and the archi-writing of social plotting; through its rejection of temporality itself 
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and the focus on the present moment.  Importantly, however, this present moment is not 
defined merely as an evanescent, fleeting non-presence or as a timeless paradise that pre-
dates the temporality of narrative (see note 29) but as a moment both of unlimited
promise and of substantial ontological materiality.  Watkins’s reference to Proust calls to 
mind Carr’s reference to Bergsonian “now points” or to bring the reference closer to 
home, Woolf’s “moments of being.”  It is not novel to read many modernists, and Woolf 
in particular, through Bergson and his definition(s) of memory and consciousness, but it 
is productive to revisit this point briefly through the lens of nonnarrative approaches to 
the real, particularly in light of Woolf’s and La Trobe’s overt attempts to theorize the 
present in Between the Acts.  Bergson’s theory of memory and the present is quite 
complicated and would be impossible to rehearse here in its totality.32   Nevertheless, 
central to Bergson’s theory is his insistence on the radically dual, and dialectic, nature of 
consciousness and time.  While a convenient shorthand of Bergsonian philosophy often 
allies Bergson with the radically relativist philosophers who offer the world, and 
particularly the experience of time, as a creation of the human mind, in fact Bergson 
insists on both the centrality of consciousness to our experience of time and on the 
materiality of a world external to that mind.  In this, Woolf’s theorization of the present 
in Between the Acts is remarkably similar.  
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Bergson insists that both time and consciousness can be conceived of as pure 
continuity, in a constant state of flux and impossible to divide into definable and stable 
moments of any size.  Because time is motion and is never reducible to a present 
moment, and because each present moment eclipses the one previous to it, matter itself 
seems to be eclipsed within the perpetual movement of time and consciousness, which 
together constitute memory.  At the same time, however, Bergson insists on the central 
presence of matter itself, and the substantiality of the natural world as independent from 
consciousness. “My brain is a part of the material world; therefore it is absurd to suppose, 
with the idealists, that it produces, or is a condition of, all other images: if we cancel the 
world we cancel the brain along with it” (Kolakowski 39).33   The seeming philosophical 
contradiction here is evident, as Bergson seems to suggest that there are two modes of 
existence: one of memory, consciousness and time that is constantly moving and one of 
solidity and matter which is of an entirely different order from the mysteries of time and 
consciousness (durée).34   Yet, Bergson insists there is a connection between these worlds, 
even if that connection is difficult to ascertain or to articulate.  As John Mullarkey 
explains, “[Matter and Memory] wants to establish a connection between the enduring 
mind and an enduring world without getting caught up in the one-upmanship of trying to 
reduce the origins of either one to the other” (33).  In order to do this, the present moment 
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is of central importance, because “the present itself is only the most contracted level of 
the past.  This time [the present] it is pure present and pure past, pure perception and pure 
recollection as such, pure matter and pure memory[...] and thus rediscover[s] an 
ontological unity” (Deleuze 74; emphasis in original).  That is, while matter and memory 
seem to be of fundamentally different orders, they come together in the present, because 
it is only in the present that matter can be said to exist.  While time eclipses the matter of 
the previous moment, it is in the present that consciousness as memory meets matter, in 
effect transforming it from matter into memory via consciousness.35  Because of this, 
Bergson writes,  “the present is that which interests me, which lives for me, and in a 
word, that which summons me to action; in contrast my past is essentially powerless” 
(Matter and Memory 137).  In identifying the past as powerless, Bergson conceives of a 
moment of an “ideal present” that separates the past from the future, but at the same time, 
he notes the impossibility of such a moment, 
What is, for me, the present moment?  The essence of time is that it goes 
by; time already gone by is the past and we call the present the instant in 
which it goes by.  But there can be no question here of a mathematical 
instant.  No doubt there is an ideal present— a pure conception the 
indivisible limit which separates past from future.  But the real, concrete, 
live present— that of which I speak when I speak of my present 
perception—that present necessarily occupies a duration.” (Matter and 
Memory 137) 
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Bergson’s attempt to theorize an “ideal present,” a commonplace of theorizations 
of temporality, is immediately undercut by his assertion that such a present cannot exist 
because the real present always has duration and is always moving.  Still, for Bergson the 
present does exist, is material and is always therefore present, if just out of our grasp. 
This is not, however, for Bergson, and importantly for Woolf, merely a matter of abstract 
philosophical pondering, but is also an important statement about the possibility of 
human freedom and the possibility of social, political, and ethical change.
As Leszek Kolakowski writes, the importance of Bergson’s present is that “each 
moment carries within it the entire flow of the past and each is new and unrepeatable” 
(3).  That is, while the present moment bears the burden of the entirety of the past (and all 
of its plots, the burden of which Isa feels in Between the Acts), it is also the one moment 
that is not purely part of the past, not strictly on the order of consciousness, but is also 
simultaneously part of the world of matter, on the order of the real and filled with the 
possibility of exceeding the plots of the past.  In this case, it is the one moment when true 
freedom is possible, the freedom to move beyond our own history, our repeated social 
plots and to instead create and experience something new.  As Kolakowski paraphrases 
Bergson:
All the components of the question of freedom are altered once we realize 
that real temporal succession occurs only in the mind and is projected onto 
matter.  In real time, in the life of consciousness, there is a perfect 
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continuity, and our self is at every moment, as it were, in a state of being 
born, absorbing its past and creating its future; it has a history, no doubt, it 
even is its history stored in memory, but it cannot go through the same 
state again; such a miracle would amount to the reversal of time.  (21)
Still, while each moment in consciousness is a freedom from the past and 
“creating the future,” each of these moments is only free in the present moment, in the 
precise moment where consciousness meets matter itself.  That is, freedom does not 
depend only on “free play” in the abstract realm of consciousness or signification but 
must, of necessity, equally rely on the materiality of the present.36
Similarly, if not identically to Bergson, Woolf theorizes and shows a version of 
life that is not completely dominated by the plots of the past, and instead gives us the 
possibility of a present that exceeds the scripted plots of daily reality, and offers a real 
outside-the-text of those plots.  In this, she offers a way to form an ethics counter to that 
generated by the plots of patriarchal and imperialist society.  Her theorization of such a 
possibility is most clearly elaborated in Moments of Being, the collection of 
autobiographical writings published posthumously in 1976, and most explicitly in the 
long autobiographical fragment, “A Sketch of the Past.”
Jeanne Schulkind’s introduction to Moments of Being summarizes Woolf’s theory 
of “moments of being” like this: “the individual in his daily life is cut off from ‘reality’ 
but at rare moments receives a shock.  These shocks or ‘moments of being’ are not [...] 
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simply random manifestations of some malevolent force but ‘a token of some real thing 
behind appearances’” (17).37  In this, Woolf offers the possibility of a vision “behind the 
scenes” or “between the acts” even when she seems to foreclose such a vision, as she 
does by showing how Giles, Isa, and the audience, like the pageanteers, are within a play 
not outside of one.  The application of “moments of being” to Between the Acts is evident 
if we return to the novel’s rare and fleeting irruptions of the real.  Isa gains a vision of the 
“real” beyond the archi-writing of patriarchy when she sees the rape, and for her this is a 
moment of being, a vision of the “real thing” obscured by the “daily life” permeated by 
hegemony.  
Most readings of Woolf’s vision of “moments of being” see them, similarly to 
Schulkind, as “the vision of reality as a timeless unity which lies beneath the appearance 
of change, separation and disorder that marks daily life” (18): that is, as a moment of 
unity inherent to reality, when the world, to all appearances, is disjointed and 
disconnected.  However, what is actually forwarded by Woolf, both in Between the Acts
and in “A Sketch of the Past” does not suggest that such unity is beautiful and timeless.  
Rather, particularly   in the novel, it is clear that if the chaos and disorder of daily 
existence is unified, it is because it is largely controlled and permeated by patriarchy.  
Likewise, “moments of being” like those experienced by Isa introduce discontinuity into 
185
this pattern.  While the lily pool and the lady’s picture may, in one sense, be a beautiful 
unified vision, they are, in another sense, that which is discontinuous with the plot of 
daily life, the real outside-the-text of patriarchal reality.  It is this vision of the real, or 
moments of being, as precisely discontinuous, non-unified, and therefore fundamentally 
anarchic and chaotic, that lends Between the Acts’ vision of the real its frightening and 
dystopian edge, whereas elsewhere in the Woolfian oeuvre it seems to be unifying and a 
source of hope.
Certainly in “A Sketch of the Past,” where the idea is formally discussed, 
moments of being are both encounters with the real and encounters with the unified and 
transcendent. Woolf offers moments of non-being as those which make up the majority of 
lived existence, the life that is not “lived consciously” but is merely the “nondescript 
cotton wool” of the repetition and recapitulation of everyday activities (70).  “Moments
of Being” on the other hand, are, as Schulkind notes, “shocks” that a give a revelation of 
the real, which is also order; “it is or will become a revelation of some order, a token of 
some real thing behind appearances” (“A Sketch” 72).  Woolf here is describing her 
vision of a flower, which, like the vision of the lady’s picture and the lily pool in Between 
the Acts is a vision of perfect unified beauty and that “behind the cotton wool is hidden a 
pattern; that we— I mean all human beings— are connected with this; that the whole 
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world is a work of art; that we are parts of the work of art” (“A Sketch” 72).  In this, 
Woolf sounds a bit like Reverend Streatfield and his interpretation of the pageant as a 
vision of unification.  “Each is part of the whole. [...] Scraps, orts, and fragments! Surely 
we should unite!” (133-34).  Streatfield, however,  is described as “a piece of church 
furniture” and as a “a butt, a clod, laughed at by looking-glasses; ignored by the cows, 
condemned by the clouds,”(132-33) making his vision of unification suspect, particularly 
when it is immediately followed by the circulation of the collection baskets and the 
transformation of the pageant into a fundraising opportunity.  However,  another 
description of a moment of being in “A Sketch of the Past” allows alternative possibilities 
to the vision of unification Streatfield offers.  
As a child then, my days, just as they do now, contained a large proportion 
of this cotton wool, this non-being.  Week after week passed at St. Ives 
and nothing made any dint upon me.   Then for no reason that I know 
about, there was a violent shock; something happened so violently that I 
have remembered it all my life.  I will give a few instances.  The first: I 
was fighting with Thoby on the lawn.  We were pomelling each other with 
our fists.  Just as I raised my fists to hit him, I felt: why hurt another 
person?  I dropped my hand instantly, and stood there and let him beat me.  
I remember the feeling.  It was a feeling of hopeless sadness.  It was as if I
became aware of something terrible; and of my own powerlessness.  I 
slunk off alone, feeling horribly depressed. (“A Sketch” 71)
It is not easy to correlate this strange experience with the vision of the flower, the 
painting, or the lily pool, but it is clear here that Woolf has a vision of an ethics that 
resides outside the dominant cultural symbolic, or the general text of patriarchy.  That 
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this moment of past experience is a moment of pacifism, and is discussed near the 
outbreak of World War II, makes this memory a simultaneously political construction 
and a belief in a universal ethics generated from real experience that resists and 
transcends social scripting.  Woolf’s pacifism is not coherent in a patriarchal culture 
dominated by violent competition and is thus outside that text.  At the same time, it can 
be viewed as a Bergsonian present in its correlation with a reality behind the scenes of 
daily existence, a solid and perceivable instant where matter and truth itself are visible.  
In this Bergsonian present there is a freedom not to merely follow the scripts and plots of 
the past, but to make a new choice, an active decision in the material world of the present, 
that changes the nature not only of one’s own consciousness, but of the world it 
encounters in that moment.  Woolf extends the idea of the Bergsonian present into the 
past by locating particular moments of anti-narrativity that exceed hegemonic plotting 
and, in so doing, reveal their status as real.
In  many ways, this moment is the precise opposite of the explanation Streatfield 
provides of the pageant.  Streatfield comes forward to try to sum up the pageant’s events 
and to place meaning upon it.  Streatfield tries to “read time itself backwards,” as Ricoeur 
suggests, by coming in at the end of the pageant and placing a unifying plot upon it.  He 
offers to the assembled crowd, “To me […] it was indicated that we are members of one 
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another,. Each is part of the whole.  [...] We act different parts; but are the same,” (133-
34) but in the middle of his speech, in the middle of a word,  twelve  RAF airplanes in 
formation streak across the sky, drowning out his voice.  These planes are often taken to 
be a pessimistic38 undercutting of the Reverend’s attempt to provide an optimistic 
unifying vision of the pageant, but in fact these planes underscore the Reverend’s 
message, as he attempts to unify and homogenize into a single plot the disparate “orts, 
scraps and fragments” of the pageant, just as Hitler attempts to unify Europe into the plot 
of German superiority and hegemony.  The planes and Streatfield’s speech reflect 
Woolf’s account of the parallels of Hitlerism abroad and patriarchy at home.  This is not 
to say that Woolf does not have a very strong attraction to unified visions and works of 
art throughout her career, but it is in Between the Acts that she most clearly expresses the 
ethical and political dangers of trusting a unifying vision, sustained by narrative. Woolf’s 
vision in a “Sketch of the Past” is both a vision of a past moment39 as real and a rejection 
of the violent unification that Streatfield attempts to inflict upon the scraps, orts, and 
fragments of the pageant and the past.  Unification, then, is not always shorthand for 
beauty, but is often a plot which excludes and marginalizes that which does not fit into its 
borders.  In the case of Woolf’s pacifist childhood encounter with her brother, that which 
is outside, abject, “something terrible,” “powerless,” and “depressed” provides the 
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moment of being. The closest parallel in Between the Acts to this moment of dislocating 
and isolating pacifism in “A Sketch of the Past” is Miss Latrobe’s attempt to make her 
audience experience the present itself, or a Bergsonian moment of the ideal present, 
outside of temporality, outside plotting, and in a very real sense, free.
The Pageant and the Present
Miss La Trobe’s Victorian playlet is followed by one last intermission before 
which the audience is to be presented with the final Act of the pageant: “the Present time. 
Ourselves.”  During this intermission, the novel takes great pains to present a 
nonnarrative situation.  Rather than presenting great acts, causally and tightly connected 
with a unified purpose, Between the Acts takes the opportunity to mention and highlight 
those intervening moments between the acts that are not part of conventional plotting, the 
moments of inaction: “They were all caught and caged; prisoners; watching a spectacle.  
Nothing happened.  The tick of the machine was maddening” (123) This moment of 
inaction is reiterated more fully on the following page:  “All their nerves were on edge.  
They sat exposed.  The machine ticked.  There was no music.  The horns of cars on the 
high road were heard.  And the swish of trees.  They were neither one thing nor the other; 
neither Victorians nor themselves.  They were suspended, without being, in limbo.  Tick, 
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tick, tick, went the machine” (124).   And again; “The audience fidgeted.  Sounds of 
laughter came from the bushes.  But nothing whatsoever appeared on the stage” (124-5).  
La Trobe’s ticking machine dramatizes the passage of time without action, the possibility 
of time’s motion without unifying plot to give it purpose.  
While the Pointz Hall residents wait for the plot to resume, Woolf, who has 
already put into question the ethical and moral efficacy of a dependency on plot, shows 
the dis-ease nevertheless associated with its lack.  Significantly, these fleeting moments 
of inaction and discomfort are immediately preceded by Lucy Swithin’s mental attempt at 
unification, or what she calls “one-making.”  
She was off, they guessed, on a circular tour of the imagination—one-
making.  Sheep, cows, grass, trees, ourselves — all are one.  If discordant, 
producing harmony — if not to us, to a gigantic ear attached to a gigantic 
head.  And thus —she was smiling benignly —the agony of the particular 
sheep, cow, or human being, is necessary; and so —she was beaming 
seraphically at the gilt vane in the distance — we reach the conclusion that 
all is harmony, could we hear it.  And we shall.  Her eyes now rested on 
the white summit of a cloud. (122)
Swithin’s urge to create unity reflects the Aristotelian idea of plotting, in which 
everything must have its place and, in this case, create harmony, although it does not 
follow the conventional notion of plot that unites action in time.  Rather, it creates a 
moment of unity that is not predicated upon action or temporality, resembling the 
lyricism that many critics suggest Woolf substitutes for plot (see note 29).  Indeed, unlike 
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Isa and Bart, who mock Lucy internally, Woolf cannot be said here to be dismissing Mrs. 
Swithin’s point-of-view out of hand.  After all, Woolf’s perspective in both “The Narrow 
Bridge of Art” and “Phases of Fiction” stresses the necessity of balancing the beauty of 
unity with the realism of the chaos of life itself in order to create art.  Still, however, Miss 
Swithin’s attempts to exert unity and harmony on life seems more of an escape or retreat 
from the violent and patriarchal plots exhibited in the pageant than an attempt to confront 
and overcome them.  In contrast, the pageant’s, and the novel’s, attempt to exclude itself 
from this plot may sacrifice the unifying features of beautiful art in an attempt to gain a 
real with a purchase on non-patriarchal ethics.  
In order to achieve this effect, La Trobe not only attempts to present time passing 
without accompanying action, but also the possibility of an ideal present without 
accompanying temporality.  She does this by presenting the present itself in three 
different phases.  The first of these is in the presentation of merely “present time” without 
any accompanying action onstage.  Again, her stage notes read:  “‘Try ten mins. of 
present time.  Swallow, cows, etc.’  She wanted to expose them, as it were, to douche 
them, with present-time reality” (125).  The audience assumes, of course, that the ten 
minutes are just an extended intermission and angrily wonder how long La Trobe will 
keep them waiting.  The pressure of a lack of plot introduces discontinuity into the 
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pageant and into the lives of the audience, as expectations, in particular the explicability 
of the accepted general text, are frustrated.  Actions are replaced with inaction and the 
progression of uniform time that is also central to traditional plotting is interrupted.  In 
this way, the marriage of action and temporality that is plot is here dissolved.  
Although the introduction of reality into the pageant is, in fact, La Trobe’s goal 
here, she is not prepared for the discomfort and dis-ease associated with it.  When she 
feels that “Reality [is] too strong” (125), she feels the same “hopeless sadness” and 
“powerlessness” that Woolf describes in her memoir during her moment of being.  
Whereas action, control and unity are the configurational acts of traditional, and therefore 
patriarchal, plotting, the attempt to let go of the power to form and unite, although 
perhaps ethically necessary, is an uncharted and uncomfortable waterway to navigate.  It 
is for this reason, it seems, that “panic seized [Miss La Trobe].  Blood seemed to pour 
from her shoes” (125), and that she analogizes this moment with the trauma of death 
itself, “this is death, death, death, she noted in the margin of her mind” (125).  As I 
explore more fully in the following chapter,  death is frequently analogized with the 
cessation of plot itself and the aversion to plot here is inextricably linked to La Trobe’s 
experience of “death.”
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The death here is not, of course, literal or biological but has more in common with 
what Slavoj Zizek, following Lacan, calls a “symbolic death.” or more explicitly a 
“symbolic suicide.”  “The act done (or more appropriately endured) [...] is that of 
symbolic suicide: an act of ‘losing all,’ of withdrawing from symbolic reality, that 
enables us to begin anew from the ‘zero point,’ from that point of absolute freedom called 
by Hegel, ‘abstract negativity.”  (Zizek, Enjoy Your Symptom! 43).  This point of freedom 
resembles the moment of freedom in the present that Bergson offers and Zizek here calls 
upon, specifically, Ingrid Bergmann’s encounter with the volcano in Rossellini’s  
Stromboli40 for his example.   Zizek points to Bergmann’s decision to jettison herself from 
the demands of social relations available to her on the patriarchally-dominated Italian 
island of Stromboli.  She ascends to the top of a volcano and, in Zizek’s reading, decides 
to no longer participate in the “symbolic order” or prescribed social relations of the island 
and instead to do something new.  What, in particular, her next move will be is unclear in 
the Italian version of the film, while the United States version finds Bergmann’s character 
(Karin) finding God and returning to the village with a new internal symbolic stemming 
from her religiosity.  Zizek denotes the ambiguity of the Italian conclusion as the 
depiction of an encounter with the Real, as “in the face of the primordial power of the 
volcano, all social ties pale into insignificance, she is reduced to her bare ‘being there’: 
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running away from the oppressive social reality, she encounters something incomparably 
more horrifying, the Real.”  While this is horrifying, after “we pass through the ‘zero 
point’ of the symbolic suicide,” it also “changes miraculously into supreme bliss — as 
soon as we renounce all symbolic ties” (Zizek, Enjoy 42-43; emphasis in original).
La Trobe’s ten minutes of  “nothing” parallels Zizek’s account of Karin’s 
experience at the volcano in La Trobe’s rejection, or at least, retreat, from the prescribed 
symbolic, plot, or archi-writing of her community.  Her decision to extricate herself from 
her community’s plot (and, indeed, the concept of  “plot” itself) reduces her to “being 
there,” an experience she, at first, also attempts of confer upon her audience.  In this 
attempt she, like Karin, feels the “horrifying” effects of removal from “symbolic ties,” in 
particular through the eyes of the audience.  Her “horrifying” encounter is experienced 
through the eyes of the audience, as she sees herself, through them, as abject “other,” 
outside of the network of social relations.  “She felt everything they felt,” (125) but at the 
same time attempts to disassociate herself from them: “Audiences were the devil.  O to 
write a play without an audience — the play” (125).  Her reliance on the audience and 
their symbolic/social recognition does not allow her symbolic suicide to be complete, but 
once she passes through this moment and “renounces all symbolic ties” (or at the very 
least acknowledges the dissolution of such ties) by noting the failure of illusion and her 
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experience of “death,” her attitude and the experience of the pageant itself begins to 
resemble “supreme bliss” more closely than an idea of the “horrifying Real.”41
As the conventional patriarchal “plot” of linear order and unity is dissolved 
through the non-narrational inaction of the pageant, a new order begins to form as it 
begins to rain.  “Down it poured like all the people in the world weeping.  Tears. Tears. 
Tears” (125).  La Trobe sees the rain as creating a new unity for her pageant and begins 
to believe that her decision to act in the open air has paid off, dissolving the pain and 
anguish recently experienced through her failure with the audience.  Indeed, Isa 
experiences the rain as if “they were all people’s tears, weeping for all people [...].  The 
rain was sudden and universal” (126).  The connection achieved here between La Trobe 
and Isa is followed by the playing of a gramophone record employed earlier in the 
pageant, saying, “The King is in his counting house/Counting out his money,/ The Queen 
is in her parlour” (126; emphasis in original).  These lines, to this point in the novel, 
comment parodically on the patriarchal plot as it has been sketched out in the historical 
pageant.  That is, the King is configured as a captain of voracious capitalism and public 
action, while the Queen embodies the feminine principle, at “’Ome” performing her 
domestic duties.  Here, however, the lines take on a completely different significance, at 
least for those members of the audience who have connected with La Trobe’s attempt at 
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symbolic suicide.  Isa experiences the recording of the traditional rhyme in this way: 
“now that the shower had fallen, it was the other voice speaking, the voice that was no 
one’s voice.  And the voice that wept for human pain unending” (126)
The notion that such conventional and, in many ways, oppressive lines from a 
nursery rhyme, could be read as not part of the symbolic reflection and creation of  
“human pain” but as voices weeping for and sympathizing with such pain speaks to the 
dissolution of the patriarchal general text under which such lines have been created and 
traditionally understood.  Here, language itself loses its conventional meaning and 
undertakes a new meaning; one of pacifism, community, and empathy shared between 
people, and particularly between La Trobe and some members of the very audience that 
she has chosen to condemn and, for a time, abandon.  Isa’s voices a wish at this time, “O 
that my life could here have ending” which reflects La Trobe’s experience of “death, 
death, death,” as Isa appears to wish for the symbolic suicide that La Trobe experiences 
and which her pageant invokes.42   Isa’s conflicted relationship with Giles and towards the 
patriarchal system in which she participates does not seem until this point to allow her an 
escape, gripped as she is with the view of Giles as “the father of her children” and with 
those children themselves as one of the central facts of her existence.  However,  her wish 
for an ending to her life is not necessarily a wish for her physical demise, but is rather a 
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wish for a place outside the historical plot outlined by the pageant’s depiction of the past.  
Most importantly, it is a hope for the present depicted here by the lack of plot, by 
inaction, and by a new language that transforms traditional gender relations into universal 
sympathy and understanding.   
Although, in many ways, the experience of La Trobe and Isa resembles the 
Lacanian symbolic death that Zizek references, there is at least one crucial difference that 
is essential to the ethical and political ramifications of the novel.  Lacan sees the act of 
symbolic suicide as a purely individual action, one which affirms the uniqueness of the 
individual at all costs and “against the community” (J. Lee 130), implying the 
fundamental isolation of one who jettisons herself from the social symbolic.  Certainly La 
Trobe feels this traumatic isolation when deploying her plotless final Act and wishing to 
be divorced from her audience, but Isa’s connection and response to La Trobe’s pageant 
indicates that even beyond the restrictions and bounds of traditional language and the 
communally accepted plot, communication and connection, although unlikely, is 
possible.   In fact, this connection between La Trobe, her pageant, and Isa resembles an 
attempt to access a communal voice that may replace the idea of the controlling, 
individualist narrator associated with traditional fiction and which La Trobe herself 
embodies in her earlier efforts to control the pageant completely.  The possibility of such 
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a communal voice is explored by Susan Lanser who notes that one of the purest examples 
of an attempt to abandon the tradition of individual narration is seen in a book like 
Monique Wittig’s Les Guérilleres in which “the women decide at one point that their 
own discourse ‘denotes an outworn language’ and that ‘everything must begin over 
again’” (Lanser 271).  This is certainly the possibility explored here by La Trobe and Isa 
who transform words and phrases from an “outworn language” and invest them with 
completely different meaning.  The joining of the two women in a place outside of 
patriarchal language, as such, resembles Woolf’s hope in Three Guineas for a female 
Society of Outsiders, who despite their status as exiled, independent, and fundamentally 
other, nevertheless can connect with one another.43
The likelihood of two people transforming the nursery rhyme from one of 
rigidified gender roles and male domination into one of fundamental human sympathy, 
community and pacifism is radically unlikely, requiring, as it does, a virtually new 
language, but the connection Isa has to La Trobe’s work offers the possibility of a 
communal bliss after “all symbolic ties are broken.”  Likewise, the tradition of an 
individual narrator, associated with a “hegemonic individualism” (Lanser 255) that 
emphasizes difference is here undermined in favor of a communal identification.  While 
it is true that, as Lanser points out, Between the Acts does not abandon an authorial voice 
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and narrator in favor of a communal one, the dispersal of voice and the difficulty in 
identifying individual narrators throughout the novel contributes to the sense of pushing 
beyond individualism and patriarchal plotting and towards the bliss beyond traditionally 
defined social relations.  Makiko Minow-Pinkney’s description of Between the Acts  as a 
move towards a “post-individualist future on the other side of the apocalypse brought 
about by the rapacious male ‘I’ (193), is then seen most clearly in the connection Isa 
makes with the pageant following the ten minutes of silence. 44   It is perhaps here that, 
despite the undoubted central narratorial presence, Between the Acts achieves the goal 
Woolf set for it in an April 26, 1938 letter in which she describes her novel in progress:
why not Poyntzet Hall: a centre: all lit. discussed in connection with real 
little incongruous living humour; & anything that comes into my head; but 
“I” rejected: “We”  substituted: to whom at the end there shall be an 
invocation? “We”... composed of many different things ... we all life, all 
art, all waifs & strays— a rambling capricious but somehow unified 
whole—the present state of my mind?” (Diary 5:135; emphasis mine)  
In Between the Acts,  undoubtedly, “we” substitutes for “I” in the narrative sense, 
and although perhaps a “unified whole” may finally be achieved, it is only after a 
fundamental dissolution of the unity of plot, both narrative and social, has been enacted, 
with a new unity being “rambling and capricious,” not linear, progressive and tightly 
unified as in traditional plotting.  This unity is a unified voice of Outsiders excluded from 
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the individualist narration of plot, not a unity achieved through the process of narration 
itself.45
The vision La Trobe has of the present as a break from the past, not as a 
continuation of it, allows for the possibility not of a continuing patriarchal plot or archi-
writing, but as the lack of plot itself, the opportunity for the breaking of symbolic ties, 
and the forging of a new language outside of patriarchy.  Bakhtin argues that the novel
form itself fundamentally focuses on the present time, and is thus “a radical response to 
what is restrictive in tradition” (Ames, “Modernist”  399).  Like Bergson, Bakhtin asserts 
that “The present in all its openendedness, taken as a starting point and center for artistic 
and ideological orientation, is an enormous revolution in the creative consciousness of 
man” (Bakhtin 38).46  Although it may be arguable that all novels fulfill this function, 
Woolf’s focus on the present moment as at least conceivably independent from the past, 
allows hope for a future that breaks from the restrictive and oppressive plot of the past.  
That Woolf first elaborates the incredible difficulty of removing oneself from the current 
archi-writing makes this cautious optimism all the more valuable.
The Pageant and the Present (Take 2)
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La Trobe’s depiction of the present does not end with the ten minutes of silence, 
however.  As Christopher Ames points out, there are three stages of the final act of La 
Trobe’s pageant.  There are the “ten minutes of silence, the actors approaching the 
audience with fragments of mirrors, and the actors chanting bits and pieces of their earlier 
lines” (“Modernist” 400). Ames does not include in his list the brief interlude in which a 
ruined wall is depicted and is then rebuilt by “human effort” (Between 126).  The wall is 
rebuilt by “woman handing bricks. [...] black man in fuzzy wig; coffee-coloured ditto in 
silver turban” taken by Mr. Page, the reporter, to be a signifier of the rebuilding of 
Civilization by the League of Nations (126).  The audience responds approvingly to what 
they see as a “flattering tribute to ourselves” (127), but in light of what has gone before 
and what is to follow it is clear that this episode calls for a future dissolution of what is 
currently “Civilization” and a rebuilding under more egalitarian terms, such that the 
League of Nations may have represented but certainly did not achieve if the forthcoming 
war is any indication.  That the unity of the rebuilt wall is soon met by more discordance 
and discontinuity indicates how its “wholeness” is yet another plot, the plot of 
achievement, civilization, linear progress, and imperialism, that must be interrupted when 
the music “changed; snapped; broke; jagged” (127). 
202
The interruption of this music is a “cackle, a cacopony!” in which “nothing 
ended” (127) and is associated with the younger generation “who can’t make, but only 
break; shiver into splinters the old vision; smash to atoms what was whole” (128).  
Certainly, nothing could be more fundamentally and thematically opposed to the unifying 
vision of plot and of the wall of Civilization than this music, and its aural discontinuity is 
soon matched by the arrival of all of the cast members using “anything that’s bright 
enough to reflect, presumably, ourselves” (128) to reflect fragments and pieces of the 
audience, but never a “whole” individual.  The choice of fragmentary reflection as a 
method of depicting the present moment again takes on important historical and ethical 
significance if read through the lens of Lacanian theory.  
Commonplace to Lacanian thought is the idea of the “mirror stage” of childhood 
development.  Lacan argues that the moment that a child first recognizes herself in a 
mirror is the moment when her “whole” identity is both created and radically 
undermined.  That is, the child here begins to see herself as a complete individual with a 
coherent and cohesive identity (J. Lee 19), but this is actually the moment when identity 
is revealed to be “fragile and largely illusory” (J. Lee 23; see Lacan,  Ecrits 95).  The 
child first begins to see herself as whole by viewing the spatially complete image of 
herself in the mirror.  This view of the self as whole comes despite the young child’s 
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incapacity to control and coordinate all of her movements.  Thus the view of the whole 
self, coherent and complete, is a false one and creates a fundamental split between the 
actual self (incoherent, disjointed, and fragmented) and the external self seen in the 
mirror which appears to be complete and coherent (see Ecrits: A Selection 1-7).47  Thus 
our image of our “selves” as coherent and unified is largely a product of a fundamental 
split in our own identity, and our image of the self is based on an external self that is 
fundamentally false. 
In this context, the attempt by La Trobe and her troupe of actors to present the 
observing audience with fragmented images of themselves, and disallowing the vision of 
the self as unified and complete takes on added significance.  Although various critics 
have seen La Trobe as an almost compulsive unifier who seeks perfect harmony in her 
pageant, following the moment of her symbolic suicide and the ten minutes of silence, 
she instead encourages others to give up the false unity of their personal plots, the 
narratives of their own lives that makes them coherent, and instead to acknowledge the 
fundamentally fragmentary and multiple nature of their identity.  “Now Old Bart ... he 
was caught.  Now Manresa.  Here a nose ... There a skirt ... Then trousers only ... Now 
perhaps a face. … Ourselves?  But that’s cruel.  To snap us as we are, before we’ve had 
time to assume... And only, too, in parts ... That’s what’s so distorting and upsetting and 
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utterly unfair” (128).  From the point of view of various unidentified audience members, 
the fragmented reflections are “distorting,” but the audience is also upset because the 
mirrors reflect them “as they are” before they have a chance to “assume” something, 
perhaps their poses, “plots,” or identities.  It is unclear then what is more distorting, the 
fragmentation or the effort to draw the fragments together into coherence.  La Trobe 
attempts to show each member of the audience their own fundamentally and truthfully 
divided and fragmented identity, not allowing them the access to the imaginary 
wholeness of self that they desire.
Woolf’s belief and advocacy of multiple and divided selves goes back at least as 
far as The Waves (1931), which, she claimed in an oft-quoted letter, depicted one self or 
identity through the deployment of six separate characters and their dramatic 
monologues.  In the novel itself this idea is also forwarded slightly more obliquely: “I am 
not one person; I am many people; I do not altogether know who I am — Jinny, Susan, 
Neville, Rhoda, or Louis: or how to distinguish my life from theirs,” says Bernard (276).  
Here the coherent unity of the individual is denied while the foundation of the self is in 
the external, here in “other people,” or at the very least in the self viewed as other people.  
The idea of the self as fundamentally “ex-centric” to itself is Woolfian long before it can 
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be said to be properly Lacanian, but Lacan’s overt theorizing helps highlight the political, 
historical and ethical significance of this idea.48
What, then, does this extended theorizing upon the nature of individual identity 
have to do with history, narrative, and ethics as they have been explored in the novel?  
Here, it is important to draw upon Lacan again, in relation to some of the narrative 
theorists already explored, Carr in particular.  For Lacan, once the self is seen to be 
fragmented, the crucial means of reconstituting it and providing a sense of wholeness is 
through the entry into the domain of language, the Symbolic, achieved crucially through 
the construction of a life narrative.  Likewise, it is important that this narrative can never 
be whole, nor the identity complete, until a narrative is created retrospectively.49
In traditional plotting, the conclusion is that which invests identity, the past, or 
history in its traditionally narrative form with meaning.  For this reason, it is significant 
that “nothing ended” in the discordant music in the closing Act of Between the Acts.  This 
lack of an end, leaves the story or history told in the pageant to this point without 
intelligibility or meaning, as such.  Indeed, the introduction of discontinuity and 
suspended ending seems here to be a concerted attempt to remove or counter the meaning 
of the pageant’s plot, that of the fundamental achievements  of patriarchy and 
imperialism.  Likewise, while the imaginary wholeness of the self in the mirror is 
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fragmented and dissolved through the medium of the mirrors, in Between the Acts
wholeness is not then reconstituted through the medium of language, as it is in Lacanian 
theory.  Rather, that which was previously seen to be the representation of the unified 
history of England (if a parodic and double history), the pageant itself, is itself 
fragmented, exploded, and dis-ordered in the same fashion as the reflection of the 
audience members.  The words of the pageant are presented in random and incoherent 
order, free from their original context and the signals and markers of traditional narration:  
Then once more, in the uproar which by this time has passed quite beyond 
control, behold Miss Whatshername behind the tree summoned from the 
bushes — or was it they who broke away — Queen Bess; Queen Anne; 
and the girl in the Mall; and the Age of Reason; and Budge the policeman.  
Here they came.  And the Pilgrims.  And the lovers.  And the 
grandfather’s clock.  And the old man with a beard.  They all appeared.  
What’s more, each declaimed some phrase or fragment of their parts ... I 
am not (said one) in my perfect mind ... Another, Reason am I... And I? 
I’m the old top hat... Home is the hunter, home from the hill ...[etc.] (128-
9; emphasis in original)
So, first the ideal image of the mirror is fragmented and then its replacement, the illusory 
wholeness of language and narrative, is likewise fragmented.  What makes this 
fragmentation and dis-ordering of the pageant and its language so interesting, however, is 
that the fragments of speech presented as spoken by the actors are not limited to those 
previously performed in the pageant, but expand out to additional texts, colloquialisms, 
rhymes, and phrases, perhaps the most recognizable of which is “Is that a dagger I see 
before me” (129) from Shakespeare’s Macbeth.50   Here, again, it becomes clear that 
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Woolf emphasizes how the pageant is both a repetition and representation of the 
Derridean general text of the world outside of it, with the words, phrases, colloquialisms, 
and hegemonic commonplaces of one bleeding into and out of the other.  Here, however,  
plots as such are not merely repeated, but they are re-ordered and transformed from 
temporally progressive and coherent plots into incoherent, not cohesive fragments that 
defy the notion of plot by refusing its narratable temporality.  If human identity and 
history itself are understood as constructions that can only be understood through 
narration as Carr suggests, Woolf argues here that this understanding of them is both 
factually inaccurate and unethical.  La Trobe’s final megaphonically enhanced speech to 
the audience both draws the parallel between human identity and history itself together 
and emphasizes its continuing ramifications.  “Look at ourselves, ladies and gentleman!  
Then at the wall; and ask how’s this wall, the great wall, which we call, perhaps miscall, 
civilization, to be built by (here the mirrors flicked and flashed) orts, scraps, and 
fragments like ourselves? (131).  Here, La Trobe and Woolf question the sense that her 
audience has of the achievements  of civilization.  While the audience sees the 
complete and unified wall of  civilization as a representative of the unity, completeness, 
and, indeed, power of their culture, La Trobe explicitly questions this view of 
civilization, noting how it is all but impossible that such a unity could be built by 
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individuals who are as fragmented, discontinuous, and divided as human subjectivity.  In 
fact, it is the distance between the communally assumed unity of both identity and history 
and the actual fragmentation and diversity, that makes the faith in the unified wall of 
civilization so troublesome and, indeed, delusionary.  It is such delusions, predicated on 
the expunging of those people and ideas that do not fit into the preconceived unity, that 
makes any actual attempt at social and political universality ungraspable.  La Trobe’s 
attempts to show the audience members the discontinuity in their own identity, their own 
personal narratives, and their own plots are “mirrored” by the discontinuities and 
fragmentation that she introduces into history and its narrative, and into the general text 
that exceeds the bounds of her own pageant.  It is for this reason that while the audience 
seems to assume that the wall of unified civilization is already built, La Trobe questions 
how it can ever be built, questioning, like Kundera, the “idyll” that must be constructed 
out of such a unified vision, an idyll which excludes and oppresses anyone outside of its 
unified plot.
The Absence of the Present and Its Presence
In applying Lacanian theories of subjectivity here, I do not wish to subscribe 
wholeheartedly to what would amount to a Lacanian reading of the novel.51   Rather, 
while useful in exploring the ways in which Between the Acts rejects a unified theory of 
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the self and of history in Between the Acts, Woolf’s final conclusions about history are 
crucially different from Lacan and from other models of poststructuralism like that of 
Derrida.  Both of these thinkers work rigorously to dissolve the material referentiality of 
history and subjectivity in their efforts to critique the possibility of a stable identity or 
ego and to deconstruct hegemonic history.  As I emphasized in the introduction, this 
dissolving of referentiality leaves us on questionable grounds where ethics are concerned 
and it is here that Woolf’s parallelism with Bergson allows her to critique hegemony 
without abandoning the necessity of material reference. 
In this context, it is important to note that although the integration of the 
Symbolic, achieved through narrative plotting, is essential to the construction of identity 
in Lacanian thought, it becomes equally important in Lacan’s later thought to pass not 
only from the Imaginary to the Symbolic, but also from the frontier of the Symbolic to 
the Real.  This notion is tied inextricably to temporality.  According to Lacan, to come to 
an understanding of the truth of identity, one must not only construct a narrative of one’s 
life in order to enter the Symbolic, but also, and perhaps more importantly, come to 
realize the “lack” or emptiness that is at the center of that identity.  That is, according to 
Lacan, while a realization of the self in the Symbolic requires an understanding of one’s 
actions through time, with periodic endings allowing one’s life to become intelligible in 
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the way David Carr suggests, in truth life does not have intelligible beginnings and 
endings.  Likewise it is not possible to distinguish the “presence” of the self, which is 
only possible in the present moment, as the present is continually passing and is never 
“present” to us.  According to Lacan, “the authentic realization of temporality [...] would 
recognize the fundamental nothingness of temporality and, thus, the inescapable 
emptiness, béance, gap, or gulf around which the human subject builds a false identity” 
(J. Lee 81).  That is, while identity, achieved through the narratable Symbolic is 
necessary for healthy Subjectivity, it may be more necessary to bring the analysand, or 
subject, into a realization of her self’s “radical ex-centricity to itself,” (Lacan, Ecrits 
171).  That is, the subject must realize the impossibility of a whole subject, a complete 
plot, within a human subject as La Trobe emphasizes at the close of her pageant.  So, 
while narration and plot are necessary to conceive of and identify one’s self, the 
realization of the truth of the self is the understanding that such a plot is false and that at 
the center of the subject is emptiness or lack.   The moment of this realization, is then 
potentially the moment of “symbolic suicide,” the removal of oneself from the plot or 
Symbolic not only of one’s own personal narrative, but from the intersubjective social 
relations that require a particular type of subjectivity.  
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Derrida’s meditation on time and temporality, “Ousia and Grammé: Note on a 
Note from Being and Time” explores much of the same territory through a lengthy and 
difficult discussion of Heidegger’s Being and Time.  Derrida’s thoughts on the matter 
conclude, similarly to Lacan, with a disavowal of the possibility of conceiving of 
presence or a stable subjectivity and existence (Being) through a study of the linguistic 
similarities and parallels between the temporal present and ontological “presence.”  His 
tracing of the impossibility of locating and determining a singular present moment in 
time, leads him to conclude that Being itself is nonexistent, or at least impossible to 
identify.  As he notes, “Being, the present, the now, substance, essence, are all linked in 
their meaning to the form of the present participle” (40), and this tying of substance and 
materiality to something as fleeting as the present moment itself, a moment that is 
impossible to capture, serves to unmoor substance itself  (Being) both in subjectivity and 
in more general historical materiality from the solidity it claims.52    This arbitrary 
integration of present time and Being removes substance, parodoxically, into the realm 
purely of the abstract and theoretical as it is impossible in the real world, where time 
passes.  Derrida’s lengthy discussion of all of the things both time and presence cannot be 
considered to be concludes with an iteration of the fundamental difference between Being 
and beings (that is, actual human subjects).  He notes how Being in time is, in fact, 
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impossible, because time erases the possibility of the distinguishable present and 
therefore presence itself.  Like Lacan, Derrida identifies the human being or subject by 
what it lacks: a coherent, stable, identity and substance.53
Here then we may finally return to the problem of poststructuralism’s treatment of 
history in relationship to ethics.  While both Lacan and Derrida see the pervasive, and in 
many cases oppressive, nature of encompassing symbolic systems or plots, the effort to 
escape these systems finally results in a dissolution of materiality and substance that 
leaves ethics itself defined by absence, lack, or the immateriality of Being/existence.  
Miss La Trobe in Between the Acts draws a parallel between the fragmentation of the self 
to the fragmentation of history, and both are seen as the interruption and disruption of 
narration.  This disruption of narration is, in turn, the disruption of the plots of patriarchy 
and imperialism.  Likewise, Derrida’s meditation on time is not merely a metaphysical 
musing, but is linked specifically, if briefly, to how we are to deal with history, as he 
notes that any understanding of time must deal with “all the themes that are dependent 
upon it (and, par excellence, those of Dasein, of finitude, of historicity)” (64).  If time is 
proof of the impossibility of presence, then history itself is a tale of non-presence, of lack 
of substance, of dissipated materiality; that is, it is precisely the opposite of what it claims 
to be.  Through Lacan and Derrida we learn what we learn from Between the Acts, the 
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holes in and dangers of plot itself and the necessity of both identifying and disputing the 
particular deployment of temporality which gives the illusion of wholeness while 
misleading and, often, abusing.  The removal from plot as such is defined as ethical by 
Lacan, but is likewise defined by absence or lack, while Derridean thought dissolves the 
materiality of anything comprised of temporality, including history itself.
This returns us to the problem of ethics raised explicitly by Geras in my 
introduction.  That is, if we cannot say with any certainty what has occurred; if we cannot 
identify the materiality or ontological existence of anything outside of the plots, archi-
writing or Symbolic in which we exist, how can we hope for a modicum of truth or 
justice.  That is, if a removal from these plots is a step purely into lack, differance, and 
unsubstantiality, the material basis for resisting historically-based oppression, based on a 
defense of truth, is transformed into an abstract theoretical concept defined, 
parodoxically, by its non-existence.  Woolf’s novel, however, offers a possible gap in the 
poststructural dissolution of substance as such, and its concomitant denial of ethics.  The 
poststructural approach to the present and temporality as such seizes strongly upon one 
half of the Bersonian dialectic defined above, defining time as continually moving, the 
present as an impossible moment continually passing, and “pure continuity,” thus making 
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presence, substance, and materiality quite impossible, a dead-end or aporia in Derridean 
terms.
As we saw, however, Bergson also insists upon the concept of the present as 
substantial and conceivable, as not merely evanescent and fleeting time, but as the 
intersection of time/consciousness and space/matter.  In doing so, he does not reject time 
as pure continuity but insists that both concepts,  pure continuity and a material present, 
must exist simultaneously.  In these terms, the dissolution of the Symbolic, the plot, and 
general text can exist without  presence itself being reduced to lack. If narrative is defined 
by temporality tied together by action, with both a beginning and an end, its dissolution 
can be achieved not only by a never ending pure continuity without beginning or end, but 
also and simultaneously by the arresting of time, the conceiving of a “point” an ideal 
present, not part of the line of narrative (if conceived spatially, as Bergson warns 
against), but independent and separate from it.  In this case, with the possibility of the 
present and all of its concomitant presence being reinstituted, ontological presence must 
accompany the fragmentation of plot as such.  It is for this reason, that La Trobe’s 
insertion of ten minutes of “unplotted time” is not purely characterized by absence or 
lack, although lack is also there, the “horrifying” lack of participation in accepted social 
relations.  Rather, it is also characterized by the material presence of a “reality too 
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strong” to be plotted or incorporated into a familiar Symbolic, anti-narrativity itself.  It is 
perhaps enough here to recall that Woolf’s description of moments that exceed the 
cultural Symbolic, that are filled with life, whether it be horrifying, blissful, or both, are 
called “moments of being,” moments where substantiality and presence are felt most 
strongly, not moments where identity dissipates either into discourse or its lack.  To 
return to my previous example, when Isa reads the newspaper account of the rape, it is 
not the story of the rape which captures her attention, nor is it purely the location of the 
rape as outside of the culturally inscribed “fairy tale” of heroic men, but the thing itself, 
the ontological presence of the rape, that makes her feel the event as real and as 
important, quite possibly, to a resistance that we never see her enact.
Plot’s Return
It is essential, then,  to see Woolf’s final novel not merely as a critical double 
reading of traditional history and its plots, but also as an attempt to theorize matter itself 
and the importance of accessing the truth itself from the observation of that materiality.54
It is only here, the novel suggests, that resistance can begin.  The insistence on the 
possibility of the presence of the present that becomes the basis for ethical resistance is 
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seen most clearly in the moment following the radical fragmentation and re-ordering of 
the pageant in the voices of its actors.
It was the cheval glass that proved too heavy.  Young Bonthorp for all 
his muscle couldn’t lug the damned thing about any longer.  He stopped.  
So did they all —hand glasses, tin cans, scraps of scullery glass, harness 
room glass, and heavily embossed silver mirrors —all stopped.  And the 
audience saw themselves not whole by any means, but at any rate sitting 
still. 
The hands of the clock had stopped at the present moment.  It was 
now.   Ourselves. (129)
Although certainly in any naturalistic reading of the novel, it would be impossible 
to say that time actually stops here for the actors and the audience, it is clear that both 
Woolf and La Trobe wish to give the audience, and the reader, the sensation, and indeed 
the knowledge, of a moment of the ideal present in which the present itself, in all of its 
presence, its ontological existence, can be observed and felt with all of its force.  That 
nearly all of the audience cannot confront their own reality, the possibility not only of 
their fragmented nature but also the weight of their present existence, illustrates the 
difficulty in jettisoning ourselves from the plots we have adopted and acknowledging that 
we are not merely part of our own stories, but also things that exist, despite our 
fundamentally fragmented and temporal natures.  “All shifted, preened, minced; hands 
were raised; legs shifted.  Even Bart, even Lucy, turned away.  All evaded or shaded 
themselves.’” (129).  Mrs. Manresa does not turn away, but instead uses the mirrors to 
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“powder her nose,” not only to deny her fragmented identity, but to “make up” a new 
one, to construct a whole, a different plot, rather than face herself as the thing itself.  
It is important to recall that Bergson and Woolf do not offer the self and history as 
purely the present, substance, or materiality, but rather they offer this ideal present as one 
half of a dialectic that is irrevocably reduced if we see history and the self as pure 
continuity or as only absence, lack, or differance, all of which deny the oppressive 
restrictions of plot, but in doing so dissolve the materiality of identity and history itself.  
It is only through the collision of consciousness and matter that a real freedom, that is, a 
freedom to act in the real world, can inhabit the present.
Woolf’s incisive and deep probing of the pervasive influence of discourse and 
social plotting are then balanced, if not undercut, by the tripartite attempt to theorize the 
present, both as something that can subvert plot and which exists in the most material and 
substantial way, while it continually passes us by.  In this sense, while we may 
experience life as a plot as David Carr and similar thinkers insist, and while discourse 
may pervade every corner of our lives as Derrida asserts with his “there is no outside-the 
text,” it is possible to seize the present moment as present to us and to remove oneself 
from the plot of our life and our culture, even if doing so feels like a kind of death.  While 
both Bergson and Bakhtin see the present break from the past as a huge source of 
218
optimism and the possibility of a new beginning, Woolf sees both this and the 
simultaneously horrifying consequences of removing oneself from the web of social 
relations and social scripting of established plots.  Between the Acts  is more than a “crazy 
quilt of discursive and aesthetic forms” (McWhirter 803), it is also an examination of 
how to remove oneself from that quilt.  
Likewise, Woolf sees the immense power of society to transform and recuperate 
symbolically suicidal acts into its own repetitive plots, despite the individual and/or 
collective effort to remove oneself.  It is for this reason that Judy Little can see the novel 
both as celebratory of the possibility of regeneration and mournful of the ways that “such 
regeneration is thwarted by the plot which political and domestic institutions have 
imposed on the heart and imagination.”(36)  It is perhaps for this reason that following 
the seemingly transformative effects of La Trobe’s symbolically suicidal performance, 
the connection with Isa, and the attempt to “abandon an outworn language,” Reverend 
Streatfield, through a retrospective summing up of the pageant, seeks to unify the “scraps, 
orts, and fragments” La Trobe has presented.  It is not only Streatfield, however, that 
returns the world of Pointz Hall to its usual plots.  La Trobe herself reunites her 
fragmented players and audience by returning to a simple tune, both linear and orderly, 
like traditional narrative itself:
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The tune began; the first note meant a second; the second a third.  Then 
down beneath a force was born in opposition; then another.  On different 
levels they diverged.  On different levels ourselves went forward; flower 
gathering some on the surface; others descending to wrestle with the 
meaning; but all comprehending; all enlisted.  The whole population of the 
mind’s immeasurable profundity came flocking; from the unprotected, the 
unskinned; and dawn rose; and azure; from chaos and cacophony measure; 
but not the melody of surface sound alone controlled it; but also the 
warring battle-plumed warriors straining asunder: To part?  No.  
Compelled from the ends of the horizon; recalled from the edge of 
appalling crevasses; they crashed; solved; united. (132)
Here, La Trobe, after symbolically halting time itself, departing from the 
Symbolic, and exploding narrative, winds up the clock of traditional narrative and re-
forms plot itself, both of her pageant and of the general text outside of it.  It is significant 
that it is not purely the linear, orderly, melody that reunites the pageant and its audience, 
but the “battle-plumed warriors,” the symbols of patriarchal violence that are necessary to 
reunite the plot La Trobe has just torn asunder.  Here, it is clear that Woolf is aware of 
the limited political and social force a singular work of art is capable of generating and 
that, indeed, it takes very little for the “battle-plumed warriors” to reassert their 
discursive hegemony.  Streatfield’s speech which follows the pageant’s finale merely 
reemphasizes this fact, in addition to wryly noting the tremendous role capital itself has 
in the patriarchal plot as Streatfield transforms the entire pageant into a moneymaking 
venture for the church by passing around the collection baskets.  La Trobe continues to 
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frustrate expectations by mockingly playing “God Save the King,” followed by 
alternating songs affirming harmony and declaring “dispersed are we.”
Nevertheless, Streatfield’s speech, the passing of the airplanes readying for war, 
and the resumed cycle of conflict and reconciliation between Giles and Isa suggest that 
the traditional plots have resumed, that the patriarchal archi-writing remains intact and 
that while La Trobe can “say to the world. You have taken my gift,” she can 
simultaneously begin to believe that “her gift meant nothing.”  As she notes, the glory of 
escaping and subverting the plot lasted “for one moment” before passing (145). 
La Trobe’s achievement then, it may be noted, is momentary.  Likewise, Woolf’s 
own attempts to not only expose the power and permeation of patriarchal discourse, but 
also to provide a possible ethics to oppose it, seems to be momentary at best.  While the 
subversion of plot La Trobe offers only seems possible within a controllable environment 
like an artistic creation, it is worth noting that Woolf has already illustrated the dramatic 
parallels between the world outside the pageant and that within it, and in doing so has 
suggested the parallels between the world depicted in her novel and that outside of it. 
Through this layering of frames, Woolf encourages her readers not only to read the world 
as a text and to do so ironically and with skepticism as deconstructive thought suggests, 
but to imagine a different type of text, a different language that may result in peace.  
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Many have read Between the Acts as a final pessimistic resignation to the inexorable 
progress towards World War II55  or as a final statement of the possibility of artistic unity 
that may protect us from the real world that moves towards this end.56 Rather, it is the 
unity and progress of a particular type of plot that makes World War II seem inevitable.  
That Woolf can see the possibility, if not the likelihood, of a break in that plot, and that 
that possibility is not based on an escape into art but on an insistence on the substance 
and materiality of a different type of history, is a reserved but insistent affirmation of 
hope.
Notes
1 Deiman’s assertion here is widely quoted by essays concerning the historicity of 
Between the Acts, including Richard S. Lyons’s “The Intellectual Structure of Between 
the Acts,” originally published in Modern Language Quarterly in June 1977 and reprinted 
in Virginia Woolf: Critical Assessments, Vol. IV in 1994, where I first discovered it (228).  
Alex Zwerdling also prominently cites Deiman on the pervasiveness of history in 
“Between the Acts and the Coming of War” (221).
2 Between the Acts was begun on April 26, 1938, while Woolf was reading proofs 
for Three Guineas on April 11 of the same year.  My attention was drawn to this precise 
dating by Karen Schneider’s “Of Two Minds: Woolf, War and Between the Acts” (93, 
n1), although their approximate simultaneity is well known and the two are often 
discussed in the same context.
3 Although Wells’s book bears the same title as that which Lucy reads, there is at 
least a little critical debate about the source material for this allusion.  Although most 
critics assert that Wells’s is the book to which Woolf refers, Patricia Joplin confidently, 
and enigmatically, asserts, “Though the title of Lucy’s book suggests H. G. Wells’ 
Outline of History, the actual source of her paraphrase is G. M. Trevelyan’s History of 
England” (103, n4).  Joplin’s assertion is only enigmatic in the sense that she does not 
provide a clear sense of the source of her confidence in the attribution, whether it is 
merely based on a closer proximity of subject material or on incontrovertible 
biographical/textual evidence.  I have not uncovered evidence to settle this rather quiet 
debate, but merely observe that there is some disagreement on the issue, despite the
overwhelming assumption by most commentators that Woolf refers to Wells’s book.
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4 Although Eliot’s comments in the essay cited are convenient for commentary 
upon this particular definition of modernism, Eliot’s oeuvre is, of course, substantially 
more complex and contradictory than it would appear from the above outline.  In fact, 
many critics of Between the Acts and Eliot’s poetry more often point to parallels between 
them than the disjunction I suggest here.  Nevertheless, the contradiction between the 
essay I cite and Woolf’s own practice in Between the Acts still stands.  For a more 
substantial comparison of Woolf’s novel and Eliot’s work, see Richard Lyons’s “The 
Intellectual Structure of Virginia Woolf’s Between the Acts.”  Lyons notes the similarity
between the treatment of history and time in Eliot’s “Little Gidding” and in Woolf’s final 
novel, while also noting Eliot’s dependency on pattern and structure where Woolf 
abandons the possibility of a pattern in history.  Weiner Deiman opens his essay on
Between the Acts with lines from “Little Gidding” which Lyons explores more 
substantially.  Also see Christopher Ames’s “The Modernist Canon Narrative” for a 
discussion of the applicability of “Ulysses, Order and Myth” to Between the Acts as well 
as to Joyce’s Ulysses (399). David McWhirter also notes some similarities between 
Between the Acts and Eliot’s “Burnt Norton” (792).
5 See the introduction, particularly the final section, “Postmodernist Historical 
Fiction and Finding the Real,” and Chapter Two for more detailed discussions of 
relativist historiography and its application to this dissertation as a whole.
6 Woolf herself makes this point explicitly when discussing novel writing both in 
A Room of One’s Own and later in “Women and Fiction.”  Like many feminists that 
follow in her wake, Woolf notes how men have always decided what is important enough 
to represent in art and that traditionally female pursuits are often considered unworthy of 
artistic consideration.  “And as men are the arbiters of that convention as they have 
established an order of values in life, so too, since fiction is largely based on life, these 
values prevail there also to a very great extent” (“Women and Fiction” 145). Woolf goes 
on to assert that it is then no surprise that woman novelists often wish to “alter the 
established values—to make serious what seems insignificant to a man, and trivial what 
is to him important” (146).  Perhaps foremost among the things men erroneously value, 
according to Woolf, is war and violence.
7 For an account of Woolf’s encounters and disagreements with the younger 
generation of overtly leftist artists and writers, see Hermione Lee’s biography, entitled 
simply Virginia Woolf, particularly Chapters 35-39.  Quentin Bell’s earlier biography, 
Virginia Woolf: A Biography, also discusses Woolf’s struggle with the demands to be 
more overtly political, pointing out that most of her direct critics were from the right 
(2:186), although she was often seen as attenuated and irrelevant by the younger 
generation of writers on the left (2:185-91). 
8  In addition to McWhirter, cited above, Mark Hussey reads the novel explicitly 
in terms of “metafiction,” an oft-used near synonym for postmodern fiction, in his “ ‘I 
Rejected; We Substituted’: Self and Society in Between the Acts.”  Like me, Hussey also 
discusses Woolf’s efforts to dissolve plot and therefore traditional history, although he 
claims this takes place in the interest of a postmodernist deconstruction of these 
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traditional forms.  I argue both that Between the Acts constitutes a deconstruction and 
attempts to go beyond the limitations of that form of criticism.
9  This scene is noted and cited almost universally by critics of the novel, although 
for different purposes.  James Hafly argues, similarly to my own interpretation, that here 
“there is no longer a difference between the pageant world and the actual world” (187), 
although, through an application of Bergsonian philosophy, this leads him to an opposite 
conclusion.  Hafly asserts that this moment of dissolution between the boundaries of art 
and life abolishes the “spatial” past and allows Giles and Isa to gain a kind of existential 
freedom through an encounter with the present.  Although I do not believe this occurs at 
this point in the novel as Hafly suggests, my own treatment of Bergson illustrates the 
importance of this concept for interpretation of the novel as a whole.
10  Although a comprehensive list of such criticism would be impossible, one 
singular champion of this reading of Woolf’s work is Jane Marcus, whose Virginia Woolf 
and the Languages of Patriarchy is a salutary effort in this regard.  Marcus has also 
edited numerous anthologies with this focus, including Virginia Woolf: A Feminist Slant,
New Feminist Essays on Virginia Woolf, and Virginia Woolf and Bloomsbury: A 
Centenary Celebration.  In 1987, Eileen Barrett made a useful (if undoubtedly 
incomplete) list of groundbreaking “feminist” studies of Woolf’s novel in her own essay, 
“Matriarchal Myth on a Patriarchal Stage.”  At the time, she listed, in addition to Marcus’ 
work, Judy Little’s “Festive Comedy in Woolf’s Between the Acts,” Madeline Moore’s 
The Short Season Between Two Silences, Nora Eisenberg’s “Virginia Woolf’s Last 
Words on Words: Between the Acts and ‘Anon,’” and Sallie Sears’ “Theater of War: 
Virginia Woolf’s Between the Acts” (Barrett 36, n2). To say that there has been an 
explosion of feminist studies of Woolf in general and Between the Acts in particular in 
the fifteen years since Barrett’s article would be a drastic understatement and I cannot 
begin to undertake a listing of such studies.  Some of those that have proved most useful 
to me are cited throughout the chapter and in the bibliography.
11  The desire of La Trobe to maintain unity and coherence in the pageant is made 
evident by her own discomfort when such unity is lost.  Still, however, to say that her 
pageant fails because it loses its coherence and unifying vision is a bit simplistic.  Indeed, 
as several critics have noted, despite La Trobe’s discomfort at the loss of control and 
artistic unity, it does seem to be her goal to at least express, if not to introduce, 
discontinuity into the village through her pageant.  Alex Zwerdling suggests that the 
pageant is “an attempt by Miss La Trobe to trace the pervasive sense of fragmentation 
and alienation in the modern world to its historical roots” (“Between the Acts” 232), 
while Christopher Ames, in his “Carnivalesque Comedy in Between the Acts,” notes that 
the whole pageant and the novel itself are devoted to the chronicling of the irresolvable 
tension between unity and dispersal in both art and life.  While I agree with these 
assessments, I also argue that La Trobe introduces discontinuity into a patriarchal 
metanarrative in the hopes of introducing a real history that is obscured by it in the 
majority of the pageant and in traditional historical representation.
12  See the next section of this chapter for a complete iteration of what is meant 
here.
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13  Simon Critchley correctly points out that there are, in fact, two distinct 
iterations of this principle.  “The axial proposition of Of Grammatology is “Il n’y a pas de 
hors-texte’ (‘There is no outside-text’) [(Of Grammatology 158)] or again, ‘Il n’y a rien 
hors du texte’ (‘There is nothing outside of the text’) [(Of Grammatology 163)] and one 
should be attentive to the nuanced differences between these two sentences: the first 
claims that there is no “outside-text,” no text outside, whereas the second claims that 
there is nothing outside the text, that the text outside is nothing, implying by this that any 
reading that refers to the text to some signified outside textuality is illusory” (Critchley 
25).  It is the relevance of both poles of this distinction that becomes evident in the body 
of this chapter.
14  These de-naturalizing gestures which make both the pageant audience and the 
novel’s audience look at their own position in relation to social scripting and patriarchal 
discourse have been explored convincingly several times in terms of Brechtian alienation 
effects.  Among these are Catherine Wiley’s “Making History Unrepeatable,” Herbert 
Marder’s “Alienation Effects,” and Patricia Klindienst Joplin’s “The Authority of 
Illusion.”
15  Such a parallel is most explicitly expressed in Chapter One of Three Guineas.  
In referring to two quotations from two publications banishing women to the house and 
giving men exclusive purview in the public sphere, Woolf writes, “One is written in 
English, the other in German.  But where is the difference?  Are they not both saying the 
same thing?  Are they not both the voices of Dictators, whether they speak English or 
German, and are we not all agreed that the dictator when we meet him abroad is a very 
dangerous as well as a very ugly animal?” (53).  In fact, Woolf famously asserts that 
patriarchy is the embryo out of which full-blown fascism grows.  “There […] is the egg 
of the very same worm that we know under other names in other countries.  There we 
have in embryo the creature, Dictator, as we call him when he is Italian or German, who 
believes that he has the right, whether given by God, Nature, sex or race is immaterial, to 
dictate to other human beings how they shall live; what they shall do” (53).
16  Woolf delineates a credo for women as “outsiders” in England.  “‘For,’ the 
outsider will say, ‘in fact, as a woman, I have no country.  As a woman I want no 
country.  As a woman my country is the whole world” (Three Guineas 109).  In this, 
Woolf tries to encourage women to separate themselves from the network of discourses 
and ideologies that make England a patriarchal nation and therefore one predicated upon 
violence and domination.  She refutes the English assertion that they are “superior to the 
men of other countries” (108), paralleling it to the similar assertions made concurrently 
by the Germans, again as a rationale for violence and imperial expansion.  For Woolf, 
nationalism itself is a patriarchal idea, bound inextricably to ideas like violence and 
enslavement.  Woolf establishes women as “outsiders” by counting them among the 
enslaved as opposed to the enslavers, “Our country […] throughout the greater part of its 
history has treated me as a slave; it has denied me education or any share of its 
possessions” (108).  Despite the rhetorical power of this statement, it is fair to note that 
the comparison of women, and Woolf herself, to slaves may stretch the comparison 
beyond its rhetorical usefulness.  Woolf’s critique of patriarchy is more than valid but the 
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comparison of herself with slaves contributes to the sense of Woolf’s lesser sensitivity to 
issues of class and race, as her own freedom and even power within the broader culture 
can hardly be compared with the objectification of slaves.
17  A similar point is made symbolically through the geographical commentary in 
Figgis’s Guide Book (1833).  “The Guide Book still told the truth.  1833 was true in 
1939” (41).  The continuity between the two eras is here emphasized as it is in Lucy’s 
comments.
18  This reflects the kind of Zizekian ideological fantasy described in Chapter Two, 
see note 12 (also see Zizek, Sublime Object 33).
19  The other possible cause and derivation of such unavoidable repetition is the 
possibility of a primitive, natural, and/or essential nature to the roles played by men and 
women.  Woolf’s invocation of primitive societies and behaviors in Lucy’s daydreams of 
prehistoric London and La Trobe’s vision of her next pageant lend credence to this point 
of view, commented on quite copiously elsewhere.  Jane Marcus expresses this view 
paradigmatically in “Liberty, Sorority, Misogyny,” wherein she writes, “The Years asks 
the question, Is there a pattern? and Between the Acts gives a sociobiological answer.  
The origin of aggression, war, and oppression is in the origin of the species, in the drama 
of the battle of sexes.  Isa and Giles fight like the dog, fox and the vixen before they 
make love” (77).   However, the complicated deployment of narrative frames in the novel 
suggests that these supposedly primitive and natural repetitions are actually creations and 
constructions, repeated because of the power of the general text or symbolic power of 
culture at least as much, if not more so, than some biological imperative.
20  See the introduction and, particularly, Chapter Two for a more extensive 
analysis of White’s “postmodern” historiography.
21  The choice of Whitehall here is significant as, as Rachel Blau Du Plessis points 
out, “Whitehall is a synecdoche for British civil service and administrative agreements 
that endure beyond changes in specific governments, and thus is a metaphor for broad 
sociocultural agreement” (39).  That is, it is a virtual synonym for hegemony itself, and 
particularly British patriarchal hegemony.  That the rape occurs here indicates the 
important parallels between physical rape and social and cultural domination.
22  Although at some points in Three Guineas, Woolf seems to naively value the 
newspaper’s ability to present the truth of present history, as is usually the case, Woolf’s 
position is somewhat more complex and ambiguous.  Most importantly, Woolf shows a 
typical shrewdness in noting the incursion of ideology onto any kind of transparent 
reportage when she notes that every newspaper “‘is financed by a board [...] each board 
has a policy [...] each board employs writers to expound that policy’” (Three Guineas
95).  She further observes that if one is to get “the facts” as such, then obtaining at least 
three newspapers is necessary in order to “‘compare at least three different versions of the 
same fact, and come in the end to your own conclusion’” (95).  Although Woolf here 
displays a typically modernist perspectivism, she also holds onto the important distinction 
between fact and fiction, closing her discussion of the newspaper with, “Now that we 
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have discussed, very briefly, what may be called the literature of fact, let us turn to what 
may be called the literature of fiction” (95).
23 Think, for instance, of the photograph of Clementis in Kundera’s The Book of 
Laughter and Forgetting as discussed in the introduction.
24 It is important to note that Carr is not alone in his view of the comparison of 
narrative and reality” but that I use him here as an exemplary instance of this type of 
thinking.  Carr is one of the most prolific defenders of this point of view, but he himself 
points to several predecessors.  Chief among these is Barbara Hardy, particularly in 
“Towards a Poetics of Fiction: An Approach Through Narrative.”
25 He points to such finite actions as a tennis match, set and point and to how each 
of these segments can be said to begin, move through a middle, and conclude and also 
that each of these actions is predicted and experienced as a mini-narrative by the 
participants.
26 See the introduction and particularly Chapter Two for further exploration of the 
relationship between narrative and plot.
27 See Richardson, Narrative Dynamics 56-62 for a brief, but useful, overview.
28 This is not peculiar to Woolf or to Between the Acts, of course, as much 
modernist work is dedicated to the minutia and “unimportant details” of existence, many 
of which could not be said to contribute to a unified plot centered around great actions.  
Still, the continually interrupted delivery of Between the Acts along with the intense 
difficulty of locating particular narrators, even after multiple readings, makes it an 
exemplary model of this anti-narrative strain.  In addition, Woolf’s concentration on 
history as narrative makes it ideal for exploring the difficulty of accessing a real outside 
of textuality. Another reading of this passage might lead us to identify this “static” with a 
Barthesian “reality-effect,” gathering various background description and information in 
order to give the world of the novel the sense of the real world.  Nevertheless, the 
absence of a clear narrative voice to describe this world to the reader, and the disjunction 
and disconnection between realistic details, leaves Woolf’s novel far from the typical 
realistic novel that Barthes discusses. Balzac’s Sarrasine is, of course, his paradigmatic 
example in S/Z.
29  Friedman’s “Lyric Subversions of Narrative in Women’s Writing: Virginia 
Woolf and the Tyranny of Plot,” is useful in sketching the connection between anti-
narrativism, lyricism, and pre-Oedipal modes of narration in Woolf.  As Friedman and 
Honor McKitrick Wallace both explain, psychoanalytic models of masculine desire are 
based on the concept of a male infant’s initial desire for the mother, which is then 
redirected towards substitute objects, none of which can ever completely substitute for 
the mother.  This, in turn, leads to a desire that can never be completely satisfied, but 
which is forever delayed, consummated, re-situated and pursued anew.  This is then 
reflected in narratives that are consistently modeled on “tumescence and detumescence,  
[…] tension and resolution, […] intensification to the point of climax and consummation.  
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In the sophisticated forms of fiction, as in the sophisticated practice of sex, much of the 
art consists of delaying climax within the framework of desire in order to prolong the 
pleasurable act itself” (Scholes, Fabulation and Metafiction 26).  Barthes’s Pleasure of 
the Text and Robert Scholes’s Fabulation and Metafiction, as well as Peter Brooks’s 
Reading for the Plot are paradigmatic examples of this analogization of narrative and 
masculine sexual desire.  For a further explanation of the male model of Oedipal desire, 
particularly via Brooks, see Chapter Two of the present study.  The pre-Oedipal focus of 
lyric, as discussed by Friedman and Wallace posits a feminine desire for the mother, that 
is not necessarily interrupted or foreclosed as it is in the Oedipal scenario, postulating a 
pre-lapsarian Edenic timeless and never-ending moment wherein the love of the mother is 
always present and paradisiacal.  This model rejects the notion that all desire must mimic 
masculine Oedipal progression as offered by Freud and suggests an alternative to 
narrative itself in the lyrical achievement of union with the mother.  As Friedman notes, 
“Lyric moments in a text [...] may encode an unbounded, boundless desire for a timeless 
union with the mother, while the linear progression of the narrative may invoke the 
child’s separation from the mother and initiation into the world and law of the father 
(165).  As both Friedman and Wallace observe, Kristeva’s semiotic register reflects this 
vision of the lyric, as opposed to her symbolic, which reflects the post-lapsarian entry 
into the Oedipal triangle.  While some, like Friedman, see Woolf’s reliance on the lyric as 
a statement of feminism versus male-dominated traditional plot, others, like Wallace are 
less convinced, noting how an over-reliance on lyricism does not allow for entry into the 
social world as it currently exists, avoiding the material and political agenda of real-world 
feminism.  Particularly interesting as a counter-text to critics interested in lyricism as 
opposed to Oedipal desire is Elizabeth Abel’s “Narrative Structure(s) and Female 
Development” which discusses the importance of an alternative female sexual 
development as differentiated from the male Oedipal triangle.  As Abel discusses (100), 
according to Freud women must displace their desires first from mother to father, and 
then to a father substitute, foreclosing what may be a more natural female/female desire.  
Through a discussion of the Sally Seton/Clarissa relationship in Mrs. Dalloway, Abel is 
able to indicate how a narrative reflective of female sexual development is likely to differ 
from that based on a masculine development, without merely relying on a pre-narrative 
lyrical unity with the mother.  Rachel Blau Du Plessis also thoroughly discusses the 
feminist implications of revising the male plot in her Writing Beyond the Ending, 
although she is less interested in the connection to psychoanalysis and readerly desire.  
For a general discussion of female lyricism as an alternative mode of desire that contrasts 
a masculine Oedipal narrativism see Wallace “Desire and the Female Protagonist: A 
Critique of Feminist Narrative Theory.” Teresa De Laurentis also provides an interesting 
discussion of the Oedipal origins of narrative desire in Alice Doesn’t, but, like Abel, 
suggests an alternative to the turn to pre-Oedipal lyricism, suggesting instead a double 
and contradictory Oedipalism that reveals Oedipal desire’s own contradictions.  See 
particularly Chapter Five, “Desire in Narrative.”  For additional discussion of some 
alternative female models of narrative, and anti-narrative, desire, and their implications 
for historical referentiality, see Chapter Two of the present work.
30 For a more in-depth discussion of narrative as the uncovering of gothic secrets, 
see Chapter Two.
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31  Here again, it is important to note the lily pool’s congeniality with the timeless 
and pre-lapsarian paradise associated with lyricism (see note 29 above and 56 below).  It 
is also important to note how lyric fails, in this instance, to provide a complete antidote or 
counter to narrative, as plot is able to incorporate and deploy the lily pool as part of its 
talk-producing elements of narrative desire, transforming the eternal lily pool into a 
locale for the story of foreclosed desire that leads to the lady’s suicide in the pool.
32  For useful overviews of Bergsonian philosophy see Leszek Kolakowski’s 
Bergson, John Mullarkey’s Bergson and Philosophy, and Giles Deleuze’s Bergsonism.  
Also see the recent collection, Key Writings and its introduction by Mullarkey and Keith 
Ansell Pearson (1-45).  I focus on Matter and Memory for my reading of Bergson while 
acknowledging the fact that Bergson dealt with the same philosophical issues throughout 
his career and that some changes enter his thinking about both matter and memory in his 
later work.  Nevertheless, the primary claims I make here about his thought remain 
largely true over the development of his work.  Fundamentally, the dual nature of 
existence as both matter and memory/consciousness is central to Bergson throughout his 
career, as is the important connection between the present and free will.” 
33  To reverse the dichotomy yet again, however, Bergson refuses to allow the 
matter that is the brain final say over the state of consciousness that is memory.  In fact, 
Bergson allows that the brain and memory/consciousness are integrally related, but the 
latter is not generated completely by the former.  Rather:
That there is close connection between a state of consciousness and the 
brain we do not dispute.  But there is also a close connection between a 
coat and the nail on which it hangs, for, if the nail is pulled out, the coat 
falls to the ground.  Shall we say, then, that the shape of the nail gives 
us the shape of the coat, or in any way corresponds to it?  No more are we 
entitled to conclude, because the physical fact is hung onto a cerebral 
state, that there is any parallelism between the two series psychical and 
physiological. (Matter and Memory 12)
34 Although Bergson refutes the notion that his philosophy allows for two almost 
incompatible worlds in the first page of Matter an Memory, it is nonetheless a common 
accusation of critics.  Nevertheless, the primary aim of Matter and Memory, as Bergson 
describes it is, “to show that realism and idealism both go too far, that it is a mistake to 
reduce matter to the perception we have of it, a mistake also to make of it a thing able to 
produce in us perceptions, but in itself of another nature than they (Matter and Memory
9; my emphasis).  That is, they are not of fundamentally separate natures, although they 
may appear to be.  In making them of the same nature, Bergson famously reverses the 
starting point of most philosophies of time.  That is, most philosophies begin by 
assuming inert matter to be the fundamental object of inquiry with time’s “motion” being 
added to them.  Bergson declares “motion” itself to be the fundamental ingredient of 
existence with the “ideal present” moment of matter being not merely the present itself, 
but rather, as Deleuze puts it “only the most contracted level of the past” (74; emphasis in 
original). 
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35 This metaphor of transformation of matter into memory is, admittedly, my own, 
and as such may not have some of the rigorous applicability the discipline of philosophy 
demands.  It seems, however, appropriate enough in explaining the importance of the 
present to Bergson, and to Woolf.  Likewise, because for Bergson, “pure memory” is that 
which retains all of the past, as such, it is as Deleuze suggests, ontology itself, even if it is 
never accessible in all of its capacity to consciousness.  Again, it is only in the present 
that the ontology of the pure past meets the materiality of matter itself.  “Only the present 
is ‘psychological’; but the past is pure ontology; pure recollection has only ontological 
significance” (Deleuze 56) 
36 It is this element that is underplayed in the somewhat similar reading of Woolf 
via Bergson provided by James Hafly in “A Reading of Between the Acts.”  Hafly 
discusses the Bergsonian contention that freedom is exercised when “clock time” is 
transformed into “durée” or “mind time” and that where space is determinable, time is 
not, and therefore only “an act motivated by and in pure time perception is undetermined 
or free” (185).  In this, he quotes Bergson, who argues, “consciousness is synonymous 
with invention and with freedom” (qtd. in Hafly 185).  Although this is accurate as far as 
it goes, Bergson’s crucial move is the bringing together of the freedom of consciousness 
and time with the world of matter, not the separation, which Hafly maintains.  It is the 
possibility of the “free act” of consciousness and movement within space and matter, 
only achievable in the present, which makes Bergson’s difficult philosophy applicable to 
the “real world” of ethics and politics that Woolf explores in Between the Acts.
37  As Schulkind notes, this kind of moment of vision is a commonplace of 
religion, and many readers take Lucy Swithin’s religiosity in Between the Acts as either 
indicative of a newfound spiritualism in Woolf, or as a condemnation of such religiosity.  
My own reading sees these moments as more crucial to the material than the 
metaphysical.
38 See Zwerdling, in particular, for this type of reading.
39  Here, it is important to note a crucial difference between Woolf’s thought and 
Bergson’s.  While Bergson says it is only the present which moves him and concerns 
him, the past being, in a sense, no longer existent, Woolf tends to linger on the past, in 
this case working hard to identify those rare past moments, once present, that have 
realized their potential for freedom.
40 I admit here to being only passingly familiar with the Rosselini film and choose 
not to engage with the possible distance between Zizek’s reading and the evidence of the 
film itself.  Rather, I use Zizek’s reading of this example to illustrate the relevance of the 
idea of “symbolic suicide” to Woolf’s novel.  The model for this reading is, of course, 
Antigone, who Woolf herself references in her choice of passivity and a Society of 
Outsiders in Three Guineas (18). The importance of Woolf’s affiliation with Antigone is 
noted by DiBattista (193) and by Wiley (5). Wiley writes, “Like the Greek heroine, 
Woolf understands that, until the law of the father in all its dimensions is fundamentally 
challenged, women, and by extension the majority of people who are powerless, will 
continue to suffer under it.  But offering readers a newer, stronger, ‘improved,’ version of 
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the feminine is not enough to crack the mirror holding women to men’s normative vision.  
Nor is cracking the mirror sufficient, for once women have understood their 
representation to be a lie, they must create a different, more truthful one” (Wiley 5).  
Much of this chapter is devoted to explaining how Woolf both cracks the mirror of male 
representation and attempts to establish the parameters for a more accurate truth than has 
been achieved in traditional historical representation. 
41 While I do wish to stress the potential freedom and agency conferred in an act 
of symbolic suicide as taken by La Trobe, it is worth noting that such an act cannot be 
taken unless one has a certain level of subjectivity and agency already within the society 
of which one is a part.  La Trobe can jettison herself from social relations precisely 
because she is a part of them, even if she is a marginal and generally shunned part of that 
community.  She does have the power and the status to stage her yearly pageant, a certain 
degree of money, middle-class status, etc.  If she were already “abject” in terms of the 
larger society, or was regarded by others and herself as an object or tool, as many are, she 
would not have the ability or the capacity to perform her act of suicide.  As such, there is 
a limit to the amount of power and agency such an act confers.  Woolf’s own status as 
well-off middle class woman puts her in a similar position (see note 16).  
42  In addition to the readings of the pageant, and this moment in particular, as 
Brechtian  (see note 14) a particularly interesting reading of La Trobe’s presentation of 
the present is made by Sallie Sears in “Theater of War: Virginia Woolf’s Between the 
Acts” in which she compares this segment of the pageant to a sixties “happening” 
designed to shock the audience for “therapeutic or terroristic ends” (227).  Sears’ 
conclusion that La Trobe fails is antithetical to my own reading of the event as a 
momentarily successful present that creates a communal voice, particularly between La 
Trobe and Isa.  Still, her identification of this moment as a “plotless performance,” (226) 
also similar to a “happening” is congenial to my own.
43 There have been several readings of Between the Acts as embodying a new 
language of sorts, although none, to my mind, satisfactorily identify the thematic and 
social significance of this new language.  Perhaps the most effective in surveying the 
contours of the linguistic experimentation undertaken is Christopher Ames’s 
“Carnivalesque Comedy in Between the Acts” which refers to the language of Between 
the Acts as the “ur-language of imitative sound,” suggesting, to a degree, that the 
language of the novel hearkens back to a pre-symbolic, prelapsarian past.  Here, on the 
other hand, I regard the language as post-symbolic, more akin to the “Real” than to the 
pre-symbolic “Imaginary” in Lacanian terms.  Nevertheless, Ames does a salutary job of 
collecting the large number of neologisms and composites that populate the novel (403) 
and closes by looking at what he calls an “astonishing passage” reminiscent of the 
linguistic inventiveness of Finnegan’s Wake:
What a jangle and a jingle!  Well, with the means at her disposal, you 
can’t ask too much.  What a cackle, a cacophony!  Nothing ended.  So 
abrupt.  And corrupt.  Such an outrage; such an insult.  And not plain.  
Very up to date, all the same.  What is her game?  To disrupt?  Jog and 
trot?  Jerk and smirk? Put the finger to the nose? Squint and pry? Peak and 
231
spry? O the irreverence of the generation which is only momentarily —
thanks be— ‘the young.’  The young, who can’t make, but only break; 
shiver into splinters the old vision; smash to atoms what was whole.  What 
a cackle, what a rattle, what a yaffle—as they call the woodpecker, the 
laughing bird that flits from tree to tree. (qtd. in Ames, “Carnivalesque 
Comedy” 407; Woolf, Between the Acts 127) 
While Ames finds all of this wordplay to be “delightfully silly” and a representative of 
the comic spirit that shines through the novel as a whole, I contend that while this may be 
true, this has a crucial symbolic significance in the novel’s attempt to resist plot and the 
incursion of the symbolic and to, instead, invent a new language in a present that 
constitutes a moment of freedom.  For other readings of the novel that focus on its 
innovations with words and language see Marilyn Brownstein’s “Postmodern Language 
and the Perpetuation of Desire,” Nora Eisenberg’s “Virginia Woolf’s Last Words on 
Words: Between the Acts and ‘Anon,’” and Julie Vandivere’s “Waves and Fragments: 
Linguistic Construction as Subject Formation in Virginia Woolf.”
44  This line is also quoted by Lanser in her brief discussion of Between the Acts in 
Fictions of Authority (118-19).
45  Several critics of the novel note the importance of the passage from Woolf’s 
diaries.  In particular, Marc Hussey in “‘I Rejected, We Substituted’: The Self and 
Society in Between the Acts” reads both the novel and the letter as moments of 
deconstruction of the boundaries between the self conceived as individual and the society 
as a whole.  He does not, however, note how this plays out in the functioning of the 
narrative voice of the novel, although he does briefly explore its ramifications for the 
reading of history (248-49, n8).  Other critics who discuss this passage include Joplin 
(91), Watkins (358), DiBattista (221) and Zwerdling (226).   The latter of these notes how 
Giles rejects the possibility of unity between people and reads this as a pessimistic view 
by the novel and by Woolf.  To ascribe Giles’s views to Woolf seems to be an inordinate 
leap to take here considering the general depiction of Giles.  It is worth mentioning that 
in one of the most influential feminist essays on Between the Acts, Jane Marcus’s 
“Liberty, Sorority, Misogyny,” Marcus reads the entire novel, paradoxically largely 
through a reading of a related myth rather than a close reading of the novel itself, as an 
articulation of female/female connection as I see occurring here between Miss La Trobe 
and Isa.  More specifically, however, Lucio P. Ruotolo’s reading of the novel in The 
Interrupted Moment is an important precedent for my own.  Ruotolo notes that La Trobe 
consciously denies “her own voice conclusiveness” despite her own need for unity and 
the inundation of rain “unites her further with the audience and more immediately with 
Isa” (226-27).  While my own argument is that La Trobe and Isa are united in a way that 
is perhaps exclusive of the “audience as a whole” and particularly of the larger patriarchal 
culture, Ruotolo nicely identifies the importance of this moment.  Likewise, Ruotolo 
notes the tendency for Woolf to be attracted to moments of unity throughout her work 
(whether narrative or lyric), but to also insistently “interrupt” those moments in a 
somewhat anarchic spirit, refusing the comfort and wholeness such moments allow.  My 
own reading agrees with this assessment of Woolf, while expanding it and 
contextualizing it within the fields of postmodern history and poststructural theory.  
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Ruotolo’s assessment of Woolf’s work as anarchic is sympathetic to my own, in 
particular with the notion of “symbolic suicide” which refuses the cultural plot as 
currently situated.  Ruotolo’s link of Woolf to existential thought is also somewhat 
congenial to my own appropriation of the freedom of the Bergsonian present.  For 
Ruotolo’s overview of Woolf’s work and Between the Acts in particular, see the 
introduction to The Interrupted Moment, as well as his chapter on Between the Acts (1-18, 
205-30).
46  This passage was brought to my attention in relation to Woolf’s novel by 
Christopher Ames’s, “The Modernist Canon Narrative’” and is also quoted there (399-
400).
47  I owe much of my own understanding of Lacan’s argument to the more 
straightforwardly and helpfully worded Twayne’s series book Jacques Lacan by Jonathan 
Scott Lee.
48  Certainly, other interpretive paradigms may be just as useful in illustrating the 
significance of the fragmenting mirrors.  Strikingly innovative in her approach to this 
scene is Evelyn Haller in her “Isis Unveiled: Virginia Woolf’s Use of Egyptian Myth.”  
Haller notes the similarity between the scene at Pointz Hall and the “mirror dance” next 
to the Nile in ancient Egypt.  Her conclusions, however, radically differ from my own.  
Haller’s assertion that Woolf’s use of Egyptian myth provides an Eliotic ordering myth 
that creates a whole out of fragments, particularly unified by the Egyptian focus on death.  
Rather, while the Egyptian mythography may be influential, I believe the fragmenting 
mirrors to be an important signifier of the breaking of false unified plots (and selves), not 
a means to further a mythographic unity.  
49 Again, according to Lacanian thought, while the “whole” image in the mirror is 
an initial way that human subjects conceive of themselves as complete and unified 
individuals, it is soon abandoned with the realization of the distance between the actual 
self and the ideal unity in the mirror.  Once this idea is abandoned (or at the very least, 
undermined), it is only the entry into the communal domain of language itself (the 
Symbolic in Lacanian terms) that the subject can unify herself (see J. Lee 20, 31-71) 
through the use of the term “I.”  It is the job of psychoanalysis to bring the patient 
attached to “imaginary” ideal images of themselves properly into the Symbolic by 
allowing him to transform statements describing himself from “empty speech” into “full 
speech” or into a “intersubjectively intelligible narration of his past” (J. Lee 42).  That is, 
the dialogue between the analyst and analysand need not necessarily capture the past with 
factual accuracy, but it must convert the fragmented and alienated identity into a coherent 
and narratable story, capable of being shared with another, bringing the analysand into 
an intersubjective community and out of the narcissistic identification with the Imaginary 
ideal self.  Crucial here is the point that “healthy” self-construction has little or nothing to 
do with an accurate “recovery” of the lost past, but has everything to do with the 
transformation of the self into “narrative.”  While I will discuss this idea more thoroughly 
in the next chapter, here it is useful to revisit the Lacanian form of this postulate: “I might 
as well be categorical: in psychoanalytic anamnesis, it is not a question of reality, but of 
truth, because the effect of full speech is to reorder past contingencies by conferring on 
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them the sense of necessities to come, such as they are constituted by the little freedom 
through which the subject makes them present” (qtd. in J. Lee 45; see Ecrits 247-48). 
Lacan here notes how our truth, or reality, is constructed retrospectively, from the end of 
the narrative, giving meaning to “past contingencies” and ordering them into a coherent 
self.  This can only be achieved, according to Lacanian psychoanalysis, through the 
analyst providing “punctuation” or various endings to the analysand’s narrative as it 
unfolds.  This is because narrative’s meaning is determined by its conclusion (a theory 
advocated by Freud and narrative theorists using a Freudian model, like Peter Brooks, as 
I discuss in Chapter Two), and an analysand’s free association will always be without an 
ending, unless the analysand “punctuates” the narrative with “breaks— such as a 
carefully phrased question, an appropriately significant cough, or the end of a session—
which have the effect of conferring meaning on the analysand’s discourse” (J. Lee 40; see 
Ecrits 243).
50 Macbeth is, of course, another play that features a mirror presented to the 
audience.
51  For a more traditionally Lacanian reading of the novel, see Marilyn 
Brownstein’s “Postmodern Language and the Perpetuation of Desire.”
52 As Derrida notes, it is for this reason that thinkers like Hegel have tried to 
remove the idea of “presence” from the idea of the temporal “now” and to place it in an 
“Eternal” realm outside of time itself, but as Derrida points out this presents the 
problematic that “Being is nontime, time is nonbeing insofar as being already, secretly 
has been determined as present, and beingness (ousia) as presence” (“Ousia and 
Grammé” 51). 
53 Interestingly, the abandonment of the narrative self constructed in the Symbolic 
in favor of a subject defined by its “ex-centricity” in Lacanian terms, or by being’s 
differance from Being, as such, in Derridean terms, denies the possibility of a “whole” 
healthy subject, rendering psychoanalysis’s purpose open to radical question.   Jonathan 
Scott Lee phrases this problem usefully: “If psychoanalysis is not essentially therapeutic 
[...] is not guaranteed to be a cure for [the analysand’s] suffering, then what exactly is 
psychoanalysis doing?” (J. Lee 97).  Lacan’s response to this question (although elliptical 
as usual) is that psychoanalysis is “an ethical discipline” and “that the analysand emerges 
as a responsible, ethical agent, that is, as a fully human being” (J. Lee 97).  The content 
of this ethics, it appears, is the result of the “symbolic suicide” detailed above, the 
jettisoning of oneself from social relations, social “plots,” and both Imaginary and 
Symbolic identifications to occupy a space that is purely individual.  For Derrida, this 
space seems to be occupied automatically, that is differance is an inherent part of 
existence, but for Lacan it constitutes an ethical behavior.
54  I am not unaware of Woolf’s antagonism in “Modern Fiction” and elsewhere 
towards those authors who she calls “materialists,” concentrating excessively on the daily 
business of government and politics.  This reading does not deny that Woolf, but rather 
looks at the Woolf who also insists that a complete abandonment of materialism is 
equally dangerous.
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55 In particular, Alex Zwerdling’s “Between the Acts and the Coming of War,” is 
the most persuasive of this type of reading.
56 Examples of the more optimistic reading of Between the Acts often focus on its 
status as “comedy” which provides a final unity that resolves the very deep and insistent 
conflicts and chaos that characterize the novel.  Often, this is accomplished by noting the 
novel’s treatment of the peasant villagers and common people in the pageant who 
continue their work of “digging and delving” despite the “historical” change that occurs 
around them.  The continuity between these peasants and the villagers in the present day 
provides a source of festive continuity and unity according to readings like those of Maria 
DiBattista, Judy Little, and Eileen Barrett.  See, in particular, DiBattista’s reading which 
notes the rejection of plot and teleology in favor of “underlying generative rhythms” that 
are transhistorical (209).  Although this line of analysis does not fit into the purview of 
this chapter, the relationship between the continuity of “common” or village life as a 
constituent of a non-narrative real is taken up in Chapter Two in my discussion of 
Graham Swift’s Waterland.  Certainly Woolf juxtaposes the circular and repetitive 
actions of the villagers to the purported progress of imperialism and patriarchy, but I do 
not see this as a significant part of the feminist anti-narrational ethics constructed in the 
novel as a counter to the plot of patriarchy.  I read these readings of Between the Acts as 
allied to a notion of lyricism that places the festive comedy and foregrounding of the 
peasant villagers as a prelapsarian world that both pre-exists and counters the patriarchal 
history built upon narratives of Oedipal desire (see note 29).  Indeed, Maria DiBattista 
argues that “Peace is [...] the emotion generated by the antidramatic, lyrical content of 
Between the Acts, the emotion that transports the mind of child, laborer, even of the dead, 
beyond the spectacle of its own history into the darker regions of another inhuman world 
[...] a world represented by the lily pool” (231).  While DiBattista’s reading does not 
examine the link of lyric to pre-Oedipal desire for the mother (again, see note 29) her 
identification here of the importance of lyric reveals the problems with these readings.  
While these moments do provide nonnarratable moments of unity, they do so in a 
hearkening for a pre-lapsarian past that cannot be revisited.  While there is some display 
of nostalgia for such moments of unity in the novel, the ethical thrust of the novel is not 
towards losing oneself in a pre-narrative paradise, but in pushing beyond the current 
patriarchal plots and languages towards a place beyond the Symbolic and a realization 
both of its inconsistencies and of the moments of material reality that allow us to see a 
world beyond patriarchal plot.  In this way, a focus on the lyricism of the lily pool, the 
lady’s picture, etc. seem less important than a focus on the final act of the pageant.  
Barrett sees the fragmentation in the mirror as a mockery of the “search for truth,” citing 
the lily pool as the true place for meditative reflection (30).  I am inclined to reverse their 
importance, with the lily pool occupying a place of lyric but static paradise and because 
static, ethically and politically paralyzed.  On the other hand, the moment of the 
fragmentation of the mirrors is the possibility of shocking the viewers into seeing the real 




“The Swamps of Myth...and Empirical Fishing Lines”:  Historiography, Narrativity, and 
the “Here and Now” in Graham Swift’s Waterland
In Between the Acts, Virginia Woolf enacts an assault on plot and advocates an 
access to the materiality of the past achieved through a theorization of the present.  In this 
critique of narrative form and its crippling effect not only upon the accuracy of historical 
representation but also its ideology, Woolf’s work foresees contemporary debates over 
narrativist historiography and the ethics of poststructuralism while preceding them  by 
several decades.  As such, any discussion of that novel’s connection to postmodernism 
happens retrospectively, through a critical lens provided by our present.  Written some 
forty years later, Graham Swift’s Waterland not only tackles the same issues but is 
clearly conscious of the academic debate over relativist historiography.   In fact, despite 
its status as fiction, Waterland has been almost inevitably discussed, as it is here, within 
the context of relativist historiography and particularly Hayden White’s theorization of 
history.
Set in the East-Anglian fens over the past 250 years as well as in contemporary 
London, Waterland focuses on the struggle of Thomas Crick, a history professor, to come 
to grips not only with his own sordid personal history, but also with his family history, 
England’s national decline, and the ontological status of “history” itself.  Like Between 
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the Acts then, the novel is obsessed with history and explores it in all of its various forms.  
Crick stresses the similarity between the historical narrative that links important 
personages and events together through narration and the “fairy-tales” his family has 
been telling for years to overcome the boredom of living in the topographically and 
narratively flat Fens.  In this he resembles the postmodernist historian who blurs the 
distinctions between fiction and history, stressing their similarities instead of their 
differences.
The novel opens innocuously with a dictionary entry for “Historia” that defines 
history as: “1). inquiry, investigation, learning, 2). a.)  a narrative of past events, history 
or b.) any kind of narrative: account, tale, story.”  While these definitions seem to begin 
with a practicing historian’s search for material accuracy, the inquiry into the past, they 
end with the assertion that there is no substantial difference between a story and a history.  
This assertion is supported by one of Crick’s students who mockingly asserts that history 
itself is a fairy tale, that it never really happened.  When the insubordinate student, Price1
objects  to one of Crick’s more subtle points of historical theory, he sounds nothing so 
much as a materialist historian responding to the overly theoretical and seemingly 
impractical viewpoint of a postmodern historian like White, Ankersmit, Kellner, et. al.  
When Crick declares “the more you try to dissect events, the more you lose hold of 
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them— the more they seem to have occurred largely in people’s imagination,” (140) he 
echoes White’s contention that there are no stories, as such, found in the past and that 
they are rather imagined and constructed later by historians and their readers struggling to 
understand incomprehensible events.  Likewise, when Price sarcastically replies: “Should 
we be writing this down sir?  The French Revolution never happened.  It only happened 
in the imagination?” (140) he sounds like the voice of materialist reason, puncturing 
theoretical relativism with the necessity of the retention of hard facts.  
This debate between teacher and student is importantly not conducted in an 
apolitical theoretical context, but against the political and social backdrop of the rights of 
the people and the oppression of the working class that undergirds the class’s discussion 
of the French Revolution.  While Crick  speculates about the semiological slippage 
involved in the popular statement “Vox populi, vox Dei” (“the voice of the people is the 
voice of God”) (139) noting how difficult it can be to find a referent behind the signifier, 
“the people,” Price instead insists on the possibility of identifying those people in order to 
create a political affiliation with them.  In this, Price resembles not only materialist 
historians, but also a Marxist historian like Bryan Palmer who advocates a retention of 
the material category of history precisely for a radical Marxist agenda.  While Crick and 
Price play out the drama of authority/aristocrat and rebel/people on the micro-scale of the 
239
classroom,2  the struggle calls to mind the “six thousand corpses (in the streets of Paris 
alone) […] not to mention the thousands of corpses in greater France or the unnumbered 
corpses of Italians, Austrians, Prussians, Russians, Spaniards, Portuguese, Englishmen —
which were to be strewn over the battlegrounds of Europe” (141) since the revolution.  
Here Price and the novel itself foreground the materiality of history and the potential 
pitfalls in dismissing it to the realm of discourse and textuality by pointing to the real 
human suffering that can be effaced if this occurs.
Although an opposing viewpoint is clearly voiced by Price, because of Crick’s 
status as the central narrator of the novel and because of his propensity to point to the 
narratable elements of history and its similarity to stories and fairy-tales, Swift’s novel 
has consistently been interpreted as not only a discussion of postmodernist 
historiography, but as an advocate of its principles.   Focusing on the novel’s exploration 
of the aporia of historical explanation and the limits of signification to represent the real, 
Robert K. Irish compares Crick’s historiography to that of Hayden White and configures 
the novel as an exploration of the tantalizing narrative “desire” created by the novel and 
its continual frustration.  Likewise, in a recent study of the novel, Pamela Cooper has 
identified Waterland as a Baudrillardian simulacrum of realistic history, which 
deconstructs notions of presence, teleology, and referentiality present in traditional 
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histories: “Waterland—by refiguring and re-presenting history, fiction and the history of 
fiction—draws to itself all the vertiginous seductive power of the simulacrum” (375).  
Baudrillard’s simulacrum is characterized by its obliteration of the notion of the real, 
which is always, in the postmodern age merely a reproduction of itself, a representation 
with no referent.  Cooper’s alignment of Waterland’s history with Baudrillard’s 
simulacrum indicates clearly how the novel has been read in sympathy with, if not as a 
reproduction of, poststructuralist discourse and, in particular, postmodernist 
historiography.3   Her further assessment of Crick’s tendency to see narrative as a “model 
of synchronized calibration” that lends structure to that which is fundamentally chaotic 
and unstructured further aligns Crick with narrativists like White and Ankersmit who see 
the various events of history as fundamentally chaotic and unordered and narrative as an 
ex post facto means of ordering them, providing, as Cooper via Derrida puts it, “the 
structurality of structure” to unstructured “traces” of the past.  The structure of narrative 
is, in this view, merely a linguistically constructed heuristic with no inherent mimetic 
claim, unmooring historical narrative from any access to the real.
When Price sarcastically asks if “we can find whatever meaning we like in 
history” (140), Crick’s internal response echoes and reiterates those of narrativist 
historians like White: “I do believe that.  I believe it more and more.  History: a lucky dip 
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of meanings.  Events elude meaning, but we look for meaning.  Another definition of 
Man:  the animal who craves meaning—but knows—” (140). Crick’s internal 
monologue, interrupted by his vocal confrontation of Price, indicates the unspeakable 
possibility that historians like White have been offering, that history itself, or at the very 
least, historical narrative, has nothing to teach us.  Rather, even as we crave meaning, we, 
as Crick puts it, “know” that history is meaningless, devoid of progress and teleology and 
irremediably beyond our grasp.  However, while Waterland is typically read as a 
postmodern novel which reflects the radical skepticism of poststructural discourse in 
relation to the referentiality of language and narrative,  it ultimately joins Between the 
Acts as an example of postmodernist historical fiction that denies the most extreme 
consequences of this theoretical viewpoint and retains the possibility of referencing the 
real.  It does so both through its focus on nonnarratable events and through its 
concentration on anti-narrative experiences that resist signification and which influence 
time to run in both directions at once as the river Ouse is said to do through the Fenlands.
Waterland’s opposition to the extreme relativism of narrativist historiography 
takes place, like Woolf’s, through a skepticism towards  the narrative form and, in 
particular, through an examination of alternatives to narrative, particularly the 
nonnarratable and anti-narrative.  Theorization of the former is provided in two seminal 
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works of narrative theory, D. A. Miller’s Narrative and Its Discontents and Peter 
Brooks’s Reading for the Plot.  Both suggest that narrative can only be created in the 
presence of “narratable” elements, that is, situations of inquietude, instability, and 
“insufficiencies, defaults, deferrals” (Miller 3).  In this construction, narrative itself is 
constituted by lack, like human subjectivity in Lacanian psychoanalysis. Lack itself, 
particularly of satisfaction, presence, and fulfillment is then perpetually sustained by 
narrative itself, while satisfaction, fulfillment and quietude make only brief appearances 
at the beginnings and ends of narratives.  According to Miller, something must always be 
missing but desired to keep the narrative middle in motion.  Once what is missing in a 
narrative is found, the narratable story is complete and the narrative itself must end.4
While in traditional narrative, beginnings and endings are characterized by stability and 
sufficiency, soon a problem or insufficiency is introduced and sustained in order for a 
narrative to be necessary.  An event is only narratable, then, if it is comprised not only of 
insufficiency and lack, but also of a “desire” for sufficiency and wholeness.  
Brooks’s model of narrative, in particular, has been justly criticized from many 
vantage points, not the least of which is its reliance on masculine sexuality for its central 
metaphor, effectively naturalizing masculinity and marginalizing the possibility of 
feminine narration, a point to which I will return.  Nevertheless, despite its limitations, it 
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does provide a useful heuristic for understanding what is one of the central functions of 
traditional narration: to take a complicated and chaotic series of desires, needs, and 
questions and to bring them into a semblance of order by resolving difficult questions and 
satisfying desires.  These desires are not merely those of the characters in the narrative, 
but more importantly those of the readers whose questions get answered and whose 
desires are vicariously realized. 
This reflects, once again, the theoretical underpinning of narrativist historians like 
Hayden White who offer that the element of narrative that undercuts its access to reality 
is its obsessive need for the fulfillment of meaning that gives historical narrative the 
illusion of completion. Historical narrative poses historical problems, lacks, and 
insufficiencies and resolves them in a conclusion that brings chaos into order and satisfies 
the desire of the reader to understand historical events.  This wrestling of chaos into order 
takes place through the process of emplotment that is most complete in narrative, if still 
inferred in earlier forms like the annals and the chronicle.  If narrative, then, is constituted 
by the lack of meaning and the desire for meaning, it is equally constituted in its 
completion, says White, by the satisfaction of that desire and the filling of the lack.  It is 
this trajectory of narrative, from quietude, satisfaction, and fulfillment through desire, 
dissatisfaction and lack and back to the original state that, for White, constitutes narrative 
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itself and which deforms the real by providing the illusion of the ordering of chaos and 
the satisfaction of the desire for order.  
Although both Miller and Brooks stress that the satisfaction of reading narrative is 
the sense of continuous displacement and delayed gratification in the long middle 
between the (en)closures of beginning and end, it is clear that, for White, the danger of 
narrative’s deformation of the real is in the false sense of satisfied meaning and (to use 
his term) “explanation” that arises out of the narrative whole, including its closure.  In 
this, White echoes the definition of narrative presented by Lawrence Stone in the 
introduction of this study, particularly in its dependency upon endings, or teleology, for 
its power to generate meaning. Waterland affirms the power of narrative endings in 
generating meaning, as well as the comforting power of narrative to provide coherence 
and understanding in the face of a bewildering and alienating history.  As I will show, 
however, Swift’s novel also illustrates the ways in which traditional narrative must be 
undercut from within and, in doing so, both implicitly and explicitly insists upon the 
possibility of accessing the historical real.  
While I contend that the novel as a whole does oppose the most extreme 
ramifications of relativist historiography, it is clear that for Thomas Crick narrative does
serve the purpose that White attributes to it.  That is, Crick says that narrative does allay 
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fears and gives a sense of satisfaction through explanation that covers up or obscures the 
vertiginous sense of lost meaning inherent in the chaos of everyday life and the trauma of 
history.  For Crick, however, as for psychoanalytic theorists of narrative like Sigmund 
Freud himself, narrative, even in its historical form, is not principally a dangerous 
deformation of the real but is rather a necessary coping strategy that allows humans to 
come to terms with the world in which they live.
However, at the same time that Crick acknowledges narrative as a means of 
necessary alleviation of alienation and lost meaning, he allows for the possible access to 
the real that White denies narrative a priori.  Swift’s novel suggests that such access to 
the real can be achieved if not through narration itself, then through its failure to fulfill its 
ideal form in two distinct modes.  First,  the novel suggests that if the real is obscured by 
the act of narration, within narrative itself, and in particular, the narration of Waterland,
there are non-narratable moments that work to subvert the desire and lack inherent in 
narrative and rather focus on the dull, quotidian, everyday events that would be unlikely 
to generate narrative.  It is through the deployment of these nonnarratable moments that 
Swift’s novel counters the deformations of the grand narrative of Britain and reveals the 
human suffering and daily life of its workers, so often ignored in traditional histories 
meant to sustain narrative interest.  In order to draw attention to the reality of this 
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nonnarratable history, Swift presents it alongside the hypernarratable family history of 
the Atkinsons replete and overflowing with those elements so often deployed to excite 
readerly desire and to encourage the need for delayed gratification inherent in the most 
narratable stories.  The juxtaposition of the hypernarratable family romance and the 
nonnarratable elements of stasis and boredom associated with Crick’s native fens 
maintains the possibility of access to historical reality through the nonnarratable, while 
foregrounding the ways that narration deforms reality to suit its needs.
In addition, while White focuses on the ways in which narrative itself 
incorporates individual actions and events into its story that conveys meaning, Swift 
suggests, through his formulation of the “Here and Now,” that certain traumatic 
occurrences and formative events, while narrated, nevertheless exceed narrative’s 
capacity to bestow them with meaning.  Rather, the anti-narrative real exceeds the 
symbolization and textualization that narrative provides it with and allows for the 
possibility of accessing the materiality of the present itself through the very failure of 
symbolization that characterizes the traumatic moments of the “Here and Now.”  
Through these dual stratagems, and in opposition to its own protagonist, Waterland, like 
Price, refuses to advocate the notion that history itself is the fictionalization of fact 
through the medium of narration.  Instead, it insists upon the reality of the past and the 
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possibility of its accessibility in the present.  This refusal of historical relativism is, like 
Woolf’s, tied importantly to issues of politics and ethics, particularly, in the case of 
Waterland, to the objection to traditional narrative’s tendency to obscure the histories of 
the working-class and to exalt imperialism.
The Progress of the Atkinsons
Sigmund Freud advocated the talking cure as an at least functional cure for his 
neurotic patients.  In doing so, he proposed the reconstruction of past events and their 
retelling, along with the reintegration of repressed traumatic moments as the key to a 
healthy and functioning subjectivity.  In this, Freud offers narrative as a fundamental 
means to understanding the self and of dealing with the past in all of its oppressive 
“presence.”  When Nietzsche advocates the abolition of history as a means to break free 
of the weight of tradition, and to allow freedom for the human will, he took what may 
well have been the first preemptive step in breaking the tyranny of modern subjectivity 
offered by Freud.  In doing so, Nietzsche takes initial steps in constructing an idea of 
postmodern subjectivity based on the performance of the self, rather than the discovery of 
its essence. 
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Thomas Crick, the historian of Waterland, interestingly combines the viewpoints 
of these seemingly antithetical thinkers.  While Crick continually refers to history itself 
and his own biography as a fairy-tale, effectively abolishing any claims he has to 
referentiality before embarking upon his tale, he likewise insists upon the necessity of its 
telling as a means to bestow reality with an explanation and to overcome the vertigo of 
meaning’s absence from human existence.  In doing so, he echoes postmodernist 
historians like White who see narration as a significant deformation of the reality it 
purports to represent, while, in opposition to White, nevertheless insisting on the 
continuation of narrative as the primary means of conveying historical data.
Certainly, Crick sees narration as a necessary and powerful tool:
Children, who will inherit the world.  Children to whom, throughout 
history, stories have been told, chiefly but not always at bedtime, in order 
to quell restless thoughts; whose need of stories is matched only by the 
need adults have of children to tell stories to, of receptacles for their stock 
of fairy-tales, of listening ears on which to unload those most unbelievable 
yet haunting of fairy-tales, their own lives. (7)
Crick offers the possibility that history and biography are, perhaps, fairy-tales, but 
that they nevertheless are necessary for providing comfort, not only for children who are 
soothed by listening to tales, whether they be historical or fictional, but also for adults 
who are comforted by telling stories.  He voices this dual interpretation of both history 
and story, along with its necessity to humanity throughout the novel, but nowhere more 
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forcefully than when, in speaking to his class, he identifies “man” as the storytelling 
animal,
Wherever he goes he wants to leave behind not a chaotic wake, not an 
empty space, but the comforting marker-buoys and trail-signs of stories.  
He has to go on telling stories, he has to keep on making them up.  As 
long as there’s a story, it’s all right.  Even in his last moments, it’s said, in 
the split second of a fatal fall—or when he’s about to drown—he sees, 
passing rapidly before him, the story of his whole life.  (63)
In this passage, in the same fashion as David Carr, Crick offers narrative not merely as a 
possible appeasement of anxieties, but as a natural inclination of a humanity that needs to 
unify and explain the chaotic elements of life.5
Crick likewise reveals the ultimate desire of narrative-oriented people, and 
historians in particular: the desire for the story that explains everything, that quells all 
doubts and integrates all chaotic elements into one coherent story.  This is what 
contemporary theory calls a “metanarrative,” or a narrative that integrates all other 
narratives.  When Crick asserts that “your history teacher wishes to give the complete and 
final version” (8), he voices the desire of totalization, the quest for a metaphysical Truth 
that will alleviate all fears of a meaningless existence.  
As I discussed at length in the introduction of this study, contemporary 
theoreticians of history, often claim that the desire Crick expresses here is the central aim 
of traditional history; the desire to unify all stories into one overarching meta-story that 
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explains everything, the Great Story itself. Crick then indicates a common longing, or 
desire, for a History that reconciles all of life’s contradictions and discontinuities into a 
narrative that explains the past and the present in the context of each other and gives 
meaning to life as it is lived.  Despite Crick’s continuity with postmodernist historians 
and poststructuralist thinkers in his skepticism towards the possibility of accessing 
material reality through narrative , his longing for a unifying and totalizing classical 
history is in direct contradiction with most politically-oriented poststructuralist thought, 
particularly that of Foucault.  While Crick longs for a “complete and final version” of 
history, Foucault argues that “history becomes ‘effective’ to the degree that it introduces 
discontinuity into our very being—” (“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” 88).  Foucault 
juxtaposes the totalizing impulse of history which Crick embodies and suggests a new 
history, or genealogy, that dismantles, rather than unifies.  Indeed, while Crick insists on 
the traditional form of narrative in conveying historical events, Foucault insists that “the 
traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history and for tracing the 
past as a patient and continuous development must be systematically dismantled” 
(“Nietzsche” 88).
It would be naïve, however, to associate Crick’s early interest in and insistence on 
a totalizing and unifying classical history, with an attempt in the novel to go back to this 
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classical model.  Rather, everything in Waterland suggests that Crick’s longing is a 
desperate one that is already antiquated before it is voiced.  While the novel does engage 
with a model of unifying classical history, it is a model that has proven not to be 
messianic in its completion, but rather has died with a whimper rather than with a bang.  
British imperialism, the model of a unified world Empire under the flag of Britain, and 
the narrative of progress, is shown both in its period of ascendancy and in its inevitable 
decline through the narrative trajectory of the brewmaking Atkinson family.  By the time 
Crick replaces the school’s traditional curriculum with his own family history, he is on 
the verge of being made redundant, not, purportedly, because of his unorthodox teaching  
methods, but rather because history itself is no longer a subject worth studying and will 
be merged with “general studies.”  As Lewis Scott, the headmaster, puts it, “we’re cutting 
back on history” (5). 
Here, Crick’s dream of a unifying and totalizing History is exploded both from 
within and from without,  both through the restructuring of British public education and 
through the fall of the British Empire.  With the dissolution of the British Empire, the 
totalizing narrative of progress and the Empire’s messianic mission must also be 
dismantled.  It is this narrative that underpins the novel’s longest chapter, “About the 
Rise of the Atkinsons”(63-105), and is revealed to be a house of cards, not a “complete 
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and final version,” but rather depriving  England of its reassuring stability of “life and 
nature.”  While the grand narrative of progress once provided communal identity and 
reassurance to the hegemonic interests in the British Empire, particularly in England 
itself, with its loss history becomes “pointless information” with no “practical relevance 
to today’s real world” (25) to use the headmaster’s words.6
Throughout Waterland, Thomas Crick, like Miss La Trobe in Between the Acts,  
offers both a traditional narrative of causality and progress and withdraws it, simulating 
the act of critical deconstruction, providing both a traditional reading and its internal
inconsistencies.  In doing so, he presents, as Linda Hutcheon has observed, a history both 
complicit in its reenacting of traditional narrative and its deconstructive critique.  The 
initial narrative of progress traces the history of the East Anglia fens from the Dutch 
arrival of Cornelius Vermuyden in 1655, through the efforts of Crick’s “water people” 
ancestors to participate in land reclamation.  It then moves on to the hiring of the Cricks 
by the Atkinsons who embody the progress of capitalism through their founding of 
breweries and their ability to use the fens to transport their beer to their customers.  The 
rise of the Atkinsons is then detailed patrilineally, as each member of the Atkinson 
dynasty is profiled both in the capitalist success of their breweries and through the 
“begetting of heirs” (69) to inherit the family business and carry on the patriarchal 
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metanarrative of progress and expansion.  The inherent maleness of this narrative of 
progress is emphasized throughout the Atkinson story and fits in amiably with the 
masculinist paradigm of narrative itself as offered by Brooks.  First, it is clearly 
illustrated with the preoccupation with the “begetting of heirs.”  In addition, it is evident 
in how George and Alfred Atkinson redirect the energies of their Oedipal desires from 
their mother toward their work, illustrating the phallic narrative par excellence of 
Freudian psychoanalysis.  Finally, it is emphasized in the studied effort to ignore and 
marginalize the female members of each Atkinson family, particularly the children of the 
brothers George and Alfred, whose daughters are named but dismissed as irrelevant 
because they are not heirs to the family fortune.  Indeed, they are explicitly excluded 
when Crick emphasizes the shortage of heirs in the Atkinson family: “to be certain of one 
heir, it is well to beget several” (87).
Here, the narrative of progressive history, as it is associated with the Atkinsons is 
pinpointed by Swift specifically within a male English power structure which parallels
closely the expansion of the British Empire.  The parallel of the Atkinson rise to the rise 
of Empire in general is indicated by the occasions for which the Atkinsons brew “special” 
versions of their heralded beer, “ The Grand ‘51’; The Empress of India’; ‘The Golden 
Jubilee’; ‘The Diamond Jubilee’” (93), all celebrations of British Imperial success.  
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Crick, indeed, makes this parallel concrete when he offers the rise of the Atkinsons as 
metonymic for that of the Empire as a whole.
Have they not brought great improvement to a whole region, and do they 
not continue to bring it?  Do they not travail long and indefatigably in the 
council chamber as well as in the boardroom, for the welfare of the 
populace?  Have they not established, out of their own munificence, an 
orphanage, a town newspaper, a public meeting-hall, a boys’ school, […] 
a bath house, — a fire station?  And are not all these works, and others, 
proof of that great Idea [of progress] that sways them; proof that all 
private interest is subsumed by the National Interest and all private 
empires do but pay tribute to the Empire of Great Britain? (92)
This passage clearly illustrates how the metanarrative of History provides 
confidence and reassurance through the great Idea of Progress (identified explicitly in the 
previous paragraph) to those who profit by it.  The passage also shows that this Idea 
excludes many others, particularly women who are absent from the schools and those 
colonized peoples whose private interest is sacrificed for, rather than subsumed by, the 
National Interest.  Indeed, Crick’s narrative of Atkinsonian progress follows a 
Foucauldian trajectory in more ways than one as two of the subjects of Foucault’s 
primary studies have a prominent but marginalized role in the Atkinson family narrative.  
The Atkinson family founds a mental institution in an effort to marginalize and 
institutionalize the mad, including the family matriarch Sarah Atkinson and, later, Crick’s 
father, Henry.  Likewise,  via their incestuous affair, Crick’s mother (Helen Atkinson 
Crick) and her father (Ernest Atkinson) fall squarely into the realm of the perverse, the 
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specification of which Foucault sees as central to the construction of Victorian sexuality.  
In the detailing of the stories of the mad and the perverse, the reader is encouraged to 
note how the Victorian narrative of progress is far from universal and rather necessitates 
the isolation and containment of certain elements of the family and/or the nation for the 
wholeness of the narrative to be comforting.  
It is, of course, a commonly voiced truism that the histories that count as history 
come from the perspective of the victor and that those who are excluded are those that are 
oppressed.  As Walter Benjamin puts it “one asks with whom the adherents of historicism 
actually empathize.  The answer is inevitable, with the victor.  [...] Whoever has engaged 
victorious participates to this day in the triumphal procession in which the present rulers 
step over those who are lying prostrate. [...] the spoils are carried along with the 
procession” (“Theses on the Philosophy of History” 256).  For Benjamin, history is not, 
of course, a recounting of universal progress, but is the narrative of class conflict, which 
always includes both dominators and dominated.  Through this Marxian perspective, it 
becomes clear why Ernest (the perverse) is the only Atkinson who is vocally and 
politically anti-Imperialist and an anti-Tory who has dabbled in socialism, Marxism and 
Fabianism at the university (156-62), further cementing his position as outside the 
narrative of capitalist progress.  Ernest’s presence suggests the possibility of an anti-
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hegemonic counternarrative to that of the rest of the capitalist and progressive Atkinson 
family, a counternarrative that Swift offers not only through the deployment of Ernest 
himself, but more significantly through the narrator’s paternal ancestors, the Cricks.
The identification of the limited perspective of the supposedly universal history of 
imperial progress is not left only to the reader to infer, however.  Rather, Crick himself 
indicates the constructedness and provisional nature of the progressive narrative by the 
attempt to identify the precise apex of the Atkinson family fortune, attempting to 
configure, once and for all, a narrative around the family progress through the building of 
drama, a climax, and a denouement.  Crick offers several possible moments as the precise 
time of the zenith of progress after which the decline ensues.  He muses upon the precise 
date of the apex of the Atkinson family fortune, finally concluding with, on one hand, 
1872, the year Atkinson Ale is sent to imperial India, and on the other, 1874, the year 
Arthur is elected to parliament as the representative from Gildsey, the Atkinsons build 
their asylum, Sarah Atkinson dies, a great flood waters down the previously superior 
Atkinson beer, and Ernest Atkinson is born.   
Here, as White, suggests, history itself  is not “found” in the sense that the 
important events are already immanent and incontrovertible, rather Crick, the historian, 
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constructs the climax of Atkinsonian progress by making a choice among the possible 
climaxes.  
When can we fix the zenith of the Atkinsons?  When can we date the high 
summer of their success?  Was it on that June day in 1849?  Or was it 
later, in 1851, when among the products privileged to be represented at the 
Great Exhibition was a bottled ale from the Fens, known appropriately as 
‘Grand 51,’ which [...] won a silver medal for excellence [...]? Was it 
before that, in 1846, when [...] George Atkinson was unanimously elected 
mayor?  Or was it in 1848 [...] when his brother Alfred succeeded to the 
same office [...]
Was in it 1862?7 (91)
The family history of the Atkinsons is self-consciously constructed 
retrospectively to fit the narrative of progress common to Victorian England.8   In doing 
so, Crick exposes this narrative not as immanent, concrete and referential, but as more 
story than fact.  In a gesture that echoes the Lacanian construction of the Symbolic 
register, history is always constructed in reverse, from now to then, as opposed to 
chronologically, from then to now.  As Slavoj Zizek notes:
the past exists as it is included, as it enters (into) the synchronous net of 
the signifier — that is, as it is symbolized in the texture of the historical 
memory — and that is why we are all the time ‘rewriting history,’ 
retrospectively giving the elements their symbolic weight by including 
them in new textures — it is this elaboration which decides retroactively 
what they ‘will have been.’” (Zizek, Sublime Object 56)
Zizek notes that history itself can only be given its meaning by looking back at 
events through the prism of currently dominant “regimes of truth,” meaning systems, or 
in Zizek’s Lacanian terms, the Symbolic register. 9   Current systems of understanding 
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lend the weight of meaning to the random and heretofore meaningless events of the past.  
Indeed, Zizek’s extreme rhetoric here indicates that the past, as such, does not exist until 
it is integrated into a system of signification that contains it and fits it into a broader 
framework (“the synchronous net of the signifier”).  In Freudian psychoanalysis, of 
course, previous traumatic events are integrated into the story of a person’s life, ideally 
allowing the person, finally, to encounter their past and understand it, resulting in a 
healthier subjectivity.  This therapeutic view of narrative is echoed both by Crick and by 
his mother, Helen Atkinson: 
she believes in stories.  She believes that they’re a way of bearing what 
won’t go away, a way of making sense of madness. [...] Like frightened 
children, what they most want is to be told stories.  And out of this 
discovery she evolves a precept: No, don’t forget.  Don’t erase it.  You 
can’t erase it.  But make it into a story.  Just a story.  Yes, everything’s 
crazy.  What’s real?  All a story.  Only a story…  (225)
Here Helen, who is a nurse in a post-World War I convalescent hospital, the Kessling 
Home of Neurasthenics, reveals an instinctive Freudianism in which traumatic events 
must be integrated into a narrative in order to deal with the “craziness” that threatens 
from within and from without.
As we have seen, Hayden White moves this type of logic from the micro-level of 
the subject to the macro-level of historical narrative,  asserting that historical events too 
must be integrated into a narrative form in order for them to be understood and for the 
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past to be made present through the process of historical emplotment.10   Indeed, White 
makes the parallel of historical emplotment to psychoanalysis explicit when he states:
This [the process of emplotment] is not unlike what happens, or is 
supposed to happen, in psychotherapy. [...] The problem is to get the 
patient to ‘reemplot’ his whole life history in such a way as to change the 
meaning of those events for him and their significance for the economy of 
the whole set of events that make up his life. [...] Historians seek to 
refamiliarize us with events which have been forgotten through either 
accident, neglect or repression [...] not only by providing more 
information about them, but also by showing how their developments 
conform to one or another of the story types that we conventionally invoke 
to make sense of our life stories” (White, “The Historical Text as Literary 
Artifact” 86-87).  
White stresses the necessity of integrating historical events into a narrative that 
explains them to the reader and that the way to accomplish this is to use forms familiar 
from fictive writing.  The familiarity of these forms has nothing to do with their mimetic 
or referential capability, but has rather to do with the conventions that are recognized by 
and familiar to the reader.11   While, then, the emplotment of historical events is necessary 
for the present’s therapeutic understanding of the past, this understanding is largely a 
fictional one because the emplotment of events transforms “historical texts” into “literary 
artifacts” that are as much fiction as fact.  From this it is clear that in each of these 
theoretical frameworks, it is assumed that the past, in itself, either does not exist or is 
meaningless until it is integrated into a narrative or some other system of symbolization.12
The former claim that the past does not exist is a radical stance that is not taken seriously 
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by any theorist, but is rather deployed, as by Zizek, for rhetorical effect.  At the same 
time, however, the distinction becomes unimportant if any attempt to access and/or 
represent that past is fruitless.
Crick’s self-conscious discussion of the retrospective construction of the story of 
the Atkinsons indicates his own knowledge that the history he tells is not found, but is 
rather dictated retrospectively by the Symbolic in which he operates.  In this case, the 
important events of the Atkinson narrative are determined to be so by a larger Victorian 
narrative of progress with the highest levels of Atkinsonian achievement not 
coincidentally approximating the climax of the British Empire itself.  Crick’s explicit 
exposure of the retrospective narrativization of the Atkinson story also indicates a 
skepticism towards the immanence and material presence of the imperialist narrative of 
progress that it parallels.  Through analogy, the rise of Great Britain seems not only to 
exist through a backward-looking glance from Crick’s position in post-Empire decline.  
As such, progress itself only exists from the vantage point of its opposite and appears to 
the reader as a construction that dissolves into the series of selections and erasures that 
characterizes the Atkinson history. 
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Process and the Cricks
While it is clear, then, that Crick’s theorization of history has much in common 
with narrativist and constructivist historiography, particularly in his skepticism towards 
the possibility of accurate historical reference, it is equally clear that Crick does not 
disapprove of the deforming nature of narrativization in representing the past.  He rather, 
like his mother, embraces the necessity of narration as a therapeutic and comforting re-
mapping of the chaotic and disquieting otherness of the past.  Crick’s recounting of the 
Atkinson family story indicates a self-reflexive acknowledgment of the constructedness 
of their historical progress. However, it also embraces the story itself as a comfort that 
helps Crick define his own life in terms of the Atkinsonian progress, while 
simultaneously seeing their decline as parallel to the decline of the British Empire, 
helping to explain his own impending unemployment.  Crick acknowledges Imperial 
progress as an ideologically narrow myth but also incorporates it into both the national 
and individual narrative necessary for survival and sanity.  In this way, narrative itself is 
associated with the idea of progress, with one event following another, connected by 
causality and leading to a teleological conclusion that explains and realizes the previous 
events, in the way that Stone defines historical narrative.  
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While Crick participates in the art of narration and consistently refers to its 
necessity in fighting the vertigo of meaninglessness, the novel indicates that narration 
itself and the progress it is associated with, while perhaps necessary for historical 
presentation, not only does not bring us closer to the real but rather accomplishes the 
opposite: deforming the meaningless detritus of everyday life into the comfort of 
storytelling.  Is there, then, an alternative that would allow us to confront the real of the 
past and if so, why would such an alternative be necessary when narrative itself provides 
such comfort?  
While Crick is quick to recount narratives of historical progress and, indeed, to 
define humanity itself, or at least “man,”  by his desire for narration and storytelling, he is 
simultaneously drawn to the opposite argument that narrative obscures the truth and, as 
such, merely conceals and falsifies without lending “meaning” or comfort.  The 
confrontation of these two opposing viewpoints is carried out through a conversation 
between Crick and his recalcitrant (yet favored) student, Price.  While Crick insists on the 
necessity of narration as both a comforting and therapeutic explanation of events, 13 Price 
argues the opposite by insisting on the importance of referentiality to facts.  Price argues 
that, “explaining is a way of avoiding the facts while you pretend to get near to them” 
(167). Pushing his point further, Price points out that explanation itself, tied by Crick to 
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narration and storytelling, is not a signifier of comfort and quiescence but is rather a sure 
sign of trouble and disquiet.  “people only explain when things are wrong, don’t they, not 
when they’re right?  So the more explaining you hear, the more you think things must be 
pretty bad that they need so much explaining” (167).  Here, Price reiterates the views of 
Brooks and Miller in identifying the narratable as a moment of disquiet, instability, and 
danger, not merely as the resolving of those inquietudes.  In this reading, explanation and 
narration become not merely symbols of the resolving of instability and lack but a 
signifier of their presence.  Narration is then seen, by both Price and Crick, not as a 
means to access the facts, but as a means of avoiding them, while it is simultaneously not 
only a means to provide comfort, but also a signifier of inquietude and the “pretty bad” 
nature of the world.  In this case, the argument that an alternative to narrative is 
unnecessary is punctured.  If narrative neither provides historical accuracy nor soothes 
inquietude but is rather a signifier of it, surely an alternative is necessary.
In response, the novel does offer a mode of historical presentation that is not, or at 
least not traditionally, narrational and shies away from explanation in the narrative mode.  
Whereas narrative is linked explicitly to progress, causality, and teleology, the opposite 
of such storytelling commonplaces is offered by the symbolic process of land drainage 
provided in Waterland.  While the Atkinsons oversee land drainage and brewmaking in 
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their progressive rise up the social scale of Gildsey and Empire, Thomas’s paternal 
ancestors, the Cricks, actually participate in the day-to-day activity of drainage and 
“human siltation” which is characterized almost completely by a lack of progress.  Crick, 
indeed, explicitly compares the process of land drainage to traditional teleological and 
progressive histories, noting their fundamental differences:  “So forget, indeed, your 
revolutions, your turning-points, your grand metamorphosis of history.  Consider, 
instead, the slow and arduous process, the interminable and ambiguous process — the 
process of human siltation — of land reclamation.” (10)
As Crick notes, this process of land reclamation is completely unrelated to the 
idea of progress so closely associated with the Atkinsons.  Rather, it is “Silt: which 
shapes and undermines continents: which demolishes as it builds; which is simultaneous 
accretion and erosion: neither progress nor decay” (9).  In addition, while narration and 
progress are explicitly associated with retrospective construction, fabulation, and, indeed, 
falsification, the process of drainage and uneventful repetition that is associated with 
siltation is explicitly associated with the real itself:  “To live in the Fens is to receive 
strong doses of reality.  The great flat monotony of reality: the wide empty spaces of 
reality” (17).  This definition of reality is elaborated later in the novel:
Reality’s not strange, not unexpected.  Reality doesn’t reside in the sudden 
hallucination of events.  Reality is uneventfulness, vacancy, flatness.  
Reality is that nothing happens.  How many of the events of history have 
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occurred, ask yourselves, for this and for that reason, but for no other 
reason fundamentally, than the desire to make things happen?  I present to 
you History, the fabrication, the diversion, the reality-obscuring drama. 
History, and its near relative, Histrionics. (40)
Here, Crick offers “History” as the presentation of intensely narratable events that 
stimulate interest; it is characterized by large, transformative happenings or events of 
local or worldwide significance.  These events, or “actions” if we recall Virginia Woolf’s 
formulation, normally taken to be history itself are here capitalized as “History,” but 
History in this case is characterized not by its referentiality but by its “reality-obscuring” 
drama.  However, in this passage, this does not mean that reality itself is completely 
inaccessible as it is in many extreme poststructural formulations.  Rather, reality itself is 
here characterized by the nonnarratable,  or those moments that lack narrative interest: 
the flat, the quotidian, the boring, and the repetitive, the lack of events themselves.
My appropriation of the term nonnarratable is not here precisely identical to the 
meaning deployed by Brooks or Miller.  Miller, in particular, declares the nonnarratable 
in traditional narrative to be the achievement of the narrative’s goals, or the attainment of 
“happiness” in terms of the conflicts central to the narrative.  “Narrative proceeds toward, 
or regresses from, what it seeks or seems most to prize, but is never identical to it.  To 
designate the presence of what is sought or prized is to signal the termination of 
narrative” (3).  In this way, Miller analogizes nonnarratability and closure itself, the latter 
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being more central to his interests.  Nevertheless, implicit to the term “nonnarratability” 
is the idea of people, events, or situations that are simply not worth narrating, at least to 
the reading community addressed.  As Miller puts it, “What defines a nonnarratable 
element is its incapacity to generate a story.  Properly or intrinsically, it has no narrative 
future —”(5).  Additionally, Tzvetan Todorov asserts that narrative is defined by the 
“transition from one state to another” (51).  In this light, nonnarratability can be not only 
associated with the undermining of conflict inherent to the “happy ending” but can also 
be associated with boredom, flatness or emptiness; an absence of plot, conflict, or events 
altogether, the nearly complete lack of transition from one state to another. 14   The 
nonnarratable, then, is explicitly linked to land drainage, siltation, and the working-class 
Cricks, while the progressive, eminently narratable narrative of progress is located with 
the upwardly mobile middle-class Atkinsons.  This distinction is further solidified with 
the attention paid to the events in the lives of the Atkinsons when contrasted with the 
astonishing lack of events in the lives of the Cricks. 
The separation of the narratable lives of the Atkinsons and the nonnarratable lives 
of the Cricks is personified in the figure of Thomas Atkinson, the first of the Atkinson 
family to become “larger than life.”  Thomas becomes, “a monument.  Man of Enterprise, 
Man of Good Works, Man of Civic Honor” (75).  He becomes, in short, a central part of 
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the community’s narrative of itself, transcending his own physical existence and 
becoming a narrational symbol, separating him from the workers around him, “He can no 
longer stand by one of his new drains and clap the shoulders of the man who has helped 
dig it.  The labourers, who once worked beside him—the Cricks perhaps among them—
now touch forelocks, venerate him, regard him as a sort of god” (75).  Here, a 
commentary is made on who and what is worth narrating and highlighting in 19th century 
Gildsey, and not coincidentally in the simulacrum of 19th century fiction that occurs 
here.  The middle-class Atkinson is raised to a level of symbol and hero while his 
workers, including the Cricks. are mere observers or worshippers at the altar of middle-
class achievement.
Thomas Atkinson’s heroic status is reflected in the stories of Victorian Gildsey.  
Not only do the Atkinsons progress both socially and economically, but they are also 
central participants in all of the town’s dramatic events.  Their lives are filled with 
exciting, hypernarratable events that are familiar from previous narratives and fictions.  
That is, their “lives” are narratable to the degree that their narrativity has been proven so 
many times in previous texts, as suggested by White’s theorization of modes of 
emplotment derived from previous narratives.  This is particularly the case with the 
(his)story of Thomas Atkinson and his wife Sarah.  Thomas famously strikes Sarah in a 
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fit of jealousy, reducing her to a vegetative state, while he lives out the rest of his days in 
a fit of guilt and recrimination, desperately trying to bring her back to her senses.  The 
incident of the striking is explicitly described as a rumor (“no first hand account exists” 
(76)), but it becomes “history” precisely because of its dramatic narratability.  Its status 
as dramatic conflict, happening, as it does, to the town greats, automatically makes it an 
event worthy of narration, regardless of its connections to the real of historical accuracy.  
After Thomas’s premature death, the distinction between the real history of the domestic 
abuse and the communal story of the event becomes even murkier, as additional 
possibilities get circulated in the town, and Sarah is narratively bestowed with the gift of 
prophecy.  This only increases after her own death when stories of her ghost haunting her 
descendants become prevalent.  
Crick intervenes in his own retrospective narration of these events, insisting that 
“There are times when we have to disentangle history from fairy-tale.  There are times 
[...] when good dry textbook history takes a plunge into the old swamps of myth and has 
to be retrieved with empirical fishing lines. [...] At all costs let us avoid mystery-making 
and speculation, secrets and idle gossip” (86).  While this seems to contradict his earlier 
allegiance to narrative as a representational mode, both the sarcastic tone in this passage 
and his account of the Atkinson family history highlight the near impossibility of the 
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separation of fact and fiction.  While Sarah’s blow to the head is a traumatic occurrence 
depriving her of speech and her own capacity for narration, she is easily integrated into a 
familiar cultural narrative.  Trapped in an “upper room” (78) of the family residence and 
remarkably well-preserved until her ninety- third birthday, Sarah takes on the role of an 
“exiled princess” with the details of her daily existence reflecting her position in the 
cultural narrative of the fairy-tale:  “At regular times servants will come, with meals on a 
tray, to comb her hair, light the fire, prepare their mistress for bed, or merely to sit beside 
her at the window” (78) as if to wait for a prince to come and rescue her.15
Thomas Atkinson, then, is a heroic “captain of industry” until his mistreatment of 
the “princess” leads both reader and storyteller to emplot his life as a tragedy.  Again, 
however, it is unclear what elements of their story are historically accurate and to what 
degree the readerly desire for coherent or consistent narration takes on a life of its own 
and produces familiar narrative models out of the raw material of the real.  Tragedy and 
Romance (the fairy tale) are already seen here, while the later return of Sarah as both 
prophet and ghost, haunting the further transgressions of the Atkinson family provides 
another variation on the emplotment of Romance, the Gothic novel.16
Nearly every dramatic or traumatic event that occurs in the Gildsey community is 
explained by its incorporation into the family history of the Atkinsons.  The flooding of 
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the community in 1874 and the subsequent decline of the quality of Atkinson beer is 
explained by the rumor/story of the ghost of Sarah tapping on the windows of Kessling 
Hall (103), while the burning down of the Atkinson brewery in 1911 is likewise 
attributed to the “apparition” of Sarah and the statements of “Fire! Smoke! Burning!” that 
she made while in her semi-coma.17  The words are converted from the ravings of the 
insane to prophecy by the Gildseyans who need to convert the contingent and traumatic 
events of their lives into a coherent story with the Atkinsons as its central characters.
In this way, large, dramatic, and narratable events are merged with the family 
history of the Atkinsons in order to construct community identity.  Perhaps the most 
narratable event in the novel is also centered around the Atkinsons.  Where narrative and 
narratability are defined by readerly desire, the surest way to extend and create this desire 
is the search to uncover a secret through the process of reading.  The desire to uncover a 
secret is often at the center of plot-driven stories (like detective fiction, gothic novels, and 
horror tales), and “the secret” is a metonymic encapsulation of plot itself in theories of 
narrative that see a sustained and unrealized desire as the center of narration itself, 
particularly in Brooks’s Reading for the Plot.  As Brooks discusses, via Roland Barthes’s 
S/Z, plot is defined by its near-identity with the “hermeneutic code,” the code of enigmas 
and answers, as opposed to the proairectic code, the code of actions (18).  “The 
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hermeneutic code concerns rather the questions and answers that structure a story, their 
suspense, the partial unveiling, temporary blockage, eventual revolution. [...] The clearest 
and purest example of the hermeneutic would undoubtedly be the detective story” 
(Brooks 18).  Although action may be necessary to insure the progress of narrative, 
mystery is necessary to provoke readerly desire and to stimulate narratability itself.  The 
“detective story” is always, of course, involved in the unveiling of a mystery or secret 
and can easily be seen to partake of all of the key words of the hermeneutic code: 
“questions,” “answers,” “suspense.”  The desire associated with narrative and plotting is 
the desire of the reader to uncover the secrets of the plot and to answer the questions it 
poses.  This desire is replicated within the text itself when there is a reader figure, 
whether it be a detective  or an amateur, who also tries to uncover secrets and answer 
questions.  It is for this reason that a secret lies at the heart of the narratable, as it enacts 
the desire of the reader to uncover and explain it.  
It is no surprise then that, along with the great actions and events associated with 
the Atkinsons and tied to their association with linear progression, there is a deep secret 
at the center of their family drama.  Thomas Crick, the son of Helen Atkinson (in turn the 
daughter of the last of the great Atkinsons, Ernest), plays the role of the reader and the 
detective in his desire to uncover and narrate the family secret.  In the chapter entitled 
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“Detective Work” (209-12), Swift partakes of the long history of secret-driven fiction 
and, in particular, the eighteenth century gothic novel, by having Crick uncover the 
existence of the secret in a chest hidden in the attic of the family home.  Within the box is 
not only the secret hidden stash of Ernest Atkinson’s Coronation Ale (made, 
appropriately, with a “secret recipe”), but also the Atkinson family history as told by 
Ernest.  Here the near identity of “boxes” and “books,” both in their etymological origin 
and their capacity to hold and reveal secrets is in evidence.18 Within the family history is 
the secret towards which much of the narratable plot of the Atkinsons, and later of the 
united Atkinson/Crick family, leads.  
Waterland’s contrast of the narratable (great actions and events, linear plotting, 
progress, teleology) with the nonnarratable (lack of actions and events, lack of progress) 
takes another leap here into the realm of the hypernarratable in its deployment of perhaps 
the most narratable, and overly narrated, secret in prose fiction.  While the narrative 
theorists discussed above frequently refer to Freudian psychoanalytic theory as a means 
to explain narrative desire, in the case of Waterland, through the deployment of incest, 
Freudian psychoanalysis comes to stand in for the narratable itself.  The revelation that 
Thomas Crick’s brother, the “potato-head” Dick, is a product of an incestuous union 
between their mutual mother Helen Atkinson, and their grandfather Ernest Atkinson 
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serves as an extreme, and approaching ridiculous, signal that the Atkinson story, despite 
its affiliation with History departs radically from the real because of its imbrication with 
the narratable.  The parodic elements of the novel’s appropriation of Freud becomes most 
obvious in the figure of Dick Crick, who is both the product of the most narratable and 
repeatedly narrated Freudian story (that of incest) and a huge phallic symbol by virtue of 
his name and his tremendously large physical stature.  The fact that he is characterized, in 
turn, by his huge penis, turns him into a distorted and perverse symbol of Freudian 
psychoanalysis itself.  He is produced by the Freudian compulsion for narration and 
appears as simply a byproduct or trace of Freudian narration rather than an actual subject 
connected with the real.
Swift’s clear reference to Freudian psychoanalysis integrates with his critique of 
narrative as a whole, particularly historical narrative.  While narrative itself is 
characterized by desire, Freud asserts that all desire is fundamentally incestuous, either 
directed toward the mother or towards a mother-substitute.  Within this formulation, if 
desire is incestuous by its nature, the representation of incest is the representation of 
desire in its purest form.  Likewise, wherein narration is itself a model for desire, incest 
becomes the epitome of narratability.  This connection is further cemented by incestuous 
desire’s status as a fundamentally repressed secret that must be exhumed and integrated 
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into the narrative of the talking cure.  The uncovering of secrets is the nature of plot 
itself, reflected in the alternative definition of “plot” as “a secret plan.”  Incestuous 
desire, then, is, according to the Freudian model, the deep, dark secret at the center of all 
of our psyches.19  The fact that incestuous desire is the secret at the center of not only 
psychoanalytic case studies, but also of so many fictions, indicates clearly its status as 
“hypernarratable.”20  The huge, mentally-challenged, and phallically endowed figure of 
Dick Crick is then presented, in Waterland, as the realization of all readerly and sexual 
desires, while simultaneously subverting and mocking those desires. 
The incestuous union of Helen and Ernest reaches its narrational conclusion with 
their mutual agreement to have a child who will be “The Savior of the World.”  As 
narrator, Thomas Crick argues that “when fathers love daughters and daughters love 
fathers it’s like tying up into a knot the thread that runs into the future, it’s like a stream 
wanting to flow backwards” (228).  Here, Crick seems to assert that despite incest’s 
status as eminently narratable, it cannot be a plot in the conventional sense after all in that 
it does not progress forward, but rather runs only backward into the past.  Again, Swift 
suggests here the problems with narrative, despite its allure.  Nevertheless, Ernest and 
Helen Atkinson insist on the completion of their narrative through the production of a son 
and the investment of this son with theological and teleological meaning, as the “Savior 
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of the World.”  Here, Dick takes on the role of Victorian history, messianic, teleological, 
invested with meaning and truth.  His actual status as a mentally deficient “potato-head” 
(in his half-brother’s words), indicates the failures of narrational and teleological thinking 
and how traditional history can never fulfill what it promises precisely because of its 
adherence to narration, and in particular the readerly desire for stimulation and 
explanation.
Dick, then, enters life as the purest of pure Atkinsons, inbred to maintain that 
purity, while his brother Thomas is a Crick as well.  Following the logic of the narratable 
Atkinsons, it is no surprise that it is Dick who then commits the murder of Freddie Parr, 
triggering the events that provide the narratability  in the (chronologically) latter part of 
the book and allow the story to continue.   The murder mystery of Freddie’s killing, the 
abortion of Tom and Mary’s child designed to erase evidence of the murder, and the 
kidnapping of a child in the supermarket years later by Mary designed to replace the lost 
child,  all can be said to spring from Dick’s initial action.  It is true that the strict division 
between the narratable Atkinsons and the nonnarratable Cricks breaks down in the 
narrative present of the book, perhaps because the two families join through the marriage 
of Helen Atkinson and Henry Crick and the production of their son Thomas.  Still, 
however, the purest of Atkinsons, Dick, triggers the narrative potency that perpetuates the 
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desire necessary for plot itself for the remainder of the novel.  Despite this consistent 
linking of Dick to narrative and narrative desire, he becomes a key figure in the novel’s 
formulation of the real, a point to which I shall return.
First, however, it is important to return to the Victorian Cricks.  While the 
Atkinson family saga takes the position of the highly narratable production of History 
that strays from reality in its representation, the Cricks clearly represent one of the 
novel’s versions of the real itself, particularly in their role in the day-to-day and quotidian 
process of land drainage.  Where, however, it is quite easy to compile examples of the 
great events and actions in which the Atkinsons participate, it is not quite so simple to 
illustrate how exactly it is that the Cricks are nonnarratable, a reality principle to counter 
the deformations of narrative.  Instead, while the longest chapter in the novel is devoted 
to the chronicling of the narratable Atkinson family drama, there is no chapter entitled 
“About the Cricks,” and none of Thomas Crick’s paternal ancestors receive any 
significant personalization, except for his father Henry, the World War I pilot who is 
nursed back to mental health by Helen Atkinson.  
Nevertheless, the Cricks retain their symbolic potency and importance in the 
novel precisely in their juxtaposition to the Atkinsons.  While the notion of Atkinsonian 
narrative progress implies change and the multiplication of events causally connected, the 
Cricks are specifically not associated with progress, but rather with the “process” of 
drainage.  While the idea of narrative and progress necessitates the addition and 
multiplication of new lurid and sensational events to spark narrative interest, the Crickian 
idea of process merely requires the repetition of certain, usually boring, events over and 
over again.  This allows the process of drainage and siltation to be described quickly, 
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over the course of approximately three pages, summarizing the process quite easily in a 
sentence or two, “When the land sinks below the water-level you have to pump” (14).  
Although there is, in one sense, progress in the technology of pumping, moving as it does 
from wind-powered to steam-powered, Crick is able to recount these changes over the 
course of two centuries in a page or two and shortly turns to the ambitions of economic 
investing in drainage by the Atkinsons.  Again, however, while the Atkinson drama is 
needed to retain narrative interest, Crick offers that reality is the lack of progress and that 
real progress is paradoxically defined by its lack:
My humble model for progress is the reclamation of land.  Which is 
repeatedly, never-endingly retrieving what is lost. A dogged, vigilant 
business.  A dull yet valuable business.  A hard, inglorious business.  But 
you shouldn’t go mistaking the reclamation of land for the building of 
Empires. (336)
If it is progress traditionally defined that has the “capacity to generate a story,” it 
is not progress in this sense that has access to the real.  Instead, it is the “dull,” “hard,” 
“inglorious” hard work and day to day drudgery of land drainage.  Indeed, if the 
contraction of the Roman and British Empires are any indication, the building of Empire 
is itself not a merely progressive development, but, as with dredging, it is characterized 
by progress and decline, with little appreciable change.
Inherent in these claims for the non-narrational access to the real is a political 
claim for the acknowledgment of the working-class.  While the novel does not go so far 
as to try to chronicle the day-to-day work of the Cricks at the expense of the more lurid 
and narratively interesting middle-class Atkinsons, the contrast of the narratable events of 
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the Atkinsons and the accompanying assertion that History itself is a “reality-obscuring 
drama,” with the vacancy of the Fens as “reality” itself, emphasizes the importance of the 
working-class Cricks and how a singular attention to the Atkinsons can be misleading 
and damaging.  Indeed, according to the novel, the Crickian nonnarratability gains an 
epistemological privilege and access to the real not afforded the more narratable 
Atkinson’s.  Similarly, Crick’s sympathy with Price’s materialist critique of his own 
constructivism combined with Price’s own role as the symbol of and advocate for the 
oppressed working class in the arena of the classroom, indicates that the working-class 
concerns of the Cricks should not be erased or ignored lest the “thousands of corpses [...] 
strewn over the battleground of Europe” that Price refers to are too easily made part of a 
comfortingly narratable story.  
The key distinction between the Atkinsonian historical model and its Crickian 
shadow can be illustrated through a deployment of Michel de Certeau’s definition of 
history itself.  De Certeau argues that historical discourse normally creates what is to be 
defined as the real through acts of division that separate the present from the past. While 
de Certeau insists that “First of all, historiography separates its present time from a past” 
(de Certeau, Writing of History 36), this act of separation allows for the revelation of two 
versions of the real.  The first is the material reality of the past, which is always Other 
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from the present.  This Other of the past, like any other group defined as Other, helps the 
present subject define himself or herself  by contrasting its unintelligibility with the self 
of the present: “intelligibility is established through a relation with the other” (3; 
emphasis in original).  In this case, the real exists only in the past, but is deployed as a 
means of understanding the present. 
The second version of de Certeau’s historical real is the process of historical 
discourse itself, “the real insofar as it is entangled within the scientific operations (the 
present society, to which the historian’s problematics, their procedures, modes of 
comprehension, and finally a practice of meaning are referable)” (35).  Here, de Certeau 
plays, once again, upon the two key meanings of the word history.  One refers to all past 
material reality, the other to its telling (“the practice of history”).  “To be sure [...] 
’history’ connotes both a science and that which it studies—the explication which is 
stated, and the reality of what has taken place” (21; emphasis in original) italics.  De 
Certeau offers that both of these poles of history are in fact “poles of the real,” that the 
real can both be found in the reality of past events, and in the present process of the 
production of historical discourse.  In this, de Certeau offers that the most accurate 
history is that which plumbs the depths of the schism between these two forms of the 
real, the first a recounting of events which are, unfortunately, irremediably other, and 
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therefore impossible to recount with complete accuracy, and the second an investigation 
of historical discourse’s own practices and epistemological assumptions.  “Historical 
science takes hold precisely in their relation to one another, and its proper objective is 
developing this relation into a discourse” (35).
Certainly the call to see the real of the past as not merely transparent reportage, 
but also as the acknowledgment of the construction and production of the text of history 
is sympathetic with postmodernism itself and with texts commonly associated with it, 
like Spiegelman’s Maus.  Self-reflexivity and the repeated reference to a text’s own 
textuality are standard hallmarks of postmodern literature, historical or otherwise.  Here, 
however, de Certeau indicates that it is the intersection of the reality of the past, however 
inaccessible it may be, with a self-reflexive investigation of the production of history that 
allows access to the real, indicating that the discursive process must be combined, 
juxtaposed with or read alongside material reality itself.  Again, the dialectic nature of 
matter and representation is asserted, as in the Bergsonian model outlined in Chapter 
One.
Here, Waterland’s sense of the real makes its intervention.  To de Certeau, and 
much contemporary historical thought, the past is irremediably passed and cannot be 
made intelligible except, perhaps, through the investigation of the ruptures, changes, or 
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transitions that make the past other, separating it from the present.  However, these 
claims of de Certeau’s take part in the logic of narrativity, explaining history and the real 
precisely through the great events and wide scale change that create narrative and 
narrative desire.  In this view, the past is separated from the present through irreversible 
chasms that separate our understanding of the present from the past, creating a kind of 
mystery surrounding their difference.  Narration attempts to make these chasms less 
painful and inexplicable, by explaining the past in such a way that the present becomes 
more intelligible.  This, however, partakes heavily of the logic of narration, wherein there 
is, at the very least, the Todorovian “transition from one state to another” if not outright 
“progress.”  As we have seen, however, Waterland suggests that this faith in and 
reference to progress and narratability is not the real at all.  Rather, lack of change and 
stasis, the circular movement forward and retreat of siltation is real, suggesting that, in 
fact, the past is not irremediably passed, or an inaccessible Other, but is, in fact, always 
present, in the sense that the large changes that make the past separated from the present 
are more narratable deformations of the real than its accurate presentation.
Indeed, the two branches of de Certeau’s real come together in the hard inglorious 
work of the Cricks.  Their pumping of water is both past material reality and a process, 
not of the labor of historical presentation, but of the labor of land drainage.  Implicit in 
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the concept of process, as opposed to progress is the inevitability of repetition and 
circularity, in which the same procedures are carried out repeatedly in both the past and 
the present, and presumably the future as well.  The logic of progressive historical 
narrative that banishes the past irrevocably to the past as an inaccessible Other, is 
substantially, although not completely, belied by the concept of process that implies that 
the actions of the past are repeated in the present and that they may not be completely 
lost, epistemologically speaking, after all.  While the grand changes and divisions of past 
from present described by de Certeau help to define the present subject by his or her 
Other in the past, the concept of process, and lack of progress, portrayed in Waterland by 
the Cricks’ labor offers that the subject can also be defined by a continuity with a past 
whose hard, inglorious labor is repeated and reproduced in the present.  This, in turn, 
allows for a diachronic identification of past and present laborers, which is characterized 
by a lack of change, a lack of narrativity, and therefore allows the past to become present.  
In this, the dual reals of material presence and laborious process come together.
“A Knife Blade Called Now”
It is a commonplace of narrativist and constructivist history to claim that the past 
and the present are irrevocably separated and that, indeed, the only purpose for the study 
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of history at all is to come to terms with the present.  However, Swift’s contrast of 
Atkinsonian progress and Crickian process indicates that the past and the present may not 
be as inviolably separate as some have theorized.  Rather, the repetitiveness and 
circularity of process indicates that the past can be made present, allowing an access to 
the real that seems impossible according to models like White’s.  Waterland does not, 
however, finally settle on only one version of nonnarrative and the presence of the past. 
Rather, like de Certeau, Crick offers two version of the real.  The first is that which lacks 
the capacity to spark narrative interest (the boring, the mundane, the quotidian, the every 
day) and reflects the process of the hard, inglorious labor of the Cricks.  The second also 
denies narrative, but in a different fashion. 
Although the correlation of the real with the repetitive and mundane process of 
daily labor is essential to the understanding of the theorization of historical representation 
in Waterland, it is not the only avenue of the real which the novel explores.  Indeed, the 
concept of the real would have a limited usefulness if restricted to the depiction of only 
this type of activity.  Through an alternative deployment of the concept of nonnarrative, 
however, it does become evident that Waterland offers an alternative real which, 
although difficult to access, also finds a way to permeate the “Here and Now” with a past 
that is made present. 
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The first indication that there is another real follows closely upon the first 
description of the Crickian reality in which the real is a “grey flat empty space” (17).  
Following this first definition of the real it is quite surprising, and indeed confusing, to 
find Crick assert only a few pages later that “Reality’s so strange and unexpected” (25), 
when we have just read how reality is what is completely expected, repetitive and lacking 
in narrative interest.  Nevertheless, this countervailing trend in the definition of reality 
continues throughout the novel and becomes slightly more clear in the subsequent 
chapter, “A Bruise Upon a Bruise”(26-39), which takes place during Crick’s teen years 
on July 25, 1943.  In this chapter, the body of Crick’s friend Freddie Parr is found in 
Henry Crick’s sluice and is fished out by Henry and his two sons, Thomas and Dick, with 
a boat-hook.  In this extraordinary circumstance, seemingly the essence of narrativity, the 
process of Crickian pumping and drainage is repeated in a parodic form when Henry 
attempts to revive the long dead Freddie through the means of the “Holger-Nielsen 
Method of Artificial Respiration”:  “For there is such a thing as human drainage too, such 
a thing as human pumping.  And what else was my father doing on that July morning 
than what his forbears had been doing for generations; expelling water?  But whereas 
they reclaimed land, my father could not reclaim a life” (32).
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Indeed, whereas the repetitive and laborious process of drainage has been 
previously defined as the real itself, here Crick notes that this attempt at drainage is just 
the opposite: “Dad labours to refute reality, against the law of nature, that a dead thing 
does not live again” (32).21  The real here is not, however, merely the material presence of 
death itself, but is rather the extraordinary and dislocating event that makes one aware 
that one is not merely a part of a story or dream but is rather inexpressibly in “the 
present,” or what Crick later calls the “Here and Now.”  It is not upon seeing the dead 
body of Freddie Parr that Crick experiences this sensation, but rather in the radically 
contingent and unsettling moment when the boat-hook catches under Freddie’s jaw and 
rips upwards through the cheek, eye-socket and temple while Freddie’s body drops back 
into the water and bursts forth with a new layer of blood which is “a dark, sticky, 
reluctant substance, the colour of black-currants’ (30).  Here, as Crick relates, “I came out 
of a dream. […] I realized I was looking at a dead body.  Something I had never seen 
before” (30).  It is this dislocating moment that allows Thomas to see the grim reality his 
father refutes in his efforts to pump the water out of Freddie.  This reality is not merely 
the prospect of mortality, but the realization of one’s own existence outside of a scripted, 
easily explained Symbolic, a momentary sense of uniqueness and presence that is not 
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easily explained or narrativized and which gives the sense of one’s own participation in 
the world, not merely as an observer. 
Why did fear transfix me at that moment when the boat-hook clawed at 
Freddie Parr’s half-slipping, half-suspended body? Because I saw death?  
Or the image of something worse?  Because this wasn’t just plain, 
ordinary, terrible, unlooked-for-death, but something more?  
Children, evil isn’t something that happens far off — it suddenly 
touches your arm. (35) 
It is true that the reality of Freddie’s body being pulled by the boat-hook is 
quickly subsumed by the needs of narration, as it is soon revealed that Dick is Freddie’s 
murderer and that Mary and Tom must participate in the cover-up, triggering the second 
detective-story of the novel.  However, while it is true that “the reality of things — be 
thankful — only visits us for a brief while” (33), it is also the case in Waterland that 
“history is a thin garment, easily punctured by a knife blade called Now” (36).  While 
history in the novel is defined as the “reality obscuring drama” that converts that which 
causes unease and fear into comprehensible narrative that comforts and explains, it 
becomes clear that that which causes fear, the real (in this latter sense) can also, at times, 
intrude and puncture its narrativization.  This intrusion or puncturing of narrative brings 
back the sense of the real, or the “Here and Now,” even and especially where it is most 
actively suppressed, and repressed, during the course of narrativization.22
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It is here that, again, the novel’s allegorization of psychoanalysis comes into play.  
While psychoanalysis attempts to find integration and coherent narrativization of 
foundational and traumatic events in an effort to explain them and therefore to create a 
more healthy subjectivity, it is also the case that psychoanalytic theory posits the 
difficulty, and in some configurations, impossibility, of completely subsuming and 
reintegrating traumatic events into a coherent narrative or subjectivity.  Indeed traumatic 
events are often those elements of the subject that resist symbolization and continue to 
“return” in different forms throughout the life narrative, never disappearing, yet never 
retaining a consistent symbolic value or place in the subject’s life-narrative.  The 
analyst’s attempt to make the patient “healthy” then often comes, paradoxically, from the 
ability to explain the inexplicable, or to incorporate these traumatic moments into a 
coherent narrative.  The Lacanian version of this traumatic moment is identified with the 
“Real” register and, as Zizek explains, resists even the most strenuous attempts to 
incorporate it into the symbolic.
According to Zizek, a traumatic event, like the fishing of Freddie Parr’s body 
from the sluice,23  is first experienced as inexplicable or beyond explanation,  “when it 
[the event] erupts for the first time it is experienced as a contingent trauma, as an 
intrusion of a certain non-symbolized Real” (Zizek, Sublime Object 61).  While the 
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reoccurrence or repetition of such a traumatic occurrence (through memory, through 
retelling, through narrativization) allows it to “find its place in the symbolic network” 
(Zizek, Sublime Object 61), there is always some portion of that intrusion of the Real that 
remains unexplained, or, within the constellation of narratability, not narratable.  It is this 
portion that retains its contingent non-symbolized status.  As Zizek puts it, the capacity 
for a symbolic “retroactive modification of the past” has its limits, “it stumbles onto a 
rock upon which it becomes suspended .  This rock is, of course, the Real, that which 
resists symbolization: the traumatic point which is always missed but none the less 
always returns, although we try [...] to neutralize it, to integrate it into the symbolic 
order” (Zizek, Sublime Object 69).  Here, Zizek indicates that despite the power of the 
human capacity to explain or symbolize events, particularly traumatic events, there are 
elements of those events which, in fact, are not so easily incorporated into the symbolic 
and which inevitably resist our attempts to explain them.
Although Lacanian theory principally speaks of how subjectivity is constructed 
and not of historical and material reference,24 this construction of the Real helps to 
conceptualize the reality that is proposed in Waterland.  That is, where Lacanian thought 
provides a structural model for reading Waterland, it does not account fully for the 
novel’s insistence on material presence, arguing more frequently for its opposite as I 
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discuss in the previous chapter.  In the case of Waterland, the extraction of Freddie Parr’s 
body from the sluice, perhaps erroneously referred to as a dislocation above, provides a 
momentary location of Crick outside of symbolization and narrativization and, instead, in 
a material reality that is not part of the story of history, but is an indicator of material 
presence.
Such moments recur infrequently in Waterland, but they do recur and are given 
the name of the “Here and Now” by Price, a name soon adopted by Crick as well.  Like 
Lacanian jouissance, the “Here and Now” brings both joy and terror and comes rarely 
(Swift 61), but, as Crick points out, it is these momentary encounters with the real of the 
“Here and Now” that prevent a completely constructivist view of history.  
I believed, perhaps like you, that history was a myth.  Until a series of 
encounters with the Here and Now gave a sudden pointedness to my 
studies.  Until the Here and Now, gripping me by the arm, slapping my 
face and telling me to take a good look at the mess I was in, informed me 
that history was no invention but indeed existed — and I had become a 
part of it. (62)
While History in the upper case is referred to as “the Grand Narrative, the filler of 
vacuums, the dispeller of fears in the dark,” or the narratives and stories that fend off and 
explain the real, history in the lower case is here identified with the real itself, not an 
invented story, but a material presence that sparks fear and dis-ease rather than dispelling 
them.  
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Perhaps the most traumatic moment in the novel that represents the “Here and 
Now” in its most jarring and unsettling form is the abortion of Tom and Mary’s child.  
Nevertheless, even this encounter with the real is first introduced as a fairy-tale about the 
“witch,” Martha Clay, who lives in the cottage beyond Wash Fen Mere and “who also got 
rid of love-children”  (298).  In this instance, the difficulty of extracting the moment of 
the real is emphasized as Crick states, “all stories were once real.  And all the events of 
history, the battles and costume-pieces, once really happened [...] were once feelings in 
the guts” (297).  Likewise, however, all real events soon become stories, and the trauma 
of the real is soon incorporated into the fairy-tale of History and “when the world is about 
to end there’ll be no more reality, only stories” (298).
Certainly, the impulse to convert the real into a story is resisted by Crick in this 
case.  As Crick says about the witch, “No pointed hat, no broomstick, no grinning black 
cat on shoulder” (301). Likewise, Crick emphasizes how the “reproduction” of a Fenland 
cottage like the Clay’s, available at the Fenland Museum of Gildsey, is not the same as 
their real home.  At the same time,  however, Crick finds himself slipping into 
storytelling mode and chastising himself for letting go of the real events. “But enough of 
Martha’s costume.  (And enough of that smell!),” he admonishes himself.  While Crick 
carries on his narratorial debate about the difficulty of separating the story of the events 
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of Mary’s abortion and the reality of it, he simultaneously insists that there are some 
events that cannot be completely contained by the story in which they are embedded.  
After Crick is sent outside to pluck a duck, while Martha performs the gruesome 
but necessary procedure of the abortion, he ventures over to the window to take a peek 
and witnesses the grotesque scene:
There are things which happen outside dreams which should only happen 
in them.  A pipe — no, a piece of sedge, a length of hollow reed — is 
stuck into Mary’s hole.  The other end is in Martha’s mouth.  Crouching 
low, her head between Mary’s gory knees, her eyes closed in 
concentration, Martha is sucking with all her might.  Those cheeks —
those blood-bag cheeks working like bellows. (308)
John Lloyd Marsden has pointed out the central role that  this abortion scene plays 
in the novel as a representative of the “Here and Now” or, in the terms sketched out 
above, the real.  Marsden links this scene with Bakhtin’s notion of the carnivalesque and 
the consistent link, both here and throughout the novel, between the female body and the 
landscape, both of which are “pumped” for drainage (Marsden 136).25   Marsden, 
however, goes further by claiming that although the Bakhtinian/Rabelaisian 
carnivalesque typically reestablishes “concrete corporeality,” the Crickian version is not 
connected to the real, but is rather “a sophisticated evasion of reality” in that Crick 
consistently sees all elements of this carnivalesque episode as a means to “further the 
fatalistic and exculpatory metanarrative of his own past and, specifically, his complicity 
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in the death of his unborn child” (Marsden 137).  In other words, Marsden sees Crick’s 
narrative impulse as overpowering, subjugating even what he himself calls an instance of 
the “Here and Now” to his own metanarrative, turning the real or history itself into his 
own story or narrative and turning the inexplicable into the explained.
While there is an element of truth to Marsden’s assessment of Crick, it is also the 
case that both Crick and the novel as a whole suggest that this moment exceeds the limits 
of narration, as a trauma that, although foundational in the narrative of the lives of Mary 
and Tom, and their mutual obsession with their lost child, also exceeds its role in those 
narratives.  When Crick asserts that “there are things which happen outside dreams that 
should only happen in them,” he once again reflects Zizek’s analogizing of the “real” and 
the dream itself.  As Zizek explains (interpreting Lacan’s Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis), the Lacanian Real is not that which awakens us from our fantasies or 
dreams,  but is instead that fundamental traumatic part of our past reality that defines us 
and our real desires and “which announces itself in the terrifying dream” (Zizek, Sublime 
Object 45).  In this context, as Crick observes, dreams are not a fantastic escape from 
reality, but are more real than reality itself  in the sense that “reality” itself, as it is 
commonly defined, is our own Symbolic reimagining or narrativization of the traumatic 
“kernel” of our identity.  “Reality is a fantasy-construction which enables us to mask the 
293
Real of our desire” (Zizek, Sublime Object 45) and the trauma always exceeds the 
narrative it engenders to normalize it. 26  Although the fishing of Freddie Parr from the 
sluice is described as awakening from a dream, both of these encounters with the “Here 
and Now” are characterized by the movement between dreaming and waking, indicating 
the presence that traumatic encounters with the real have in both.
However, the correlation of the scene of Mary’s abortion and the real as such, 
goes beyond this momentary correlation of the event with an anti-narrative, or 
unsymbolizable, “dream” rather than narratable “reality.”  Indeed the parallel Marsden 
draws between the pumping of the Fens and the extraction of the child from Mary via 
Martha Clay’s bellows is especially relevant here. It is important to recall that the process 
of siltation is linked to the novel’s notion of the real, particularly in its rejection of grand 
cataclysmic events that separate the present from the past and its embracing of the 
continuities between them.  In this, there is an implicit claim that the past is accessible, 
not irremediably inscrutable, because of its continuities with the present.  The traumatic 
unsymbolizable moment embodied in the extraction of Freddie Parr and the abortion does 
not share the idea of process with the drainage of the Fens, but as with this other strand of
the real, it does serve to collapse the fundamental separation of present and past, and 
instead stresses how time is recursive, repetitive and cyclical, bringing the past into the 
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present, and vice versa, despite the fact that formal patterns of repetition and recursion 
are also disrupted by the novel. 
This strange effect of the traumatic  real, bringing together the present and the 
past is best illustrated during Tom’s duck-plucking outside the Clay cottage:  
His head starts to spin.  The duck he’s holding in his hand isn’t a duck, it’s 
a hen.  He’s sitting in the sunny space between a chicken coop and the 
kitchen door, where Mother stands, in her apron.  But the hen’s not dead, 
it’s still alive.  Its wings start to flap and it starts to lay eggs. [...] A 
copious unending stream of eggs, so many that he has to collect them with 
the help of his mother and her apron.  But Mother says they’re not really 
eggs, they’re fallen stars.  And so they are, twinkling and winking on the 
ground.  We carry the fallen stars into the chicken coop.  Which isn’t a 
chicken coop at all.  It’s the shell of the old wooden windmill by the 
Hockwell Lode.  And Mary’s inside lying naked with her knees up.  
Mother discreetly retires.  And Mary starts to explain about her menstrual 
cycle and about the wonders inside her hole and how babies get to be 
born.  She says, “I’ve got eggs, you know.”  And he, ignorant but eager to 
learn, says, “What like hens?”  And Mary laughs.  And then she screams 
and then she says she’s the mother of God — I drop the duck I’m holding 
(it’s a duck after all).  It’s not a dream.  What you wake up into can’t be a 
dream.  It’s dark.  I’m here; it’s now.  I’m sitting [...] on a bench outside a 
cottage where Martha Clay, a reputed witch ... (307-8)
This passage entails not only the merging of reality and dream, particularly in the 
literalization of his mother’s metaphorical transformation of chicken eggs into fallen 
stars, but also of the past and present.  Specifically, the present plucking of the duck is 
transformed into the childhood plucking of the hen, while the hen’s eggs are transformed 
into the eggs of Mary during their mutual exploration of “holes and things” at the 
Hockwell Lode during their teen years.  This is, in turn, transformed into the obvious 
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religious iconography of the novel , with Mary as the mother of God and Dick as the 
parodic “Savior of the World.” This iconography is further crystallized by the oaths Mary 
swears while the abortion is being carried out “‘HolyMaryMotherofGodHolyMaryMother 
ofGodHolyMaryMotherof—”(308).
Waterland then indicates how, on a broader scale, lived experience is recursive 
and repetitive, repeating and reliving foundational trauma and unconsciously revisiting 
the past in the present.  Tom and Mary’s experience of losing a child recurs often in their 
later lives, as they obsessively seek out and obtain child substitutes in various attempts to 
cover over this trauma.  Price, their dog, and the kidnapped supermarket baby all, at 
various times, fulfill this symbolic role.  What this passage indicates, however, is how 
both Tom and Mary are obsessed with the symbolic significance of reproduction long 
before their own child is aborted, and how this traumatic moment of an encounter with 
the real, that exceeds their mutual capability to explain or narrativize the experience takes 
them both into their past (the eggs of the mother and their sexual curiosity at Hockwell 
Lode) and into their future. This passage lends weight to Crick’s earlier theorizing about 
history in which he claims:  “It goes in two directions at once.  It goes backwards as it 
goes forwards.  It loops.  It takes detours.  Do not fall into the illusion that history is a 
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well-disciplined and unflagging column marching unswervingly into the future [...] how 
does a man move?  One step forward, one step back” (135). 
While the future is often configured as a land of hope and prospective Utopian 
paradise, as Crick himself explains to the class in discussing the motivations behind the 
French Revolution, it is during this encounter with the real that Crick offers the 
alternative to this idealistic teleological vision of the future.  When Crick receives the 
remains of the aborted fetus in a pail from Martha Clay, he observes, “In the pail is what 
the future is made of.  I rush out again to be sick” (308).  Here the future is not a place of 
prospective improvement or progress, but is dead, aborted, indeed, by the preceding 
generation in much the same way that Isa experiences her life as “abortive” in Between 
the Acts.
Throughout Waterland, Crick insists on his belief in the future, in children, if not 
to progress towards a Utopian paradise, then to, at least, not allow things to get any worse 
and to maintain the world as it is.  The prospect of a lifeless future as symbolized by the 
aborted fetus of Crick’s child makes him sick and instills him with fear, just as the notion 
of the “End of the World” and a futureless existence triggers the nightmares of his 
students who form the Holocaust Club to share their fears of the end of the world.  Here, 
again, the notion of anti-narrative is useful.  Where narrative, in the novel, is consistently 
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tied to the soothing of fears and the use of explanation to quell inquietude, these moments 
of traumatic fright seem to exceed the possibility of narrative.  In Peter Brooks’s Reading 
for the Plot, he echoes the Benjaminian notion that the aim of all narrative is the 
explanation of death, an explanation which we cannot have in lived experience.  
Likewise, the end of narration is, metaphorically, death itself, the cessation of narrative 
desire and the “terminal quiescence of the end” (Brooks 103).  Brooks contends, via the 
Freudian notion of the death drive, that narrative desire is, in fact, the desire for an 
explanation of the plot that can only come once it is completed and narrative quiescence, 
or metaphorical death, is achieved.  At the same time, however, he also suggests that the 
explanation that narrative gives is only accomplished through the ways that the narrative 
middle, or the plot, is realized by the final narrative foreclosure of the conclusion.  Here, 
Waterland suggests again that the trajectory of nonnarratable-narratable-nonnarratable is 
false in its banishment of death to a realm where it serves only as satisfactory explanation
of life itself.  Through the medium of the unsymbolizable traumatic moment of fear, the 
novel asserts that the real of death, the anti-narrative that cannot be explained by 
narrative, cannot be controlled so easily and is, in fact, a signifier of the difficulty of 
repressing the truth, that the future for each of us is a radically contingent death that may 
not have an explanation or fit neatly into a life story.  Where we have seen that the 
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nonnarratable in Waterland is, at times, an expression of that which has traditionally held 
no narrative interest (the daily drudgery of working-class labor), we can also see that in 
the form of anti-narrative,  nonnarrative is also that which exceeds narrative’s capacity to 
explain or allay fears, especially the fear of death.  In Brooks’s Freudian terms, the 
nonnarrative is found then both in the failure to incite the pleasure principle and in the 
realization of the death drive.
This reference to theories of Freudian desire brings us back to Dick Crick and one 
final example of what his half-brother identifies as “the Here and Now,” the real that 
denies the radical relativism of constructivist historiography: “There’s something about 
this scene.  It’s tense with the present tense.  It’s fraught with the here and now, it’s laden 
with this stuff—is there a name for it? [...] a feeling in the guts...” (207).  The scene 
referred to here is not the abortion of his prospective child, but refers to a time even 
further back in Crick’s life-story, when Mary Metcalf, after already removing her blouse, 
offers to remove her knickers if the five boys present (Tom and Dick Crick, Freddie Parr, 
and the largely irrelevant Peter Baine and Terry Coe) reveal their “swellings” first.  
While this episode seems to be insignificant, detailing, as the chapter title indicates, 
“Child’s Play,” it retains, for Crick, a connection to the traumatic real, the “here and 
now” which is less clearly evident than that of the abortion scene.  Once again, however, 
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the novel’s appropriation and parody of Freudian psychoanalysis makes the importance 
accorded to this episode more clear.
The prospect of the revelation of five penises, one of them preternaturally huge, 
once again pulls the novel into the discourse of psychoanalysis.  Both Freud and Lacan, 
of course,  attribute much symbolic freight to the penis (or phallus) and its centrality in 
the oedipal triangle.  In particular, the phallus is that which replaces the originary 
connection to the mother for the Oedipal child, and as such, in the Lacanian linguistic 
adaptation, signifies both meaning and its lack.  The phallus represents for Lacan, the 
Law of the Father, the entry into the world of language and meaning and “the Symbolic 
register” as such.  Again, however, although the Symbolic register allows entry into the 
social world characterized by the interchange of signs and language, it is also, despite its 
association with the phallus, a “castration” of sorts.  The castration is symbolic in that the 
phallus represents the lack of plenitude or identity between signifier and signified that is 
part of the Imaginary register, or the fantasy of unblemished identity between the self and 
the mother before the Law of the Father intrudes.  
For Lacan, of course, much of this is an allegory of linguistic understanding and 
although the phallus or Symbolic register is necessary to allow for social interaction it is 
not connected to the real as such:   “it can never have any direct access to reality, in 
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particular to the now prohibited body of the mother.  It has been banished from this ‘full,’ 
imaginary possession into the ‘empty’ world of language” (Eagleton, Literary Theory
145).  As such, the phallus represents a movement beyond the fantasy of transparent 
meaning and referentiality, but it also avoids the Real of the unsymbolizable or that 
which cannot be contained within reality as defined solely by discourse, culture, and 
language.  As Zizek notes, “the phallus is not simply lost but is an object which gives 
body to a certain fundamental loss in its very presence.  In the phallus, loss as such 
attains a positive existence” (Sublime Object 157; emphasis in original).  As Zizek points 
out, the meaning or wholeness that the phallus represents is already a fetish, covering the 
lack of meaning and wholeness that was imagined as part of the originary connection to 
the mother.  The phallus is the first signifier in a chain that attempts to replace this 
originary wholeness, while the recognition of this failure is access to the Real.
Although there is nothing in Waterland to assume a specific reference to Lacanian 
thought, there is clearly a use of, manipulation, and parody of Freudian psychoanalysis 
that is similarly pre-occupied with the importance of the penis or phallus as the site of 
symbolic importance, especially in such constructions as “castration anxiety” and “penis 
envy.”  This is particularly evident in the scene near the Hockwell Lode in which Mary 
Metcalf offers to reveal her “hole,” to borrow the vernacular of the novel, if the boys 
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show their “things.”  In this scene, the phallus takes on an extremely important role as it 
is revealed that Dick himself has a gargantuan penis that strains at the limits of his 
swimming trunks at the sight of Mary’s exposed upper body.  While the other boys 
expose themselves readily in anticipation of Mary doing the same, Dick withholds from 
doing so until Mary declares that she will only reveal herself to one boy, the one who can 
swim the furthest underwater.  
Dick’s late entry and triumphant victory in the competition promises the 
revelation of the huge phallus which has stimulated such curiosity in Mary and, by this 
time, the reader as well.  This curiosity, however, meets disappointment, as Dick’s huge 
erection has disappeared during his swim, as the “swellings” of the other boys did, under 
Mary’s inspection: “as Dick draws near us something is evident, or evident by its 
absence.  The monstrous swelling, that trapped baton — he no longer pushes it before 
him.  It is gone — or sunk” (190).  As we have seen, Dick is symbolic of a failed 
teleological narrativism derived from Freudian-based psychoanalysis, and again here, 
while Dick’s startling tumescence seems at first to be loaded with meaning and presence, 
it is instead characterized by absence itself.  Like the Lacanian phallus, Dick here 
symbolizes the impossibility of complete fulfillment, both of sexual and of linguistic and 
narrative desire: the desire for a total narrative, as well as linguistic transparency and 
302
referentiality.  If, as Peter Brooks writes, we should see “the narratable as a condition of 
tumescence, appetency, ambition, quest,” Dick’s rapid de-tumescence indicates the 
novel’s interest in the nonnarratable, or the foiling of traditional narrative interest.  Dick’s 
failure to fulfill his sexual and narrative promise is again indicated later in the novel, 
when it is revealed that despite his prodigious size, he is, in practice, impotent, because 
he is “too big” (259-264) to have completed the sexual act with Mary and, therefore, to 
be the father of Mary’s child.  While Dick’s phallic significance is suggested and 
frustrated during the contest at the Hockwell Lode, when the materiality of his 
unnaturally large penis is finally revealed, it does not hold the almost magical power nor 
symbolic significance that the readers expect, and for which Mary hopes.
None of this, however, completely explains why this scene is, as Crick asserts, 
“tense with the present tense.”  It is not, at least not completely, the presence of Dick, nor 
the revelation and withdrawal of his symbolic phallus.  Rather, when Crick makes this 
claim, he explicitly refers to the embarrassment of his own penis (and those of Freddie, 
Peter and Terry) which “droop so plaintively” upon inspection (207).  While Crick, 
typically, does offer an explanation or two for his failure to rise to the occasion (his love 
for Mary, “a common response, referred to by the best sexologists”), it is clear that there 
is no symbolic weight or significance attached to the pedestrian phalluses of the four real 
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boys.  Dick is, to a large degree, a byproduct of narrative excess and his 
hypernarratability is further compressed into the seemingly hefty significance of his own 
phallus.  On the other hand, Freddie, Tom, Peter and Terry are unremarkable products of 
the Fens whose penises are similarly unremarkable, “Four wrinkled irresolute and slightly 
sticky members revealed, amidst nests of incipient pubic hair; which attempt to stand up, 
go limp and stir again feebly” (184).  While Mary’s sexual curiosity and the reader’s 
narrative desire are piqued by the contest, what is finally revealed, and not revealed in the 
cases of Mary and Dick, suggests a parallel to the comparison of the historical Cricks and 
the Atkinsons.  What is real here is not the satisfaction of narrative desire or the demands 
of narratability, but the impossibility of realizing that desire, an impossibility signified 
here by the phallus itself.  As Crick himself points out, it is at this moment of encounter 
with the real that he, once more, “escapes to his story-books,” which for him are always 
historical but paradoxically provide him with a buffer from his real experience.
Curiosity
The sexual curiosity that Mary displays at the Hockwell Lode  closely parallels 
the narrative curiosity of Crick in his attempt to discover the truth behind the murder of 
Freddie Parr.  Both locate Dick as their object and both partake of a Freudian logic of 
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narrative desire like that of Peter Brooks.  While curiosity is the condition necessary for 
narrative desire and provides therefore, for Brooks, the basis for plot itself, Waterland 
offers both the withdrawal of curiosity and an alternative model of curiosity as a means to 
escape the narratable and to, in some fashion, access the real.
The sexual curiosity of Tom and Mary is specifically analogized in the novel with 
that curiosity that leads to the construction of narratives that attempt to explain. 
“Curiosity drove her [Mary], beyond all restraint to want to touch, witness, experience 
whatever was unknown and hidden from her. [...] Curiosity, which bogs us down in 
arduous meditations and can lead to the writing of history books, will also, on occasion 
[…] reveal to us that which we seldom glimpse unscathed […] the Here and Now” (51).  
While this curiosity is sparked in Tom and Mary’s secret liaisons by the windmill and can 
lead to an unexpected glimpse of the “Here and Now,” its excessive exploration can also 
lead to the satisfaction of that curiosity, the revelation of all secrets that simulates the 
“death drive” or the terminal quiescence that the end of narrative indicates.  In this case, 
“everything is open, everything is plain: there are no secrets, here, now, in this nothing-
landscape” (52). Mary’s tendency to want to share everything with Tom and to satisfy all 
curiosities, even the secrets of her monthly bleedings, is analogized to the Fens 
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themselves in which everything is flat and open to inspection, “the wide empty spaces of 
reality” (17), which are, in turn, associated with the real, the “here, now.”
Still, while the satisfaction, or cessation, of Tom’s sexual desire and, it seems, 
narrative curiosity are postulated here and given the privileged epistemological position 
of the “Here and Now” or the real, this is not the novel’s final word on curiosity.  
Common theorizations of narrative desire like Brooks’s are built heavily on Freudian 
psychoanalysis which takes masculine desire as its model.27 Waterland, on the other hand,
suggests that there are other models of curiosity and desire which might be more useful in 
understanding and expressing history itself and more closely accessing the real, allowing 
a glimpse of the real through desire itself, rather than its nonnarratable lack.  Crick even 
goes so far as to imply that the desire for traditional historical narrative is not a “natural” 
urge or curiosity but rather obscures and deforms the type of curiosity that is  natural, the 
type that would allow people to “make history” rather than write it:
Supposing it’s revolutions which divert and impede the course of our 
inborn curiosity.  Supposing it’s curiosity — which insures our sexual 
explorations and feeds our desire to hear and tell stories — which is our 
natural and fundamental condition.  Supposing it’s our insatiable and 
feverish desire to know about things, to know about each other, always to 
be sniff-sniffing things out, which is the true and rightful subverter and 
defeats even our impulse for historical progression.  Have you ever 
considered that why so many historical movements, not only revolutionary 
ones, fail, fail at heart is because they fail to take account of the complex 
and unpredictable forms of our curiosity?  Which doesn’t want to push 
ahead, which always wants to say, Hey, that’s interesting, let’s stop 
awhile, let’s take a look-see, let’s retrace — let’s take a different turn?  
What’s the hurry?  What’s the rush? Let’s explore.  (194; emphasis in 
original)28
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Here Crick echoes the many feminist narrative theorists who see the Brooksian 
model of narrative desire as reductive and limiting.   French Lacanian feminists like 
Irigaray and Cixous point out how traditional narratives that seem to follow this model 
express only a masculine point of view and a masculine desire and that therefore a 
disruption of this type of narrative is necessary through transgressive narrative strategies.  
Other critics, like Robyn Warhol, Susan Winnett, and Marilyn Farwell point out that it is 
perhaps not traditional narrative itself that needs to be subverted, but theories of narrative 
desire, like Brooks’s, because they only account for one type of desire as the engine 
behind traditional narratives.  In discussing women’s viewing of soap operas, Warhol 
invokes the possibility that all desire in narrative is not and cannot be defined by the 
death drive that defines narrative satisfaction by the realization or conclusion of a story 
that helps to define and explain everything that has led up to it.  The Freudian model 
privileges the conclusion as analogous to the “death” of the orgasm that justifies and 
explains all of the foreplay that leads up to it.  Instead, Warhol points out that, in viewing 
soap operas, no end is wanted or needed and that narrative desire is sustained by the 
desire for a continuous deferral or avoidance of conclusion and replaced by “narrative 
climax after narrative climax” (353).  Winnett, likewise, points out the shortcomings of 
Brooks’s theory by pointing out how a novel like Frankenstein fails to come to the death 
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of the creature and how it illustrates a different version of the “incipience, repetition, and 
closure” central to Brooks’s theory, but this time based on a female biological model.
While it has been convincingly argued that linearity or chronological, proleptic 
narratives do not necessarily have an identifiable ideological valence (Richardson, 
Linearity and Its Discontents ), it is clear that a theory of narrative that claims that all 
traditional narratives reflect a Freudian psychoanalytic, and therefore masculine, model 
may limit the possibilities of narrative itself, or may place narrative itself into a category 
that cannot account for important texts, ideas, and quite possibly, truths.  This may, to 
some degree, account for Stone’s definition of narrative that cites linearity, coherence, 
and closure as central to the definition of historical narrative.  While it is this kind of 
historical narrative that Crick, at times, advocates in his attempts to quell the fear and 
inquietude associated with the real,  the novel also positions the progressive linear 
narrative associated with the Atkinsons as a departure from an accurate presentation of 
reality, with the nonnarratable, circular and repetitive process of drainage associated with 
the Cricks given epistemological privilege.  That is, while the novel appropriates and 
deploys Freudian psychoanalysis, it questions the efficacy of this model of narrative 
desire in the representation of the past.
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In his advocacy of a different kind of curiosity, Crick deviates from his previous 
alliance with linear narrative,  promoting a curiosity and a storytelling that is “complex 
and unpredictable,” that does not “push ahead” or progress in some linear manner, but 
which rather strays off course and investigates all of the potential of curiosity, beyond a 
drive that desires only completion and explanation.  Like the feminist critics who see the 
Brooksian model of narrative as limiting, Crick here argues for what might be considered 
a “deviant” or “perverse” desire in the historical field, a desire not for one story, but for 
many explorations.  Crick’s model for this different kind of desire is the “natural history” 
of the search for the origins of anguilla anguilla or the common eel, one of which 
Freddie Parr drops in Mary’s knickers following the swimming contest.
Swift’s own radical deviation from his central plot of the Crick family history, 
Tom and Mary’s romance, and the firing of Crick to tell the origin of the European and 
American eel is, to some degree, a model of the tangential curiosity that he advocates.  
Likewise, what Crick discovers about the eels is also proffered as a possible alternative to 
traditional narrative desire.  As Crick explains, the journey of the eels from Europe to the 
Sargasso Sea and back again is “more mysterious, more impenetrable perhaps than the 
composition of the atom” (204), in its accomplishment of “vast atavistic circles” (204).  
A contrast is once again offered here between the inexplicable, unsymbolizable, and 
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circular and the linear, progressive, and explicable with the latter seeking conclusions 
while the former merely pursues curiosity for its own sake.  It is the result of this 
alternative curiosity that Crick comes to call “natural history” (205) as opposed to the 
“artificial history” of traditional historical narration.  For Crick, traditional historical 
narration is tied to the linear progression of grand, cataclysmic, and  revolutionary events 
and the search for “Reality.  Reality made plain.  Reality with no nonsense.  Reality cut 
down to size.  Reality minus a few heads” (206).  What Crick suggests here, however, is 
that the reality that reduces, eliminates nonsense, and cuts things down to size is the 
opposite of the real as it has been defined throughout the novel: the quotidian, the 
unsymbolizable trauma, and the “unsolved mysteries of mysteries” like the mating 
pattern of the eels.
Reproduction, Representation, and the Reality of the Real
As in Chapter One, my deployment of Lacanian theory implies an affiliation with 
the element of poststructural thought that denies access to truth and reality.  However,  
although Waterland, like Lacan, explores the ramifications of Freudian theory displaced 
to the linguistic and discursive realm, it employs a similar model to make a very different 
point.  That is, where Lacan insists that his register of the Real in no way refers to the 
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plenitude of truth or meaning, in Swift’s novel its parallel, the “Here and Now” does, at 
the very least, refer specifically to the material past. 29  In this, Waterland parallels Slavoj 
Zizek’s manipulation and transformation of Lacanian thought into a discourse about class 
struggle.  Zizek takes the commonly held Lacanian denial of referentiality and insists 
that, unlike much poststructuralist theory, it paradoxically does refer not only to 
materiality but to truth as well.  Swift’s novel importantly performs a similar operation.
Terry Eagleton provides a fairly standard account of Lacanian thought and, in 
doing so, implies a Marxist critique of Lacan’s relativism.
With the entry of the father, the child is plunged into post-structuralist 
anxiety.  It now has to grasp Saussure’s point that identities come about 
only as a result of difference. [...] Language is ‘empty’ because it is just an 
endless process of difference and absence:  instead of being able to 
possess anything in its fullness, the child now will simply move from one 
signifier to another, along a linguistic chain, which is potentially infinite.” 
(Literary Theory 144-5)
Eagleton’s explanation describes a child’s entry into the world of the Symbolic, or that of 
language and discourse, and although this is crucial to understanding Lacan, what makes 
Lacanian thought congenial to Zizek’s class politics, as well as my own claims about the 
reading of Waterland, is the dimension of the Real.  It is here that Zizek’s insistence on 
the separation of Lacan from Derrida and other poststructuralist thinkers squarely resides.
Zizek argues that “post-structuralism” claims that truth, in some sense, does not 
exist, that in fact “truth itself is finally reduced to one of the style effects of the discursive 
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articulation” (Zizek, Sublime Object 153).  This, indeed, is precisely Hayden White’s 
argument in “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality,” in which he 
argues that historical reality, as we perceive it, is generated, not reflected, by the form of 
narrative.  From this perspective, discursive formations create what we perceive as truth 
and there can be no metaphysical or material way to access a truth beyond discourse, or a 
metalanguage that has access to truth. On the other hand, Zizek’s Lacan allows for a truth 
beyond discourse, even if that truth is unsymbolizable or cannot be fully accessed or 
occupied.  It is this truth itself, Zizek argues, that constitutes the Real.  In fact, Zizek 
argues that the possibility, if not the actuality, of a metaphysical Truth or metalanguage 
is, precisely, the Real itself.  He argues that, contrary to poststructuralist thought, 
“Metalanguage is not just an Imaginary entity.  It is Real in the strict Lacanian sense—
that is, it is impossible to occupy its position.  But Lacan adds, it is even more difficult 
simply to avoid it.  One cannot attain it, but one can also not escape it” (Zizek, Sublime 
Object 156-7; emphasis in original).  It is this sense that although the truth (or reality 
itself) cannot be truly occupied in all of its plenitude, it also cannot be completely 
banished to the realm of discourse.  Rather, it, like the psychoanalytically repressed, 
always returns, a reading that is evocative and instructive for Waterland’s theorization of 
history.
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 In Waterland, the narratable, or at least narrative itself serves the role of the 
Lacanian Symbolic.  It allows Crick, Mary, and even Crick’s students a framework for 
comprehending their lives, comforting them and allowing them to move forward.  As 
Crick asserts, History is the telling of stories, “the Grand Narrative, the filler of vacuums, 
the dispeller of fears in the dark” (62).  However, despite the therapeutic effects of 
storytelling (whether historical or fictional), the construction of teleological, coherent and 
comprehensive narratives out of the random detritus of daily existence is seen to be, at 
best, misleading (“the reality-obscuring drama”), and at worst, physically and 
emotionally damaging.  This is clearest in the incestuous creation of Dick, which 
positions him at the end of the teleological narrative of Christianity as “The Savior of the 
World.”  This theological and teleological narrative is parodically undermined in the 
character of Dick himself and is tragically concluded when Dick discovers the truth of his 
origins, kills Freddie Parr and, eventually, himself.  Likewise, Mary spends much of her 
life trying to face and deal with the reality of her lost child and the deaths of Dick and 
Freddie, but she eventually succumbs to the lure of the symbolic or the potential 
teleological narrative of her own life, when she decides that God has touched her to 
become a second “Mary,” a mother without becoming pregnant.  Unfortunately, she must 
kidnap a baby from the supermarket in order to fulfill that narrative.  
313
Mary’s impulse to subsume the traumatic real of her aborted child within a 
symbolic narration is, the novel suggests, the universal human condition, the impulse to 
answer the question “why?” by creating a story to explain events, but this impulse, while 
being comforting, is also dangerous.  Mary is, for much of her marriage, brave enough to 
face the reality of her lost child and “did not believe any more in miracles and fairy-tales 
nor [...] in New Life and Salvation” (127). Crick, on the other hand, has a tendency to 
need the escape of stories and storytelling.  It is Tom who leans on Mary in facing their 
mutual trauma, not the reverse. Indeed, while Tom is forever attempting to replace the 
lost child with his students, she “made do [...] with nothing [...].  To withstand, behind all 
the stage-props of their marriage, the empty space of reality” (126) and refuses to adopt 
because “to adopt a child is not the real thing” (127).  This acceptance of the real and the 
facing of the truism that “you cannot dispose of the past” (126) is, however, finally too 
much for Mary to bear as she turns towards one of the most tried and true of teleological 
metanarratives, that of religion, and adopts the role of the metaphorical mother of God 
that her name suggests.   Here, Mary withdraws  from the real of her traumatic past or, 
more precisely, engulfs it in symbolic narration, rather than facing it.  All of this suggests 
that she does have a choice, not between an infinite amount of textual significations, but 
between an engagement with the real and a departure from it.  
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This sense that the real can, and should, be accessed through the rejection of 
traditional narration as the mode of historical discourse is explored in varying ways 
throughout the novel, whether it be the epistemological privileging of the quotidian 
process of land drainage over the narratable grand events of the rise of the Atkinsons, or 
the insistence on the presence of traumatic anti-narrative events that exceed narrative’s 
capacity to contain them.  In either case, however, the novel points to the ways in which 
the past and the present are not necessarily inviolably separate, but how circular 
processes and repetition allow the past to recur in the present, as traumatic occurrences 
allow not only for a return of the repressed, but also for a return of the referent of the past 
itself, a past that cannot be subsumed by retroactive narrativization and becomes present 
in the “Here and Now.”  While Hayden White rejects traditional narrative historical 
storytelling by arguing that “the historian serves no one well by constructing a specious 
continuity between the present world and that which preceded it” (“Burden of History” 
50), Swift’s novel offers the contrary possibility that there may be continuities between 
the present and the past not accounted for by traditional narrative or by chronological 
connection.
It is worthwhile here to recall that Hayden White’s relativism is not forwarded out 
of an expressed desire to obliterate the historical profession or to destroy any confidence 
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we may have in historical representation.  Rather, he objects to narrative in order to argue 
for a transformation of historical discourse away from traditional “realistic” narrative, 
and towards the use of “surrealistic, expressionistic, or existentialist historiography” 
(“Burden of History” 43), including historical representation that “plunder(s) 
psychoanalysis, cybernetics, game theory, and the rest” (47).  Waterland, like many 
modernist and postmodernist novels, is characterized stylistically by its rejection of 
linear, realistic narrative and its embrace of recursive, circular, self-reflexive and heavily 
subjective narration.30   Again, White’s argument is made in an effort to push 
historiography towards displaying its limits and, perhaps, its ultimate futility, while 
simultaneously fulfilling its potential for metaphorical richness. Waterland, on the other 
hand, makes similar arguments against traditional narrative while insisting on the 
referential possibilities for a new kind of historical discourse.
Particularly through the deployment of the story of the Atkinsons and its contrast 
with the non-story of the Cricks and through the advocacy of alternative types of 
curiosity not aimed at narrative fulfillment, Waterland suggests that these recursive, 
circular and repetitive narrative techniques are a means of accessing the real itself, the 
anti-narrative and the nonnarratable, not a merely formal exercise that demonstrates 
metaphorical richness.  Indeed, where postmodernism is often associated with the 
316
linguistic play and reflexivity suggested by White and where Waterland is most 
frequently identified as a postmodern novel in its analogizing of story and history, the 
evidence of the novel suggests otherwise.  Despite a decidedly vexed and difficult 
struggle with the theory and significance of history, Waterland, like Between the Acts ,  
insists that there is a material real to be had in the past and that it is possible, if not easy, 
to access it through the nonnarrative representation.
None of this is to suggest that Waterland advocates the elimination of narrative 
itself from our history, or from our lives.  First, the definition of narrative that allies it 
with linearity, teleology, and explanation, is shown to be somewhat restrictive by novels 
like Waterland.  That is, if the definition of narrative were expanded somewhat, 
particularly to include alternative models of narrative desire, narrative’s capacity to 
access the real might improve.  
More, importantly, however, Crick’s continual assertion that history and 
storytelling are necessary human means of coping with trauma and dispelling “fears of 
the dark,” should not be dismissed as merely fetishistic disavowals of the real.  Rather, as 
Dominick LaCapra has discussed thoroughly, it is not an effective means of dealing with 
the world to allow trauma to remain unnarrativized, or in its original state.  Rather, as 
LaCapra points out, if trauma is not dealt with, it is often “repeated”: “scenes in which 
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the past returns and the future is blocked out fatalistically caught up in a melancholic 
feedback loop” (Writing History, Writing Trauma 21).  While “repetition” is one means 
in which the past returns, Freud recommends two additional steps, “remembering” and 
“working through” and LaCapra echoes these  recommendations.  Certainly,  “working 
through,” as constituted by the Freudian “talking cure,” almost inevitably involves the 
narrativizing of traumatic moments,31  a process that both White and Swift warn against 
as a possible erasure of materiality and the real.  At the same time, however, Crick does
advocate storytelling as a necessary protection against the threat of the vertigo not only of 
meaninglessness, but also of the too painful possibility of the real itself.  While Mary 
appears at first to be something of an existential hero in her ability to face her trauma 
with no compensatory narrative to replace it, the “presence” of her past proves too much 
for her to cope with and she must replace it with something or go mad.
In this, LaCapra’s warning against an overly enthusiastic embrace of trauma or 
the sublime unsymbolizable moment is instructive.  “One can [...] recognize the role of 
untranscendable structural trauma without rashly rendering its role in hyperbolic terms” 
(Writing History 77).  Here LaCapra acknowledges the necessity of acknowledging the 
existence of what he calls sublime moments of traumatic encounters with the real, but 
also asserts the importance of not allowing those moments to dominate and define our 
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encounter with the past, as they do within the models of several theorists.32  Instead he 
points to the importance of “working through” as an important means of encountering the 
past and dealing with trauma.  
Conversely, however, Zizek’s insistence that the entering of the Symbolic that 
“working through” represents should not allow for the erasure of the real, or the complete 
incorporation of the traumatic past into a symbolizable and therapeutic representation.  
Indeed, the access to reality that trauma represents is paradoxically acknowledged by 
Hayden White himself who, when faced with the trauma of the Holocaust, cannot quite 
bring himself to apply his own radically constructivist theory of historiography.  As 
LaCapra notes, White usually takes the position that “a historian could choose to plot any 
series of (inherently meaningless or chaotic) events with any given plot structure or 
mode”(17-18).  However, when faced with the Holocaust, White, in his “Historical 
Emplotment and the Problem of Truth” reverses fields by  offering: “In the case of the 
events of Third Reich in a ‘comic’ or ‘pastoral’ mode, we would be eminently justified in 
appealing to ‘the facts’ in order to dismiss it from the lists of ‘competing narratives’ of 
the Third Reich” (40).33   Although White is well known for his claims to the contrary, 
here he acknowledges that there is something about the facts, the material reality, of the 
Holocaust, that prevents an emplotment free of certain parameters.  The access to the 
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real, represented by trauma, becomes increasingly clear, as even White acknowledges the 
impossibility of a completely constructivist approach to such events.
Swift’s novel insists both on LaCapra’s warning against the valorization of the 
sublime and on Zizek’s injunction against the erasure of the real through symbolization.  
Waterland continually refers to the important therapeutic power of narrative and how 
narrative, storytelling, and history stave off madness and allow one to live in the world.  
At the same time, both Crick as narrator and Swift as novelist point to the presence of the 
real in the past and the possibility of accessing it in the present.  That the real is not solely 
occupied by trauma in the novel, but also by the quotidian enterprise of daily labor also 
indicates that while narrative has a tendency to deform the real to meet its requirements, 
there may be more than one means of moving beyond those demands and locating the 
reality of the past.  Indeed, what is suggested by the novel is that a dialectic exists 
between the real and its narrativization.  
When Crick tells his students,  “I believed, perhaps like you, that history was a 
myth.  Until a series of encounters with the Here and Now gave a sudden pointedness to 
my studies,” (62) he highlights how the real of the Here and Now indicates how history, 
while arguably just another story, is also a representation of the materiality of past events 
that touched lives like his.  It takes a series of traumatic encounters (the floating Freddie 
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Parr, Mary’s abortion) for Crick to realize that somewhere within, or behind, the 
narration of history is a glimpse of reality itself.  Likewise, Crick indicates the 
interdependence and inextricability of story and reality when he offers, “First it was a 
story — what our parents told us, at bedtime.  Then it becomes real, then it becomes here 
and now.  Then it becomes a story again” (328).  Although here Crick cleverly inverts the 
normal materialist assessment of the relationship between the real and its symbolization 
by claiming that the story comes first there is not here a claim that materiality is 
inaccessible or invisible, it rather lies at the heart of its transformation from and into 
storytelling.  This sense is compounded when Crick continues by saying, “First there is 
nothing; then there is happening.  And after the happening, only the telling of it.  But 
sometimes the happening won’t stop and let itself be turned into a memory” (329).  Here, 
Crick shifts the primacy to his two versions of the real (nothing and happening), while the 
telling takes a tertiary role.  Even so, once again, the insistence that there are some 
events, traumatic events, that are not so easily banished to the past and transformed into 
notoriously untrustworthy memory. That memory briefly takes center stage in a novel 
obsessed with history again emphasizes what was clear in Maus and The Book, that these 
two poles of the past are more similar than different. 
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Indeed, as Richard Terdiman notes in his study of memory in the modern age, 
there is a continuous tension and balance between memory as “the absolute reproduction 
of unchanging contents” and memory as the “mobile representation of contents 
transformed” (288; emphasis in original).  Waterland asserts that the same is true of 
history, as it alternates between these extremes: the reproduction of traumatic events that 
retain their presence despite being past, and the re-presentation of stories of the past as a 
therapeutic salve for the lack of meaning in the present.  Constructivist historiography in 
the mode of Hayden White maintains only one half of this dialectic,  asserting that history 
is all representation and no reproduction.  This assertion denies any access to the real.  
Waterland, despite its common labeling as a postmodern novel that reproduces the 
concerns of constructivist historiography, rather insists that both sides of this dialectic be 
maintained, asserting the possibility of nonnarrative encounters with the real, even within 
a broader narrative.  While it is certainly true that the novel makes what might seem like 
a contradictory effort to symbolize the unsymbolizable, to narrate the nonnarratable, and 
therefore proves the impossibility of such encounters, it is also true that Waterland insists 
on the possibility of reproduction and (even) repetition of past events along with their 
representation, and that the two are inextricable.  
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Likewise, Swift’s novel, in addition to its claims about the unsymbolizably real 
nature of trauma, points to the political ramifications of an over-reliance on narratability 
by contrasting the imperialist, narratable Atkinsons with the working class reality of the 
Cricks.  In doing so, Waterland asserts the ways in which these theoretical discussions of 
the narrativity of the past go beyond theory and have important ramifications for how we 
deal with the present, particularly in dealing with class struggle. Certainly, the 
transformation of the real into narratives and the assumption that these narratives are, 
transparently, the real itself, may have  significant social and political ramifications, but 
the erasure of the past, as such, by asserting that our view of it is purely narration is 
equally dangerous.  Waterland shows that it is necessary to see history as both 
reproduction and representation, even if we must look beyond the confines of traditional 
narrative to locate the real.
Notes
1 It is no coincidence that Price shares a name with the British preacher who 
delivered one of the opening salvos in the French Revolution “pamphlet wars.”  The 
French Revolution is the subject of Crick’s lessons throughout the novel and provides the 
occasion for many of his speculations about the nature of history.
2 This parallel is indicated explicitly in the novel in several places.  In Chapter 
Twenty, for instance, Crick reveals his “pedagogic panic” that he will teach them about 
revolution and there will be “revolt in the classroom” against his own authoritarian rule 
(163-67).
3 Many studies of the novel and Swift’s novels in general do allow that Swift 
searches for some kind of access to the “real,” although most continue to assert the 
relativism and postmodernist leanings of the novel (Cooper’s and Irish’s work fall into 
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this category).  Brewer and Tillyard’s “History and Telling Stories” takes Swift to task 
for his adherence to the “rather extravagant claims [of postmodernist representation] of 
much modern literature” and his analogization of fiction and history. George Landow’s 
“History, His Story, and Stories” demonstrates how the novel posits “reality” as that 
which cannot be shaped or narrated and therefore demonstrates the aporia or inevitable 
failure of historical representation in claiming that the novel shows how “the material of 
stories often refuses to be shaped by them” (202).  Although my claim has similarities to 
Landow’s, I will more explicitly show how narration or “storytelling” is offered as that 
which cannot access reality, but that there are other means available to us to come in 
contact with the real.  For an interesting look, complementary to my own, at how Swift’s 
work dramatizes the pursuit of the real as opposed to the radical relativism of postmodern 
representation, see Frederick M. Holmes’s “The Representation of History as Plastic:  
The Search for the Real Thing in Graham Swift’s Ever After.”  
4 Miller does provide for the possibility of a new desire being introduced, or a 
narratable leftover, something I take up in relation to Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children in 
Chapter Three.
5 See Carr’s Time, Narrative and History, as well as “Narrative and the Real 
World: An Argument for Continuity,” in Fay, Pomper and Vann for a phenomenological 
argument asserting that narrative and materiality are not inviolably separate, but are 
rather inextricable.  For Carr, narrative itself is inherent and essential to human 
subjectivity and human existence not merely as a comfort, as Crick suggests here, but as 
one of, if not the only, primary means of explaining, internalizing, and dealing with 
existence.  Stories, to Carr, are not merely written or spoken after events occur, as White 
and others suggest, but are constructed prior to and during lived experience. Life is, in 
fact, experienced as a series of chronologically overlapping narratives, according to Carr.  
For more on this perspective, see Chapter One.
6 For a brief discussion of how Waterland appropriates and parodies Victorian 
narratives of progress through the Atkinsons, see Landow 204-5.  My own, more 
extended, discussion follows.
7 The entire chapter, indeed, goes on with this hypothetical question, encapsulating 
the rest of the history of the Atkinsons within the search for the apex of their powers, 
dramatizing how retrospective narration can contain and control disparate events within 
the search for causality and historical explanation.  This makes it appear to the reader, at 
least, that the question of the zenith of Atkinsonian success is the only question worth 
asking by the historian.
8 The idea that Victorians saw their own age as one of historical progress is, of 
course, a common one, but was challenged then as it is now.  Nevertheless, many 
contemporary theorists find that the Victorians tended to have a faith in history itself as a 
realization of historical process and progress, which is met by increasing skepticism in 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  For an interesting account of how the Victorian 
view of historical “progress” was constructed (and how it tended to exclude many British 
citizens, women in particular) see Christina Crosby’s The Ends of History: Victorians 
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and "The Woman Question, particularly the introduction. Crosby asserts that in the 
Victorian era “history itself is conceptualized in profoundly theological ways, imagined 
as the alpha and omega of human life.  This is a particular conception of history: ‘history’ 
as the revelation of meaning, of truth, the revelation of the meaning and truth of 
humanity” (144).  In this way, history is seen as progress, in which we move toward 
meaning and truth, to be revealed at its end.
9 For the purposes of this chapter, it is worthwhile to note that while I commonly 
reference Zizek, Zizek’s own claim is most often that he is merely interpreting Lacan.  
Some portion of Zizek’s theorizing should therefore be credited to their Lacanian roots.  I 
choose not to delve too deeply into Zizek’s original sources because Zizek’s interests 
more completely dovetail with my own.  Zizek is interested in applying Lacanian theories 
of the subject to broader socio-historical areas, particularly to Marxist analyses of both 
superstructure and base.  He is also particularly interested in reconciling postmodern 
skepticism towards referentiality with a radical politics and more particularly, class 
struggle, as am I. A recent essay in which Zizek deals with this topic explicitly and 
relatively clearly is “Class Struggle or Postmodernism?  Yes, Please!” (Butler, Laclau 
and Zizek 90-135).  I delineate the differences between Lacan and Zizek later in this 
chapter.
10 Following Northrop Frye, White offers that historical events can be emplotted in 
four basic ways: as Tragedy, Comedy, Romance, and Satire.  Here, again, White 
emphasizes how “plotting” is itself a fictionalizing process that pushes “history” into 
literary forms.  White does not necessarily see this as problematic because he rejects the 
idea that the function of history itself should be mimetic.  Rather, he insists that history’s 
purpose is to help us understand our present age through the study of the past.  In this 
way, there is no reason for historical narrative not to be largely “fictionalized” through 
narrative as long as it contributes to this goal.  For White on the methods of emplotment, 
see both “The Poetics of History,” his introduction to Metahistory and “Interpretation in 
History” in Tropics of Discourse, both of which lay out White’s basic assertions about 
possible modes of emplotment.
11 This element of White’s argument has much in common with Roland Barthes’s 
analysis of the “realistic” novel in S/Z.  Barthes famously argues that there is nothing 
intrinsically realistic about the “realistic novel,” but rather that it deploys various textual 
features to simulate the effect of reality.  The realistic novel is merely a series of 
conventional textual deployments, not a reflection of reality at all.  It is for this reason 
(among others) that White’s work is often associated with poststructural theorists like 
Barthes despite White’s attack on such theory in essays like “The Absurdist Moment in 
Contemporary Literary Theory.”
12 For Zizek, the integration does not necessarily have to be in a physically present 
system of symbolization like a written narrative or book of Law.  It can be, and perhaps 
most often is, instead the cultural “rules” which are often unspoken but nevertheless 
(nearly) universally followed and cultural narratives that are assumed to be true.  This 
“big Other” of the cultural symbolic (as Zizek calls it) is often ironically questioned or 
refuted but its rules and assumptions are followed anyway.  In this way, Zizek critiques 
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what he considers to be the ironic detachment of “postmodernism,” which acknowledges 
and at times critiques the deep problems of capitalism, but nevertheless does nothing 
about it.  To Zizek, this type of impotent self-knowledge is nevertheless imbricated in the 
Symbolic (a term which Zizek associates closely with the system of capitalism itself, the 
dominant Western system of symbolization).  “What they overlook, what they 
misrecognize, is not the reality but the illusion which is structuring their reality, their real 
social activity.  They know very well how things really are, but still they are doing it as if 
they did not know.  The illusion is therefore double:  it consists in overlooking the 
illusion which is structuring our real, effective relationship to reality.  And this 
overlooked unconscious illusion is what may be called the ideological fantasy [...] 
Cynical distance is just one way to blind ourselves to the structuring power of ideological 
fantasy:  even if we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an ironical distance, we 
are still doing them”  (Zizek, Sublime Object 33).  It does not take too much imagination 
to see how this assessment of ideology in capitalist culture can apply readily to Thomas 
Crick’s treatment of history.  Crick, like Zizek’s hypothetical postmodern cynic, sees that 
his “story” of history is made up, constructed, and disconnected from material reality.  
Still, however, he insists not only on recounting it, but also on its importance, indeed 
centrality, not only to his existence, but also to the world around him.  Crick’s self-aware 
“ideological fantasy” is about the importance of “history” in opposition to “story” despite 
his awareness of the falseness of that dichotomy.  Interestingly, Marxist critics (Fredric 
Jameson being the foremost example), find the erasure of history to be at the center of 
postmodern culture.  Here, however, through a Zizekian prism, Crick seems to reflect the 
ironic detachment of “postmodernism” in his clinging to the materiality of “history” 
despite his internal disavowal of the accessibility of its independent existence.  
13 For more on this common assertion of Crick’s see 60-63 and 106-9.
14 The nonnarratable contrasts with the narratability of traditional plot.  Of course, 
the obsession with “plot,” “action,” and “events” in fiction is more closely associated 
with the realistic fiction of traditional narrative whose apex is most often located in the 
nineteenth century, precisely where the progressive plot of the Atkinsons occurs here.  
The literature of plot and dramatic conflict has been, of course, challenged by many of 
the works associated with high modernism, which focus on the everyday lives of ordinary 
people in which few “events” of dramatic import seems to happen.  Nevertheless, such 
narratives still need an admittedly small amount of dramatic lack and/or anticipated 
resolution to propel the reader through the narrative.  Mrs. Dalloway, for instance, builds 
to and climaxes with Clarissa’s party, while the “suspense” in Ulysses at least nominally 
revolves around the near misses of Bloom and Stephen, which reaches its (near) 
resolution in the Ithaca episode.  While these novels approach the nonnarratable, they 
maintain a minimal level of unfulfilled readerly desire, or “plot,” to stimulate the interest 
in the explorations in consciousness and language that is their central object of interest.  
A complete lack of linear plotting, or a complete dismissal of readerly interest would 
constitute a nonnarratable novel, which these texts may asymptotically approach, but 
never quite achieve.  Beckett’s novels, particularly something like The Unnameable or 
his later work, comes much closer to fulfilling the idea of a nonnarratable text.
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15 In a more ominous formulation, she resembles Gilbert and Gubar’s madwoman 
in the attic, or the banishing of the hysterical woman to the realm of the “insane,” as a 
necessary prop for the narrativization of Victorian progress.
16 Ronald McKinney also notes the novel’s deployment of the gothic in his “The 
Greening of Postmodernism: Graham Swift’s Waterland” (822).
17 This connection of the possibly insane ravings of a semi-comatose woman, dead
37 years by the time of the brewery fire, with the subsequent events that “fulfill” her 
prophecy fits in amiably with the Lacanian idea of the “letter” that always arrives at its 
destination.  As Zizek describes it, the Lacanian dictum of the letter is a metaphor for 
both the Imaginary and Symbolic registers.  On the level of the Imaginary, Zizek points 
out how any one who receives a letter will assume it is for them and fit its contents into 
their own personal narrative or subjectivity.  While Zizek’s examples are evocative, a 
simplistic version can be found in the recent film The Love Letter, in which any member 
of a small town who (accidentally) happens upon a torrid love letter assumes it is for 
them and constructs a story from its contents to fulfill their individual fantasies of an 
ideal partner.  Here, the Imaginary register of subjectivity is fulfilled as the members of 
the town are trapped in a pre-Symbolic paradise of fulfilled fantasies through 
“misrecognition”:  “whosoever finds himself at this place is the addressee since the 
addressee is not defined by his positive qualities but by the very contingent fact of 
finding himself at this place” (Zizek, Enjoy Your Symptom! 11).  The movie can also be 
read as a fulfillment of the Symbolic letter finding its destination, if, again, we read the 
Symbolic as the rules and codes of a text (or of social existence) that allow it to “make 
sense” or to retain a coherent “meaning.”  Again, Zizek asserts that we can find a 
Symbolic letter finding its destination in a series of seemingly irreducibly contingent 
events that, nevertheless, allow the “intended” recipient of the letter to receive it in the 
end (or any series of contingent events that mysteriously end where they begin).  This 
also occurs in the film The Love Letter in which, despite a hopeless series of confusions 
and misrecognitions of the letter, its original addressee (an elderly lesbian mother) finally 
receives the missive from her world traveling lover and the “meaning” or “coherence” of 
the movie becomes clear, completing the circle of the Symbolic.  This (finally) clearly 
applies to the strange episode of Sarah’s prophetic mutterings of “Fire! Smoke!, etc.” in 
her semi-comatose state and the actual fire 37 years later.  Any words or statements Sarah 
would make would be (mis)recognized by the Gildseyans precisely because of the heroic 
status of the Atkinsons in their community.  In this case, “Sarah Atkinson as prophet” is a 
central element of the “big Other” of Gildsey and its environs, and her statements are 
immediately incorporated into their cultural narrative once an appropriate event (the 
brewery fire) allows it.  Here, again, Swift emphasizes how narrative deform the “facts” 
of “history” to make it “make sense” to lend it meaning and to allow it to fit into the 
communal “big Other.”
18 See D. A. Miller’s “Secret Subjects, Open Secrets,” in The Novel and the Police 
for an interesting discussion of the relationship between boxes and books (216).  In 
addition, while the eighteenth century gothic novel is replete with examples of secrets 
uncovered in boxes, trunks, or chests, here I see a particular resonance with William 
Godwin’s Caleb Williams, in which the chest of Falkland contains a secret charged with 
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an astonishing amount of narrative energy and importance despite the fact that we never 
learn precisely what the box contains.  One strongly implied possibility it that it contains 
a narrative of Falkland’s crimes and transgressions, effectively destroying his status as 
chivalrous, kindhearted, and generous nobleman.  His life’s narrative is then (re)produced 
in the form of the novel itself, which, we are led to believe is Caleb’s life story.  The 
proliferation of stories, uncovered (or inspired by) the “secret” in Falkland’s chest is an 
interesting parallel to the story of the Atkinsons found by Crick in Waterland.
19 Here, I do not suggest that the Freudian model is a natural and/or essential one.  
Rather, Swift self-consciously explores and exploits the Freudian model to comment on 
the nature of mysteries, secrets and narratability.  Certainly, the use of Dick Crick and his 
huge phallus as a byproduct of an incestuous union is a direct reference to Freud, 
especially taking place, as it does, around the turn of the century, contemporary to the 
historical Freud.  Helen Atkinson’s mothering of her father after her own mother’s death 
also seems to be a clear rewriting of the Freudian theory that desire is displaced from the 
mother to a mother substitute (and that all incestuous desire is a displacement of the 
Oedipal urge).  This resonance is further indicated by the reference to the two sons of 
Sarah Atkinson, George and Alfred, who (it is intimated) have sexual desires for their 
mother that they do not act upon, instead putting those sexual energies into their work.
20 Obviously, a complete list of stories with incest at their center would be 
impossible, but certainly a disproportionately large number of texts (particularly in the 
literary canon) deal with incest and incestuous desires.  It is a horrible secret that is 
nevertheless eminently narratable.  Perhaps the author whose oeuvre is most easily 
identified with incest as both unstoppable desire and incomprehensible secret is Faulkner 
(particularly in The Sound and the Fury and Absalom, Absalom).  However, incestuous 
desire permeates canonical literature, starting, of course, with Oedipus itself, and 
continuing through the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, including examples of the 
American Gothic, such as Sam Shepard’s Fool for Love, of the Latin American magical 
realist “Boom” like Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude, and of the 
postmodern/ postcolonial historical novel, such as Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children. None 
of this is to suggest that incest is deployed in the same ways or with the same results in 
these other texts, but it is merely to show the prevalence of incest-related stories and its 
continuing resonance in the literary imagination and its status as one of our most 
“narratable” plots.
21 It becomes clear that Crick here offers a countervailing claim to the one I made 
in the previous section.  Here, it does seem like the past is irrevocably past through the 
metaphor of the dead that does not live again.
22 In the Political Unconscious and elsewhere, Fredric Jameson similarly identifies 
history as that which cannot be symbolized in conventional narrative.  Rather than seeing 
this as an opportunity to access and identify the real as reality, however, he follows 
Lacan in seeing the real as approachable only asymptotically.  As such, he argues for a 
rigorously historical analysis while denying the possibility of touching the real.  In 
Literary Theory and the Claims of History, Satya Mohanty criticizes Jameson for his 
epistemological relativism (93-115), particularly as it fails to fulfill Jameson’s own stated 
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radical political goals.  Mohanty’s study shares many concerns with my own and, in this 
regard, I agree with him.  In particular, Mohanty notes how Jameson reads history itself 
as narrative and narrative, likewise, as history.  This identification between history and 
narrative is something my own study endeavors to deny and unmoor.
23 This example only serves to help us understand what is conceived of as the real 
in Waterland.  The real in Zizek’s version of Lacanian thought is never tied to something 
so mundane as an actual event, but is instead the real of desire that is typically only 
revealed in dreams (see, for instance, Zizek, Sublime Object 47-49).  Nevertheless, this 
metaphorical deployment of Zizek is useful here in indicating how Swift does, in fact, 
ally the “Here and Now” with the materiality of the historical past.
24 Lacan’s concern with the Real is principally in how subjectivity is itself defined 
by those desires by the subject that can never be realized, preventing the realization of a 
whole subject (for more on this, see Chapter One of this study).  This results, in Lacanian 
terms, in the “barred subject,” ($) or the subject that can never explain itself and resists 
the “life story” as it is told to the analyst.  Indeed, for Zizek, the subject is precisely the 
Real or the “very bar that prevents its realization” (Zizek, Enjoy 139).  Unlike some 
constructions of Freudian psychoanalysis, which claim that analysis attempts to exhume 
the traumatic event and explain it in the form of a story, Zizek insists that Lacanian 
analysis is founded on the principle that such an integration is impossible.  “The analysis 
achieves its end when the patient is able to recognize, in the Real of his symptom [the 
overt signifier of the trauma], the only support of his being” (Zizek, Sublime Object 75).  
25 Pamela Cooper also notes the parallel that the novel draws between the natural 
landscape and the woman’s body in the novel, contrasting both with the “artificial 
history” of man.  John Schad similarly draws the parallel between history in the novel 
and how women, like siltation, lie outside history.
26 Along with Zizek, I advocate a return to Lacan’s Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis, Chapters Five and Six for a more complete discussion of this idea.
27 As I noted in Chapter One, the model of narrative as flaccidity/tumescensce/ 
detumescence is not exclusive to Brooks and/or Miller.  The most well-known iterations 
of this principle are located in Barthes’s Pleasure of the Text and Robert Scholes’s 
Fabulation and Metafiction.  Alternatives to narrative are also commonly offered from a 
feminist perspective.  In particular lyric unity is sometimes proffered as an antidote to 
narrative.  See Chapter One, note 29 for a lengthy discussion of this possibility.
28 For a similar perspective, see Patricia Parker’s Inescapable Romance.
29 For a more strictly Lacanian reading of the novel, see Sean P. Murphy’s “In the 
Middle of Nowhere: The Interpellative Force of Experimental Narrative Structure in 
Graham Swift’s Waterland.” Murphy recites the common Lacanian line of thinking about 
the real, when he writes: “References to the real have nothing to do with reality.  Rather, I 
am referring to Lacan’s real order, which is comprised of that which is left out of/over 
from the imaginary and symbolic orders.  Once parts of the real are symbolized they pass 
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out of the real and into the symbolic.  The “contents” comprising the emptiness of the 
real cannot be fully symbolized” (81, n2).  Although this is true of a strict interpretation 
of Lacan, my argument is that Swift’s novel follows the trajectory of Lacanian thought to 
some degree, but that its version of the “real” (the “Here and Now”) is explicitly 
connected to the elusive content of material reality.
30 Of course, White here critiques the narrative strategies of the practicing 
historian, a position that Waterland does not properly occupy.  Nevertheless, in the sense 
that both White and Swift’s novel participate in theoretical discussions of the capacity for 
historical discourse to represent reality, it is reasonable here to compare them.
31 That is, by conventional definitions, “working through” is analogized to the 
narrative form of the “talking cure.”  LaCapra calls for a broader, more comprehensive, 
and utilitarian model of “working-through,” not necessarily reliant on narrative. 
32 LaCapra refers to Zizek, in particular, as well as a theorist like Cathy Caruth, 
whose Unclaimed Experience argues for the primacy of traumatic experience in the
representation of the past. 




“What’s Real and What’s True”:  
Mahatma Gandhi, Errata, and the Shadow of the Real in Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children
Like the other texts this study examines, Salman Rushdie’s oeuvre is frequently 
discussed in terms of its unconventional and occasionally contradictory treatment of 
history.  Rushdie’s rendering of past events is quite often read as cleaving tightly to the 
historical record, while at the same time treating such events cavalierly, as if they are 
merely stories, on an ontological level no different from his own novels.   As Aruna 
Srisvastava asserts, in Midnight’s Children, “reality and truth are not quantifiable and not 
ascertainable. They are constructs of imagination and experience, and of language” (65).1
In this, it reflects how Woolf’s and Swift’s novels examine the discursive and linguistic 
construction of history, while seemingly sacrificing the possibility of material 
referentiality.  However, while Swift and Woolf’s novels are principally concerned with 
the theorization of historical discourse, Midnight’s Children and Shame both perform this 
theorization and provide an account of actual historical events  in the years before, 
during, and following Indian Independence and Partition. So, while it is true that 
Rushdie’s work insistently points to how history and historical representation are 
constructed from myth, from language, and from ideology, it also installs a version of 
events it offers as more truthful than that of traditional accounts.  In doing so, it offers 
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that narrative is a necessary and vital part of historical representation, but that it also must 
be supplemented by something else. 
Like Swift, Rushdie seems particularly close to theorists like Hayden White in his 
adoption of the notion of history as merely another narrative, whose seeming 
approximation of reality is merely an effect of the narrative function.  Indeed, Nancy 
Batty has suggested that the resolute confusion of history and fiction is the central
purpose of Midnight’s Children, accomplishing both a critique of history and a re-
situation of historical fiction:  “Rushdie’s implication — that if history is composed of 
fictions, then fiction can be composed of history — is perhaps the most potent message of 
Midnight’s Children” (Batty 80).  Michael Reder, in an attempt to clarify Batty’s 
statement, makes a broad claim about Rushdie’s beliefs that seem to follow from her 
assertion: “Rushdie believes that history is not scientific or objective; history is the same 
as ‘fiction’” (“Rewriting History and Identity” 239) and “that literature and history are 
one and the same thing” (249, n. 52).  
Where Woolf’s novel portrays the traditional plotting of history as one of the 
tools of patriarchal domination and Swift’s novel offers narrative as a strategy of comfort 
and relief to cover up or mitigate traumatic events whose wounds might be better left 
exposed, Midnight’s Children seems to offer narrative as a tool of political, social and 
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religious domination, in particular through the narrative of dynastic succession and Hindu 
religious dominance advanced by the Nehru/ Indira Gandhi/ Sanjay Gandhi dynasty in 
post-Independence India.  Likewise, Pakistan’s narrative of religious mission and the 
founding of a truly Islamic state is exposed in Shame as merely another story, constructed 
for the purposes of hegemony, but with very real effects on those forced to live within its 
plot.  That these competing Indian and Pakistani narratives have continued in various 
forms into the present day subcontinent makes Rushdie’s confrontation of these issues 
remarkably relevant still, some twenty years after Midnight’s Children was first 
published.
It would, however, be disingenuous to suggest that, as I have argued for Woolf 
and Swift, part of Rushdie’s attack on narratives of dominance takes the form of an attack 
on the use of narrative itself in the representation of reality and history.  Rather, the 
distaste exhibited towards certain types of dominant narrative in Midnight’s Children is 
not countered with a lack of narrative, but rather through an abundance of narratives, both 
traditional and alternative, often incorporating the same monumental events and “great 
actions” of “great men” eschewed by Woolf and Swift, but examined with different 
interpretations or different accounts of their causation.  Indeed, much of Rushdie’s most 
acclaimed novel seems devoted to the countering of the famous political slogan “Indira is 
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India and India is Indira” with the claim that the fictional middle-class Bombay youth 
Saleem is India, and that India is Saleem through an ironic examination of the very same 
events that most often figure in classical accounts of India’s history, like that of Stanley 
Wolpert’s A New History of India.2 Unlike Between the Acts and Waterland, Midnight’s 
Children does not seem to argue for a reconfiguration of what events should “count” as 
history, per se, but rather advocates a reinterpretation of those events and the history they 
can be made to tell.   In Rushdie’s advocacy of a redeployment of events and stories that 
have always counted as “history,” Rushdie does not critique narrative itself as a method 
of recounting the real, but rather sees narrative as a medium that has not reached its 
transformative potential in the political, social and ethical arena. 
In this context, critics most often see Rushdie, quite correctly, as an advocate of 
self-reflexive narrative that points to its own incapacity to fully represent the real, while 
simultaneously insisting on the power and importance of narrative itself.  While this 
reading of Rushdie is valid and important, throughout this chapter I argue that Rushdie’s 
novel also paradoxically functions as a critique of narrative historiography and its 
tendency to betray a “longing for form” that encloses certain historical events while 
excluding others.  While Rushdie’s fanciful and abundant narratives in Midnight’s 
Children do attempt to “swallow the world” and all of its players and events, these 
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narratives are supplemented by a shadowy series of events that are obliquely referred to 
but never explicitly narrated as part of the novel’s multitude of stories.   The present 
absence (or absent presence) of these events, centered around the figure of Mahatma 
Gandhi, illustrate the novel’s non-narrative undercurrent and the insistence on the 
representation and inclusion of events that do not fit into a particular narrative but whose 
truth and reality cannot be erased.  Through a succession of strategically placed “errata,” 
Rushdie hints at the impossibility of any narrative containing all of the events necessary 
for a true fidelity to a past that is necessary to define the national and international 
present.  The incapacity of  Saleem’s narrative to include these important events reveals 
the shortcomings of narration while insisting on a fidelity to the real that narrative, by 
itself, cannot fully achieve.  Rushdie’s alternation of unifying and coherent narrative and 
excessive and fragmentary non-narrative suggests some different possibilities for how the 
historical real can be, and should be, represented.
Inherent, however, throughout these contradictory narrative strategies, is the 
insistence on a referentiality to the historical past and on its necessity.  It is only when 
Saleem is struck upon the head and is “emptied of history” (419) that he becomes a 
passive, submissive follower of orders, as a member of the Pakistani army.  Clearly, 
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Rushdie suggests, an attachment to history must be maintained in order for agency to 
exist and for political and social action to be possible.  
Midnight’s Children, Postcolonial Historiography, and Class Politics
The debates over the practical utility and ethical ramifications of relativist 
historiography detailed in the introduction are strikingly reflected and repeated within 
postcolonial studies and, in particular, in studies of Rushdie.  Interestingly, Rushdie is an 
important and oft-mentioned figure in these debates, despite the fact that his work is not 
explicitly part of historiographic discourse at all, but would seemingly deny history’s 
allegiance to truth claims by operating in the field of fiction.  Nevertheless, Rushdie has 
simultaneously claimed by both postmodernism and postcolonialism, leaving him open 
for praise by proponents of the radical and transgressive potential of postmodern 
discourse, while simultaneously leaving him open to attack from more materially minded 
theorists. Within postcolonial studies, the development of the Subaltern Studies 
movement illustrates the different approaches to historiography that Rushdie’s work is 
both praised and castigated for employing.  Particularly relevant here is the affinity 
Rushdie’s work has with the type of historiography advocated by one of the most recent 
spokespersons for the movement, Dipesh Chakrabarty.  Chakrabarty argues against the 
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deployment of historical discourse that is in keeping with the values of the 
Enlightenment, for these are the values of Europe, imperialism, and hegemony.  This 
attack on Enlightenment thought consists of a critique of its false claims to objectivity 
and the ways in which such claims have contributed to domination and exploitation.  
Inherent in this critique is an effort at exposing the constructed and ideological nature of 
European historiography, both its methods and results, as well as an insistence that 
postcolonial history should consist of “provincializing Europe” and “taking history to its 
limits”(286).  Chakrabarty’s work reflects Hayden White’s denaturalization of historical 
objectivity here, but instead of arguing for the denial of narrative objectivity for aesthetic 
reasons, Chakrabarty and like-minded theorists sees the myth of objectivity as a 
hegemonic strategy of domination.  As such, Rushdie’s own flights of fantasy and 
explosion of conventional history might easily place his work in a radical political 
position, “taking history to its limits” and resisting the dominating influence of Europe 
and its historiography.  Indeed, much of the critical work praising Rushdie’s aesthetic 
also praises his politics upon these grounds (see note 1). 
Not surprisingly, however,  as with the critical reaction to White, there are 
postcolonial theorists who see Chakrabarty’s vision of historiography not as politically 
and socially liberating, but as dangerous relativism and this critique extends to Rushdie as 
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well.  In particular, critics like Arif Dirlik and Vinay Bahl have accused the Subaltern 
Studies collective of abandoning their stated original goal of uncovering and privileging 
subaltern and resistant voices in favor of a deconstructive history of the colonizer and the 
hegemonic West.  That is, by advocating a history that “provincializes Europe,” Dirlik 
and Bahl contend that Chakrabarty paradoxically makes the error of denying oppressed 
peoples their own history, instead focusing on the fissures and inconsistencies in 
European historiography and granting that historiography centrality while claiming to 
provincialize it.  Indeed, the original “mission statement” of the Subaltern Studies 
collective insisted not upon the provincializing and deconstructing of Europe, but upon 
the excavation and presentation of the material history of the oppressed.  “The 
historiography of Indian nationalism has for a long time been dominated by elitism —
colonialist elitism and bourgeois-nationalist elitism.  What is clearly left out of this un-
historical historiography is the politics of the people (Guha xiv-xv).  In this, it is clear that 
for the original Subaltern Studies group, an opposition to Enlightenment objectivity was 
not an issue.  Rather, there is a confidence in objectivity to such a degree that there is a 
belief that the “true” history of the people can be uncovered and delivered.  It is this 
objectivity that critics like Bahl and Dirlik wish to revive.  Bahl argues that the “goal of 
Subaltern Studies, in [Chakrabarty’s] view, is not to achieve political democracy or to 
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promote the equal distribution wealth, but to keep alive the philosophical question of 
difference (Bahl 89).  Bahl further argues that Chakrabarty has forgotten the important 
political task of recounting real strategies of resistance to imperialism and capitalism, 
displacing all oppression and resistance to a realm of discourse, while removing the 
important goals of class politics in favor of a philosophical deconstruction of previously 
written histories.  In this, his argument is similar to my own critique of deconstruction in 
Chapter Two, noting the ways in which the “double reading” of European historiographic 
methods does not allow for a critique from outside that discourse.  Indeed, the problem of 
representation of the oppressed postcolonial subject has led to a whole species of 
criticism dedicated to the careful separation of postcolonialism and postmodernism, 
despite their many discursive similarities.3
Similarly, while many critics have praised Rushdie for his novels’ role in the 
provincializing of Europe and the more general deconstruction of history, others have 
taken an approach more akin to Bahl’s critique of Chakrabarty.  V. S. Naipaul insists on 
an allegiance to rationality and argues against Rushdean narrative extravagance by 
arguing that it “dodges all the issues” (qtd. in Gorra 200).  To varying degrees, Timothy 
Brennan (Salman Rushdie and the Third World) and Michael Gorra support this claim.  
More pointedly, M. Keith Booker, has argued that while Rushdean stylistics may 
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undermine notions of rationalist linear historiography, in practice, novels like Midnight’s 
Children serve to support Western liberal ideology while mocking or undermining a 
discourse that would be truly radical or emancipatory, name that of Marxism 
(“Midnight’s Children, History, and Complexity”).  Neil ten Kortenaar likewise notes 
that while Rushdie’s formal elements may seem radical, in this case the destabilization of 
hegemonic historiography gives way to an ideology of liberal humanism that can hardly 
be considered radical.  In fact, Rushdie’s work tends to promote the same basic values as 
those of the classic nineteenth century realistic novel, despite its stylistic departure.  In 
this context, it is worth noting that the protagonist of Midnight’s Children is not the poor 
and downtrodden Shiva who sees the world in stark terms of class difference and is 
willing to use violence to rectify that difference, but is rather the bourgeois Saleem whose 
dreams of equality are balanced by his repulsion for Shiva and his attempts to exclude 
Shiva from the story of which he is a central part.  In this, Rushdie’s work reflects 
Chakrabarty’s historiography and leaves it open to the criticisms of Bahl and Dirlik.  
After all, Saleem’s story is precisely, it seems, the story of the elite middle class that has 
always been told, even as it is a deconstruction of it.  The exclusion of Shiva in this 
reading presents itself as yet another iteration of class hegemony.
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The placing of Rushdie’s work in this constellation of debates over representation 
and historiography is not accidental or coincidental.  Rather, Rushdie installs such 
debates within his own work, clearly asking to be included within this discussion.  In 
Midnight’s Children, Saleem’s Uncle Hanif insists on the creation of rigidly and 
relentlessly “realistic” films, with allegiance to the truth of the plight of the working 
classes, after specializing in more fantastic storytelling techniques.  Likewise, the painter 
Aurora da Gama in The Moor’s Last Sigh vacillates between artistic styles which might 
be said to show allegiance to objectivity and those more in line with deconstruction or 
denaturalization.  So, while Rushdie’s critics accuse him of flights of fantasy and 
representational methods inimical to radicalism, Rushdie examines closely the radical 
and liberating potential of multiple modes of representation.  Contrary to critical 
consensus, however, Rushdie’s deployment of denaturalizing and extravagant narrative 
strategies do not necessarily point only to a desire to “take history to its limits” or to 
denaturalize historical objectivity.  Rather, they also suggest alternative means to 
establish objectivity and to access the real.
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Mistakes and Lies
Central both to the praise and the critique of Rushdie’s politics is the 
interpretation of his various aesthetic strategies as the denaturalization and deconstruction 
of history.  In particular, Midnight’s  Children deploys a contrast of unification and 
fragmentation that results in various self-conscious mistakes, or “errata.”  Likewise, 
Rushdie consistently and comprehensively literalizes various commonly used metaphors 
to create a world where language and materiality are nearly continuous.  Critics have 
almost universally taken both of these strategies to be examples of Rushdie’s 
postmodernist historical relativism and have assessed his work’s social and political 
impact accordingly.  On the contrary, while these strategies do certainly complicate and 
critique notions of transparent referentiality, they do so not to dissolve the possibility of 
historical reference, but to insist upon an access to historical materiality that accounts for 
these complications both through narrative and its opposite 
First, as in Swift’s Waterland and particularly Woolf’s Between the Acts, 
Midnight’s Children enacts a vacillation between the unity of form and its opposite in 
fragmentation.  While critical focus tends to be upon the latter, there is a certain mania 
for form in the novel that reflects Miss La Trobe’s initial horror at the prospect of 
dispersal.  Saleem is consumed with the desire to narrate his entire life and that of his 
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nation in order to acquire meaning: “I must work fast, faster than Scheherazade, if I am to 
end up meaning — yes meaning— something” (4).  Here, Saleem feels the necessity of 
completing his story, providing closure and wholeness to his life’s narrative, indicating, 
as in both Waterland and Between the Acts, how comprehensibility can only be generated 
from a completed whole and a unified form.  It is undoubtedly this urge that leads Saleem 
to attempt to create a Great Story, or a comprehensive history that “swallows” the 
multitude within one:  
And there are so many stories to tell, too many, such an excess of 
intertwined lives events miracles places rumors, so dense a commingling 
of the improbable and the mundane!  I have been a swallower of lives; and 
to know me, just the one of me, you’ll have to swallow the lot as well.  
Consumed multitudes are jostling and shoving inside me; and guided only 
by the memory of a large white bedsheet with a roughly circular hole 
some seven inches in diameter cut in the centre, clutching at the dream of 
that holey, mutilated, square of linen, which is my talisman, my open-
sesame, I must commence the business of remaking my life (4; emphasis 
in original)  
The duality and internal contradictions of Midnight’s Children, of Saleem and 
ultimately of India itself are contained quite startlingly in this passage. Saleem declares 
the multitude of divergent tales4 and participants that his autobiography will contain, 
noting the seeming incompatibility of the “improbable and the mundane” that will 
constitute his tale.  Nevertheless, he asserts that his life will contain all of these divergent 
narratives, “swallowing” them whole into his singular body and his singular story, 
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providing a unity of form and content that would seem, at best, unlikely from such 
divergent source material.5  Ironically, however, the object that will allow him to bring all 
of these divergent elements together, the “open-sesame” that allows Saleem access to a 
past that he has not lived (that of his ancestors), is one of the novel’s most obvious 
symbols of fragmentation: the holey bedsheet that played such an instrumental role in the 
courtship of Dr. Aadam Aziz and the “Reverend Mother” Naseem, Saleem’s apparent 
grandparents.  The sheet serves as the covering necessary for the modesty of purdah, 
preventing Dr. Aziz from viewing his patient in her wholeness.  Instead, he is only 
allowed to view small portions of her through the circular hole, fragmenting her body and 
allowing Aziz to slowly, piece by piece, fall in love with her.  Ironically, this quite 
obvious symbol of the magic of fragmentation allows Saleem to make his narrative 
unified: “I seem to have found from somewhere the trick of filling in the gaps in my 
knowledge” (15).  That is through the deployment of this “holey” symbol, Saleem makes 
his history “whole,” filling in the gaps in his narrative.   The thematic oscillation between 
form and fragmentation continues throughout the novel.  On the side of form and unity, 
the novel moves from Nadir Khan’s roommate whose paintings “had grown larger and 
larger as he tried to get the whole of life into his art” (50), to Lifafa Das, the peepshow 
proprietor who invites people to “see the whole world” in his postcards, to Saleem 
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himself, who finally asserts that: “Everything has shape if you look for it.  There is no 
escape from form” (271).   He likewise asserts that the urge to find form and unity is 
endemic to India, a “national longing for form” and that “form lies hidden within reality” 
(359).  These urges towards formal unity are contrasted with the equally prevalent images 
of fragmentation: the slow dissolution and eventual fragmentation of Saleem’s body into 
400,000, 5066 pieces, Amina’s resolve to fall in love with Ahmed Sinai piece by piece, 
and the slow dissolution of the Midnight’s Children Conference. Within the logic of 
constructivist historiography in the mode of Hayden White, the urge to unify and explain 
that is indicated in the “national longing for form” is actually a barrier to material 
reference, while the possibility of the fragmentation of that unity might be the only 
possible access to the real.  Under such theories,  the process of unification, of the filling 
in of gaps, that Saleem undertakes is considered a process of transformation from a more 
referential history, always contingent and meaningless, into a “meaningful” fiction, a 
story with identifiable themes, storylines and moral content, but with no identifiable link 
to the historical real.  Importantly, in Midnight’s Children, as in Waterland, while unity, 
structure, and narrative itself provide the comfort of understanding and meaning, it is 
those events that refuse to conform to that unity that the novel offers as undeniably 
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historically accurate, lying outside the purview of narrative.  In this way, fragmentation, 
again, becomes a version of the real itself, not a denial of it.  
The unity Saleem strives for in his story is generated by Saleem’s efforts to 
correlate himself with the nation as a whole, leading him to manipulate personal and 
political chronology in order to correlate more clearly with one another.  This leads to 
many historical errors, identified by Rushdie retroactively as “errata.” It is these mistakes 
that compose one of Rushdie’s assertions of the real, our capacity to access it, and the 
necessity of doing so.  This necessity is most clearly indicated through the errors 
surrounding Mahatma Gandhi’s existence and his general exclusion from Saleem’s 
narrative.  Through the elaboration of these “errata,” Rushdie proposes important 
distinctions between the real, fictional narratives, and outright lies and falsehoods; 
distinctions useful in untangling historiographic theory and its implications for ethics and 
politics.
 Rushdie points to the importance of these frequent errors in an 1987 essay, 
offering that they function not merely to identify Saleem as an “unreliable narrator,” 
(“Errata” 22) but also for rather more important reasons, although even Rushdie’s 
explanation seems unsatisfactory.  First, Rushdie emphasizes that the majority of the 
errors are intentionally introduced to encourage the readers to “maintain a healthy 
distrust” of Saleem and particularly his efforts to correlate Indian history and his own 
personal saga.  Rushdie reminds his readers that Midnight’s Children was conceived of as 
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a novel of memory and thus was meant to be both selective and inaccurate.7  In addition, 
Rushdie seems to follow the lead of theorists like Pierre Nora, who separate memory 
from history, by offering it as a personal and liberating alternative to oppressive 
traditional histories.  Saleem’s memory becomes, in this construction, an alternative 
narrative dedicate to “denying the official, politicians’ version of the truth (“Imaginary 
Homelands” 14).  Saleem echoes this assertion in Midnight’s Children when he claims 
memory “creates its own reality, its heterogeneous but usually coherent version of events; 
and no sane human being ever trusts someone else’s version more than his own” (253).  It 
is through memory that Rushdie suggests that a migrant like himself can look back to 
“create fictions [...] imaginary homelands, Indias of the mind” (“Imaginary Homelands” 
10).
In acknowledging that Saleem’s memory is constructed from errors, selections, 
erasures, and obfuscations and in preferring it to institutional and political histories, 
Rushdie falls into what appears to be a typically postmodern relativism.  Like Kundera 
and Spiegelman, he acknowledges memory’s incapacity to access the real, while 
simultaneously asserting its preferability to any historical account that is destined to be 
both inaccurate and oppressive:  
History is always ambiguous.  Facts are hard to establish, and capable of 
being given many meanings.  Reality is built on our prejudices, 
misconceptions, and ignorance as well as on our perceptiveness and 
knowledge.  The reading of Saleem’s unreliable narration might be, I 
believed, a useful analogy for the way in which we all, everyday, attempt 
to “read” the world.  (“Errata” 25)  
That is, by Rushdie’s account, Saleem’s mistakes underscore his deconstruction 
of the discourse of history, emphasizing its fallibility, construction, and inaccuracy, 
commenting on how any claim about the past holds limited access to the real and how all 
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historical accounts are subject to personal and ideological manipulation, both conscious 
and unconscious.  Certainly this explains, to a degree, why Saleem makes so many 
historical errors, but it does not explain fully why he is so aware of some of those 
mistakes and so troubled by them.  Rather, Rushdie’s explanation is not completely 
satisfactory and undersells the importance of errata in the novel.  Indeed, the full 
understanding of the use of the errata reveals that they assert the possibility of accurate 
referentiality and the importance of an adherence to the historical real despite the pitfalls 
Rushdie points to in this essay.  Most importantly, perhaps, to this understanding is the 
simple assertion that, in pinpointing Saleem’s errors and correcting them both within the 
text and in his later essay, Rushdie asserts the existence of factual accuracy that exceeds 
or lies outside of his protagonist’s errors.  
Most of these mistakes are generated by Saleem’s efforts to correlate his own life 
with that of his country.  In particular, Saleem’s complex structural model for connecting 
himself to India is so comprehensive as to become parodic.  Saleem’s belief in his own 
centrality derives from the letter he receives from Prime Minister Nehru once he is 
determined to be the foremost “midnight’s child,” or the one born closest to the precise 
moment of Indian Independence.  “You are the newest bearer of that ancient face of India 
which is also eternally young.  We shall be watching over your life with the closest 
attention; it will be, in a sense, the mirror of our own” (143).  Because of this close link, 
we are certainly meant to read the novel as a historical account of Indian history and 
politics, but the novel likewise functions as a parody of that history, not in the least 
because Saleem’s purported status as the “midnight’s child” is erroneous, as he was 
switched at birth with the knock-kneed Shiva.  The ridiculously elaborate structural 
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framework Saleem needs to make all events in his personal life relevant to the nation as a 
whole furthers this parody.
How, in what terms, may the career of a single individual be said to 
impinge on the fate of a nation?  I must answer in adverbs and hyphens:  I 
was linked to history both literally and metaphorically, both actively and 
passively, in what our [...] scientists might term ‘modes of connection’ 
composed of ‘dualistically-combined configurations’ of the two pairs of 
opposed adverbs given above.  This is why hyphens are necessary: active-
literally, passively-metaphorically, actively-metaphorically and passively-
literally, I was inextricably entwined with my world. (285-86)
The pseudo-scientific language and elaborate ends Saleem takes to connect 
himself to history points the reader away from taking Saleem’s claims seriously.  Saleem 
goes on to define each of his four terms, noting how he affects his nation both literally 
and metaphorically and how India affects him in both manners.  No doubt, with such an 
elaborate rubric any member of the nation could find correspondences between history 
and their own lives, but of course this is, at least partially, the point Rushdie makes here.  
Equally important, however, is the implication that such elaborate structuring sacrifices 
referentiality for unity.  This is clear when Saleem’s mania for form and consistency 
produce a close correspondence between his own life and India’s but does so by 
generating obvious mistakes.
  The best and most significant example occurs when Saleem recounts how he 
hears of the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi while viewing his Uncle Hanif’s 
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successful film, The Lovers of Kashmir.  To the uninitiated reader, nothing seems amiss 
in this account but two chapters later, Saleem realizes he has made a mistake.  “Re-
reading my work, I have discovered an error in chronology.  The assassination of the 
Mahatma Gandhi occurs, in these pages, on the wrong date.  But I cannot say, now, what 
the actual sequence of events might have been; in my India Gandhi will continue to die at 
the wrong time” (198).  Here, Rushdie infers, through the mis-timing of Gandhi’s death 
in his India, that it was not the right time for Gandhi to die when he did in our own, even 
if that date is correct, factually speaking.  Still, however, there is more to this error than a 
brief commentary on the tragedy of the Mahatma’s murder, as Saleem seems much more 
unnerved by his error than by the fact of Gandhi’s death.  In fact, he begins to doubt the 
validity of his entire narrative:  
Does one error invalidate the entire fabric?  Am I so far gone, in my 
desperate need for meaning, that I’m prepared to distort everything — to 
rewrite everything — to re-write the whole history of my times purely in 
order to place myself in a central role?  Today, in my confusion, I can’t 
judge.  I’ll have to leave it to others.  For me, there can be no going back; I 
must finish what I’ve started, even if, inevitably, what I finish turns out 
not to be what I began. (198)  
In this, Saleem begins to suspect that his efforts to place himself in a “central 
role” may be stretching the limits of historical accuracy beyond their breaking point.  
Indeed, this inconsistency does begin to threaten his elaborate structural framework,  but 
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it does so by introducing the true date of the Mahatma’s death, a small slice of reality 
itself.  That is, while most accounts of Rushdie’s errata identify these errors are merely 
self-reflexive signals to the reader of the inevitable inaccuracy of all historical narration, 
particularly by forcing facts into the requirements of storytelling, they paradoxically 
accomplish this by pointing to the real itself.  The errata, then, introduce an accurate 
referentiality for which narrative cannot account, even while that narrative continues.  
The other mistakes that Rushdie points to in the essay also come as a result of Saleem’s 
efforts to integrate his own life with his nation’s, 8 but they too function not merely as an 
index of the fundamental impossibility of accurate representation, but as an injunction to 
the reader to find a version that is more correct than Saleem’s.  David Carroll’s claim that 
a coherent national story naturally contributes to and supports a unified and healthy
subjectivity is undercut here  (Carroll 112; see Srisvastava, “The Empire Writes Back” 
112). Rather, the two narratives, personal and national, push and pull at one another, 
generating errors in one or the other, in an effort to make them continuous.  It thus 
becomes difficult to believe Rushdie’s invocations to always trust the relative truth of 
one’s own memories at the expense of the official version of the truth,  when memory’s 
narrative is not only provisionalized, but a more accurate reparative is also presented in a 
form outside that narrative.
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The introduction of errata that are then exposed as “untrue” introduces the 
question of truth itself through the backdoor of its opposite.  The very notion of truth 
undergoes a radical transformation within the context of poststructuralism and historical 
truth undergoes a similar reevaluation under the aegis of constructivist historiography.  
This, in turn, leads to the questioning of the distinctions between fiction and lies, or 
untruths.  Certainly, Saleem’s narration of Gandhi’s assassination seems to fall into both 
categories.  While it is undoubtedly part of a fiction, its laying claim to historical 
personages and events seems to allow it to be read as “untrue” as well.  The crucial 
distinction between fictional truths, untruths, and outright lies are, however, central to the 
novel, and are only partially evident in the mistakes made by its narrator.  Few critics 
note these crucial distinctions, but Neil ten Kortenaar makes some initial observations by 
asking “if history is a fiction, why should any one version be preferable to another?” 
(“Allegory of History” 53) noting the same ethical and political pitfalls offered by 
materialist critics of constructivist historiography. 9   However, Rushdie is careful, to 
show that not only are some fictions preferable to others, but also that fiction itself is not, 
in itself, a lie.  This distinction is clearest in the contrast Saleem draws between the 
fictions of his native India and lies of Pakistan:  
in a country where the truth is what it is instructed to be, reality quite 
literally ceases to exist, so that everything becomes possible except what 
we are told is the case; and maybe this was the difference between my 
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Indian childhood and my Pakistani adolescence — that in the first I was 
beset by an infinity of alternative realities, while in the second I was adrift, 
disorientated [sic], amid an equally infinite number of falsenesses, 
unrealities and lies. (389)  
Saleem responds to the election-day manipulations of General Zulfikar, reflected multiple 
times in Shame by the practices of Raza Hyder and Iskander Harappa.10  Post-Orwell
, 
it is, 
of course, not surprising to find a critique of an authoritarian government’s domination 
and control not only of individual lives, but also of information and what is considered to 
be truth itself, but most such critiques come from a position of relative epistemological 
certainty, in which the manipulation of truth is unacceptable precisely because there is a 
truth underneath its manipulation to be uncovered.11  The postmodernist viewpoint most 
often attributed to Rushdie does not seem to allow such a solid rock to stand upon for his 
critique of Pakistani politics.  Rather, Saleem is left offering an infinity of alternative 
realities as opposed to a single one in his attempt to overcome an equally infinite number 
of lies.  The mere identification of an infinity of realities seems to deconstruct the binary 
notion of truth vs. falsehood, and also seems to invalidate the critique of one side of that 
binary, or at the very least resituates such a critique radically.  
The introduction of the notion of historical accuracy in the form of the correction 
of errors continues here, as Rushdie refuses the extremity of relativism that would allow 
political lies and manipulation to assume the same status as fictions, whether it be his 
own or others.  By separating fictions from lies, Rushdie maintains the possibility of 
political critique and ethical consistency by insisting on a limit to his own relativist 
historiography and acknowledging the necessity of a degree of materialist referentiality.  
Indeed, Rushdie has argued that it may sometimes be “better to counter myths with facts” 
(“Dynasty” 52), although his own allegiance to myths makes this dichotomy tentative at 
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best.  In either case, Rushdie’s inclusion of errors and their correction, along with his 
refusal to allow realities and lies the same epistemological status indicates an adherence 
to materiality that his work is rarely afforded by critics.   
Indeed, Rushdie never dismisses the possibility of historical referentiality.  
Instead, he insists upon it by pointing to several events that have been recounted 
incorrectly or misleadingly in traditional historical discourse.  Again, here, the crucial 
distinction between untruths and narratives, including fictions, is upheld.  In delineating 
the “truths” of these events, particularly the Amritsar Massacre and Indira’s Emergency, 
he insists that truth can also be found elsewhere.  In the case of the Emergency, whereas 
the positive side is often highlighted, Saleem insists that “it had a black part as well as a 
white” (427).  In particular the paying of taxes and the trains running on time (434) are 
accomplished through fear, tyranny, suspension of civil rights, forced sterilization, etc.12
For Rushdie, this is not merely an alternative story to the one painted by Indira in her 
official statements and writings, but also a truer one.  Likewise, whereas postmodern 
readings of Midnight’s Children note the possibility of multiple interpretations of the 
Amritsar Massacre, Rushdie clearly asserts the truth of one type of interpretation over 
another.  That is, while Sabrina Hassumani writes that “History. Rushdie demonstrates, is 
always an interpretation that depends on the subjective perspective of the interpreter,” 
(36) Rushdie consistently makes a distinction between a subjective interpretation and 
ideological deception for political dominance.  Hassumani suggests that Rushdie offers 
epistemological equivalency to diametrically opposed versions of the massacre: “The 
colonizers viewed this as putting order to chaos; the colonized viewed it as a cold-
blooded massacre of innocent victims” (36).  Rather, Rushdie clearly asserts the truth of 
one type of interpretation over another.  He does not grant equal epistemological status to 
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Indira Gandhi’s version of the Emergency or General Dyer’s version of the massacre.  
When Dyer calls the massacre “a jolly good thing” (Midnight’s Children 35), this is 
clearly a condemnation of an imperial system based on violence and racism, not a value-
neutral presentation of alternative opinions.13  In his deployment of subtle distinctions 
between political propaganda, subjective interpretation, lies, truth, mistakes, and myth, 
Rushdie allows for an insistence on historical materiality without a dependency on the 
rigid binaries deconstructed by poststructuralism and dissolved by Hayden White’s 
historiography.  Rushdie also deploys another important gray area between truth and 
falsehood in order to insist on the political and ethical importance of maintaining some 
measure of historical materialism; that of metaphor.
Literal Metaphors and Metaphorical Truth
Perhaps, the most pervasive of Rushdie’s narrative strategies that are used both to 
expose the pitfalls of historical discourse and to insist upon its necessity is the 
literalization of commonly used metaphors.  Both David Lipscomb and Neil ten 
Kortenaar note the ways in which Rushdie self-consciously takes metaphors commonly 
employed in conventional textbook accounts of Indian history and makes them literal.  In 
particular, both note that Rushdie self-consciously uses Stanley Wolpert’s A New History 
of India, transforming its descriptive metaphors into literal events in Midnight’s Children.
So, when Saleem says, early in the novel, “I am not speaking metaphorically; [...] I mean 
quite simply that I have begun to crack all over like an old jug — that my poor body, 
singular, unlovely, buffeted by too much history, subjected to drainage above and 
drainage below, mutilated by doors, brained by spittoons, has started coming apart at the 
seams” (37), he is not only providing the reader with a list of coming attractions, but is 
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also informing them of the novel’s central strategy of making metaphors literal.  In this 
case, Saleem is literally, physically, disintegrating, not just having a mental breakdown as 
the common metaphor suggests.  The entire novel is permeated by such metaphors, 
recounted by many critics (see esp. Kortenaar,  “Allegory of History” 43).  Likewise, it is 
not merely isolated events that receive this treatment, but the novel itself is built on the 
metaphors of the “body” of the nation and its birth, both literalized in the figure of 
Saleem, who is born precisely at the moment of Independence and becomes an 
embodiment of the nation as a whole.  As several critics have noted, the pervasiveness of 
this narrative strategy serves to illustrate the degree to which conventional historical 
narration relies on metaphor and/or tropes to convey its purportedly neutral reportage.
Metaphor, by its nature, colors the presentation of events and lends it a degree of 
interpretation, by comparing one set of events to something else.  If history is supposed to 
be a transparent presentation of past events, its heavy reliance on metaphors exposes the 
degree to which it depends upon the conventions of fictional narrative and tropological 
language that describes not the event itself, but something else entirely.  The fantastic, 
extravagant, and fairy-tale feel of Midnight’s Children that Naipaul criticizes comes 
principally from the literal presentation of historiography’s metaphorical excesses, not 
from any science-fiction style departure of imagination.  Rather, it reveals how these 
flights of fancy, these deviations from the reality of materially lived experience, are 
already installed in discourse that is seemingly most reliant on the materiality of life 
itself, that of history.  This, in turn, leads to the reasonable assertion that Rushdie echoes 
and reiterates Hayden White’s claims that narrative and language prevent an accurate 
account of history, and that, in fact, any sense we have of the reality of history is built on 
language in all of its semiological slipperiness. As Kortenaar n writes:  “Midnight’s 
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Children exposes the fictionality, the constructedness, of the metaphors and narrative 
conventions implied in national history” (“Allegory of History” 51).  In doing so, 
Rushdie seems to offer the possibility that both the nation and its history are nothing if 
not a metaphor .  
This construction of the nation as its own narration is most explicit when Saleem 
presents his pre-partum self not only as India, but also as the book he is writing, 
Midnight’s Children.  
What had been [...] no bigger than a full stop had expanded into a comma, 
a word, a sentence, a paragraph, a chapter; now it was bursting into more 
complex developments, becoming, one might say, a book — perhaps an 
encyclopedia — even a whole language [...] which is to say that the lump 
in the middle of my mother grew so large [...] Amina found herself in a 
circular first-floor tower room, scarcely able to move beneath the weight 
of her leaden balloon (115)  
This is only one of several instances wherein Saleem draws a parallel between 
himself and the narrative(s) of which he and India itself are a part.  In this chain of 
metaphorical signification Saleem becomes equivalent to the novel that he occupies, 
while the novel and the histories it both parallels and parodies become equivalent to the 
nation of India itself.  In this way, the novel works to undercut the notion of India as an 
inviolable land mass and a material population and transforms the nation into the process 
of its own narration and into its social and linguistic construction.  India becomes a 
discursive construction as opposed to a purely material entity.  Rushdie summarizes this 
position quite effectively in the question he asks of India’s residents in “The Riddle of 
Midnight: India, August 1987.”  Quite simply, “Does India exist?” (26; emphasis in 
original).
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Rushdie’s transformation of nation into discourse does not appear to be 
revolutionary at this late stage, although it was more so when Midnight’s Children was 
first published.  As Josna Rege reminds us, “It may [...] be useful to remember that the 
publication of [Midnight’s Children] preceded the contemporary critique of nationalism” 
(252).  The “contemporary critique of nationalism” Rege refers to here tends to offer, like 
Rushdie, the nation as at least as much fictional construction and discourse as concrete 
material reality.  The studies of Benedict Anderson, Homi Bhabha, Partha Chatterjee, and 
Eric Hobsbawm have served to make this type of critique more orthodoxy than 
radicalism in recent years.14   What these critics have in common is their assertion that 
while it is certainly true that most nations are defined within specific, if contested, 
geographical parameters the sense a people has of its own national community or national 
story is almost completely imagined not in strict adherence to these national boundaries 
but through national stories and traditions.  Bhabha and Chatterjee both bring this type of 
theory into the post-colonial context that Rushdie also occupies, although with different 
ideological conclusions.15
The transformation of the nation into its own narration likewise transforms a 
landmass into an imaginary construction, something Rushdie makes clear:
this year [...] there was an extra festival on the calendar, a new myth to 
celebrate, because a nation which had never previously existed was about 
to win its freedom, catapulting us into a world which, although it had five 
thousand years of history, although it had invented the game of chess and 
traded with Middle Kingdom Egypt, was nevertheless, quite imaginary; 
into a mythical land, a country which would never exist except by the 
efforts of a phenomenal collective will — except in a dream we all agreed 
to dream; it was a mass fantasy shared in varying degrees by Bengali and 
Punjabi, Madras, and Jat, and would periodically need the sanctification 
and renewal which can only be provided by rituals of blood.  India, the 
new myth — a collective fiction in which anything was possible, a fable 
rivaled only by the two other mighty fantasies: money and God.” (129-
30)16
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It is significant that the nation must not only be imagined at the moment of its 
birth, but also must be continually reimagined and willed into being, because it is a 
collective fiction that can never exist outside the minds of its creators.  It is a story whose 
tale must continue to incorporate new events and new participants if it is to retain its 
usefulness, and therefore its existence.  It is also important here to remember that India 
may fit more readily into the notion of an “invented” nation than some others, in that the 
“complete” Indian nation comprised of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, never existed 
and that this imagined nation was created only at the moment of independence from 
Britain, which was also, of course, the moment of the Partition of India and Pakistan (see 
Rushdie, “The Riddle of Midnight” 27).  Rushdie is also careful, in Shame, to point to the 
imaginative construction of Pakistan.17   Of course, with the Partition came the creation of 
at least two separate narratives validating the presence of both India and Pakistan, along 
with religious and territorial claims based on those narratives.  That these competing 
narratives of national development were constructed largely post-partition can hardly be 
refuted, but they are, of course, still being hotly contested today with the most powerful 
of weapons.  
We arrive, then, at the difficult and confusing conclusion, that Midnight’s 
Children proposes India itself as a fiction built largely upon the discourse of traditional 
history, the stories of India that construct its imagined community.  These histories, in 
turn, are built upon a series of metaphors that, when literalized in Midnight’s Children, 
reveal the disconnection between what could be said to have actually occurred and the 
communal vision expressed through historical discourse.  It seems, at the very least, that 
while shared fictions may be necessary to construct a nation, these fictions can have no 
relation to the truth of the historical past built as they are upon metaphors and tropes that 
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do not describe lived experience, but give us an alternative fantasy world.  How then to 
account for Rushdie’s insistence upon an allegiance not only to the truth of events like 
the Amritsar Massacre and the Emergency, but on the possibility of accessing them?
There can be no answer to this question within the account of metaphor suggested 
by poststructuralist thought and applied liberally to postmodernist fiction like that of 
Rushdie.  Certainly, within this thought, metaphor is seen as the principal structure of 
language itself, comparing one thing to another in a string of significations that never 
ultimately reveal a referent.  However, Saleem’s explicit references to metaphor in 
Midnight’s Children do not reveal such a radical skepticism towards a possible 
referentiality, but rather see the potential of metaphor to paradoxically reveal reality 
itself, rather than obscure it.  This is most forcefully expressed when Saleem insists to 
Padma upon the reality of his supernatural clairvoyance, despite the fact that it is clearly a 
metaphor for Rushdie’s own capacity to see and control all of his character’s minds.
I am not speaking metaphorically; what I have just written [...] is nothing 
less than the literal, by-the-hairs-of-my-mother’s-head truth. [...] Reality 
can have metaphorical content; that does not make it less real.  A thousand 
and one children were born; there were a thousand and one possibilities 
which had never been present at one time before; and there were a 
thousand and one dead ends.  Midnight’s children can be made to 
represent many things, according to your point-of-view; they can be seen 
as the last throw of everything antiquated and retrogressive in our myth-
ridden nation, whose defeat was entirely desirable in the context of a 
modernizing twentieth-century economy; or as the true hope of freedom, 
which is now forever extinguished; but what they must not become is the 
bizarre creation of rambling, diseased mind.  No: illness is neither here nor 
there.  (240)18
Saleem here argues to Padma, that although the existence of the “midnight’s 
children” is metaphorical, it is, nevertheless, real and true.  That is, while metaphorical, it 
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is not a wholesale invention or lie.  While it may require considerable interpretational 
license, there are several senses in which the “midnight’s children” Saleem refers to do 
exist and are not merely inventions of a fevered mind.  Saleem tells Padma that there 
were 1001 new children born between midnight and one o’clock A. M. in India, and that 
each of these children had magical gifts or abilities, the more powerful the closer their 
birth was to midnight.  Although this certainly deviates from any kind of conventionally 
verifiable historical record, their functional purpose within the novel’s world has a clear 
parallel in our own real world.  In fact, “midnight’s children” has become a commonly 
used term in Indian historical discourse to refer to the first generation of Indians who 
never lived under the Raj, but who came into being more or less coterminously with the 
new nation.19  So, while the 1001 fantastical children born in the midnight hour do not 
exist, per se, the people they metaphorically represent, undoubtedly do exist and carry 
some of the symbolic weight of the children in the novel.  Like those metaphorical 
children, the generation that grew up in a newly independent India carried the hope and 
optimism associated with new beginnings, and like those children, many of their hopes 
proved unfounded and many of their lives foreclosed. 
Saleem’s insistence that fictions, stories, and legends are not necessarily the 
opposite of facts, truth and reality, and that truth has metaphorical content is not limited 
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to this discussion of the children, but extends to various episodes in the novel.  Likewise, 
Rushdie asserts in an interview with Kumkum Sangari, “It seems to me very telling that 
those elements which are clearly untrue are central to the notion of fiction — but that 
doesn’t mean that they don’t tell you the truth” (Chauhan 63).20  So, when Mian “The 
Hummingbird” Abdullah’s fails to form an Islamic Convocation that creates a secular 
India and resists the Muslim League’s efforts at Partition, Saleem invokes the “legend” 
surrounding this event to point to its importance.  “Sometimes legends make reality, and 
become more useful than the facts,” Saleem suggests (54).  The legend details Abdullah’s 
assassination by six men in black with crescent knives and the supernaturally high-
pitched humming that Abdullah unleashes, gathering 6,420 stray dogs to avenge 
Abdullah, leaving the killers “so badly damaged that nobody could say who they were” 
(50).  Certainly, the details of this legend cannot be historically accurate in the 
conventional sense, but the exposition of the legend brings attention to an event, or a 
group of people, most often “swept under the rug,” and left out of the reported facts of 
mainstream Indian historical and political discourse.  
It has been common, particularly with the increasing power of Hindu nationalism, 
to paint the role of Muslims in Indian political history as ardently separatist and resistant 
to cooperation.  Rushdie’s invention of the Hummingbird and his Convocation illustrates 
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the broader truth of the historical marginalization of moderate Islam.  Saleem suggests 
that,  even if not all coordinates of the legend of Abdullah and his Convocation are 
historically accurate, they nevertheless keep alive the truth of the historical and 
contemporary existence of a substantial part of the Islamic community that is not ardently 
anti-Hindu or anti-India, as the two have become increasingly conflated in contemporary 
political rhetoric.21
As Gandhi is an important figure within the novel’s construction of its errata, he 
is also central to Rushdie’s definition and deployment of metaphor.  Aruna Srisvastava 
illustrates the various historical models that Rushdie deploys in his efforts to find both 
truth and history and the distinctions between them.  While Srisvastava, like many others, 
points to both Foucault and Nietzsche and their postmodernist attempts to deconstruct 
history as models for Rushdie, she also points instructively to Gandhi who asserts, “that 
which is permanent eludes the historian of events.  Truth transcends history” (qtd. in 
Srisvastava 66).  Srisvastava proceeds to note how Gandhi’s sense of history is 
mythological and timeless, rather than confined by dates and immediate causality, the 
provinces of traditional history.  Also important here, however, is the sense that truth 
itself, a concept looked skeptically upon by the likes of Foucault and Nietzsche, may be 
available and accessible, not perhaps through conventional means, but through embracing 
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the liberatory power of metaphor and myth.  While Srisvastava points to the universal 
and transcendental possibilities of Gandhian history, Rushdie is more concerned, I 
suggest, with the exigencies of accurate historical representation and how, paradoxically, 
metaphor and myth may help us to achieve this goal where conventional methods cannot.
Consistent with Rushdie’s efforts to note the truth-telling potential of metaphor is 
his separation of metaphor, as such, from lies and intentional deception.  Indeed, this 
separation of metaphor and lie takes on even greater significance in The Moor’s Last 
Sigh.  The protagonist of this later historical novel, Moraes Zogoiby, is convinced to 
abandon his family by his lover, Uma Sarasvati, by the stories she tells of her past.  In 
fact, Uma presents a different life story and a different identity to each member of the 
Zogoiby family in her effort to supplant Moraes’s mother, Aurora, and bring herself to 
artistic and social prominence.  While the capacity to portray different selves, to create 
one’s own life narrative and to re-invent one’s identity is part and parcel of the 
postmodernism Rushdie’s work is often associated with, here there is a careful limit to 
such play that is applied by Moraes and by the novel as a whole.  That is, while there is a 
power, a truth, and a political and social utility to metaphor, Rushdie is careful to 
delineate between metaphors and lies, even when his characters do not or can not.  When 
Moraes confronts Uma about her false claim that her parents are dead and that her uncle 
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has abusively raised her, Uma makes a defense built around this difference, or lack 
thereof:
“But what you said about your family.  And the ‘uncle’ [...] it wasn’t 
true, Uma.  Your parents are alive and the uncle was a husband.”
“It was a metaphor.  Yes! A metaphor of how wretched my life was, of 
my pain.  If you loved me you would not give me the third degree.  If you 
loved me you would stop shaking your poor fist, and put it here, and you 
would shut your sweet face, and bring it here, and you would do what 
lovers do.”  
“It wasn’t a metaphor, Uma,” I said, backing away. “It was a lie.  
What’s scary is, you don’t know the difference.” (Moor’s Last Sigh 269-
70)22
As Ambreen Hai points out, Uma is “ungrounded in ethicality or belief, unmooring 
hybridity from desirability” (42)   In fact, Uma’s status as changeling, as primal source of 
stories and representations without any kind of referent or “true self” beneath the 
performances seems to be a warning against the extremes of postmodern relativism that 
Rushdie himself is often said to promote.
None of this works to clarify, precisely, what the difference between metaphorical 
truth and outright falsehood is in the novel and why this distinction is so crucial to the 
politics and ethics of Midnight’s Children and Rushdie’s work in general.  What we can 
see, is that Rushdie, in general, and in Midnight’s Children in particular, despite its 
critique of historical representation, is not willing to give up the terms “truth” and 
“reality,” to a discourse outside of narrative and metaphor, if such a discourse exists.  
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Rather, he insists on its presence within these figures, despite what might be perceived as 
their literal deviation from our materially lived existence. In a revealing statement, 
Rushdie defines “metaphor” in terms of his own status as migrant intellectual: “The very 
word metaphor, with its roots in the Greek words for bearing across, describes a sort of 
migration, the migration of ideas into images.  Migrants —borne-across humans— are 
metaphorical beings in their essence” (“Gunter Grass” 278; emphasis in original).  
Fascinating here is the notion that real people can be “metaphorical beings” and that 
metaphor can be part of an inherent essence, with essence being precisely that which is 
denied to be relevant by poststructuralist thought.  Indeed, in this statement, the 
contention that the acknowledgment of linguistically constructed subjectivity precludes 
essence is turned on its head, as language’s most fluid component, figuration itself, is 
constructed as that which constitutes essence.  Metaphor is suggested to be that which 
provides a bridge between lived experience, ideas, and images, and migrants are 
metaphorically the same as metaphor.  As vertiginous as this comparison becomes if 
looked at closely, it is clear that for Rushdie metaphor is a gateway to truth as 
much as it is an obfuscation of it and is not necessarily that which leads us astray.
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The Epistemology of Metaphor and Fictional Worlds
 To clarify the distinction Rushdie develops, it is helpful to invoke Paul de Man, 
and particularly his “The Epistemology of Metaphor,” which takes the problematics of 
metaphor and referentiality seriously and helps to pinpoint the area of Rushdie’s crucial 
insights.  De Man’s investigation of metaphor in this essay begins precisely with the 
troubling relationship between history’s claims to referentiality and its use of “metaphors, 
tropes and figural language” (34).  As de Man takes great pains to prove over the length 
and breadth of his work, the problems of the referentiality of metaphor “have been a 
perennial problem, and [...] a recognized source of embarrassment for philosophical 
discourse and [...] for all discursive uses of language, including historiography and 
literary analysis” (34).  Why is the presence of metaphor so troubling for such a wide 
variety of discourses?  It is not a problem inherent to metaphor itself, but to the 
discourses to which de Man refers.  These discourses make implicit claims to some 
measure of referentiality, whether this reference be to philosophical truth, to actual 
events, or to other stable texts to analyze, and they all must establish  the possibility of 
their discourse referring “rigorously” to their objects of study.  Metaphor and figuration 
are always referring to something other than their perceived object, through the process 
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of comparison and signifying chains, displacing the possibility of a stable and rigorous 
analysis.  So, as de Man suggests, “It appears that philosophy either has to give up its 
constitutive claim to rigor in order to come to terms with the figurality of its language or 
that it has to free itself from figuration altogether” (34).  
De Man, over the course of many essays, recounts how many of the most well-
respected and “rigorous” of Western philosophers attempt to free their discourse from 
figuration and metaphor in an effort to maintain rigor and the ability to refer to reality, as 
such.  However, as de Man, puts it, “the use and abuse of language cannot be separated 
from each other” (41).  That is, the representational capacity of language cannot be 
separated from its figurative and metaphorical content, and when referring to such 
innocent things as “the legs of the table or the face of the mountain” (42), already a 
“catechresis” or “abuse of language” takes place, as “one begins to perceive a world of 
potential ghosts and monsters” (42), or, in this case, a world of walking tables and talking 
mountains.
De Man goes on to invoke Locke’s well-known struggle with the slippery nature 
of language in his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding in which Locke attacks 
the error of mistaking the metaphors and figures of language with the “real world,” as 
such: “‘he that hath ideas of substances disagreeing with the real existence of things, so 
368
far wants the materials of true knowledge in his understanding, and has instead thereof 
chimeras. [...] He that thinks the name centaur stands for some real being, imposes on 
himself and mistakes words for things’” (qtd. in de Man 42; Locke Bk. 3, Chap. 10; 
emphasis in original).  Here the application to Midnight’s Children becomes evident.  
That is, where de Man declares that philosophy and history either must give up their 
claims to rigor and referentiality or must attempt to divorce their discourse from 
figuration altogether, Rushdie’s novel refuses both of these options by insisting on both 
the referentiality of historical discourse and on the taking the latter to its unexpected 
logical extreme.  That is, where referentiality and rigor are guaranteed by the elimination 
of metaphor and figuration, Rushdie succeeds in the reversal of this assertion by creating 
a world in which the tropological and the literal are not separated by an undividable 
chasm, but are, in fact, coterminous.  In this world, Saleem’s India, reality does have 
metaphorical content and, indeed, the metaphorical is the real. By literalizing metaphor, 
Rushdie creates a world wherein the linguistic slippage invoked by de Man and 
poststructuralist thought in general is eliminated, not highlighted, a world in which the 
linguistic and the metaphorical refer precisely to reality. That is, when Ahmed Sinai and 
other Indian businessmen, begin to turn white because they have internalized the mindset 
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and ideology of the English colonizers, this is not a catachresis, or a fatal mistaking of 
language for reality, because in this world, language and reality are not separable.
This focus on Rushdie’s narrative strategy as the creation of another world brings 
us, inevitably perhaps, to the discourse of fictional worlds theory, represented most 
archetypally by Thomas Pavel’s book, Fictional Worlds and revived very recently in 
reference to Midnight’s Children by Richard Walsh in his “Fictionality and Mimesis.”  
Walsh provides a useful shorthand definition of fictional worlds theory and identifies 
some of its problems, particularly in relationship to a novel like Rushdie’s.  As Walsh 
explains, fictional worlds theory developed in response to structuralist and post-
structuralist accounts of language and referentiality, whose primary concern has been 
“the linguistic and ontological problem of fictional reference” (114) as discussed at 
length in this study.  Fictional worlds theory aims to avoid this problem altogether:
The solution is elegant and simple: fictional worlds, literally understood as 
non-actual other worlds, rather than as imitations of this one, resolve the 
problem by providing for literal reference in fictional texts.  The world to 
which a fictional narrative refers is a textual construct, to be extrapolated 
from the sentences of the text itself in the broad context of our knowledge 
and understanding of the real world, supplemented by a framework of 
inference rules and qualified by generic and specific deviations from real-
world norms. (Walsh 114)
Indeed, much of Pavel’s very interesting work is devoted to explaining how readers fill in 
the gaps left  in the closed and created-whole-cloth fictional world with their knowledge 
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of the “real world” which they inhabit.  The real world then becomes a supplementary 
author of sorts in the creation of the fictional one, but the latter in no sense refers to the 
former directly.  Mimetics and referentiality then become non-issues.  Although this type 
of theory may be useful in establishing the unique character of Saleem’s world, such a 
theory fails in the face of what is clearly in Midnight’s Children an attempt to represent 
the real India of the twentieth century, albeit with some important differences (see also 
Kane 116).  
The status of Rushdie’s India as an alternative country to our own is only 
strengthened over the course of his oeuvre in which characters recur and non-actual 
events that happen in one novel have an impact upon other novels. 23  Rushdie’s 
compatibility with fictional worlds theory is clear in The Ground Beneath Her Feet  in 
which the guitarist/protagonist, Ormus Cama, has visions of an alternate real, that seems 
to closely resemble our own.  Rushdie’s affirms his interest in creating an alternative 
fictional world in Shame when he writes: “The country in this story is not Pakistan, or not 
quite.  There are two countries, real and fictional, occupying the same space, or almost 
the same space.  My story, my fictional country exist, like myself, at a slight angle to 
reality” (Shame 22).  Cleverly, Rushdie manages here not only to construct a fictional 
world, but to also clearly refer to the real world of which he is a part, occasionally telling 
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details from his own real life, while noting its distance from the story of his novel, despite 
being contained with it (Shame 19-22).  As in the use of errata, the use of a fictional 
world illustrates the difficulty of historical reference, while simultaneously insisting on a 
reality outside of the discourse of the novel.24  That is, although Rushdie’s real life is not 
part of his alternate Pakistan, he includes himself in the novel about that other Pakistan, 
installing the real world parodically within its fictional counterpart. 
In this regard, Rushdie’s review of Terry Gilliam’s film Brazil is instructive. 
Rushdie points to how Gilliam’s film configures an alternative world, a world in which 
the crushing pessimism, bureaucracy and foreclosed dreams of the real world are 
combated.  “In Brazil, flight represents the imagining spirit; so it turns out that we are 
being told something very strange about the world of the imagination — that it is, in fact, 
at war with the ‘real’ world, the world in which things inevitably get worse and in which 
centres cannot hold” (“The Location of Brazil” 122).  This description of Gilliam’s Brazil
applies very precisely to Midnight’s Children, in which Rushdie creates an alternative 
world in which metaphors come true and hope exists.  As in Brazil, however, this 
alternative world meets reality, and the power of that alternative then seems to be limited 
at best, when both Sam in Brazil and the members of the MCC in Midnight’s Children
meet their ultimate demise.  Rushdie reminds us, however, that the idea Gilliam’s film 
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presents, the idea of “the opposition of imagination to reality [...] is of great importance , 
because it reminds us that we are not helpless; that to dream is to have power” (122).  
This is, indeed, precisely the function of the fictional world created in Midnight’s 
Children, to remind us that even the most far-flung fantasies, hopes, and dreams, can 
have application to our daily life, if we take those fantasies and examine what is real 
within them.  In this, the alternative world is configured neither as imitation of the real 
one, nor as inviolably separate.  Rather, it has a rhetorical relationship to its counterpart,  
offering an alternative where none initially appears to exist.
This is precisely the claim Walsh makes for fictional worlds, denying the 
poststructural account of historical reference as failed imitation and the fictional worlds 
model of a textual world disconnected in any substantive way from the real one.25  In 
opposition to both schools of thought, Walsh insists on focusing on a text’s “fictionality”: 
its positioning of itself as fiction and what rhetorical significance this has. Focusing on 
the fictionality of Rushdie’s novel, as Walsh suggests but never undertakes, helps to 
untangle the function of literalized metaphor and its relationship to material referentiality.  
It is all to easy to assert that the function of literalized metaphor in Midnight’s Children is 
to reveal the “abuse of language” or catachresis functional in traditional historical 
accounts of India and in general, leading us once again to the conclusion that the novel is 
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merely an exposé of the failure of historical narrative.  Looking more closely at the 
fictional world of Midnight’s Children, however, it is clear that this is not the case.  
Again, it is one of the central tenets of fictional worlds theory that most fictional worlds 
sketch out the parts of that world that deviate from our own, while the reader is left to fill 
in the rest, importing details from the real world.  Already then, the world of the real 
seeps into the fictional India Saleem presents to us, and the metaphorical cannot be 
completely separated from the real, just as the reverse is shown to be true by de Man.  
More important, however, is the comparison and commentary this model allows upon the 
real world, even if, in theory, this world is considered to be completely separate.
As Michael Riffaterre argues, the layering of metaphor and tropes in all literary 
fiction functions to alert the reader that this is “a circuitous artificial version of the story 
that could have been told more simply.”  That is, it alerts the reader that it is their 
responsibility to mentally reconstruct a “pretransformation text,” a version of the story 
not so “twisted” or so dominated by metaphor and trope (Riffaterre xv).  Rushdie’s 
simultaneous allegiance to metaphor and history makes the notion of the reader and the 
“pretransformation text” even more relevant than in those texts that are only theoretically 
mimetic.  For Rushdie, the pretransformation text is history itself, and the layering of 
metaphor, while providing a certain type of truth, should not and cannot lie about that 
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text.26   Instead, the reader is rhetorically instructed to restructure that text from the one 
they are given, that of the fictional world. 
To look closely, then, at the world Rushdie has designed, is to find an interesting 
type of utopia, a utopia in which the linguistic/metaphorical telling of a story is, 
theoretically speaking, consistent and coterminous with the events narrated.  It is a world 
of transparent referentiality where we no longer have to worry about things not being as 
they appear, because the expressions, metaphors, and comparisons used are, magically it 
seems, true.27   Despite this referential utopia, it soon becomes clear to the reader that this 
world is not free of inaccuracies or assertions that do not turn out to be true.  First, there 
are the liberal sprinkling of errata cited above, which, when seen in this light, are 
certainly not on a continuum with the literalized metaphors, but rather contradict their 
function, introducing error where the referential utopia would seem to deny this 
possibility. In addition to these errata , there are the fairly extensive collection of lies and 
conscious propagations of untruths.  So, the referential utopia Rushdie creates does not 
quite have the transparent mimeticism and easy accessibility to facts we might expect, 
illustrating a clear distinction between the catachreses Locke inveighs against and the 
various other forms of error that inhabit not only our world, but that of Midnight’s 
Children as well.  
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While many of the references to lies and untruths are part of a withering critique 
of the Pakistani government’s means of political and social control, perhaps the most 
significant instance of lying is when Saleem first admits to an intentional falsehood:
To tell the truth, I lied about Shiva’s death.  My first out-and-out lie—
although my presentation of the Emergency in the guise of a six-hundred-
and-thirty-five-day-long midnight was perhaps excessively romantic, and 
certainly contradicted by the available meteorological data.  Still and all, 
whatever anyone may think, lying doesn’t come easily to Saleem, and I’m 
hanging my head in shame as I confess. [...] Why then, this single 
barefaced lie? (529)
As it turns out, Saleem has no clear idea of what became of Shiva after Saleem’s release 
from the Widows’ hostel.  As he then continues to explain, his lie is motivated by his fear 
of what may happen to him if Shiva does survive.  He hopes that by wishing for and 
narrating Shiva’s death, it may be true .
That’s why I fibbed anyway; for the first time, I fell victim to the 
temptation of every autobiographer, to the illusion that since the past 
exists only in one’s memories and the words which strive vainly to 
encapsulate them, it is possible to create past events simply by saying they 
occurred.  My present fear put a gun into Roshanara Shetty’s hand; with 
the ghost of Commander Sabarmati looking over my shoulder, I enabled 
her to bribe coquette worm her way into his cell [...] in short, the memory 
of one of my earliest crimes created the [invented] circumstances of my 
last. (529-30)
Here, Saleem openly contradicts what is the standard interpretation of Midnight’s 
Children, that is, that the novel suggests that referential nonfiction (history, 
autobiography, etc.) do create events simply by their narration and that there is no 
difference between these arts and lying, per se, or fiction, in particular.  Here, by pointing 
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to one incident in which a lie does occur, and clearly so, Rushdie asserts the crucial 
distinction between “fibbing” and narrating, as such.  In fact, the comparison between 
this particular lie and literalized metaphor as a mode of narration is invoked explicitly in 
the first of the two passages above.  Whereas the claim that Shiva died at the murderous 
hands of Roshanara Shetty turns out to be an outright falsehood, the metaphor Saleem 
provides us for the emergency, while excessively romantic and one of the more 
outlandish examples of literalized metaphor, is not, or not quite, a lie.  Rather, there is in 
this, as in the examples described above, quite a bit of metaphorical truth in this 
statement.  What’s more, when Saleem offers that his claims about the dark night of the 
emergency do not match with the actual weather reports from these days, he refers to the 
weather in the real world, or the pretransformation text, not in the fictional world he 
normally narrates to us, for in that world such strange meteorological events would not 
necessarily be so strange.  Even in that world, however, a lie is a lie and not a metaphor, 
literal or otherwise, as Moraes Zogoiby explains to Uma Sarasvati in The Moor’s Last 
Sigh.28
This crucial difference is further highlighted by the comparison between the 
episode of “Commander Sabarmati” and that of the proposed murder of Shiva.  The 
Sabarmati, incident, based on the rather infamous Nanavati affair,29  involves the 
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Commander’s shooting of Sabarmati’s wife, Lila, and her lover, the film magnate Homi 
Catrack.  Saleem claims responsibility for this turn of events because he tips the 
Commander to the existence of the affair.  In the hopes that the exposé of Lila 
Sabarmati’s affair will somehow scare off his own mother from her platonic meetings 
with ex-husband Nadir Khan at the Pioneer Café, Saleem sends the Commander a note 
saying, “COMMANDER SABARMATI/ WHY DOES YOUR WIFE GO TO COLABA/ 
CAUSEWAY ON SUNDAY MORNING?” (312).  In the process, Saleem partakes in his 
“first attempt” at rearranging history, by cutting out stories and events from 
contemporary newspapers in order to create his collage-style note to the Commander.  
Here Saleem takes real events and through their reorganization, metaphorically “creates” 
a new one.  In the end, Saleem is quick to call himself the murderer of Homi Catrack, 
who dies at the Commander’s hands.  Although Saleem undoubtedly plays a part in the 
tragic events,30 it would be unfair to call him the literal, or legal, murderer of Catrack, 
although in the novel’s practice of literalizing metaphor, his metaphorical share of the 
blame is easily transformed into actual guilt.  
The case of Roshanara Shetty, however, is different, even if the ghost of 
Commander Sabarmati metaphorically peers over Saleem’s shoulder.  In the latter story, 
Roshanara is one of the many upper-class socialites who partake in sexual slumming with 
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Shiva, the biological son of Ahmed and Amina Sinai who is raised by the beggar, Wee 
Willie Winkie. Saleem’s narration of Roshanara’s efforts to slip into Shiva’s prison cell 
and kill him for saddling her with a crazy bastard son (526) turns out to be a complete 
invention, marking a clear distinction between a purely textual invention and a real 
occurrence, albeit one sparked by a textual intervention and then retold in narrative form.  
For although Saleem at one point asserts that “in autobiography, as in all literature, what 
actually happened is less important than what the author can persuade his audience to 
believe” (325), here it becomes clear that, for Saleem, although the past exists only in 
memory, it is still an illusion to believe that it is “possible to create past events simply by 
saying they occurred.”  Events occur or they do not, and although our efforts to recall or 
recreate them may be difficult at best and futile at worst, words do not create the actions 
they describe, explicitly denying Hayden White’s claim that reality is indeed created by 
the narrative form.  Saleem’s role in the Sabarmati affair may make him temporarily 
forget this, but he soon releases the fantasy he has about the power of his own narration.  
While Saleem can take some of the blame for the murder of Catrack, he cannot take the 
blame for something that did not occur, the murder of Shiva, only for the lies he told 
about it.
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“What’s Real and What’s True”
The remorse Saleem shows for lying to his readership certainly equals, and 
perhaps exceeds, the guilt he seems to feel for the death of Homi Catrack.  Like the errata 
or factual errors, Saleem commits, lies are identified as a transgression of the reader’s 
trust, a violation of the unwritten contract that joins the reader to the 
writer/autobiographer/historian.  While Saleem and Padma, the figure of the reader in the 
novel, may disagree on the preferable mode of storytelling, with Padma preferring a more 
linear, realistic account of events, it is agreed between them that Saleem will not lie about 
his life and will make as few errors as possible.  When Saleem violates this unspoken 
agreement, he feels pangs of guilt that he does not when indulging in his more 
metaphorical brand of storytelling or in his less linear approach to historical narrative.31
In this, it is clear again that the unavoidable manipulation and deviation from material 
experience that both metaphor and narrative create is not equivalent to intentional 
falsification or factual error.  The construction of a fictional world in which metaphor and 
actual experience are coterminous allows Rushdie to draw this distinction, for in this 
world, lies and mistakes still are common occurrences and prevent a transparent historical 
representation, even in a world in which, within the logic of poststructural theory, such 
transparent representation would be possible.
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Again, the large-scale political and social commentary accomplished through this 
distinction between fictions/metaphors and lies, is through the comparison of India and 
Pakistan.  Saleem proposes India to be a land of metaphor, narrative, and excesses of
figural representation, while Pakistan is seen to be the land of lies, falsehoods and 
intentional attempts to mislead.  Like Gilliam’s land of dreams, in Midnight’s Children
India thus becomes the land of infinite possibility, as in this fictional world the metaphors 
we invoke, and the narratives we generate are precisely those which, at the very least, 
have the possibility of coming true.  On the other hand,  the unrealities or falsehoods 
embodied in Pakistan are precisely those things which are not true, even if they are 
asserted by those in power.  As such, metaphor and narrative, literally in the world of the 
novel and metaphorically in our own, open up possibilities and opportunities, political, 
social and otherwise, while lies and falsehoods foreclose those opportunities.  Metaphor 
and narrative are here seen as the stimuli to the social and political imagination which is 
necessary for change, while falsehoods, lies, and unrealities are positioned as powers for 
stasis and lack of movement. This may help to untangle one of the most enigmatic 
statements Saleem makes in the novel.  In responding to S. P. Butt’s rhetorical question  
“what’s real any more? what’s true?” (90), Saleem carefully separates the two seeming 
synonyms:
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“What’s real and what’s true aren’t necessarily the same.”  True, for me, 
was from my earliest days something hidden inside stories Mary Pereira 
told me:  Mary my ayah who was nothing more and less than a mother; 
Mary who knew everything about all of us.  True was a thing concealed 
just over the horizon towards which the fisherman’s finger pointed in the 
picture on my wall, while the young Raleigh listened to his tales.  Now, 
writing this in my Anglepoised light, I measure truth against those early 
things: Is this how Mary would have told it?  I ask. Is this what that 
fisherman would have said? (90; emphasis in original)
Again, this strange passage is often interpreted as a relativist deconstruction of the 
nature of reality and of truth.  That is, by separating reality and truth, Saleem seems to 
take something away from each of these concepts, especially when truth is then collated 
with narrative skill, as opposed to a fidelity to the facts or verisimilitude.  Inherent in this 
separation of the real and the true, however, is their mutual separation from the false.  
While the real here seems to correlate with the kind of literal representation of events that 
it is impossible to, at every point, reproduce in textual form (a la de Man), the true is the 
artful telling of those events with a metaphorical correspondence to the actual.  Despite 
the near correspondence of these two within the world of literalized metaphor, they are 
never precisely the same.  Neither of these, however, can be equivalent to the lies and 
falsehoods that have neither literal nor metaphorical correspondence to lived experience.  
While the real and the true are then not precisely the same, particularly in the real world, 
there is a correspondence between them that is denied to falsehood and unreality.  
Rushdie’s critique of the social and political situation in both nations, then, comes down 
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to a critique of a lack of imagination, as neither the leaders and the people of India nor 
those of Pakistan seem to have the capacity to make the truth of narrative and metaphor a 
reality as he does in the creation of his fictional world.  The rhetorical positioning of his 
alternative world is, however, an injunction to do just that.
The initial separation of India and Pakistan is misleading, however, because the 
novel’s critique of Pakistan is soon reflected back upon India as well.  Both of these 
critiques are accomplished through the deployment of the “midnight’s children” 
themselves.  Clearly, the children are meant to be seen as a metaphorical microcosm of 
India as a whole.  Their initial number, one thousand and one, reflects the number of 
Scheherazade’s Arabian Nights, itself a synecdoche for an infinitude of possible 
fictions.32   In this tale, storytelling becomes the means by which Scheherazade can 
forestall her eventual death and her imagination becomes essential to her own survival.  
This individual plot is, in Midnight’s Children, transferred to the fate of a nation, as the 
1,001 midnight’s children are representative of an abundance of imaginative and 
metaphorical possibilities for the nation as a whole.  
Where Saleem initially is able to see into the minds of all of his Indian 
countrymen, after his bulging temples crash into the hollows in Sonny Ibrahim’s 
forehead, he is able to not only see and hear the surface noise of many minds, but can 
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also access the “pure language” beneath the confusing babel of languages of only the 
1,001 midnight’s children (223-4).  Not coincidentally, the moment of Saleem’s capacity 
to break through the language barrier separating the children coincides with Nehru’s 
division of the country into linguistic territories.  Rushdie’s capacity to imagine the 
coming together of those linguistically separated is contrasted with the inability of 
politicians to imagine such communication.  In addition, the revelation that Saleem is 
only one of many children born simultaneously with their nation spreads his metaphorical 
connection to India more diffusely.  The Midnight’s Children Conference (MCC)
provides a much broader cross-section of race, caste, and class than Saleem ever could on 
his own, providing a microcosm of nation as a whole.  So, while Saleem is, himself, a 
metaphor for India, he is only one possible India, while the other midnight’s children are 
likewise opportunities for the nation.  That some of these opportunities have already been 
foreclosed is clear when it is revealed that 420 of the 1,001 children have died before the 
first mental meeting of the MCC can be convened.
Despite this setback, Saleem consistently and insistently configures the members 
of the MCC as the hope for the future of India, as “a thousand and one possibilities,” 
(240) even if these possibilities are, by real world standards, impossibilities: children who 
can step into and out of mirrors, multiply fish, become werewolves, change their sex, 
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divine water, inflict damage with words, eat metal, fly, perform alchemy, and predict the 
future.  From the beginning, it is established that either there are no similar children in 
Pakistan or that Saleem is incapable of seeing them (235).  Again, the notion of the 
imaginary nation becomes literal as arbitrary political borders also become the 
metaphorical limits of imagination, and beyond these borders imaginative national 
possibilities are both currently absent and denied for the future.  While on the Indian side 
of the border, Saleem communes with the magical MCC, on the other side he discovers 
that: “Midnight has many children; the offspring of Independence were not all human.  
Violence, corruption, poverty, generals, chaos, greed and pepperpots [...] I had to go into 
exile to learn that the children of midnight were more varied than I [...] had dreamed” 
(350).  In this passage, the real offspring of partition are associated with Pakistan, while 
the imagined and the magical (the MCC) inhabit India.
Likewise, while Saleem’s sister was once a font of narrative possibilities, burning 
shoes and talking to animals, a move to Pakistan changes her nature, with Saleem 
“observing the Monkey, once so rebellious and wild, adopting expressions of demureness 
and submission which must, at first, have seemed false even to her; [...] revealing the 
streak of Puritan fanaticism which she had hinted at” (350; emphasis mine).  Like India, 
Saleem’s sister is divided into two distinct pieces, the “Brass Monkey” of India, and the 
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Jamila Singer of Pakistan, with the former being preferred to the latter, although Saleem 
does fall in love with her second incarnation.33   Consistent with the binaries delineated 
above, the former is associated with storytelling and imagination, and the latter with both 
the real and the false.  India and the Brass Monkey thus become a microcosmic 
representation of the alternative fictional world of literalized metaphor in which 
possibilities come true and change is possible, while Pakistan and Jamila Singer provide a 
counterbalancing microcosm of the real in which such flights of fancy do not and cannot 
occur.  While the false is initially only associated with the Pakistani side, it soon becomes 
clear that lies, political domination, and the violent administration of hegemony occur on 
both sides of the border.
While Saleem argues that in Pakistan there is a “Divorce between news and 
reality” (399), it becomes evident that such a divorce also exists in India. 
On the night of September 22, air-raids took place over every Pakistani 
city.  (Although All-India Radio...) Aircraft, real or fictional, dropped 
actual or mythical bombs.  It is, accordingly, either a matter of fact or a 
figment of a diseased imagination that of the only three bombs to hit 
Rawalpindi and explode, the first landed on the bungalow in which my 
grandmother Naseem Aziz and my aunty Pia were hiding under the table. 
(407)
In this passage, the distinction between India and Pakistan is initially maintained, as the 
facts of the bombing are not transformed into lies as they might be from the Pakistani 
side, but into “myth” or “fiction” by All-India Radio.  Nevertheless, the ironic tone in this 
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passage indicates a discrepancy between the truth of what occurred in the Indian bombing 
of Pakistan and the myth that no bombing occurred.  Here, as in Woolf’s description of 
the victims of bombing in Three Guineas,  the reality of the dead victims of Indian 
bombing cannot be obscured or palliated by mythmaking and fiction.  Instead, it is clear 
that India too is capable of lies even if some of the details presented, particularly the 
targeting of Saleem’s family, are undoubtedly the province of fiction.  Indeed, both 
Pakistan and India are equally seen to be the perpetrators not only of fictions, with the 
concomitant possibility of metaphorical truth, but also of lies, correlated with the 
propagation of unrealities: “on the radio, what destruction, what mayhem!  In the first 
five days of the war Voice of Pakistan announced the destruction of more aircraft than 
India ever possessed; in eight days, All-India Radio massacred the Pakistan Army down 
to, and considerably beyond, the last man” (405).  While, certainly, the Radio itself does 
not massacre people, there is some metaphorical truth present here, as the lies and 
deceptions propagated by both governments and their media outlets are part and parcel of 
the war machinery that perpetuates religious hatred, national superiority, and, ultimately, 
eliminates the possibility for growth and cooperation, rather than providing it. 
The division between the possibilities of India and their lack in Pakistan is not, 
then, as unassailable as it originally appears, just as the division between the fictional 
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world and its real alternative are not inviolable.  First, from this division, it would seem 
that the transformation of metaphor into reality should only occur within India’s borders, 
but Saleem retains his magical powers of smell in the Land of the Pure, and suffers from 
a metaphorical amnesia that becomes literal.  So, while only one nation seems to contain 
imaginative possibilities, both actually do.  Likewise, while one nation seems to foreclose 
these possibilities, so the other soon does the same.  As Saleem notes, his perception of 
the abilities of the members of the MCC do not last forever, nor does the promise of the 
MCC.  In fact, the positioning of Pakistan as a land of unrealities and lies to be compared 
with the infinite realities and possibilities of India soon serves to show the similarities 
between the two nations rather than their differences.  While it is true that Saleem’s first 
lost contact with the MCC coincides with his first trip to Pakistan, he soon loses contact 
with the MCC permanently when he undergoes sinus surgery, as arranged by his parents, 
in India.  Saleem’s personal lost access to the minds of the members of the MCC is not 
merely a matter of epistemology, for it is not only his knowledge of the members that is 
lost, but as with virtually everything else in the novel, Saleem’s surgery bears 
metaphorical weight as well.  That is, the tenuous unity of the conference begins to 
dissolve even before the operation, just as the possible unification of India’s diverse 
peoples crumbles. 
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 Just as the Chinese armies come over the Himalayas to humiliate Indian troops, 
the various members of the conference find reasons to leave: the predictor of the future 
tires of being ignored, the alchemist is lured away by the possibilities of gold, the 
beautiful twins have plenty of lovers without the help of the conference, and the Brahmin 
children decide that they do not want their thoughts to touch those of the untouchables.  
In short, the divisions inherent in the nation of India come to apply to the conference as 
well: greed, lust, gender, race, religious, caste and class divisions.  It is then no surprise 
that the imaginative possibility of transcending these divisions begins to fall apart.  That 
is, the nation of metaphor and fiction begins to resemble its other, and to become a nation 
of foreclosed possibilities, lost narratives, and lost opportunities: the real world itself.  
Likewise, the fictional world of literalized metaphor slowly inches closer and closer to its 
real world counterpart.
Saleem hopes for a way out of this predicament: “Do not permit the endless 
duality of masses-and-classes, capital-and-labour, them-and-us to come between us!  We 
must be a third principle, we must be the force which drives between the horns of the 
dilemma; for only by being other, by being new, can we fulfill the promise of our birth” 
(306).  While Saleem cries out for the members of the conference to allow a third 
principle to overcome the traditional binaries separating India’s citizens, such a principle 
does not appear.  Rushdie’s interest in a third principle or an outside possibility to 
overcome traditional social and political dead-ends is evident not only here, but also, for 
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instance, in The Ground Beneath Her Feet, in which the Anglophile Darius Cama 
proposes a third principle of outsidership as a means of overcoming his own intellectual 
and social dilemmas.  Likewise, the Rushdean creation of a fictional world to comment 
upon and critique our own functions as a third principle, something explicitly outside of 
our own experience, but with the ability to comment upon it.  However, the difficulties 
encountered by the MCC also provide an internal critique of this third principle and a 
comment upon the limits of its usefulness, as well as the limits of the usefulness of the 
fictional world itself.
This internal critique is advanced most devastatingly by Shiva, the real midnight’s 
child, who is displaced by Saleem.  
No, little rich boy; there is no third principle; there is only money-and-
poverty, and have-and-lack, and right-and-left; there is only me-against-
the-world! The world is not ideas, rich boy; the world is no place for 
dreamers or their dreams; the world, little Snotnose, is things.  Things and 
their makers rule the world; look at Birla, and Tata, and all the powerful: 
they make things.  For things, the country is run.  Not for people.  For 
things, America and Russia send aid; but five hundred million stay 
hungry.  When you have things, then there is time to dream; when you 
don’t, you fight. (307)
Remarkable in this passage and throughout Shiva’s contributions to the debates in 
the MCC is the degree to which Rushdie predicts, precludes and provides the arguments 
of his materialist, Marxist, and post-colonial critics who make the same arguments 
against Midnight’s Children as a worthwhile historical commentary that Shiva makes 
against Saleem’s dreams.  Like Saleem, Rushdie is often seen as a dreamer, indulging in 
flights-of-fancy and historical pipe dreams rather than presenting the world of things and 
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acknowledging that the only way to approach such a world is to fight.  Like these critics,  
Shiva notes that there is nothing outside the world of things, the material world, and that 
the only resistance is political and social resistance, and particularly violence.  That is, 
dreams of alternative realities and far-flung possibilities are only dreams, and we are best 
served by dealing with reality, things as they are, not as they might be, and by material 
resistance..  Again, Rushdie’s choice of Saleem as narrator and his production of 
abundant narratives seems to suggest that Shiva’s alternate point of view, like its 
originator, is meant to be frowned upon.34   To look closely at the results of Saleem’s 
dreaming and the fate of the MCC is to come to a radically different conclusion and to 
see that Rushdie has more in common with his materially-minded critics, and with Shiva, 
than it first appears.
While the division between the imagination and promise of India and the lies and 
social and thought control of Pakistan seems clear at first, as the novel progresses 
towards the regime of Indira Gandhi it becomes clear that India begins to resemble the 
Pakistani failure of imagination more than it differs from it.  While the lies perpetrated by 
All-India Radio occur under the 1965 watch of Prime Minister Shastri, in very short 
order, Indira becomes the Prime Minister and during her established Emergency, the 
Widow, as Saleem calls her, imprisons all of the extant members of the MCC, surgically 
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removes their magical powers, and sterilizes them.  Only Shiva escapes.  Here, the 
imaginative possibilities for the nation that the children represent comes to an abrupt 
conclusion.  Certainly, what is centrally located in this abrupt ending of the powers of the 
MCC is Rushdie’s unequivocal critique of the Emergency and the Prime Minister who 
administered it.  Here, Indira is, in many ways, analogized with the Pakistani leadership 
(Ayub Khan, General Yahyah, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Saleem’s uncle General Zulfikar), as 
she is depicted as a dictator who forcibly establishes what is true and even what is 
narratively possible, shutting down all of the imaginative, social, and political 
opportunities represented by the midnight’s children.  As Rushdie later writes of Indira, 
“She told the world the horror stories about the Emergency were all fictions; and the 
world allowed her to get away with the lie” (“Dynasty” 48).  Again, the crucial 
distinction between fictions and lies is foregrounded, with the supposed fictions assuming 
the position of truth resistant to Indira’s lies.35
While this critique of both Indira Gandhi and her son, Sanjay, stands, the 
symbolic weight of the MCC prevents the demise of its members from being merely a 
local and specific political critique of a particular individual or regime.  Shiva’s initial 
critique of Saleem and the MCC predicts their demise, because, as Shiva notes, the world 
is built not on dreams and imagination but on things, and the Rushdean flights of fancy 
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that allow the MCC to even exist must at some point be supplemented and informed by, 
if not abandoned to, the world of things.  It is at the moment that the members of the 
MCC are deprived of their powers that the fictional world of literalized metaphor 
intersects most clearly with our own.  No longer are metaphors real and no longer are 
magical powers possible.36   Rather, the only possible resistance to Indira’s regime as 
presented in the novel is the resistance of real people oppressed by power. 
Indeed, the special nature of India being the land of infinite truths and realities as 
opposed to the lies of Pakistan is dramatically undercut long before this moment, not only 
in the opposing propaganda machines of national radio, but also in the meeting of the 
leading generals of India and Pakistan’s armies.  Sam Manekshaw (of India) and Tiger 
Niazi (of Pakistan), old friends, congratulate one another on their war efforts and 
mutually agree to lie about the atrocities of war: “[...] General Sam, ‘Listen old sport: one 
hears such damn awful lies.  Slaughters, old boy, mass graves, special units called 
CUTIA or some damn thing, developed for purposes of rooting out opposition ... no truth 
in it, I suppose?’ And the Tiger, ‘Canine Unit for Tracking and Intelligence Activities?  
Never heard of it’” (453).37   The exaggerated use of British English and the contradictory 
simultaneous specification of the CUTIA acronym and denial of its knowledge lends a 
kind of humor to this exchange, but it is a gallows humor, for signaled is not only the 
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death of those lying in mass graves, but also the death of the distinction between the two 
nations that held out hope for one of them.  Here lies become truth and truth is then 
nothing but lies.  The sterilization of the midnight’s children that follows is then largely a 
symbolic resolution of something that has already occurred.  It is perhaps for this reason 
that Saleem, who represents the former nation so clearly, begins to disassociate himself 
from his homeland.  Where once he was proud of the connection and insisted up his 
influence, begins to object to it; “Why, alone of all the more-than-five-hundred-million, 
should I have to bear the burden of history” (457; emphasis original). It is here, when 
India too is identified as a nation of lies, that Saleem no longer feels part of its story.
Saleem also describes how this process is completed, when the Widow finally 
drains both him and the other members of the MCC completely of narrative options and 
his dreams for a better future in India: 
I no longer want to be anything except what who I am.  Who what am I?  
My answer: I am the sum total of everything that went before me, of all I 
have seen done, of everything done-to-me.  I am everyone everything 
whose being-in-the-world affected was affected by mine.  I am anything 
that happens after I’ve gone which would not have happened if I had not 
come.  Nor am I particularly exceptional in this matter; each “I”, every 
one of the now-six-hundred-million-plus of us, contains a similar 
multitude.  I repeat for the last time: to understand me, you’ll have to 
swallow a world. (457-58)
Saleem denies his privileged connection to the nation as a whole, and, indeed, his 
status as special font of narrative and meaning.  In short, he loses his metaphorical role 
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and becomes normal, not “particularly exceptional” but a real person, like anyone else.  
In this, Shiva seems to be correct, the search for meaning beyond action and reaction, 
oppression and struggle, is eliminated and the difference between this fictional world and 
the real world is eliminated, along with the particular hopefulness the elimination of the 
distance between metaphor and reality allows.  In this, the novel suggests a need to face 
the real world of things, of facts and lies, and of abandoning the world of metaphor, even 
if there is some truth contained within it.  With this abandonment comes the birth of 
Saleem’s son, who is identified as more cautious, more stubborn, tougher, less prone to 
action, but more likely to take significant action.  In short, he is more realistic, less 
idealistic, and more likely to make a difference.  Hardly the dreamer that Saleem is and 
that Rushdie is sometimes accused of being, Aadam seems poised to take on the mantle 
of resistance and struggle promoted by Rushdie’s more materialist critics, positioned as 
“stronger, harder, more resolute than I” (507).38
Politically, socially, and ethically, however, Saleem’s newfound realism leads 
him not to a mode of struggle, and a contestation of power, but to a quietism and 
resignation that has incontrovertible significance.  Saleem asserts to his fellow midnight’s 
children: “Politics, children; at the best of times is a bad dirty business.  We should have 
avoided it, I should never have dreamed of purpose, I am coming to the conclusion that 
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privacy, the small individual lives of men, are preferable to all this inflated macrocosmic 
activity” (518).  The reader is then left to wonder if this is the conclusion that is meant to 
emerge from Rushdie’s opus: a stoic resignation of struggle and opposition, just when 
materialism takes center stage instead of metaphor.  With the removal of the special 
powers of the members of the MCC, comes the removal of hope both from Saleem and 
from India.  This is what Saleem calls a “sperectomy” (521).  
Over the course of the novel, then, Rushdie introduces a “third principle,” by 
creating a fictional world that merges the normally separated purviews of metaphor and 
reality.  This third principle, although self-consciously outside of our lived experience, 
has a rhetorical force upon our own world, suggesting that metaphor, narrative, and 
imagination can provide us with truths about our own world even if those truths are not 
literally real, or do not touch the world at every point.  In Midnight’s Children, metaphor 
and narrative provide hopeful possibilities for political and social change, imagining 
worlds beyond the one in which we live, worlds which may have some connection to the 
future world which lies ahead of us, but which is only fiction to our present.  The 
unrealistic idealism of this perspective is, however, tempered by the critique of Shiva 
who warns us that the real world we inhabit is populated by things not metaphors or 
fictional worlds, and as India is slowly drained of its fantastic metaphorical properties, it 
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becomes evident that Rushdie’s enthusiasm for a metaphorical world is, at the very least, 
characterized by a realistic skepticism and ambivalence.  Rushdie recognizes that the real 
world is characterized by falsehood, lies and abuse of political power and that while a 
third principle may provide us with hope for the future, that hope can be removed by the 
exigencies of the lived historical present.   Nevertheless, metaphor does have a utility, if a 
limited one, precisely in its intersections and connections with a type of truth, 
connections that cannot be seen with lies, even when the real world is full of them.  
Narrative and Its Leftovers (Ectomies and Turds)
The sperectomy of Saleem and his fellow members of the MCC is, in all senses 
but one, the conclusion of the novel, although it is precisely in its inversion of the 
trajectory of traditional narrative that this conclusion is reached.  The one way that it is 
not the conclusion is in the literal sense that the novel continues, in fits and starts, for 
another chapter, before Saleem fragments completely into millions of pieces, ending the 
possibility of his continued narration.  In a thematic way, however, the sperectomy is the 
quintessential conclusion, as it provides the essence of the nonnarratable moment, itself, 
in Miller’s model, an analogue for closure.  As I discussed at length in relation to 
Waterland, Miller defines the nonnarratable by the elimination of the dissatisfaction and 
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inquietude that engenders narrative, and its replacement with satisfaction and realized 
desires that the conclusion normally signals.  In Midnight’s Children,  however, the 
reverse is the case, with the narratable middle of the novel being characterized not by 
dissatisfaction and lack but by hope, promise, and possibility.  In this case,  the 
nonnarratable is reached through the back door, as narration is normally achieved through 
dissatisfaction coupled with the hope for satisfaction and eliminated when that hope is 
achieved.  Here, narration is not eliminated by the achievement of hope’s aspirations, but 
by its excision, making the continued search for satisfaction, and thus continued 
narration, irrelevant, just as it would be if the hope were realized.  Peter Brooks’s 
configuration of narrative desire is similarly inverted here.  Where Brooks correlates the 
end of a narrative with its climactic achievement of male sexual desire, here narratability 
is concluded through a literal and metaphorical sterilization.  While narrative and desire 
ceases in both cases, the effect is significantly different.  The sterilization of the members 
of the MCC is both symbolically and metaphorically a sterilization of narrative itself, as 
the MCC, via Scheherazade, has been associated with narrative itself throughout the 
novel.
This startling inversion of the Miller/Brooks model has striking relevance both for 
the thematics of fragmentation and unity detailed at the outset of this chapter and for the 
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claims of constructivist historiography challenged by this study as a whole.  Hayden 
White’s model suggests that it is the satisfaction and coherence of meaning endemic to 
narrative closure that positions it as antithetical to the real.  However, in the case of 
Midnight’s Children, the close of narration is not associated with coherence and 
satisfaction, but precisely with dissatisfaction and with an encounter with the real world 
of chance, individualism, lost opportunities and political struggle.  In this sense, closure 
becomes the encounter with the real as opposed to its denial, in direct contradiction to the 
relativist historiography that Rushdie’s work is typically said to reflect.
Saleem’s lost will in the face of such daunting and overpowering realism is then 
understandable if not completely endorsed by Rushdie or the novel itself.  What is clear 
from the novel’s extrapolation of a world of literalized metaphor and from that world’s 
remaining traces in the novel’s final chapter is that the literal and limited sense of reality 
offered by this conclusion denies, rather than affirms, the possibility of political and 
social action.  Nevertheless, Rushdie, despite the negative connotations of the novel’s 
conclusion, is not yet willing to forfeit the future to a grim realism that abandons the hope 
for change.  Indeed, much of the final chapter is dedicated to Saleem’s reluctance to 
continue narrating, after the narratable itself is metaphorically eliminated.  On more than 
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one occasion in this chapter, Saleem observes incidents that would previously have been 
occasions for abundant storytelling, but self-consciously rejects them.  
The second, and strangest, of these incidents, occurs after Saleem has been 
reunited with his ayah, Mary Pereira, and the narrative has caught up to its narrator, as he 
describes the writing of the narrative we are reading.  During this time, an inexplicable 
interlude occurs:
Midnight, or thereabouts.  A man carrying a folded (and intact) black 
umbrella walks towards my window from the direction of the railway 
tracks, stops, squats, shits.  Then sees me silhouetted against light and, 
instead of taking offence at my voyeurism, calls: ‘Watch this!’ and 
proceeds to extrude the longest turd I have ever seen. ‘Fifteen inches!’ he 
calls, ‘How long can you make yours?’  Once, when I was more energetic, 
I would have wanted to tell his life-story; the hour, and his possession of 
an umbrella, would have been all the connections I needed to begin the 
process of weaving him into my life, and I have no doubt that I’d have 
finished by proving his indispensability to anyone who wishes to 
understand my life and benighted times; but now, I’m disconnected, 
unplugged, with only epitaphs yet to write.  So, waving at the champion 
defecator, I call back: ‘Seven on a good day,’ and forget him. (546)
This interlude is so strange and self-contained that it seems to refuse interpretation.39
Still, however, crucial to the episode is its articulation of both Saleem’s refusal of 
continuing narratability and its persistence.  While Saleem self-consciously rejects his 
previous penchant for extravagant storytelling, he nevertheless feels compelled to narrate 
this strange incident, leaving the sense that he is not as “disconnected, unplugged” as he 
claims.  Indeed, the encounter seems to provide a renewed narratability that was 
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seemingly eliminated by the sperectomy performed by the Widow’s hand.  What is still 
puzzling, however, is the relative importance of the incident itself.  Why does Rushdie 
feel compelled to include it?
The answer may be found, at least somewhat, in an earlier incident, wherein Saleem 
meets Durga, the new wife of Picture Singh and the wet-nurse for Saleem’s adoptive son 
during Saleem’s imprisonment.  When Picture, the snake-charming Marxist who serves 
as de facto leader of the Magician’s ghetto, introduces Saleem to Durga, Saleem is less 
than happy to make her acquaintance: “It is with the greatest reluctance that I admit her 
into these pages.  Her name, even before I met her, had the smell of new things; she 
represented novelty, beginnings, the advent of new stories events complexities, and I was 
no longer interested in anything new” (532).  As in the later encounter, Saleem’s 
reluctance is not because of any personal animosity towards Durga or Picture, but rather 
out of an allegiance to the nonnarratable realism he has finally encountered.  Durga 
represents the power of narrative, of new possibilities, and new directions.  In short, she 
represents the hope that has been removed from the novel’s protagonist.  Interestingly, 
however, Saleem is forced to admit her to his rapidly concluding narrative out of an 
allegiance to historical verisimilitude, “once Pictureji informed me that he intended to 
marry her, I had no option: I shall deal with her, however, as briefly as accuracy permits” 
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(532). In this instance, accuracy of representation takes precedence over an adherence to 
the realism of nonnarratability that has drained Saleem of his hope.  That is the real, as 
such, must include narrative and narrative possibility, even after these things seem to 
have been eliminated.  Despite the best efforts of Indira Gandhi, the Emergency, and 
materialist denial of Rushdean flights of fancy, narratable leftovers persist and demand to 
be asserted, precisely because they are true or that they happened.  Saleem’s ultimate and 
conclusive defense of his narrative is based on a similar plea:  Saleem insists that “it 
happened that way because that’s how it happened” (549), offering that the outlandish 
and the narratable are not necessarily deviant from historical accuracy.  Rather, stories, as 
such, are part of reality as David Carr has elsewhere asserted (see Chapter One of this 
study).  Here, Rushdie’s allegiance to narrative is reasserted, not as an escapist alternative 
world, but as an unavoidable element of the real world itself, reasserting the hope that 
was so recently extracted.  Consonant with the insistence on verisimilitude is the 
notion of the narratable leftover, also theorized by Miller, and pervasive not only in 
Midnight’s Children but also in the body of Rushdie’s work.  Miller suggests that there 
are authors and works whose work “exemplifies a closure at once enforced and effaced” 
(Narrative and Its Discontents 273).  Here he refers to the practice of writing complete 
works that leave room open for sequels or additional narratives.  That is, such works have 
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a clear closure, “but what is left over is demonstrably capable of producing further 
narrative” (Narrative 273).  In Midnight’s Children, closure is most certainly enforced. In 
fact, the whole notion of closure is associated with repressive political regimes who, 
through the use of force, foreclose the possibility of narratable leftovers and dictate a 
world of rigidly defined possibilities through the manipulation of truth.  This enforcement 
of closure is, however, accompanied by its effacement in the leftovers that are clearly 
capable of producing other narratives.  Because of the self-conscious attention to the 
nature of narrative in Midnight’s Children, such leftovers are clearly identified as such, as 
Durga is explicitly identified with “new stories events complexities,” while the 
unidentified man with the umbrella produces a more fetid and material “leftover” which, 
if the metaphorical parallel holds, has a story even more long and prodigious than 
Saleem’s own.  While Miller argues that the existence of narrative sequels is the best 
available evidence that such narratable leftovers exist (Narrative 273), Rushdie includes 
and insists upon such leftovers in the final chapter of the singular novel.  Likewise, 
although the stripping away of literalized metaphor and fanciful narratives is associated 
with the realism of closure, the surplus of narrative leftovers is seen as necessary, 
precisely because of its adherence to accuracy, because that is “how it happened.”
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In this case, as in Waterland, the real has a double movement.  While the 
obliteration of the fictional world of literalized metaphor is necessary to confront the real 
world of political and social abuse of power, there is also a referentiality to the protrusion 
of new stories and new directions, which may lead the reader out of the seeming dead-
end of the former real.  While Saleem no longer has the strength to follow the truth, 
whether literal or metaphorical, of the narratives of Durga and the umbrella-man, Rushdie 
suggests that we, as readers and writers, must do so, both here and in the revival of the 
fictional world itself in future novels like Shame, The Moor’s Last Sigh, and The Ground 
Beneath Her Feet.  While the crushing loss of hope that is associated with the real world 
of modern India and the foreclosure of narrative possibility is historically true, so too, 
suggests Rushdie, is the opening of new narratives and new possibilities that may help in 
the resistance to power.  The dialectic of the enclosed and unified with the contingent and 
leftover is, in fact, one of the central themes of the novel, but this dialectic itself is 
positioned as an insistence both on the fidelity to the depressing limitation of possibility 
that reality embodies, and the simultaneous possibility that it encompasses. Rushdie 
similarly points to this dialectic in his essay, “Imaginary Homelands.”  
What I tried to do was to set up a tension in the text, a parodoxical 
opposition between the form and the content of the narrative.  The story of 
Saleem does indeed lead him to despair.  But the story is told in a manner
designed to echo [...] the Indian talent for non-stop self regeneration.  This 
is why the narrative constantly throws up new stories, why it ‘teems’.  The 
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form [...] is the optimistic counterweight to Saleem’s personal tragedy. 
(16)
The tragedy here is not particular to Saleem, as he is evidently emblematic of his nation.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that although the metaphors and narratives that provide the 
“teeming” hope for the future are systematically extracted by the vicissitudes of history, 
history itself, not just the form of the novel, indicates that such hope cannot be 
completely lost.  That is, while the form and the content are preferred here as the 
counterweights of optimism and pessimism, it becomes clear that both narrative form and 
historical content in and of themselves can be (and indeed inevitably are) both hopeful 
and despairing.  In particular, the novel suggests that referential historical discourse not 
only reflects both sides of this coin, but is essentially characterized by the dialectic 
oscillation between them. 
Nowhere is this dialectic more clearly expressed than through the personage of 
Shiva, who both insists upon a fidelity to the limited binary world of “masses-and-
classes” and provides the most important narratable leftover in the novel.  Shiva, is of 
course, named explicitly after the Hindu god of destruction and (pro)creation (150), 
marking these concepts as two sides of the same coin, and predicting his important role in 
the novel’s version of India.40   Shiva’s role as military hero for Indira’s India and his 
crushing of Saleem between his knees is the symbolic and material realization of his 
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theoretical antagonism towards Saleem’s optimistic doctrine of the third principle.  Still, 
despite the important role Shiva plays in the elimination of the members of the MCC, he 
also plays an important role in their (re)creation as well.  While all of the other members 
of the MCC are sterilized during the Emergency, Shiva, because of his alliance with 
Indira and Sanjay, is left to roam freely.  Upon his return from the war to liberate 
Bangladesh, he enjoys the rewards of his popularity by seducing the wives of all of the 
important men in India, fathering innumerable bastard children along the way (488).  
Shiva later turns away from the rich women who look down upon him and towards poor 
and slum-dwelling whores, fathering even more children (491). 
Shiva’s penchant for fathering not only material children, but also narrative loose 
ends is somewhat surprising considering his role in shutting down narrative possibilities 
in the rounding up and sterilization of the members of the MCC.  Indeed, Shiva’s attitude 
towards pregnancy reflects his antagonism towards flights of fantasy and narrative 
possibility.  Whenever he impregnates a woman, whether a society lady or a slum-
dwelling whore, he immediately loses any sexual attraction for her and abandons her and 
her child.  Nevertheless, while Shiva is an emblem of destruction, he also literally 
populates Rushdie’s India with a new set of midnight’s children, this group encapsulated 
in Aadam Sinai but containing a variety of hopes, possibilities, and stories like their 
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predecessors.  In this, the novel suggests that hope and narrative possibility cannot be 
completely eliminated, but perhaps they must come from a grounding in materialism, in 
the duality of masses-and-classes, the things that Shiva contends are more important than 
Saleem’s fantasies.  Certainly, the achievement of nonnarratability encapsulated by the 
sperectomy is once more undercut here by the presence of narratable “leftovers”.  While 
the reader never actually hears or sees the stories of Shiva’s offspring, their narratable 
status as genetic and thematic heirs to the members of the MCC is clear.  That is, while 
Shiva has, unsurprisingly, undergone “voluntary vasectomy” (524), Saleem is sure to 
make the irrelevance of the operation clear:
Saleem begins to laugh, wholeheartedly without stinting [...] I was 
remembering stories told me by Parvati. [...] the legendary tales of the war 
hero’s philandering, of the legions of bastards swelling in the unectomied 
bellies of great ladies and whores; I laughed because Shiva, destroyer of 
the midnight children, had also fulfilled the other role lurking in his name, 
the function of [...] Shiva-the-procreator, so that at this very moment in the 
boudoirs and hovels of the nation, a new generation of children, begotten 
by midnight’s darkest child, was being raised towards the future.  Every 
Widow manages to forget something important. (524) 
The importance of what the Widow has forgotten is precisely the renewal of hope 
and narrative possibility that the series of “ectomies” has eliminated.  In this, Shiva 
embodies the dialectic specified above.  He is both the crushing pessimism that the 
sterilization of the midnight’s children exemplifies and the “teeming” optimism of 
possibility that the narrative form of the novel reflects.  That is, while Saleem’s narrative 
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reaches a condition of nonnarratability, the existence of Shiva’s multitudinous children 
asserts the continuing presence of narratability itself, as do Durga and the umbrella-man.  
Importantly, as well, both sides of the dialectic are emblematic of the novel’s 
specification of the real.  That is while the achievement of nonnarratability involves the 
elimination of the fantasy-world of literalized metaphor and an encounter with the world 
of things, the renewal of narratability is paradoxically also characterized by the need for 
historical accuracy, as Saleem reluctantly includes events that do not fit into the unity of 
his newly realistic narrative because “that’s how it happened”.
Gandhi and the Ethics of Inclusion
Midnight’s Children then has a conflicted or, at the very least, double view of 
what historical reality is and how we can access it, but it does not dismiss the possibility 
of such access.  While Hayden White and narrativist historiography argue that the 
achievement of a unified form and coherent explanation of past events must necessarily 
involve a deviation from historical accuracy, Rushdie’s inversion of the narratable and 
the nonnarratable suggest that a unified form can resist explanation and, in doing so, 
more closely reference the historical past.  At the same time, however, Rushdie’s work 
acknowledges White’s most essential critique, that the adherence to a particular narrative 
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or story will necessarily exclude important events and shape others.  This brings us back 
to the importance of Saleem’s errata.  Like Saleem’s reluctant inclusion of the narratable 
leftovers in the concluding chapter, the errata are real elements/episodes of history that do 
not fit within the unified form of Saleem’s narrative, yet because they are both important 
and true in the conventional sense, they must be included within the novel’s attempt to 
portray the past accurately.
Through the chain of signification offered in the novel, Saleem is metaphorically 
coterminous with his nation, making him also literally so in the fictional world of 
literalized metaphor.  Because Rushdie proffers metaphor as that which holds truths even 
if they are deviant from historical verisimilitude, Saleem’s autobiography has the 
capacity to reveal various metaphorical truths about India and its surrounding environs.  
However, Saleem is not merely a metaphor for India, but is also, in the context of the 
fictional world,  an independent subject.  Saleem’s duality is clearest when his efforts to 
make his story correspond to his nation’s generate factual errors.  As these errata indicate, 
there are certain parts of Saleem’s life as individual subject that cannot be integrated with 
that of India.  As is the case with the narratable leftovers and the nonnarratable 
conclusion, Saleem’s allows for the inclusion of both metaphorical truth and factual 
accuracy, by revealing and drawing attention to the factual errors that metaphorical truth 
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can generate.  Once again, Rushdie and Saleem provide the satisfying meaning that 
accompanies a “longing for form” as well as the loose ends or leftovers that are, 
nevertheless, also part of the truth.
In this case, it is the “leftovers” which we might consider to be non-narratable, or, 
at the very least, not narrated, despite their inclusion.  While Saleem’s narrative asserts 
that Gandhi died on the same date as the premiere of The Lovers of Kashmir, the 
correction occurs outside of that narrative, as a leftover that is both absent from narration 
and present in the text: an antinarrative moment.   In the errata, then, the real world’s 
events encroach upon and interject into the narrative proper, as the real world begins to 
crack into the fictional world in the later The Ground Beneath Her Feet.  They do so, 
however, without superseding or replacing the fictional world’s version of events.  This 
creates something of a shadow narrative or a ghostly presence that haunts the narrative as 
it is presented to us, with the real world’s facts and dates always threatening to invalidate 
the metaphorical truths of Saleem’s narration, as Saleem himself suggests when he 
inquires whether one of his errors invalidates the “entire fabric” of his narrative.  While 
the primary narrative never quite collapses as it seems it might, it does comes closer and 
closer to meeting with the real world, instead of deviating from it.  It is within the tension 
between the fictional world of literalized metaphor and the shadow narration of its real 
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counterpart that Rushdie points to the dialectic of historical representation that might help 
in efforts to access the reality of the past.  Through this dialectic, Rushdie suggests that 
we need not abandon metaphorical discourse in our representation of reality, as long as 
we also acknowledge its limitations and supplement it with the unnarrated facts that 
unitary narratives and metaphors tend to exclude.
Indeed, it is no accident that the largest mistake, or at least the one bearing the 
novel’s most textual attention, surrounds Mahatma Gandhi, for it is on his personage that 
most histories of contemporary India linger, and which Rushdie virtually ignores.  
However, Gandhi’s centrality in the shadow narrative of the errata signals his 
simultaneous importance  both to the novel and to Rushdie’s version of the real.  Both 
Gandhi’s actual history and his treatment in significant popularized narratives, 
particularly Attenborough’s film, Gandhi, is central to Rushdie’s treatment of historical 
referentiality and the ethics of inclusion that define it.
Neil ten Kortenaar makes the provocative observation that Rushdie’s near 
exclusion of Gandhi from his novel is a social and political polemic against the Gandhian 
influence upon Indian history and politics.  Indeed, he argues, Rushdie cleverly promotes 
a liberal secular democratic ideal by replacing the real world’s Gandhi with the fictional 
world’s Shiva, unfairly biasing readers towards Saleem’s own view of politics and away 
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from another possible alternative: “the Gandhian and the transcendental” (“Allegory of 
History” 60).  He additionally argues that Rushdie replaces the standard Indian political 
dichotomy of Nehru vs. Gandhi with Saleem vs. Shiva, correlating Gandhi with the 
instrument of destruction and violence that is most antithetical to the Mahatma’s ideals 
(“Allegory of History” 59-60).   Rushdie is unabashedly humanist, secular and 
democratic in his political sympathies advocating such classic liberal values as “liberty, 
equality, and fraternity” in Shame.  However, the characterization of Rushdie’s political 
maneuvering in Midnight’s Children as manipulative and Anti-Gandhian in the pursuit of 
secular democracy misses the point somewhat.  This misinterpretation does, however,  
help to reveal Gandhi’s central role within Rushdean historical representation and the 
ethics that arise from it.
While Saleem never seems to consider Gandhi relevant to the story of India that 
he is narrating, Rushdie both acknowledges and overtly points to the fact that the 
Mahatma’s exclusion threatens to unravel the entire fabric of Saleem’s liberal humanist 
narrative.  It is not only at the moment of Gandhi’s death that his shadowy absent 
presence haunts the primary narrative.  Rather, the Amritsar Massacre that is presented in 
some detail through the eyes of Saleem’s “grandfather” Dr. Aziz is committed in 
response to a Gandhi-inspired protest and strike.  Again, while Aziz is the central figure 
412
here (and Aziz himself is clearly associated with Nehru, not Gandhi, throughout the 
novel), Gandhi’s influence and importance towers over the event, even though he is 
mentioned only briefly.  
Likewise, when Saleem offhandedly remarks that Indira Gandhi is no relation to 
the Mahatma, it seems to be merely a throwaway line that serves to simultaneously 
provide some historical context for one of the novel’s central characters and to further 
indict Indira’s policies and politics.  “She [Indira] was not related to ‘Mahatma’ M. K. 
Gandhi; her surname was the legacy of her marriage, in 1952, to one Feroze Gandhi, who 
became known as ‘the nation’s son-in-law’” (501).41   While this passage does serve both 
of these purposes, it simultaneously serves to emphasize Rushdie’s view of the Mahatma
as fundamentally opposed to the type of rule by force enacted in the Emergency as well 
as the political appropriation and manipulation of religious schism.  The Mahatma, 
Rushdie suggests here, is the furthest thing from Indira Gandhi, his namesake.  Rather, 
Indira is related to Nehru, even if she seems to abandon his principles, complicating the 
rather simplistic view of Rushdie as a Nehru disciple who explicitly excludes Gandhi and 
regards his influence as dangerous.
This simplistic view of Rushdie as a Nehru disciple is curious considering his 
loud objections to the consideration of Nehru as a Gandhi disciple in Attenborough’s 
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biopic Gandhi.  This argument against the subjugation of Nehru to Gandhi complements 
and clarifies the broader argument in Midnight’s Children about the possibility of 
historical referentiality through an ethics of inclusion. Rushdie insists that India’s greatest 
conflict in defining itself is in the choice between “Nehru, the urban sophisticate who 
wanted to industrialize India [...] and the rural, handicraft-loving, sometimes medieval 
figure of Gandhi” (Rushdie, “Attenborough’s Gandhi” 104).  However, Rushdie does not 
choose this image of Nehru over this image of Gandhi, rather he rejects both images as 
reductive.
The venom unleashed in Rushdie’s review of the Attenborough’s film is in 
reaction to more than the film, but it is not directed against Gandhi himself or his 
teachings as Kortenaar suggests.  Rather, Rushdie objects to the Western tendency to 
paint the East as a font only of spiritual wisdom as opposed to modern social and political 
knowledge and choices.42   This facet of Orientalist discourse places the East in a position 
of economic and political dependency, while placing all of its positive attributes into 
something of a fictional world of metaphysics and spirituality that is, at the very least, 
difficult to access and has little practical utility.  By subjugating Nehru to Gandhi, 
Attenborough’s film, argues Rushdie, participates in this type of Orientalist discourse, 
while the film’s widespread critical and popular acclaim confirms the appeal and 
414
influence of such discourse in the West.43   While it is true that Rushdie clearly opposes 
the widespread application of Gandhi’s doctrine of non-violence (“Attenborough’s 
Gandhi” 105), what he is principally opposed to is the transformation of Gandhi into a 
Christ figure for which “the assassination is the crucifixion, which needs no explanation” 
(“Attenborough’s Gandhi” 104).  Rather, Rushdie insists that Gandhi was a human being 
with multiple and complex actions and motives whose killing “was a political, not a 
mystical act” (104).44  Once again, this leads Rushdie to assert his crucial distinction 
between fiction or mythmaking and lies.  “Attenborough’s distortions mythologize, but 
they also lie” (104).  Again, Rushdie does not object to mythologizing, the reading of 
stories as transhistorical and containing universal truths.  He does, however, object to 
mythologizing at the expense of accurate referentiality.45
Rushdie’s final attack on Attenborough’s film is not based only on the possibility, 
but also on the necessity, of accurate historical referentiality within a storytelling 
medium.  He further argues that referentiality can be recovered in the inclusion of much 
of what Attenborough has excluded: the national debate between Nehruvian and 
Gandhian politics, the motivation  behind Gandhi’s assassination, Gandhi’s secular and
religious sides, and more rounded portrayals of other leaders of the independence 
struggle like Patel, Jinnah, and especially Bose whom Attenborough excludes altogether.  
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What Rushdie objects to here is an inaccurate portrayal of the past that allows only one 
side of a national debate to be seen, while simultaneously perpetuating Western 
stereotypes of the East.46
In this regard,  Rushdie is not merely a proponent of Nehruvian politics.  Rather, 
he actually insists vigorously that only showing one side of this debate and obscuring 
other historical facts is the kind of lie that cannot be tolerated.  Similarly, in his critique 
of contemporary film and television portrayals of the East, he notes how “Brits” are 
inevitably at the center of such narratives, while Indians are “bit-players in their own 
history.”  His objection to this is the same, that is, that so much is left out, that a lie is 
perpetrated, “The form insists that they [the Brits] are the ones whose stories matter, and 
that is so much less than the whole truth that it must be called a falsehood” (“Outside the 
Whale” 90; emphasis original).  Here again, Rushdie exhibits an ethics of inclusion, 
insisting that only a wide-ranging, all-inclusive representation can hope to contain a 
measure of truth.  It is for this reason, that Rushdie writes and promotes a certain kind of 
novel.  
There are novels which proceed on the basis of excluding most of the 
world, of plucking that one strand of the universe and writing about that.  
Or there are novels in which you try to include everything, what Henry 
James would call the “loose, baggy monsters” of fiction.  And I suppose 
that my books would fall roughly into the loose-baggy-monster camp 
(“Midnight’s Children and Shame” 10; see Needham 153).
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The bagginess of Rushdie’s monsters derive, precisely, from an allegiance to history, and 
its multitude of events, not from a desire to deconstruct it.47
While I would not argue that Rushdie does not prefer a Nehruvian secular nation 
to an allegiance to a government run under metaphysical or transcendental principles, 
whatever that government might look like, it is clear that Rushdie insists on accurate 
historical representation based on inclusion rather than its opposite.  Indeed, Rushdie’s 
policy of historical representation follows the policy of Saleem’s family who bring him 
home from the hospital and refuse to discard any of the evidence of his birth.  “Nothing 
was thrown away; baby and afterbirth were both retained” (Midnight’s Children 144).  In 
this case, while it is possible that mistakes are made, it is clear that the intent is to retain 
as much as possible, as Rushdie maintains must be done with the historical past.   As 
Midnight’s Children illustrates, this retention may take a narrative form, as long as that 
form is supplemented with the non-narrative episodes not easily integrated into it.  
In regard to Gandhi, while it is true that Saleem marginalizes his presence when 
compared to more traditional accounts of the history of twentieth-century India, his 
consistent reference to the various errata he makes, particularly in regards to Gandhi, 
continues to place a significant focus on the Mahatma.  In addition, by pointing overtly to 
his mistakes, Rushdie encourages readers to fill in the gaps of Saleem’s linear, exclusive 
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narrative in order to access historical materiality.  Also, although Rushdie focuses on 
twentieth-century political and social history, he also acknowledges the  importance of a 
larger, more transcendental, history, when he refers to his existence within the Kali-Yuga, 
the Maha Yuga cycle, and the Day of Brahma (194).  Likewise, and perhaps more 
importantly, while Kortenaar accuses Rushdie of excluding the “Gandhian and the 
transcendental,” he overlooks the form of Rushdie’s novel, which compensates for the 
exclusion of Gandhi with the use of literalized metaphor and the exploration of its 
power.48  If the Mahatma, for some, presents an ideal of hope and promise for India 
through allusions to a world beyond our own and through the application of extreme, if 
occasionally unrealistic, political practice, the fictional world of Midnight’s Children 
serves much the same function.
Like religious discourse, Rushdie’s world of literalized metaphor provides a 
world of hope beyond our own, and which has a rhetorical force upon ours which is 
meant to steer our future moral, ethical, and political choices.  Rushdie’s novel does not 
exclude the transcendental element of Indian history but rather includes it as an integral 
part of the form of the narration itself.  In this sense, to accuse Rushdie of correlating 
Shiva and Gandhi is absurd, for it is Saleem whose narrative powers provide the 
transcendental hope that Shiva’s focus on the world of things does not allow.  Still, while 
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Shiva is a materialist, he is also the font of future hope and the progenitor of another 
generation of midnight’s children, and in this sense, he too partakes of the transcendental 
side of Indian history.  Rushdie does not, then, exclude the Gandhian and the 
transcendental, but through the literalization of metaphor and the nonnarratable presence 
of the errata, insists on its inclusion alongside the secular ideals of Saleem and the 
materialist perspective of Shiva.  Here, Rushdie makes an effort to “throw nothing away” 
as he accuses Attenborough of doing in his focus only on the transcendental in his 
depiction of India.  Rushdie’s point in the essay is that Gandhi too has a materialist, 
practical and political side, the effacement of which is a lie.  He does not, however, in 
Midnight’s Children, efface the transcendental side of Gandhi, but rather explores it 
through the mystical and fantastic storytelling form he has chosen.
In the previous two chapters of this study, we have seen that despite the 
deployment of narrative and the acknowledgment of some affection for it, both Graham 
Swift and Virginia Woolf propose that a true historical referentiality cannot be achieved 
through narrative, but must be accessed through non-narrative and/or anti-narrative 
means.  On the other hand, many critics assert that Rushdie embraces narrative at the cost 
of historical and material referentiality.  Here, however, it is clear that Rushdie is not only 
preoccupied with the difficulty of referencing the historical real, but he is also insistent 
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on the possibility and necessity of doing so.  Unlike Swift and Woolf, however, in 
Midnight’s Children, Rushdie sees the referencing of the historical real as possible only 
through the complementary deployment of both narrative and non-narrative means, as 
well as through the use of closure and its attendant asserted final meaning and the 
strategic acknowledgment of loose ends that allow for that meaning to be adjusted.  
Unlike Hayden White, Rushdie never suggests that the meaning inherent to the narrative 
form is an inherent lie, rather he suggests that metaphorical truth can be achieved through 
such “longing for form.”  At the same time, however, like White, Rushdie acknowledges 
that some events, personages, and ideas do not fit into a particular narrative or ideology.  
While White argues that these excess elements that cannot be included in the narrative 
are inevitably left out, triggering a deviation from historical accuracy, Rushdie’s novel 
suggests that we must, instead, find a way to leave them in, even if they threaten the 
coherence of the narrative they shadow.  The price of exclusion is not only historical 
inaccuracy, but also intentional deception.  In this, Rushdie encourages us as readers and 
prospective historians to not only “swallow the world,” but to also present what escapes 
from the other end, because that too is the truth.
Finally, it is useful to return to Saleem’s two sides and how they too represent two 
versions of historical accuracy.  Again, both Swift and Woolf, in keeping with their 
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rejection of the vehicle of narrative for historical representation, reject the traditional 
subject matter of traditional historical discourse: the great actions of great bourgeois men, 
particularly in the field of battle and in national politics.  While Rushdie too mocks this 
type of history, he also insists on its inclusion, not only in practice, but symbolically.  
Like Omar Khayam in Shame, Saleem is not your typical heroic personage, whether it be 
in appearance or in his actions.  He is, however, a bourgeois male whose progress is 
symbolic of his nation’s as a whole, and he is a participant in all of the great actions and 
events of traditional narrative histories of India.  What’s more, even when Saleem is not 
explicitly involved in the important “actions” of history, Rushdie is sure to keep the 
reader up-to-date on important military and political events.49   If Khayam is identified as 
a “marginal” man in Shame, Saleem is certainly a central figure in the history of this 
alternate India, so much so that he honestly believes that a series of bombs directed at 
Pakistan are meant exclusively for him and his family.  Still, however, unlike much 
historical discourse, Rushdie emphasizes the contingent nature of what is important 
enough to receive historical representation.  First, although Saleem continually contrives 
and constructs ways to configure himself as central to all historical action, there is much 
about his narrative that is quite ordinary and personal, as opposed to nationally grand and 
influential.  In particular, the stories surrounding his school days, childhood romances, 
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and family squabbles seem far from the national drama in which Saleem claims a central 
role.  More importantly, perhaps, is the contingency introduced by the revelation of the 
baby-switching by Mary Pereira.  That is, while Saleem, the bourgeois child with a 
somewhat inflated sense of self-importance, receives the letter from Prime Minister 
Nehru telling him that his life is inextricably tied to his nation, it is at least an even 
proposition that the letter should be received by Shiva, who was exchanged with Saleem 
at the time of their mutual births.  Likewise, it is Saleem who is afforded the opportunity 
to tell his tale, linking himself to history, as such, while Shiva, the inarticulate adoptive 
son of Wee Willie Winkie is kept silent.  
The novel here invokes Gayatri Spivak’s well-known question of “Can the 
Subaltern Speak?” by pointing to the contingent and ideological nature of what is 
typically considered history.  Because Saleem is lucky enough to be placed in a bourgeois 
household, he is able to place himself in a central position in India’s history by simply 
narrating his tale.  Likewise, Shiva’s life, while perhaps intensely narratable in the sense 
specified by the likes of Miller and Brooks, remains unnarrated because he is unlucky 
enough to be taken home by a beggar, losing his capacity for self-representation because 
of his class and education.  Shiva then only enters the narration of Midnight’s Children
when his life or mind intersects with Saleem’s or when he participates in activities 
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common to traditional histories, as is the case in the latter portions of the novel when he 
becomes a military hero.50
By pointing to the ways that what is traditionally selected as historical discourse 
is influenced by both random chance and bourgeois ideology, Rushdie makes an implicit 
argument that the traditional fare of narrative historiography is not sufficient in itself in 
representing the truth of the past.  In particular, while Saleem’s life is a reflection of 
traditional bourgeois historiography in its tracing of easily identifiable national histories 
like Wolpert’s, it is also filled with irrelevant and occasionally inconsistent events that 
pinpoint Saleem’s life as merely one among many.  While Saleem chooses to focus on his 
heroic and representative status throughout most of the novel, he does, in the end, retreat 
from this stance and embraces his own status as a singular entity, rather than as a symbol 
for his nation.  In this move, Rushdie suggests to his readers that the tracing of Shiva’s 
life, or the life of any other character in the novel not afforded the centrality that Saleem 
is given, might also be a key to uncovering the truth of the past.  In particular, both 
Padma and Parvati-the-Witch come to mind.  In their status as women, lower class, and 
postcolonial subjects, they exemplify the voices that Spivak suggests have been not only 
obscured in historical discourse, but perhaps completely lost.  
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While neither Padma nor Parvati, like Shiva, ever get to tell their own stories in 
Midnight’s Children, Saleem’s final conclusion that the “small individual lives of men, 
are preferable to all this inflated macrocosmic activity,” (518) suggests that all lives 
deserve greater attention, especially considering the random and ideologically biased 
manner in which certain types of lives are chosen to represent history, as such.51   Padma 
helps to voice this point of view when she accuses Saleem of being “too intellectual, too 
skeptical, too out of touch” (Brennan, “Cultural Politics” 123).  Rushdie’s social and 
class proximity to his protagonist also leave him as a target of this (self)-accusation. 
Although Saleem accuses Padma of “ignorance and superstition,” he also acknowledges 
that she is a counterbalance to his own biased point-of-view (39).  Likewise, it is 
significant that renewed hope in the novel comes in the form of members of the lower 
class, like Shiva, Durga and the umbrella-man.  So, when Aruna Srisvastava notes two 
strands of Indian philosophy of history, the “ordinary” and the “extraordinary,” (67) she 
refers to the coexistence of traditional history and its transcendental counterpart.52   In 
Midnight’s Children, however, it also applies to the narratable and one of its opposites, 
the everyday or the quotidian.  As Uma Parameswaran notes, “Rushdie [...] seems to 
spoof traditional histories for often being no more than biographies of kings and 
generals” (41).  David Price concurs that often the “focus is on the common, everyday 
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experience of average people, and it is their experience [...] that comprises a more 
accurate history of India” (104).53  While this is only partially true, it is an important part.
Unlike Swift and Woolf, however, Rushdie’s novel does not assert the historical 
irrelevance of traditional history and narrative in order to epistemologically value the 
non-narrative, the lack of progress and action, and the lower-class workers as opposed to 
their bourgeois counterparts.  Rather, in the lives of both Saleem and Shiva, as well as in 
the novel as a whole, we have the suggestion that the macrocosmic, the metaphorical, and 
the narrative may provide us with ideals of progress, universalism, and meaning that are 
essential not only to our accessing of the historical past, but also to our movement 
towards the future.  At the same time, Saleem has a quotidian, even non-narratable, side 
that is represented in the novel that, when coupled with the obvious exclusion of similar 
details in Shiva’s life, stands in for the individual lives not represented in traditional 
histories.  However, this quotidian side of Saleem also represents a pole of the historical 
real that must be included if “both baby and afterbirth” are to be retained and access to 
history, both narrative and its excess, is to be achieved.
In this sense, Gandhi again becomes an important touchstone for Rushdie’s sense 
of how accurate historical representation can be achieved.  Like Saleem, Gandhi takes 
part in virtually every “important” (traditionally considered) military, political and social 
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decision that occurs during his adult lifetime.  At the same time, however, the Mahatma 
and his followers saw him not as a traditional politician, but as one of the people, 
particularly the historical underclass, the peasants whose daily existence (and starvation) 
was often ignored or shunted to the margins of centralized political decision-making and 
historical representation.   That is, some elements of Gandhi’s life and career can be seen, 
quite easily, as intensely narratable by traditional historical standards while others, were 
they not attached to the same personage, would normally be excluded from history.  
While Rushdie asks that neither element of Gandhi’s past be excluded from 
Attenborough’s film, he likewise asserts that if historical representation is to present the 
truth of the past, it should exclude neither the narratable macrocosmic activity of politics 
and military might, nor the nonnarratable experiences of the subaltern.  Rather, as with 
narrative and non-narrative, metaphor and materialism, each should dialectically 
supplement the other.
In Midnight’s Children, then,  Rushdie suggests that a combination of 
conventional and non-conventional representational techniques can help us represent the 
past accurately, something that it is essential to do.  While Rushdie continually plays with 
the forms used to present history, he also continually insists that there is a real to be 
accessed and that the cost of obscuring that real is substantial.  Whether it be the Amritsar 
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Massacre, the Indo-Pakistani conflict, or simply the lives of those unable to represent 
themselves (whether politically or aesthetically), Rushdie points to events and personages 
buried in history and in rhetoric that must be recovered if political and social progress in 
the present is to be gained.  It is true that in an essay like “Outside the Whale,” Rushdie 
notes that “objectivity becomes a great dream, like perfection, an unattainable goal for 
which one must struggle in spite of the impossibility of success” (101).  At the same time, 
however, he makes this statement in an effort to insist upon an ethics and a morality
based upon the possibility of truth, not truth in the metaphysical sense, but in the sense of 
accurately identifying what has occurred.  If a precise objectivity is impossible to 
achieve,  this does not mean that one cannot come closer to identifying that truth.  
Rushdie asserts, “It seems to me imperative that literature enter such arguments, because 
what is being disputed is nothing less than what is the case, what is truth and what 
untruth” (100).  Far from being an exercise in postmodern relativism, Midnight’s 
Children is an effort to enter into this argument, and to insist on what is the case, both 
within narrative and outside of it.54
Notes
1   This positioning of what is generally considered to be reality and truth as 
actually ideologically and discursively constructed is, of course, a common contention of 
what I have been calling postmodernist (or constructivist) historiography, as well as 
postmodernism in general.  Like many proponents of this view of historical discourse, 
Srisvastava points to how all history in Midnight’s Children and Shame is constructed 
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from the perspective of a particular ideology, deceptively transforming one particular 
point-of-view into purportedly transparent representation.  According to Srisvastava, 
Rushdie’s novel exposes history, which is always constructed, as construction, revealing 
its ideological commitments and its complicity with such ideology.  While I do not 
necessarily disagree with this assessment, I endeavor in this chapter to also show how 
Rushdie suggests that while historical discourse is colored by ideology and by 
construction of other sorts (linguistic, for instance), it is also necessary to insist upon its 
capacity to represent the truth of the past and to preserve events that might otherwise be 
lost. Srisvastava also has some compelling things to say about how the novel attempts to 
confront and present “Truth” (historical or otherwise), some of which I will be 
contending with over the course of the chapter.  For some additional readings of Rushdie 
as a postmodernist deconstructor of traditional history par excellence, see David Birch 
“Postmodernist Chutneys,” Sabrina Hassumani’s Salman Rushdie: A Postmodern 
Reading of His Major Works, Linda Hutcheon The Politics of Postmodernism (63-76), 
Michael Reder, “Rewriting History and Identity,” M. Keith Booker “Beauty and the 
Beast,” Ron Shepherd “Midnight’s Children as Fantasy,” and David W. Price, “Salman 
Rushdie’s Use and Abuse of History in Midnight’s Children.”  In typical language 
assessing Rushdie as postmodernist, Hassumani says of Midnight’s Children, that it 
illustrates the proposition that “there are no absolute versions of history and, in fact, all 
the versions are constructs” (27).  Likewise, Price correlates Rushdie’s philosophy of 
history with that of Nietzsche in “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” 
reading the novel as a critique of “monumental” and “antiquarian” models of history.  
Says Price, “Saleem presents history as a performance of narration, as opposed to a 
representation of events that took place in the past” (93).  Jean Kane echoes this 
sentiment despite arriving at it from a less conventional direction, “Rushdie uses 
recollection as a corrective to the distortions of imperial and neocolonial history, but this 
antidote meets the limit in the romance of India as the repository of narrative” (116).  
Here, suggests Kane, Rushdie’s politics and history fail to reach their potential precisely 
because of their reliance on romance as a genre and, more importantly, narrative as a 
form.  Her comments summarize postmodernist historiography in general, and many 
readings of Rushdie, quite nicely.  Over the course of this essay, I suggest that Rushdie 
rather insists that narrative performance and representation of past events are not 
mutually exclusive.  
For interesting counter-viewpoints to Rushdie as a postmodernist, interested in 
history as discourse, and only as discourse, see Pierre François, Bishnupriya Ghosh, 
Patricia Merivale and Timothy Brennan. In Brennan’s “The Cultural Politics of Rushdie 
Criticism,”, he idiosyncratically asserts, rather offhandedly, that Rushdie stridently resists 
the postmodern focus on discourse, calling him an “unapologetic debunker of discursive 
theory” (109) and “resolutely nonpostmodern (115).  This claim seems to be based both 
on Rushdie’s nonfiction essays and interviews (see Chauhan 68), as well as on his rather 
evident political and social commitments.  These commitments do not, of course, 
preclude an affiliation or sympathy with discourse theory, as I discuss over the course of 
this study.   Ghosh also interestingly asserts the belief that Rushdie’s vision “is a 
modernist one, tied to a clear world-text divide,” (147) before detailing ways in which 
Rushdie is both modern and postmodern. Merivale, in her explicit argument that Rushdie 
if influenced by Gunter Grass, also notes that “for Grass and Rushdie, the historical has a 
clear ontological status, but it may be perceived, described, and interpreted in such a way 
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as to show the marvelously grotesque inherent in the actual” (335).  In this, like Ghosh, 
she makes an inherent claim for Rushdie’s modernism, rather than postmodernism.  
François focuses on The Satanic Verses, insisting on its philosophical materialism, as 
opposed to idealism.
2 I cite Wolpert here not as a  particularly egregious example of “traditional 
historiography” that participates in ideological deception, but because several critics of 
Midnight’s Children have identified his text as either a source text for the novel, or as a 
representative example of the kind of historical account that Rushdie parodies.  See 
Lipscomb for the most complete version of the former and Kortenaar’s “Midnight’s 
Children and the Allegory of History” for the latter.  Certainly Wolpert’s book is an 
example of traditional historiography but, as there are several histories of India that are 
similarly constructed, it would be unfair to single Wolpert out as the only example.  
Another Rushdie critic who cites Wolpert in particular is Price, 
3 See Hutcheon, “Circling the Downspout,” Appiah, During and Huggan for some 
examples.
4 Michael Gorra, who also comments on the simultaneous form and fragmentation 
of the novel, makes a partial list of the divergent narratives that serve as a useful 
reminder to how much of the novel is not attached to a unitary account of the fate of the 
midnight’s children: “odes to chutney; Tai the Kashmiri boatman, who for years refused 
to wash, the pyromania of Saleem’s sister, the Brass Monkey; a father who offers to have 
his daughter’s teeth pulled and replaced with gold as a dowry, the atrocities of the 
Bangladesh war; the ghostwomen of the Sundarbans; mango-kissing in the Indian film 
industry; smuggling in the Rann of Kutch; Bombay billiards, snakecharmers, and 
bicycles” (190).  For other readings of the dialectics of form and fragmentation in the 
novel, see Rege, Brigg and Wilson.
5 Saleem asserts the singularity of the body, if not of the subject, when he writes, 
“a human being, inside himself, is anything but a whole, anything but homogeneous; all 
kinds of everywhichthing are jumbled up inside him and he is one person one minute and 
another the next. [...] The body, on the other hand, is homogeneous as anything.  
Indivisible, a one-piece suit, a sacred temple, if you will” (230-31).  Jean Kane calls this 
claim of Saleem’s “disingenuous” focusing, as she does, upon how the body is shown to 
be fragmentary and open to the outside world, as opposed to inviolably separate.  Like 
Kane, Lorna Milne points particularly to the trope of the nose, as that place in the novel 
where the world enters the body and vice versa (Kane 97-98; Milne 31; Midnight’s 
Children 19).  While this point can hardly be argued, I believe there is more to Saleem’s 
claim than disingenuousness.  Rather, in typically dialectic fashion, Rushdie points to 
how the body is both singular and unitary, capable of containing multitudes within one 
form, while also being fragmentary and interpenetrative.  That is, when Saleem loses the 
tip of his finger and claims his belief in the unity of the body has been “undone,” this is 
only partially true, while there is also some truth to his earlier statement.
6 This is a continuation of the trope of Saleem as metaphor for India, as he breaks 
up into as many pieces as there are people in India at the time of the novel’s writing.
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7 In fact, Rushdie cites one of the key lines of The Book of Laughter and 
Forgetting discussed in the introduction of this study to explain the role of memory in 
Midnight’s Children (“Imaginary Homelands” 14).  
8 See Rushdie’s essay, “‘Errata’: Or, Unreliable Narration in Midnight’s 
Children,’” for a more complete listing of errors, many of which, with my outsider’s 
knowledge of Indian history, I would undoubtedly have missed.  Among these are the 
elimination of the festival of Mumbadevi from the calendar of the novel and the moving 
the debut of Lata Mangeshkar, on whose life Jamila Singer is based, on All-India radio 
chronologically forward to 1946.
9 Timothy Brennan also briefly notes this distinction as the central difference 
between Midnight’s Children and Shame, noting that in Shame “the problem is not 
idealizing the past [as it is in the former novel] but simply ‘rewriting history’ — not myth 
as ‘false consciousness’ but myth as the government lie one knows to be a lie but cannot 
contradict for fear of reprisal” (Salman Rushdie and the Third World 123).  Here Brennan 
sees both “myths” and “lies” in this context as fundamental deviations from the real that 
mislead and obstruct access to political and ethical initiative.  He does, however, make 
distinctions between them.  My argument in this chapter is constructed around these 
distinctions as they operate within Midnight’s Children and how they impact the question 
of referentiality.
10 These two “characters” are clearly alternate-world analogs for General Zia ul-
Huq and Zulfikar ali-Bhutto and are universally acknowledged by both critics and casual 
readers as such.
11 Rushdie has, of course, commented on Orwell directly himself in “Outside the 
Whale,” and elsewhere has noted “there has never been a time when the truth has been so 
manipulated because the weapons of manipulation are now so sophisticated” (Reder, 
Conversations 70).  In this, Rushdie seems to be asserting that “truth” itself exists prior to 
manipulation and that its manipulation is to be avoided if possible.  Likewise, he writes in 
“Outside the Whale” that “new and better maps of reality” (“Outside the Whale” 100) can 
be created, affirming the existence of a reality that precedes its mapping.  None of this 
seems to coincide with the view of Rushdie as postmodernist par excellence that I am 
discussing here, and which I ultimately reject.
12 As Stanley Wolpert writes, “Fear motivated millions of Indians to greater 
efficiency .  Police were free to do as they liked. [...] A chill climate of silent terror 
gripped many Indian homes, for no one knew who might be listening, recording, 
reporting ‘treasonous remarks’” (qtd. in Kuchta 213-14).  Later editions of Wolpert, 
however, tone down the implicit critique of the Emergency (see Wolpert 397-404). Todd 
M. Kuchta notes that the Emergency also spawned many forced sterilizations and the 
destruction of property: “Between April and September of 1976, 3.7 million sterilizations 
were performed at Sanjay’s behest, and in April he ordered the demolition of the squatter 
settlements near the historic Turkman Gate in New Delhi, where six people were killed 
by police and tens of thousands lost their homes” (213).  This is the “black side” of the 
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Emergency which Rushdie insists on as a hidden truth. For a more complete discussion of 
this side of the Emergency and its intersections with Midnight’s Children, see Kuchta 
(211-14).
13 See Rushdie’s essay, “Attenborough’s Gandhi,” for what he perceives to be the 
false history perpetuated in an effort to distance Britain as a whole from the horror of the 
Amritsar Massacre.  In this essay, he endeavors to remind his readers of the “truth” of the 
aftermath of the massacre:
Take the Amritsar Massacre.  This is perhaps the most powerful sequence 
in the film [Gandhi].  Both the massacre and the subsequent court-martial 
at which outraged Englishmen question the unrepentant Dyer with barely 
suppressed horror, are staged accurately and with passion.  But what these 
two scenes mean is that Dyer’s actions at Jallianwala Bagh were those of a 
cruel over-zealous individual, and that they were immediately condemned 
by Anglo-India.  And that is a complete falsehood.
The British in Punjab in 1919 were panicky.  They feared a second 
Indian Mutiny. They had nightmares about rape.  The court-martial may 
have condemned Dyer, but the colonists did not.  He had taught the wogs a 
lesson; he was a hero.  And when he returned to England, he was given a 
hero’s welcome.  An appeal fund launched on his behalf made him a rich 
man.  Tagore, disgusted by the British reaction to the massacre, returned 
his knighthood.  In the case of Amritsar, artistic selection has altered the 
meaning of the event.  It is an unforgivable distortion.  (“Attenborough’s 
Gandhi” 103)
The key in this passage to my argument is Rushdie’s clear claim that, when it 
comes to history, there is such a thing as truth, just as there is such a thing as falsehood.  
In particular, the practice of selection and erasure removes pieces of the story that are 
essential to a truer referentiality, and therefore a truer meaning.  This contributes to 
Rushdie’s ethic and aesthetic of inclusion, discussed more thoroughly later in the chapter.
14 For a useful overview of this type of criticism, as well as a commentary on the 
importance of nationalism, whether fictional or real, for third-world resistance to 
imperialism (and particularly for Rushdie), see the first chapter of Timothy Brennan’s 
Salman Rushdie and the Third World.  Brennan also points to the many critics whose
work predates and supplements the theorists I highlight here.
15 Bhabha’s articulation of the nation as narration divides the concept into two 
parts, the pedagogical and the performative.  The pedagogical is composed of things 
learned and passed down through the ages, creating “tradition,” as such.  The 
performative is that part of a nation’s history that is created anew, through performance, 
in each present moment.  This latter allows for Bhabha’s optimistic sense of the nation 
and narration itself as “emergent,” capable of participating in the formation of cultural 
difference, hybrid subjectivities, and double meanings that he proposes as essential for 
the present, particularly in the postcolonial arena.  Bhabha appropriates Rushdie’s work 
explicitly, pointing to its own engagement with hybridity and double meanings, but in 
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doing so he positions Rushdie within the poststructural/postmodern discourse that 
Bhabha privileges and underplays Rushdie’s allegiance to the material referentiality to 
the historical past that I point to here.  Chatterjee (like Chakrabarty) proposes that the 
very idea of the “nation” is linked with such Western concepts as “progress” and 
“rationalism,” which led India to follow the path of Western industrialism: a bad choice 
according to Chatterjee.  Here Chatterjee criticizes the East, and India in particular, for 
accepting the story of the nation as established by the colonizing West, noting (and 
recounting) the possibility of lost opportunities in the discursive construction of the 
nation.  Rushdie, by contrast, advocates many of the West’s discursive values, 
particularly those of the Enlightenment (see esp. Shame 251), if not the practice that has 
gone with them.  Chatterjee points to the problems and pitfalls of applying Enlightenment 
rationalism to the construction of the Indian nation, while Rushdie points towards the 
universal values of the Enlightenment as a model, while critiquing the West’s discursive 
construction of the East.  In this sense, Chatterjee disagrees with Rushdie ideologically, if 
not with his sense of the nation as narration.
16 Although it would undoubtedly be a mistake to attribute Saleem’s views to 
Rushdie in their totality, quite often Rushdie seems to use Saleem as a mouthpiece for 
opinions expressed elsewhere.  Here, for instance, Saleem’s claims about the fantasy that 
is India is later advocated and expanded upon by Rushdie: “I suppose what he 
[Saleem]—or I, through him—was saying was that there never had been a political entity 
called India in 1947.  The thing that became independent had never previously existed, 
except that there had been an area, a zone called India.  So it struck me that was coming 
into being, this idea of a nation-state, was an invention.  It was an invention of the 
nationalist movement.  And a very successful invention.  One could argue that nation-
states are that kind of collective fantasies” (qtd. in Reder , “Rewriting History and 
Identity” 246, n. 24).  In fact, this is precisely the argument made by Bhabha, Anderson, 
Hobsbawm, Chatterjee, and many others.  This particular claim originally appeared in 
Rushdie’s essay,  “A Fantasy Called India” (36) in India Today International in 1997.
17 It is well known that the term “Pakistan,” an acronym, was originally thought up 
in England by a group of Muslim intellectuals.  P for the Punjabis, A for the Afghans, K 
for the Kashmiris, S for the Sind and the “tan”, they say for Baluchistan. [...] So it was a 
word born in exile which then went East, was borne-across or translated, and imposed 
itself on history; a returning migrant, setting down on partitioned land, forming a 
palimpsest on the past.  A palimpsest obscures what lies beneath.  To build Pakistan it 
was necessary to cover up Indian history, to deny that Indian centuries lay beneath the 
surface of Pakistani Standard Time.  The past was rewritten; there was nothing else to be 
done” (Shame 87).  Interestingly, Aruna Srisvastava takes this passage as pointing to 
important differences between India and Pakistan, although both nations require a 
“rewriting” of the past in order to establish themselves as nations.  Perhaps it is the 
obscuring of “what lies beneath” that is considered to be different in Pakistan, but the 
imposition of a new history upon an old is also seen, over the course of Midnight’s 
Children, in India.  Rushdie’s assessment seems to be that both nations are imagined, but 
Pakistan “insufficiently” so (“In God We Trust” 387).
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18 This cry for literal interpretation occurs several times throughout the novel, in 
particular when Saleem describes how his body begins to crack, quoted above (37).  
Although the degree to which the audience is supposed to take Saleem literally is 
questioned at various points, in particular, when the doctors can find nothing wrong with 
him, the fictional world seems to dictate that although the cracking and shattering of 
Saleem is merely a metaphor, it is a metaphor that literally comes true at the close of the 
novel, while commenting on how the real world India also seems to be falling apart, or 
shattering.
19 See, for instance, Guha, A Subaltern Studies Reader, particularly the 
introduction.
20 Interestingly, in this case Rushdie explicitly ties lies and fictions together, noting 
“The beginning of fiction is fable-telling lies” (Chauhan 63).  Nevertheless, perhaps there 
is a difference between something that starts with a lie, yet produces truth, and an isolated 
lie that produces nothing.
21 For one of Rushdie’s sustained attacks on Hindu communalism and the 
effacement of Muslim efforts at cooperation and support of a unified India, see “The 
Riddle of Midnight,” first published in 1987 and reprinted in Imaginary Homelands (26-
33).  See also the Rushdie’s opening comments in a 1996 interview with Alvaro Vargas 
Llosa (reprinted in Chauhan 209-12), in which he notes the ever-increasing communalism 
in India and how his then most recent novel, The Moor’s Last Sigh, deals with the end of 
the secular India in which he grew up.
22 As usual, there is some ambiguity to Rushdie’s assertions of a limit to the 
changeling side of human nature.  The narrator of The Moor’s Last Sigh (Moraes 
Zogoiby himself), as is typical of Rushdean narrators, asserts the value of precisely those 
principles that Uma negatively embodies in his commentary against the Hindu cult of 
Ram.  “The true ‘rule of Ram’ should [...] surely be premised on the mutating, inconstant, 
shape-shifting, realities of human nature— and not only human nature, but divine as well.  
This thing being advocated in the great god’s name flew in the face of his essence as well
as ours” (351). Rushdie criticizes the movement by right-wing Hindu elements to 
transform the multitudinous polytheism of Hinduism into a form of monotheism and 
praises forms of hybridity and multiplicity.  Likewise, if Uma is the negative example of 
protean art and subjectivity, Aurora is her positive counterbalance, and she comes to see 
hybridity as an ideal in itself.  Nevertheless, while Rushdie’s aversion to singular and 
monolithic personality and community is well commented upon critically, his 
simultaneous aversion to the infinite delights of proteanism are not as widely 
acknowledged as they should be. Even in reference to Ram, Rushdie here insists on the 
truth of the multivalent, hybrid Ram at the expense of the Ram invented by the novel’s 
Mainduck Fielding and his followers in Mumbai’s Axis (or Bal Thackeray and the Shiv 
Sena Party in the real world).  So, Bishnupriya Ghosh, for instance, draws attention to 
how the Mainduck version of Ram is an “invented essentialism, a claim to origins that 
Indian history makes impossible” (138).  At the same time, however, the multivalent 
alternative Moraes presents is not meant to be seen as merely a different invention, but 
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instead as closer to the truth of religious, national, and cultural history: indeed, closer to 
the “essence” of Ram himself.  
23 Rushdie’s interest in creating a “fictional world” that encompasses several of his 
novels seems to have increased over the course of his career.  For instance, while 
Midnight’s Children uses the actual names of many, if not all, historical personages (like 
Indira Gandhi and her son Sanjay, as well as several Pakistani political leaders), Shame 
represents Pakistan’s politicos almost exclusively with pseudonyms.  In The Moor’s Last 
Sigh, however, Rushdie clearly returns to the world of the former novel, including Aadam 
Sinai, Saleem’s son, as a character of some small import, as the ultra-Westernized 
businessman/stepson of Abraham Zogoiby.  Mary and Alice Pereira are also mentioned 
in passing, as are the Sabarmati’s and Dom Minto, the private investigator who 
uncovered Lila Sabarmati’s affair. For further correspondences between the two books, 
see Moss (124-25). Likewise, Zeeny Vakil, the spokeswoman for cross-cultural 
translations in The Satanic Verses, makes several appearances in The Moor’s Last Sigh in 
her role as an art critic, bringing that former novel clearly into the fold of those sharing 
this fictional world.  The strategy of literalizing metaphor is not as pervasive in later 
novels like The Moor’s Last Sigh and The Ground Beneath Her Feet, but is deployed at 
times and is clearly evident in The Satanic Verses, in which Saladin Chamcha takes on 
the appearance of a devil, precisely because this is the metaphor commonly conferred 
upon the subcontinental immigrants into London, where the novel takes place.  In short, 
most of Rushdie’s major novels share a world, both in its deviations from the real laws of 
physics and in the personages that people it.  Indeed, in The Ground Beneath Her Feet,
several key historical events are self-consciously different from those in the real world: 
John F. Kennedy lives through the assassination attempt, Watergate is a novel, rather than 
an actual event, etc.  It is, I believe, worthwhile to investigate the reasons why such a 
shared world is necessary, and the rhetorical effect it has, whether intended or not.  
Rushdie himself comments on Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s fictional world of Macondo and 
stresses that it should not be seen as “an invented self-referential closed system” 
(“Gabriel García Márquez” 301-02).    He also points out the Garcia Marquez is not 
writing about a fantasy or science fiction world but “about the one we inhabit” (128).  
The same can be said about Rushdie’s work; he writes about another India in order to 
comment up his own.
24 Of course, there is in this the problematic relationship between the real author, 
the implied author, and the narrator.  Although the three seem coterminous here, Rushdie 
does note elsewhere that these autobiographical passages, although clearly meant to refer 
to him directly, are at times fictionalized to a degree.  “In Shame there’s no narrator.  It’s 
not narrated, except by me.  There is an ‘I’ figure in it which is me and occasionally says 
things.  And even that isn’t quite me because novelists, being sneaky people, will 
fictionalize even the bit that looks like autobiography” (Chauhan 29-30).  Rushdie’s 
typical simultaneous effort to insure real world reference, while pointing to its fictionality 
is clear in this case.
25 An interpretation of postmodernism like Brian McHale’s correlates the two 
approaches, poststructuralism and fictional worlds theory, by noting how the deployment 
of alternative fictional worlds, or even of different levels of framing diegeses, puts 
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ontology itself into question, questioning not only reference, but also existence itself   
That is, according to McHale’s logic, the skepticism towards historicity and 
representation present in a poststructural approach to a text like Midnight’s Children is 
largely spawned by the novel’s deployment of a fictional world in its capacity to displace 
our faith in the reality of our own world.  M. Keith Booker makes a similar claim, 
explicitly applying the idea to Rushdie’ work, when he says that “the theme of two 
contradictory realities occupying the same space is a favorite one in Rushdie’s fiction” 
and that “if two incompatible and contradictory alternative realities can occupy the same 
space, then clearly the very notions of ‘identity’ and ‘reality’ are called into question” 
(“Beauty and the Beast” 990).  For McHale, this is, at least partially, the function of 
postmodernist fiction.  My argument here is somewhat antithetical, as, like Walsh, I 
suggest that the use of the fictional world functions as a rhetorical commentary on our 
own, not as an intrinsic alert to our world’s ontological fragility. Rushdie himself has 
likewise commented upon the limited utility of both of these types of readings. In a 
conversation with Gunter Grass, Rushdie notes, “There are two bodies of thought at the
moment which would hold that politics is none of our business as writers.  There is [...] 
an attitude towards writing which says that it is somehow separate from these public 
issues, and ought to be separated from them.  And, on the other hand, you have the whole 
apparatus of post-modernist critique, which also, for very different reasons, seek to 
separate the text from the world.  So you have both a radical and conservative discourse 
suggesting that writers should not meddle in public affairs” (qtd. in Reder, Conversations
74).  I believe Rushdie’s admitted lack of first-hand experience with postmodern and 
poststructuralist discourse leads him to a reductive reading of this type of thought.  In 
particular his notion of postmodernism stipulating a text/world separation, rather than the 
construction of the world as text, betrays a lack of conversance with  poststructuralist 
theory.  He does, however,  point to some of the limitations of that discourse that I 
discuss here and throughout this study.
26 Although Riffaterre’s argument is useful to me here, I do disagree with his 
central claim, which I read as postmodernist at its most radically relativistic.  In his book, 
Riffaterre argues that, in fact, “truth” in fiction is defined completely by the coherence of
its inner system, along with how we read the external world like a fiction, with a similarly 
coherent system or metalanguage.   In this sense, the truth of a work has no relation to its 
reference to the real world: “Metalanguage remains the same whether it rests on actual 
referentiality or is an image of referentiality.  There is no formal difference between a 
metalinguistic reading of a text about accepted facts and that of a text whose contents are 
a figment of the author’s imagination (Riffaterre xv).  My point about history as a 
pretransformation text is precisely the opposite.  Rushdie, indeed, asks his readers to 
contribute to and acknowledge the world outside the text and his novels attempt both to 
represent it and comment upon it.  Riffaterre also argues that the transformation of truth 
into a metalinguistic question allows for the discussion of “general truths” or truths of the 
more metaphorical and universal variety.  In this, his thought reflects my above 
discussion of Rushdie’s insistence on truth in metaphor.  Rushdie’s simultaneous 
allegiance to historical referentiality is, however, abandoned by Riffaterre.
27 The structure of the novel does not completely adhere to these rules, of course.  
There are undoubtedly metaphors employed that are not experienced literally in the world 
435
of the novel.  However, theoretically speaking, the degree to which literalized metaphor 
is pervasively embedded in the novel serves the rhetorical purposes I describe.  Rushdie, 
however, is not above making fun of his own strategy, in particular in the episode in 
which Mary Pereira is disturbed and frightened by Nehru’s letter to the family, noting 
that he and the nation will be “keeping an eye” on Saleem.  Mary takes this metaphor 
literally and is fearful that Saleem and his family will be constantly watched.  Although 
this appears to be a moment for the reader to laugh at Mary’s naïvete, in the world of the 
novel, it is difficult to blame her for taking this figure of speech for a literal possibility.  
Finally, I do not wish to suggest here that Rushdie invents this mode of storytelling.  Its 
close relationship to allegory, a venerable literary genre, has been noted elsewhere (see 
Kuchta, Kortenaar, “Allegory of History” and Reder, “Rewriting History”) as has the 
similarity of Rushdie’s narrative strategy to precursors like Gabriel Garcia Marquez and 
Günter Grass.
28 For an alternative, and indeed diametrically opposed, interpretation of this 
passage, see M. Keith Booker’s “Beauty and the Beast” (243). Booker claims that 
Rushdie’s admitting of his lie invokes the (in)famous “liar’s paradox,” although my 
understanding of this paradox involves someone who claims to always lie (not who 
claims to lie just once as is the case here), thus invalidating his claim to be a liar.  If that 
claim is invalidated then he could be telling the truth about being a liar, etc.  In any case, 
Booker asserts that the reader, after reading this passage, will find it impossible to 
separate the true from the false, and because Saleem’s narration is tied so closely to 
history, historical discourse itself is likewise put into doubt.  While there is undoubtedly 
some truth to this interpretation, I believe it is also important to see how Saleem does 
indeed have an aversion to outright untruths, and that historical inaccuracies in the novel 
are either unintentional “mistakes” and flagged as such, or metaphorical interpretations 
which does not necessarily invalidate their truth claims.
29 Lieutenant Colonel K. M. Nanavati shot his wife’s lover on April 27, 1959 and 
then surrendered himself to the police.  Several appeals were denied and the case was 
something of a newspaper and tabloid sensation.  The Sabarmati affair is clearly (and has 
been acknowledged to be) based on the story of the Nanavatis.
30 His role in the shooting of Catrack is certainly greater than the one he plays in 
the death of classmate Jimmy Kapadia, whose death he dreamed on the night previous to 
its occurrence (297).
31 While Saleem continually asserts how his narrative is different from the kind 
Padma expects, citing linearity in particular, my own reading of the novel is that it is 
more linear that Saleem cares to admit.  Although there are elements of non-linearity, the 
main thrust of the narrative is unrelentingly linear, starting many years before the Indian 
Independence and Saleem’s birth, and proceeding through these formative events forward 
through the life of the nation and the protagonist.  In this way, Saleem does slowly fulfill 
the expectations of Padma’s “what-happened-nextism” (41).  Uma Parameswaran cites as 
elements of non-linearity, Rushdie’s employment of both Public Announcements 
(updates on contemporary events that parallel the novel’s story) and “periodic previews 
of events to come,” (38) wherein Saleem interjects brief versions of stories as yet untold 
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in their entirety, both whetting his readers’ appetite and providing a sense of 
foreshadowing.  Another element of non-linearity is the multitude of digressions, or tales 
that do not seem to fit comfortably within the central broader narrative (see note 4). 
These latter, however, are presented within the linear structure of the novel as a whole, 
perhaps not fitting into a rigid definition of plot, but certainly part of a chronological 
succession.  As I continue to explore throughout this chapter, Rushdie combines elements 
of linear and non-linear storytelling, just as he advocates for a combination of narrative 
and non-narrative strategies of historical representation.  David Carroll writes, “The 
novel must transcend its own language, its own linearity, and constitute a space in which 
linearity is simply an element” (145; see also Srisvastava 75).  While linearity is certainly 
an element in Midnight’s Children, it is an element often used to explore its own 
limitations, as the limitations of narrative in general are explored.  Timothy Brennan 
makes a compelling argument about Rushdie’s strategy of deploying the Koran (a non-
linear, relatively atemporal text) as a model for Shame and thus giving it something of a 
non-linear (and non-narrative style) (Salman Rushdie and the Third World 129-ff.).  This 
novel too, however, includes a linear development of recent Pakistani history
32 For the best account of the relationship between Midnight’s Children and the 
Arabian Nights, see Batty.
33  This interesting division of Saleem’s sister and his affections for her can 
perhaps be explained in the mode Jean Kane suggests.  If Jamila represents Pakistan as 
that part of India that has been lost, it makes sense that Saleem (India) has greater 
affection for her when she is part of him in his role as the nation, but the desire for 
repossession transforms affection into lust.  “Jamila, as Pakistan, becomes the missing 
and inaccessible part that Saleem, as India, incestuously desires to repossess” (Kane 111).
34 This is, in fact, the position taken by many critics.  Neil ten Kortenaar 
exemplifies this point of view when he argues, “the reader is free to prefer Shiva to 
Saleem as the mirror of India.  But the concern for order is valuable in and of itself, and 
we readers cannot but opt for order [Saleem] over chaos [Shiva].  There is no absolute 
reason to choose Saleem, but no reader will choose Shiva.  The historian offers order and 
narrative.  His enemy is the one who seeks only chaos” (“Allegory of History” 57).  This 
point of view is, of course, predicated upon the notion that Saleem represents order and 
narrative, while Shiva represents anti-narrative and chaos.  I argue throughout the rest of 
this chapter, that, in fact, both Saleem and Shiva represent both narrative and its non-
narratable opposite and that Rushdie wishes us to choose a combination of these elements 
in order to more accurately access historical reality and to fight for the future of the real 
world India.  While Saleem is, of course, the “hero” of the book, it is not quite correct to 
assign Shiva the role of villain.
35 In this essay, Rushdie critiques Indira’s efforts to mythologize the Emergency.  
Nevertheless, I believe it is important to note that it is not the process of mythologizing 
that Rushdie solely objects to, but the simultaneous production of lies.  
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36Again, there is some ambiguity in this case, as there are some remnants of magic 
and metaphor that remain behind.  However, symbolically, this is the moment that the 
novel’s world can begin to be seen as not only parallel to, but also touching, our own.
37 Included in this episode is yet another of Saleem’s errata, as it is Jajit Singh 
Aurora who accepts Niazi’s surrender, not General Sam Maneksaw, after all.  My reading 
of the scene is relatively unaffected by this error, however.
38 It is worth noting that the optimism that could be associated with the assignment 
of these attributes to Aadam Sinai is undercut somewhat by his reappearance as the 
ultimate representation of capitalism itself and its influence upon the east in The Moor’s 
Last Sigh.  Adam, the spelling of his name Westernized, departs from the novel into 
prison, convicted on a variety of counts including “corruption, drug-smuggling, arms 
dealing, money laundering, and procuring” (Moss 126; Moor’s Last Sigh 370).  As Laura 
Moss notes, “In the figure of Adam, Saleem’s metaphorical hope for the future of India is 
truncated” (126).  Indeed, some Marxist critics have interpreted Rushdie’s anti-Indira 
focus in Midnight’s Children as an implicit complicity with the capitalist West.  The 
withering critique of capitalism and its inherent bedfellow, organized crime, in The 
Moor’s Last Sigh, at the very least, complicates this criticism.  
39 One of the few critics who makes a brief attempt at an interpretation of this 
passage is Keith Wilson in “Midnight’s Children and Reader Responsibility.” Wilson 
notes the fact that the “seven inch” length of the turd matches the length of the hole cut in 
the perforated sheet that allows Dr. Aziz to see his future wife.  While Wilson calls this 
correspondence “suggestive,” he is a bit unclear as to what it suggests.  Perhaps both 
passages suggest a limited perspectivism as Saleem has, at this point, given up his claims 
to being a representative of India as a whole.  Nevertheless, Wilson does not explore the 
lure of the narratable that the umbrella-man’s turd evokes.
40 The pairing of the Widow (or the goddess Kali) and Parvati-the-Witch (or the 
goddess Parvati) establishes a similar parallel, as they too represent both creation and 
destruction when paired together.
41 For an interesting, extended discussion of this passage, see Price “Salman 
Rushdie’s Use and Abuse of History.”  Price notes how the incessant reminder that Indira 
Gandhi is not related to the Mahatma nevertheless serves to link them together not only 
in Midnight’s Children but in historical discourse in general.  Price’s broader point, that 
Rushdie’s novel serves to deconstruct the type of “monumentalist” history that attempts 
to deify contemporary politicians like Indira, may be undercut somewhat by Rushdie’s 
repetition of the (non)relationship of the two Gandhis.  That is, Rushdie makes Indira into 
something more than a mere individual, not only by asserting the non-relationship 
between Indira and the Mahatma, but also in the ominous construction of her as the more 
than human Widow.  For Rushdie’s own discussion of Indira’s opportunistic deployment 
of her last name, see “Dynasty” (50).
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42 Again, this objection of Rushdie’s takes greater prominence in some of his later 
books.  In particular, The Ground Beneath Her Feet satirizes the tendency of 1960’s rock 
stars to search for spiritual enlightenment in India.
43 Rushdie lingers on the film’s reception of the 1983 Academy Award, noting “If 
this is the Best Film of 1983, God help the film industry” (“Attenborough’s Gandhi” 
105).
44 Rushdie makes a similar case for his portrayal of the prophet Mohammed in The 
Satanic Verses in several interviews (see Chauhan).
45 Frank Kermode’s distinction between myth and fiction is useful in this case.  
Kermode suggests that fiction is always acknowledged as untrue in the conventional 
sense, while myth, although often more outlandish, is often seen as containing elements 
of truth or reality that are transhistorical: true in every era or location.  Rushdie never 
repudiates the possibility of the latter, but insists that it need not come at the expense of 
historical referentiality. That is accurate referential history and myth can themselves 
coexist (as they do in Midnight’s Children), despite Kermode’s claims that histories are 
fiction and History (as a concept; totalizing History) is itself a myth.  Hassumani also 
discusses Roland Barthes’s definition of myth and its relationship to Midnight’s Children
(32-33).  
46 For a similar account of the film, including Rushdie’s distaste for the 
“falsification of history,” see the 1983 interview with Salil Tripathi, reprinted in Reder, 
Conversations (28-29).
47 For a reading of Rushdie in some ways congenial to my own, but focusing on 
gender issues in Shame, see Anurandha Dingwaney Needham’s “The Politics of Post-
Colonial Identity in Rushdie.”  In particular, Needham points to Rushdie’s efforts at 
inclusive storytelling in an effort to subvert or oppose false versions of the past. 
Likewise, Rushdie himself has reiterated his affection for the “baggy monsters” of fiction 
in several other interviews (e.g. Chauhan 234).  It is, perhaps, inevitable to suggest that it 
is actually impossible to include everything, and that such a term as “all-inclusive” 
cannot help but be a misnomer.  This does not, however, change the fact that Rushdie 
both insists upon inclusive historical representation and presents just that, particularly in 
Midnight’s Children, while self-consciously pointing to areas he may have left out so that 
the reader can fill in the gaps themselves.
48 This is not to say that Kortenaar ignores the form of literalized metaphor.  
Rather, he discusses it prominently.  He does not, however, clearly see the parallels 
between the form of Rushdie’s novel and the function of Gandhi within Indian historical 
discourse.
49 That is, even when Saleem is elsewhere or otherwise occupied, he is sure to 
keep the readers (and Padma) up to date on the movements of conventional history 
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(military conflicts, regime changes, elections) through expository passages of varying 
lengths.
50 In this regard, Aamir Mufti’s brief reading of the novel (53-54) has much in 
common with my own more expansive treatment, particularly in Mufti’s focus on Shiva’s 
opposition to the third principle, and the novel’s specification of the limits to bourgeois 
historiography.  However, Mufti does not tease out all of the ramifications of this 
reading, particularly in regards to the novel’s historiographic materialism, principally 
because his focus is not Midnight’s Children, but The Satanic Verses.
51 In this case, it is worthwhile to note that while Saleem refers specifically to 
men, his fictional practice indicates not only an avowed feminism, but also a correlation 
between the position of the postcolonial subject and the position of women in general.  In 
this, my choice of Parvati-the-Witch as an exemplar of the untold stories that should be 
included in historical accounts makes a certain amount of sense.  Still, however, 
Rushdie’s deployment of gender politics and his general construction of women over the 
course of his oeuvre are contradictory and problematic.  For an excellent overview of 
Rushdie’s developing treatment of women and of feminism, see Ambreen Hai’s 
“‘Marching in from the Peripheries.’”  Hai focuses largely on Shame and The Moor’s 
Last Sigh, the two novels that most self-reflexively address the troubled relationship 
between India, its women, and Western feminism.  She does, however, also discuss the 
remainder of Rushdie’s major novels.  See also Ahmad, Gremal, and Mann on these 
issues.  
52 The conjunction of the ordinary and the extraordinary in Rushdie’s work takes 
on multiple incarnations.  While here I have been talking about the ordinary events and 
passage of everyday experience as opposed to the extraordinary and narratable grand 
events of traditional historical representation, Aruna Srisvastava discusses ordinary 
historical time and the extraordinary transcendental time specified by Gandhi.  Likewise, 
much discussion of magical realism devotes itself to the discussion of extraordinary 
events and circumstances told in an ordinary or straightforward manner, as in the case of 
Gabriel Garcia Marquez.  Saleem himself provides a description of this style when he 
writes, “Matter of fact descriptions of the outré and bizarre, and their reverse, namely 
heightened, stylized versions of the everyday — these techniques, which are also 
attitudes of mind, I have lifted — or perhaps absorbed — from the most formidable of the 
midnight’s children” (214).  At times, Rushdie partakes in this type of combination of the 
ordinary and the extraordinary but his narrator also, at times, expresses amazement at the 
metaphorical manifesting itself literally, as is the case when Saleem gains his powers of 
clairvoyance. See Laura Moss’s interesting discussion of magical realism in Rushdie, 
particularly in Midnight’s Children and The Moor’s Last Sigh, for a further examination 
of the ordinary vs. the extraordinary in these works. In particular, Moss notes how while 
the magical realist form may be a manifestation of optimism for the future in the earlier 
novel, the later novel parodies the form and thus reverses the utopian movement of 
Midnight’s Children.
53  Price’s assertion, unwittingly perhaps, reveals the problem of postmodernism 
for historical discourse.  Price’s essay is typical in its assertion of Rushdie’s efforts to 
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deconstruct, denaturalize, and ultimately devalue traditional, positivist accounts of 
history.  In doing so, however, he positions Rushdie as purely antagonistic towards a type 
of history that seeks to “preserve the ‘historical truth,’” favoring instead the mode of the 
artists who “explore the myriad dimensions of past experience” (104).  In ceding the 
former type of discourse, however, Price suggests indirectly that Rushdie cannot talk 
about or assert anything about historical accuracy.  It is thus a bit of a surprise when he 
suggests that Rushdie’s focus on the common and the everyday is somehow more 
accurate than some other types of history.  Price does qualify this claim by asserting that 
this view of accuracy is purely from Saleem’s perspective, but we would do well not to 
cede the discourse of accuracy to those with a naïve trust in transparent referentiality and 
see how even those with complicated and difficult views of historical representation may, 
and must, insist on some sense of accuracy in historical representation.
54 For a  similar argument on the relationship of truth, falsehood, and alternative 




Ethics, Universality, and Postmodernist Historical Fiction
Throughout this study, I have employed several implicit terms and assumptions 
that are open to significant contestation.  Indeed, they have been preemptively contested 
to such a degree that it hardly seems possible to reintroduce them.  Nevertheless, I 
believe, it is worthwhile to make some of these implicit assumptions explicit, if only to 
make the stakes of my argument more clear and to contest the foreclosure of an important 
discussion.  There are three major areas to address in this regard: 1) the use of terms like 
ethics, morality, and justice, 2) the exploration of notions of universality vs. notions of 
historical specificity as they relate to ethics, and 3) the specification of postmodernist 
historical fiction as a genre that expands to additional texts.  I will deal with each only 
briefly as a means of providing some initial explorations of the ramifications of this study 
as opposed to a comprehensive and thorough analysis of each of these areas that could, 
and perhaps should, generate their own full-length studies.
I have up to this point contended that the insistent invocation of the historical real 
by Woolf, Swift, and Rushdie has been based on the necessity of material referentiality 
for establishing both an ethics and a resistant politics.  I have only addressed the very real 
problem of defining ethics and the constellation of terms surrounding it tangentially, 
principally because I do not believe that the precise definition of ethics is easily 
established or within the primary purview of my argument.  The other terms, particularly 
“morality” and “justice,” pose similar problems, and as such, they too are worth 
exploring, if only briefly.  While the fastidious delineation of such terms may seem 
irrelevant to some, it carries significant importance to others struggling to oppose the 
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reinscription of hegemonic ideology where it has been, at least in the realms of critical 
and literary theory, on the run.
In this regard, the recent “turn to ethics” has met some significant resistance from 
the left, particularly as the ethics to be turned to has been regarded suspiciously as merely 
the return to the values of bourgeois patriarchy, whiteness, and heteronormativity so 
convincingly deconstructed by various poststructuralist-influenced schools of theory.  It 
is this fear that Judith Butler voices in “Ethical Ambivalence,” when she asserts, “I’ve 
worried that the return to ethics has constituted an escape from politics, and I’ve also 
worried that it has meant a certain heightening of moralism and this has made me cry out, 
as Nietzsche cried out about Hegel, ‘Bad air! Bad air!” (15).  Butler’s radically 
constructivist treatment of gender as performativity is, quite correctly, seen both by her 
and by others as a significant blow against patriarchal discriminations constructed on the 
basis of an inviolable biologism that conveniently constructs morality for both genders at 
the expense of women’s freedoms.  Similarly, as I discussed in the Introduction, the 
pseudo-scientific constructions of race that were the building blocks for a purportedly 
objective racism cannot remain in place when race is itself revealed as contingent and 
constructed.  Butler’s fear is that the notion of some kind of universal ethics introduces 
the possibility that any rigidly defined rules and codes will inevitably restrict someone’s 
freedoms of thought, action, and/or identity, and will perpetuate hegemony.  That is, any 
purported universal ethics is inevitably a particularist one that reflects hegemonic 
ideology.  While this may well be the case, reversing the relevant terms here reintroduces 
the necessity of ethics even in its repudiation.  That is, if we are to come to any 
conclusions about the necessity of opposing both the ideology and the deeds of 
longstanding hegemonies like bourgeois patriarchy, heteronormativity, whiteness, etc., 
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we can only do so from an ethical position that indicates that the “right” thing to do is to 
work against power as long as it exists. 
It is this reversal of terms that leads Butler, in this essay, to admit to some kind of 
ethical necessity and she, like many other poststructuralist theorists, when faced with this 
dilemma, turns to Levinas.  In doing so, Butler invokes Levinas’s definition of the ethical 
relation: 
The ethical relation is that of a passivity beyond passivity, one that 
escapes from the binary opposition of passive and active; it is an 
‘effacement,’ a ‘bad conscience,’ a primordial exposure to the Other, to 
the face of the Other, to the demand that is made by the face of the Other.  
“To have to respond to [the Other’s] right to be — not by reference to the 
abstraction of some anonymous law, some juridicial entity, but in fear of 
the Other.  My ‘in the world’ […] my ‘place in the sun,’ my ‘at 
homeness,’ have they not been the usurpation of the places belonging to 
the other man already oppressed and starved by me.” (Butler, “Ethical 
Ambivalence” 27, n2; see also Cohen 38).
The ethical relation, as defined here, bears a striking similarity to the Christian 
golden rule, as ethics, in this case, is defined almost completely by the subject’s relation
to someone else.  The substantial difference here is that whereas the “golden rule” 
dictates behavior (“do unto others”) this Levinasian ethics is defined by passivity and 
“recognition.”  It requires such a deep acknowledgment of the Other’s existence that guilt 
and fear seem to be the only response.  In the rarefied air of Theory, this definition of 
ethics seems useful, except when we realize that any delineation and adoption of such a 
theory within social praxis results in the kind of “juridicial entity” to which Butler is 
opposed.  That is, ethics is, by its nature, a desirable thing and therefore defining it, as 
Butler does via Levinas, functions as an injunction to follow that definition. The 
definition is an instruction on how to be ethical.  This injunction is a Law of sorts if it is 
to be taken seriously at all.  That is, the presumption made in the general “turn to ethics” 
444
is that ethics is worth defining precisely so that we can work on making both our attitudes 
and behavior ethical.  As such, the definition becomes an instruction, transforming the 
supposedly intensely interior experience of ethics into a social bond, if somewhat less 
constrictive than a formal Law.
In this case, the distinction that is commonly asserted between morality and ethics
is somewhat problematic, if not nonexistent.  Morality is linked in moral philosophy to 
justice, or “the right,” which is in turn based upon “redistribution.”   Ethics, on the other 
hand, is linked to “the good life,” or “the good,” which is, in turn, based upon 
“recognition” (see Fraser “Recognition without Ethics?” 97).  As such, “norms of justice 
are thought to be universally binding; they hold independently of actors’ commitments to 
specific values.  Claims for the recognition of difference, in contrast are more restricted.  
Involving qualitative assessments of […] relative worth, they depend on culturally and 
historically specific horizons of value” (Fraser, “Recognition” 97).  The distinction 
offered here is one between the universality of morality and the specificity of ethics.  
Within this context, however, the distinction is impossible to maintain, as whoever 
decides what is “universally binding” does so in a culturally and historically specific 
context, making its universality questionable.  Maintaining the distinction between 
morality and ethics does, however, have the advantage of allowing for a type of social 
interaction in which not all values held within a specific community are exported to 
another.  However, this advantage only functions if the values in question are defined as 
part of a community’s ethics and not part of their moral justice.  If they are defined in the 
latter way, and therefore as universal, imperialist exportation of values, or internal 
suppression of behavior becomes no less likely.  
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Again, however, the mere opposition I have just expressed to the imposition of 
one community’s values upon another is made from an ethical and, quite possibly, moral 
position in which such acts of cultural imperialism are defined as “wrong” (or bad) and a 
more egalitarian approach is defined as “right” (or good).  That is, any political stand of 
this kind is based on an ethics.  Even political decisions made for only economic reasons 
derive from an ethics that suggests that the economic frame of reference is the most 
important, however much someone with a different set of ethical principles may disagree.  
The impossibly subtle distinction between morality and ethics does not solve any of these 
hypothetical problems and certainly no real ones. 
In this, I agree with Nancy Fraser to the degree to which she denies the 
fundamental distinction between justice/morality and recognition/ethics, a denial that also 
begins to slowly erode distinctions between universality and specificity.  Her argument 
that injustice/immorality and misrecognition can both be ameliorated by participatory 
politics is also attractive, although not my primary concern.  What is central to my claims 
is that regardless of the types or numbers of participants in a society’s efforts to govern 
itself, it is impossible to arrive at a sense of justice or of ethics without looking at a 
society both as it currently exists and also how it has existed.  The observation must then 
be followed by an assessment of what types of behavior, attitudes, and laws are just, 
unjust, ethical, or unethical.  Certainly such decisions will be contingent upon the 
participants involved in the judging process, but the process of judgment, predicated upon 
material observation, is necessary regardless. 
In this light, implicit to all of the texts I have studied is the sense that the 
precondition for an ethical society is possible to establish.  This precondition is that of 
being able to observe, in its material existence, both the present and the past and to make 
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observations, even judgments, about them.  For Woolf, the precondition for arguing for 
an ethics of pacifism and of women’s social and political equality is based on an 
identification of injustices and inequalities in the history of Britain.  For Swift, working-
class history is an undeniable material fact, generating the ethical argument against its 
effacement.  Likewise, for Rushdie colonial domination and its reiteration and 
reenactment in Pakistani and Indian politics are observable facts that can only be opposed 
politically by identifying them as ethically, or morally, wrong.  The precondition for 
resistance is the identification of that which should be resisted: the immoral, the 
unethical, the unjust.
Derrida’s warning against the perils of justice in “Force of Law: The Mystical 
Foundation of Authority” is paradigmatic of the kind of aversion to the discourse of 
ethics and justice much poststructuralist thought evidences.  In this essay, Derrida 
exposes how justice is inextricable from its enforcement and is therefore always 
contaminated with “force” or “violence,” perhaps the essence of injustice.  Likewise 
“history” and “myth” are deconstructed as part of one another with both invoking both 
“divine violence,” or that violent which is without bloodshed, and also “foundational 
violence,” the traditional kind accompanied by plenty of bloodshed.  The inextricability 
of one from the other firmly establishes the danger of trying to establish justice through 
any kind of action, for any such action will be necessarily violent.  It is this kind of 
thinking that leads to the Levinasian invocation of passivity beyond passivity, for even 
pacifism, as justice, is a kind of violence.  It is also the kind of analysis that leads Slavoj 
Zizek to note that, within poststructuralist thought, “the moment one shows a minimal 
sign of engaging in political projects that aim seriously to change the existing order, the 
answer is immediately: ‘Benevolent as it is, this will necessarily end in a new Gulag’” 
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(“Class Struggle or Postmodernism?” 127).  While Derrida makes no such hyperbolic 
claims nor does he necessarily oppose justice in the abstract, it is the kind of political 
inference one can derive from his essay.  Like Zizek, then, I wish to insist upon the 
possibility of action even though there are undoubtedly dangers within it.  Included in 
this idea of action is the type of pacifism that Woolf advocates in Between the Acts and 
Three Guineas.  This is not passivity beyond passivity, but the kind of pacifism that 
defines an ethics and makes a judgment.  Likewise, I wish to insist upon the accessibility 
of experience even when the reference to experience is commonly denounced in similar 
ways as Derrida’s deconstruction of justice.
I do not suggest, in this, that one can ever be sure of what, in all circumstances, 
can be considered ethical, but ethics is a precondition for action, not an avoidance of it 
and as such, it is not inimical to politics as Butler initially suggests.  They are, rather, 
inextricably related, and morality, while a more tainted term if the “moral majority” is 
any example, is bound to them as well.  In all cases, however, the possibility, if not 
inevitability of maintaining the possibility of accessing and representing our past, as well 
as our present, is necessary for any discussion and delineation of these terms.  That is, a 
refusal of the possibility of accessing history is a simultaneous refusal of ethics and 
morality, an unacceptable refusal, certainly.  I do not wish, in this, to unlearn the lessons 
of poststructuralism.  The complication of linguistic reference, along with the revelation 
of ideology beneath seemingly naturalistic and transparent discourse is essential to the 
construction of ethics and morality, not inimical to it.  Zizek’s refusal to abandon either 
term of the either/or question of “Class Struggle or Postmodernism?” is useful here.  Like 
Groucho Marx, and perhaps Karl as well, Zizek responds to this question with “Yes, 
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please!” asserting a fundamental need for both sides of the equation even though the 
latter is based upon materiality and the former is based upon its dissolution.  
In typical postmodern fashion then, Joan Scott argues against any identification of 
“experience,” as such: “evidence of experience […] becomes evidence for the fact of 
difference, rather than a way of exploring how difference is established, how it operates, 
how and in what ways it constitutes subjects who see and act in the world” (25).  In 
response, it is necessary to note that the establishment of difference via discursive 
structures is itself an experience undergone by whole societies, and that evidence is 
needed to establish both the existence and the deployment of such structures.  The claim 
that referentiality is not transparent does not obviate the necessity of some kind of 
referentiality, however vexed, if we are to be able to analyze the structures Scott 
identifies.  All of the texts I have explored, then, take problems of reference extremely 
seriously, including their ideological and political repercussions.  At the same time, 
however, they refuse to deny the fundamental possibility of seeing the real within and, at 
times, beneath discourse, precisely because of their political commitment, which is, in 
turn based on ethics.
As noted above, where the separation of morality and ethics cannot be 
maintained, the opposition between universality and culturally situated specificity begins 
to crumble. Certainly, the struggle to deny universality in favor of specificity has proven 
to be just as problematic as the effort to transform the specific into the universal.  
Habermas’s insistence on the utility of the public sphere as a model for developing a type 
of universal ethics is contested by critics like Nancy Fraser (“Rethinking the Public 
Sphere”) who argues that the concept of the public sphere is already culturally specific, 
generated by the values of the white, middle-class, male Enlightenment.  She 
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concomitantly contends that any possibility for a functional ethics for the present moment 
must occur through the reconstruction of the public sphere to reflect that moment.  
Ironically, however, the result is a more universal conception of ethics, applying to more 
people of more diverse backgrounds, genders, classes, and races.  This more universal 
conception of ethics claims to be more specific in order to oppose a more limited 
conception that claims to be universal.  
In all of this, it is clear that ethics can have no meaning unless situated within a 
particular social and material context but can have no utility unless it is possible to 
transfer it to other equally specific contexts.  From that perspective, is worthwhile to 
follow the lead of a critic like Seyla Benhabib, who in Situating the Self, insists that 
universal values can be generated from within a particular cultural and social context and 
through the construction of a “generalized concrete other.”  (6).  Without necessarily 
subscribing to this concept in all of its particularities, it pinpoints the need for both 
specificity and universality, as well as some degree of referentiality.  Likewise, such 
universality can and must exist between times as well as spaces.  That is, all theorists of 
time note that the present is always fleeting.  For practical purposes then, we must be able 
to transfer the ethics of the past into the present because the present is simultaneously 
always and never available.  The capacity to transfer values, ethics, even observations 
implies, indeed demands, some degree of universality.  That is, while it is necessary to 
keep any delineation of ethics open to revision and discussion as the present moment 
dictates, it is also necessary that such a delineation last for more than just the “present,” 
or it will necessarily be gone before it is articulated.  
Woolf and Swift’s attempts to theorize the present in such a way as to make it 
both “matter” in the material sense and matter in the sense of significance reflect this 
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need.  That is, they insist that ethics can only be constructed through an observation of 
the real of the past and that that sense of the real can be transferred to the present, 
allowing the ethics generated from that observation to be applied in the now.  Neither 
suggests that such an observation is easy to accomplish, nor is the process of accessing 
the past in the present one of transparent reportage, but both authors do insist that it is 
both possible and necessary.  The transfer of lessons learned from the past to the present 
is not possible within a species of thought that is predicated only upon culturally situated 
specificity.  That is, all events, thoughts, and actions must have some component of 
transferability, or some degree of universality, just as they arise from and are constituted 
by specific historical and cultural situations.  Terdiman’s injunction to see memory as 
both reproduction and representation is again productive in this case because of its 
insistence on the possibility of bringing the past into the present.  Similar to the dialectic 
nature of memory (and history), ethics must be constituted dialectically both of 
specificity and universality.  The effort to isolate one from the other is more likely to lead 
to political paralysis than to productive action because no two times and places are 
precisely the same, even when separated by seconds, as opposed to days, weeks, months, 
or years.
The necessity for the capacity to transfer both observations about the world and 
construct a workable ethics based upon that observation does not, of course, guarantee 
that such reference is possible.  Rather, our needs rarely correspond precisely with reality.  
I do not then suggest that the texts studied here guarantee the possibility of reference but 
that they both insist upon it and offer new ways to think about reference that contribute to 
the discourse in important ways. The general theoretical hegemony of poststructuralism 
has led to the widespread interpretation of these texts as denying historical reference as 
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anything beyond construction.  These texts do not make such a denial. Instead they offer 
ways to approach the past to uncover its material reality that are productive and allow 
readers to see additional texts, both historical and fictional, in new ways.
Certainly both The Book of Laughter and Forgetting and Maus yield more than a 
desperate need to access the past when viewed through the prism of nonnarratability and 
anti-narrativity offered by Woolf, Swift, and Rushdie.  The Book’s refusal of a narrative 
that connects all of its parts can, for instance, be seen as a refusal of the unifying, 
thematizing, and meaning-generating capacities of narrative, while Maus’s occasional 
overlaying of images of the represented past of the death camps onto and in the same 
frame as the represented present in Rego Park indicate how the past and present are not as 
inviolably separate as some versions of constructivist historiography suggest.  In both of 
these approaches, a glimpse of the real is theorized.
In this, I do not wish to assert that all texts commonly labeled as postmodern 
insist upon a level of the historical real that both resists and precedes discourse, but that 
the homogenization of these texts has made this strain of thought difficult to see.  The 
expansive scope of a work like Linda Hutcheon’s A Poetics of Postmodernism gives a 
sense of sameness to the discourse of postmodernism that inhibits the analysis of the 
specificity of any one text.  My own expansive treatment of individual texts, on the other 
had, inhibits the analysis of the degree to which transferability from one text to others 
(and to the broader world) is possible.  Briefly, then, I wish to suggest that the ideas 
presented in these texts are relevant for other works of fiction that may, if analyzed more 
expansively, give further insights into the nature of historical reference.  
In, for instance, novels like Ian McEwan’s Atonement and A. S. Byatt’s 
Possession the majority of their “stories” are deeply textual, with the former evidencing a 
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wide cross-section of pastiches of literary styles and documents and the latter offering 
both family history and military history as a literary production of one of the main 
characters.  Both novels, however, reverse the common conception of postmodernism by 
revealing, at their conclusion, a level of truth and reality that the novel’s central narrative 
never offers.  In Possession, particularly, the “Postscript 1868” (552-55) offers an 
authoritative voice offering the truth of what happens, despite the fact that none of the 
novel’s narrators or textual authorities can possibly know about it.  In this, the materiality 
of history is suggested, even as it is subsumed within the narrative of the novel itself.
Other postmodern novels, like Jeanette Winterson’s Sexing the Cherry and Carlos 
Fuentes’s Terra Nostra offer theorizations or versions of time that refuse its conception 
as linear and progressive, denying the possibility that the past is inaccessible, as Swift 
does in Waterland.  Terra Nostra presents various historical and fictional eras 
simultaneously, suggesting not only a fictional world that comments upon our own, as 
Rushdie does, but also the possibility of bringing one time into contact with another.  
Also like Rushdie, Winterson asserts truths through the identification of lies, while 
simultaneously denying the nature of time as it is normally considered both within
Enlightenment and poststructuralist discourse.
Lies 1: There is only the present and nothing to remember.
Lies 2: Time is a straight line.
Lies 3: The difference between the past and the future is that one has 
happened while the other has not.
Lies 4: We can only be in one place at a time.
Lies 5: Any proposition that contains the word ‘finite’ (the world, the 
universe, experience, ourselves.  (90)
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While Winterson’s final two lies seem more in line with general conceptions of 
postmodernism, “Reality as something which can be agreed upon” and “Reality as truth” 
(90) neither denies either “reality” or “truth” as materially accessible.  Rather they are not 
equivalent, as Rushdie too suggests, and reality is never transparently evident.  The denial 
that time is a straight line and that there is only a present suggests the possibility of 
accessing the past, as does the strange reverse assertion that we can be in more than one 
place at a time.  The erasure of the distinction between past and future also indicates a 
continuity between them and an accessibility that is also indicated by a novel like D. M. 
Thomas’s The White Hotel, in which it is the future which continually “returns,” in the 
fashion of the Freudian past, as the Freudian narrative compulsion is simultaneously 
denied.
Likewise, Caryl Churchill’s play Cloud 9 functions, like Between the Acts, both as 
a denaturalization of hegemonic discourse in both present and past, and as the assertion 
of the possibility of accessing the materiality of both.  In particular, the embodiment of 
present and past subjects within the same actors suggests continuity and transferability as 
opposed to historical inaccessibility.  Gabriel García Márquez’s delineation of the banana 
massacre as a truth obscured by most traditional histories predicts the concerns of 
Rushdie in regard to the Emergency and the Amritsar massacre, while deploying many of 
the same narrative and non-narrative strategies.  Günter Grass’s The Tin Drum, Maxine 
Hong Kingston’s Woman Warrior, John Banville’s Doctor Copernicus, E. L. Doctorow’s 
Book of Daniel and J. M. Coetzee’s Foe likewise have varying degrees of dependency 
upon the historical past and the attribution of such dependency to the effort to deconstruct 
traditional histories may be reductive.  In particular, Grass’s allegiance to historical 
specificity and representation has led many to read him as a precursor to Rushdie, and to 
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read Rushdie as postmodernist historical fiction indicates how Grass may be read in 
similar ways.  
Even texts as strange and fanciful as Angela Carter’s The Infernal Desire 
Machines of Doctor Hoffman and Philip K. Dick’s The Man in the High Castle offer 
possibilities for accessing the real.  Carter’s thematization of narrative as desire, along 
with the death of Dr. Hoffman and the destruction of his desire machines, suggests the 
possibility again of a real beyond narrative.  Dick’s alternate history of a world in which 
the results of World War II are reversed installs the real within it, as the titular character 
is the one person in the book who has access to our own reality, writing a book in which 
the Allies do win the war.  The installation of an object that represents reality, like the 
Man’s book can also, perhaps, be seen in a novel like Julian Barnes’s Flaubert’s Parrot
in the figure of the parrot, while the 1/2 chapter in Barnes’s A History of the World in 10 
1/2 Chapters installs a belief in transhistorical “love” that exceeds the discourse that 
surrounds it.
It is not my contention that a close and expansive reading of each of these texts 
would reveal that they theorize the real in the same ways, or even that anti-narrativity 
would necessarily be the strategy deployed in each of them.  Rather, it is important to rely 
on their own specificity to discover what they can teach us about historical reference 
precisely because the capacity for historical reference is a necessity.  Hayden White’s 
assertion that an explosion of traditional narrative history is necessary for a full 
exploration of history’s aesthetic potential may be true, but it is also true that a variable 
and extensive approach to historical reference offers important possibilities for accessing 
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